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ABSTRACT
In 1988, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(ECA) celebrated its 30th anniversary amidst increasing demands from 
its member states that it should formulate and implement concrete and 
realistic programmes which give value for money, and that it should 
evolve a development philosophy and strategy reflecting African con­
ditions. This thesis evaluates and analyzes the role of the ECA 
covering the period 1958-88, on the basis of fieldwork conducted at 
the ECA’s headquarters and at one of its subregional offices in North 
Africa. Secondary materials were obtained from ECA documents, journals 
and books.
The argument is that the ECA has been unable to transform itself 
from a research-oriented institution into an operational one. The 
main proposition is that the ECA was unable to play a vital and effec­
tive role in development because of internal constraints. It has 
evolved as a complex bureaucracy without a clear mission, objectives 
and policies. Its scope of operations and strategies are shrouded in 
uncertainty. Furthermore, the demands for development have outstripped 
the capabilities of the Commission. As a result it has been of marginal 
concern to African states.
The study is in two parts. Part I consists of the introductory 
chapter; Chapter 2 examines the Commission’s structure and organization, 
work programmes and resources; Chapter 3 examines its intellectual 
contribution to the debate on development in Africa; Chapter 4 refers 
to one of its major strategies for regional co-operation and integration, 
while Chapter 5 is an historical analysis of its efforts to decentralize. 
Part II consists of Chapters 6-9, covering the ECA in West, Eastern and 
Southern, Central and North Africa. The conclusion (“Chapter 10) is 
unhappily pessimistic, namely that in its present form the ECA cannot 
play a meaningful role in development in Africa.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research was made possible by an award from the Commonwealth 
Scholarship Commission (UK) for the period 1985-1988. The fieldwork 
to Addis Ababa was funded through a travel grant of the University of 
London Central Research Fund (1986) and a Senior Award of the Gilbert 
Murray Trust Fund (1986). Part of the cost of typing the final draft 
was through another award - the Mountbatten Memorial Grant at LSE (1989)
Many individuals involved with the UN made their knowledge and 
experience available to me during the field trips, namely, Abdurrezak 
Ahmed; J.O. Aiyegbusi; Perla Assayag; Amina Bakhat; E. Gboloco Haward- 
Clinton; B.E. Ekatt ; 1.1. Ekanem; Mohammed El-Keeb; M.M. Mesomola;
Zelleka Haile; Toga Mackintosh; P.N.B. Nyangabyaki; A.L. Sengor;
J.C. Sengor; A. Tahir and G. Zelleke.
The following officials of the Nigeria Embassy (Ethiopia) made my 
stay a comfortable one - Regina Essiet; A.A. Yadam and the Rtd Major- 
General H.A. Hannaniya.
I am particularly grateful to Kate Ekanem; Mabel Ogbe; Francesca 
Alabi and Hilary Parker who typed the earlier drafts, and to Marianna 
Tappas who did the final draft.
Many thanks to my cousins Edemanwan I. Henshaw; Mary Amissah;
Rose Amissah; Margaret B. Usen; Joseph B. Usen; Anwa E. Ekpenyong;
Ekei U. Ekpenyong (Jnr) for all their encouraging letters and cards.
My thanks also go to the Hon. Justice and Mrs. J.B. Amissah;
Mr* I.G.D. Henshaw; Mr. and Mrs. K.W.B. Amissah; Mr. and Mrs. M.M.B. 
Usen; Mr. and Mrs. E.A. Norris; Mr. and Mrs. A. LongJohn; Mr. and Mrs.
S. Ero; Mrs. U. Eke; Justine and Ken Gbeve; Kate and Paul Kodjokuma;
Miss M.E.A. Ogbebor; and Destiny A. Iyoha, for their financial and 
moral support.
I am indebted to my husband, John 0. Etim, for his love and en­
couragement, for typing earlier drafts and for paying for a couple of 
chapters to be typed.
My twin step-daughters, Affiong and Nko Etim, have been very 
patient and are behaving very well at home and at school. I appreciate 
that.
To my three brothers - Esien E. Ekpenyong; Edem E.E. Ekpenyong 
and Umo N. Ekpenyong, I wish to say I love you all.
I remain grateful to my father, Mr. E.O. Ekpenyong, who encouraged 
me and made all the necessary arrangements and payments for the earlier 
part of my education in the UK and later lost all interest in my affairs 
and to his brother, Chief E.U. Ekpenyong, who has remained a mystery to 
my existence.
Many thanks to His Eminence Archbishop David Makambi of the World 
Evangelical Church and International Leader of the Redeemed Churches, 
for his continuous prayers and effort towards my spiritual development.
- 4 -
But most important of all, I am grateful to my supervisor, 
J.B.L. Mayall, for all the long hours of reading and discussions, 
his patience and recommendations to the awards and travel grants 
institutions.
- 5 -
DEDICATION
To
Mrs. E.B.Henshaw, (Mum I) 
and
Mrs. H.B. Ekpenyong, (Mum II) 
for giving me a better future
- 6 -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ..........................................................  2
Acknowledgements .................................................  3
Dedication ........................*............................... 3
LIST OF TABLES, MAPS AND FIGURES..... ............................  9
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................ 11
INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 13
PART I : ECA1 S APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT ......................... 22
CHAPTER 1 THE ECA: HISTORY, MEMBERSHIP, RELEVANCE AND AFRICAN
ECONOMIC CRISIS .....................................  23
1. Introduction ..................................................  23
2. The History of the ECA ....................................... 25
3. Membership ....................................................  33
4. The Relevance of the ECA ....................................  37
5. The African Economic Crisis: An Overview .................... 47
6. Conclusion ....................................................  59
CHAPTER 2 STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION, LEADERSHIP, RESOURCES
AND WORK PROGRAMMES OF THE ECA ......................  64
1. Introduction ..................................................  64
2. Structure and Organization.....................................  64
3. Leadership of the ECA ........................................ 74
4. Financial and Manpower Resources ...........................  82
5. a. Work Programmes of the ECA ........................... 94
b. PADIS as an Example of a Concrete Programme ............  101
6. Conclusion ...................................................  109
CHAPTER 3 ECA AND THE DEBATE ON DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA ....... 117
1. Introduction ..................................................  117
2. African Economic Crisis and the ECA's Response ..............  121
3. ECA and the Evolution of Ideas on African Development .... 126
- 7 -
4. The Lagos Plan of Action: What Strategy for Africa? .....  139
5. Conclusion ...................................................  150
CHAPTER 4 ECA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING .....................  157
1. Introduction .................................................  157
2. The Reasons for and ECA’s Approach to Institution Building 158
3. Categories and Objectives of ECA-Sponsored Institutions .. 164
4. ECA’s Assistance to and Problems Facing its Institutions . 169
5. Conclusion ...................................................  181
CHAPTER 5 THE DECENTRALIZATION OF THE ECA TO THE SUBREGIONS 186
1. Introduction .................................................  186
2. Reasons for Decentralization ...............................  187
3. Phases of Decentralization .................................  193
4. Conclusion ...................................................  217
PART II : ECA IN THE SUBREGIONS .....................  221
CHAPTER 6 ECA IN WEST AFRICA: THE NIAMEY MULTINATIONAL
PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE (MULPOC) ...... 222
1. Introduction .................................................  222
2. Salient Features of West Africa ............................ 222
3. Niamey MULPOC: Structures, Organs, Financial and Manpower
Resources ..................................................... 227
4. Niamey MULPOC: Work Programmes ............................. 243
5. The Peculiar Problems in the Subregion and ECA's Response . 253
6. Conclusion ..................................................  271
CHAPTER 7 ECA IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE LUSAKA
MULTINATIONAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE 
(MULPOC) .............................................  277
1. Introduction .................................................  277
2. Salient Features of Eastern and Southern Africa .......... 278
3. Structures, Organs, Financial and Manpower Resources ....  286
- 8 -
4. Lusaka MULPOC: Work Programmes ............................  293
5. The Peculiar Problems in the Subregion and ECA's Response 306
6. The PTA: History, Structure and Organs, and Problems .....  307
7. Conclusion ....................   317
CHAPTER 8 ECA IN CENTRAL AFRICA: THE YAOUNDE AND GISENYI
MULTINATIONAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRES 
(MULPOCs) ...................................  324
1. Introduction .................................................  324
2. Salient Features of Central Africa .......................... 325
3. The Yaounde MULPOC - Central Africa I ......................  327
a. Structures, Organs, Financial and Manpower Resources . 327
b. Yaounde MULPOC: Work Programmes ........................  335
4. The Gisenyi MULPOC - Central Africa II .....................  342
a. Structures, Organs, Financial and Manpower Resources . 347
b. Gisenyi MULPOC: Work Programmes ........................  351
5. The Peculiar Problems in the Subregion and ECA’s Response 362
6. Conclusion ...................................................  363
CHAPTER 9 ECA IN NORTH AFRICA: THE TANGIER MULTINATIONAL
PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE (MULPOC) .....  369
1. Introduction ................................................ 369
2. Salient Features of North Africa ..........................  371
3. Tangier MULPOC: Structures, Organs, Financial and Manpower
Resources ...................................................  386
4. Tangier MULPOC: Work Programmes ..........................  392
5. The Peculiar Problems in the Subregion and ECA’s Response 402
6. Conclusion ..................................................  408
CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION .........................................  416
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................... 438
APPENDICES ....................................................... 456
- 9 -
LIST OF TABLES, MAPS AND FIGURES
Table 1.1 Actual and Projected Sub-Saharan African Debt-
Service Ratios (per cent) ......................... 51
Table 1.2 Basic Indicators ...................................  53
Table 2.1 Organizational Changes of the ECA Secretariat ... 66
Table 2.2 Comparative Budget Situation for the Regional
Commissions 1980-1983 .............................  83
Table 2.3 Status of UNTFAD ...................................  85
Table 2.4 ECA Staff 1960-1968 ...............................  88
Table 2.5 Progress in Implementation of Phase II Programme
1987   100
Table 4.1 Classification of ECA-Sponsored Institutions,
Dates Established, Geographical Coverage and 
Functions ..........................................  165
Table 4.2 Estimated UNDP Funding for ECA-Sponsored
Institutions (1982-1986)   172
Table 4.3 Financial Standing of ECA-Sponsored Institutions 179
Table 5.1 Staff Resources 1966-1968   197
Table 5.2 Staff Resources 1968-71   198
Table 5.3 Organizational Chart of Subregional Offices of
ECA 1971-1975   199
Table 5.4 Proposed Staffing of the MULPOCs through the
Regular Budget of the UN .......................... 213
Table 6.1 Area, Population and Density of the West African
Subregion in 1980   226
Table 6.2 Summary of Niamey MULPOC Cost Structure 1978-1980 235
Table 6.3 Available or Required Resources from Funding
Sources (US$)   238
Table 6.4 Date of Creation and Composition of West African
Inter-governmental Organizations ................. 254
Table 6.5 IGOs with Activities in the Sector ...............  260
Table 6.6 The West African Inter-governmental Organization
and their Membership ..............................  262
Table 7.1 Statement of Contributions to the Clearing House
Budget as at 30 September 1987     313
- 10 -
Table 7.2 PTA Tariff Reductions .............................. 314
Table 8.1 Estimated Resources Gap Assuming Current UNDP
Funding Levels (US$) - Yaounde ...................  331
Table 8.2 Estimated Resources Gap Assuming New UNDP Ear­
markings (US$) - Yaounde .......................... 331
Table 8.3 Estimated Resources Gap Assuming UNDP Funding
Levels (US$) - Gisenyi ............................  348
Table 8.4 Estimated Resources Gap Assuming Proposed New
UNDP Ear-markings (US$) - Gisenyi ................ 348
Table 9.1 Basic Economic Indicators for North Africa (1985) 376
Table 9.2 Foreign Trade (1985)   380
Table 9.3 Selected Data ....................................... 384
Map 1 The Distribution of MULPOCs in Africa ............ 207
Map 2 General Reference Map of West Africa .............  223
Map 3 The Map of North Africa ...........................  374
Figure 1 Secretariat of the ECA ............................. 67
Figure 2 Proposed Framework for Economic Integration in
West Africa ........................................  268
- 11 -
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AAC African Association of Cartography
AATPO Association of African Trade Promotion Organization
ACC Administrative Committee on Co-ordination
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries)
ACMAD African Centre of Meteorological Applications for
Development
ADB African Development Bank
AIHTTR African Institute for Higher Technical Training and
Research
APPER African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery
ARCC African Regional Co-ordinating Committee
ATRCW African Training Research Centre for Women
BADEA* Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
BLS Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland
CADIS Central African Development Information System
CEAO Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l ’Ouest
CEPGL* Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
CPC Committee for Programme and Co-ordination
EAC East African Community
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECA Economic Commission for Africa (UN)
ECE Economic Commission for Europe (UN)
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (UN)
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (UN)
ECWA Economic Commission for Western Asia (UN)
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(UN)
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FLS Front Line States
IBAR Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDEP African Institute for Economic Development and Planning
LAS League of Arab States
LDCs Least Developed Countries
* French acronym
- 12 -
LPA Lagos Plan Action
MRU Mano River Union
MULPOC Multinational Programming and Operational Centre
NADIS North African Documentation and Information Centre
NIEO New International Economic Order
OAU Organization of African Unity v
OCAM Organization Commune Africaine et Maurici-enno
PADIS Pan-African Documentation Information System
PAID Pan-African Institute for Development
PCCM Permanent Consultative Committee of the Magreb
PTA Preferential Trade Area
RCSSMRS Regional Centre for Services in Surveying, Mapping and
Remote Sensing
RECTAS Regional Centre for Training in Aerospace Surveys
RIPS Regional Institute for Population Studies
SACU South African Custom Union
SADCC Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SALC Southern African Labour Commission
TAZARA Tanzania-Zambia Railway
TEPCOW Technical Preparatory Committee of the Whole
UDEAC Union Douaniere et Economique de l’Afrique Centrale
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDATs United Nations Inter-disciplinary Develoment Advistory
Teams
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization
UNTFAD United Nations Trust Fund for African Development
UN-PAAERD United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic 
Recovery and Development
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WADIS West African Rice Development Association
WHO World Health Organization
WMO World Meteorological Organization
WTO World Tourism Organization
- 13 -
INTRODUCTION
The central argument of the thesis is that the ECA has been 
unable to transform itself from a reasearch-oriented institution to an 
operational one. It has been unable to play a vital and effective role 
in development because of internal constraints. The Commission has 
evolved as a complex bureaucracy without a clear mission, objectives 
and policies. Also its scope of operations and strategies are shrouded 
in uncertainty. Finally, the demands for development have outstripped 
its capabilities. As a result, it has been of marginal concern to 
African states.
For the past three decades African governments have been debating 
about how best to solve their development problems. They want solutions 
indicating the best ways and means of utilizing their financial, manpower, 
natural and mineral resources to attain development. Development is 
defined as a multi-dimensional process which results in industrialization, 
urbanization, provision of basic amenities and infrastructures and an 
overall better standard of living of the people. The challenges of 
development remain intense and the governments are under pressure to 
eradicate mass poverty, unemployment and inflation. They are also expected 
to diversify their economies to reduce vulnerabilities in the world 
markets for commodities which they export.
The failure of past development strategies and the fact that there 
is no end in sight for the numerous economic ills in Africa has made 
the task of governing a daunting experience. For the people have come 
to depend on the government for their well-being. They see political 
independence opening the path to the attainment of prosperity and wealth. 
The search for solutions and the urge to satisfy such expectations and
- 14 -
aspirations have led governments and scholars to look far and wide. 
African governments are pursuing development objectives on three 
levels. Globally, there are negotiations and debates through Inter­
national Organizations such as the UN, IMF and the World Bank. There 
are also bilateral agreements between the government and the industri­
alized nations. On the regional level, these are conducted through 
the OAU and ECA and through other bodies such as ECOWAS and SADCC.
At the national level, development is co-ordinated with the help of 
national development plans and major policies such as the structural 
adjustment policies. It is difficult to state the level that is more 
important or effective, except to say that all the levels are inter­
related and the processes are taking place at one and the same time. 
Increasingly too, African governments are trying to exploit the 
opportunities and benefits they derive from international bodies such 
as the UN. They now want value for money from the subscriptions they 
make. In the case of the ECA they are questioning its objectives and 
programmes.
What has the ECA done so far? According to Asfour (1960),^ the 
ECA has been able to establish itself as a focal point where the 
economic needs of the African people can be expressed and where action 
designed to meet the needs can be initiated. It was a sort of clearing 
house for the exchange of information and experience.
2
Magee (1970) studied the role of the ECA and concluded that it 
encountered two major problems. Externally, the problems included 
the sovereignty issue, Anglophone-Francophone frictions, Africanization 
of its staff and its clash with the OAU. On another level, the manner 
in which the UN system was stacked against it affected its search for 
a role. It was practically impossible to inject the ECA's regional
- 15 -
approach into the UN system’s decision-making processes. The
specialized agencies, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs
of the UN headquarters, were all organized along functional lines.
"The ECA to some extent has fallen into the very pattern that it
criticizes. Its various divisions, while frequently critical of the
functional, or sectoral stress in the rest of the UN system have not
overcome temptations of functional organization. Each bureau often
goes its own way, and internal agreements within ECA on priorities and
3
planning are not always forthcoming." He concluded that, "given the 
political power of functional organizations and the apparent intracta­
bility of African political rivalries, the future of regionalism in
4
Africa, and, therefore, of ECA is not promising."
Gruhn (1979)^ stated that the ECA has found it exceedingly 
difficult to win legitimacy as a kind of African institution in the 
eyes of its African clients. Also, "the ECA has been hesitant to 
choose a central emphasis in its work programmes ...." She concluded 
that "ECA's ability to fully realize its potential as a central voice 
in African economic development in the years to come may well rely in 
large measure on its willingness and ability to make some hard choices 
from amongst its many roles and functions and to develop its future 
work programmes in accordance with those choices."^
Over the years, African governments have expressed dissatisfaction 
on the roles and activities of the Commission. His Excellency Daniel 
T. Arap Moi was convinced that it was time for the ECA to "move away 
from an institution of theoretical studies to one of political action,
g
for concrete and meaningful development of the continent."
9
Mmusi (1983) concluded that, during the decades ahead, food 
production and the supporting of economic activities must receive top
- 16 -
priority in the work programme of the ECA.
Rawlings (1983)^ suggested that it was imperative on the inter­
national plane that the Commission should use its expertise and valuable 
data to advance action-oriented proposals within the framework of a 
well-defined analysis and strategy of development based on African 
needs and interests.
Diouf (1983)^ appealed to the ECA to help in identifying the 
areas in which co-operation is possible and can rapidly be put into 
practice.
The terms of reference of the ECA stipulate that its main role
12
is to promote economic and social development. But its relations 
with its member states are voluntary and it cannot undertake any action 
with respect to any country without the prior consent of the latter.
Against this background, the thesis evaluates and analyzes the 
role of the Commission with special reference to its promotion of 
regional economic co-operation. Why its limited success? And why 
was it of marginal concern to African governments?
The research covered the period 1958-1988. It enables us to 
examine its activities over a reasonable period of time and allows for 
the assesssment and documentation of its evolution, bearing in mind 
that 1975-1985 depicted an era which was the most challenging and 
dynamic phase in its development. It was also the period when Africa 
faced severe economic crisis which led them to make higher demands on 
the ECA than in previous times.
For the evaluation, the following assumptions were made:
(a) That the Commission was providing valuable services;
- 17 -
(b) That its activities and programmes contribute to the raising of 
the standard of living of the African people;
(c) That the ECA was a vital forum for the exchange of ideas and 
information on development.
Hypothetically, there were five major constraints responsible 
for its marginality which were as follows:
(1) The peculiar status of the ECA as an arm of the UN;
(2) The lack of financial and manpower resources;
(3) The inadequacies in its organization, structures, policies and
strategies were responsible for its ineffectiveness and the lack 
of participation of the member states in its programmes;
(4) The Commission did not have organs for the co-ordination, 
execution and monitoring of projects;
(5) The programmes took no account of the development priorities of
the states.
To test the hypothesis, the study examines the structures, 
organization, resources and work programmes of the Commission at both 
the continental and subregional levels. The various objectives and 
strategies were also considered at both levels.
Fieldwork was conducted at the ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, and at the Multinational Programming and Operational Centre 
(MULPOC) in Tangier, Morocco. Although there are five MULPOCs in 
existence, there is no reason to believe that visits to the other four 
would have yielded different results since all their activities, finance, 
administration, personnel and implementation of programmes were organized 
and controlled by the headquarters. Also since 1986/87 most of their
- 18 -
programmes have been suspended until such a time that funds could be 
found for their implementation. Their roles have, therefore, been 
reduced to routine activities such as organizing the annual meetings 
of the policy organs. The fieldwork was augmented with publications 
of the ECA, statements and speeches of African Heads of State and 
Government, articles in journals, newspapers, books and also corres­
pondence from ECA officials and other related institutions.
The study is in two parts. Part I, which is entitled ’The ECA’s 
Approach to Development’, deals with the roles and relevance of the 
Commission; its structures and resources, and also its development 
ideas and strategies. The evaluation refers to the work of the ECA 
on the continental level. Part II, entitled, 'The ECA in the Subregions', 
deals with the Commission at that level. The key to success depended 
on how effective it was at this level. It also depended on whether it 
understood the peculiar problems in each area and applied positive 
remedies. But the findings were that the ECA was less effective and 
had little impact in North Africa. Also the same set of internal 
constraints such as inadequate financial and manpower resources, 
administrative bottlenecks and unrealistic programmes, affecting the 
headquarters were present in the subregions. Because the Commission 
was inefficient in the subregions, its overall image, influence and 
impact were minimal. The conclusion is that in its present form the 
ECA cannot play a meaningful role in development. Its failure was 
attributed to the fact that it was an arm of the UN system.
It is hoped that this study will be of interest to scholars in 
Development Studies, Area Studies, International Organizations and 
International Relations as a whole. Also African development planners 
and officials of the UN specialized agencies should find the information
- 19 -
useful. The academically inclined officials of the ECA were eager to 
encourage this research because they pointed out that there were debates 
on how best to re-structure the Commission to give it a more positive 
image. They also remarked that it was a long time since scholarly work 
was done on the ECA, with none on aspects of the MULPOCs, which have 
been in existence since 1978.
Since the research is an evaluation work concerning the role of 
the Commission, a few definitions to clarify terms become vital. The 
role prescription includes the pattern of behaviour expected and the 
functions, duties, authority and responsibilities assigned to it. The 
structure of an organization deals with the coupling of roles, 
programmes and the flow of information and authority. It is 
important to note that in carrying out its role, the leadership and 
professional staff used programmes and activities to determine the 
mission, objectives, policies and strategies. In evaluating the past 
performance of the ECA, these aspects are not so clear-cut and so it 
is sometimes difficult to distinguish them with precision, but none­
theless, evaluation cannot proceed effectively without knowledge of 
these elements and how they are interrelated. There are common threads 
which have been traced through many of the statements by African 
governments and the ECA alike on the various aspects.
Programmes are defined as generalized activities that are used 
in response to perceived development needs. They are implemented in 
favour of the member states. There are also activities which pertain 
to the Commission itself such as its annual meetings and representation 
to the General Assembly. It also plays hosts to meetings of the OAU 
and other inter-governmental institutions.
The policy formation process involves the decision-making procedures
- 20 -
which have evolved over the years with wide ramifications. Policies 
refer to broad guidelines for programme managers, supervisors and 
staff for the achievement of objectives. For example, the Commission 
promotes regional economic co-operation. This policy is closely 
related to the principle of the Lagos Plan of Action which aims at 
the creation of an African Common Market by the year 2000. The policy 
also formed thfbasis for the Commission's role in institution building, 
its promotion of regional economic groupings such as ECOWAS, and efforts 
to decentralize to the subregions.
Strategies are broad instruments or means for action. They have 
also been viewed as major actions used for the attainment of set goals.
Some of them have been planned in advance such as the move to set up
a PTA in North Africa scheduled for 1990 (the PTA is viewed as an 
institutional framework for the promotion of trade and economic co­
operation among the states), while others have emerged over time based 
on ad hoc decisions. A good example is the strategy of establishing 
institutions for regional co-operation.
The term mission is used to describe the scope of operations with
reference to services, activities and programmes. The objectives, on
the other hand, are results and targets. These are both 
specific and general as borne out in the chapters. The policy organs 
perceive, analyze and choose alternative missions, goals and strategies.
- 21 -
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CHAPTER 1
THE ECA: HISTORY, MEMBERSHIP, RELEVANCE 
AND AFRICAN ECONOMIC CRISIS
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to look at the history, member­
ship and relevance of the ECA. There is also an outline of some of 
the economic problems facing African states. This is then followed 
by a summary of the ECA's strategy and approach to solving the problems. 
As stated in the literature review in the introduction, the member 
states have increasingly been criticizing the Commission for what it 
has done and they have made suggestions about what it should have been 
doing. In the light of these we ask the following questions:
(a) What is the role of the ECA? (b) Who are its member states?
(c) What economic and social problems do they face? And lastly,
(d) Why are they dissatisfied with the Commission?
Throughout its existence, the ECA has been trying to define its 
role in development and it has experienced difficulties. There are 
three main reasons for this. Firstly, problems originated from its 
status as an arm of the United Nations. The terms of reference 
indicate several possibilities of what it can do - such as collection 
of data and analyzing the results, surveys, publication of annual 
reports and bulletins and the conduction of seminars and workshops.
But there was no ordering of priorities or specific emphasis on 
aspects deemed more vital for the members. Its programmes are too 
broadly based, even when some states like the LDCs have peculiar needs
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requiring special attention. But the ECA is not alone, as all the 
regional commissions have similar structures and scope of activities.
Secondly, the degree of the economic crisis, the scale on which 
it has occurred and its persistent nature, further highlights the fact 
that the ECA will experience difficulties if it wants to play a positive 
and leading role in either solving them or in initiating the kind of 
change in development which Africa needs so badly. The Commission has 
developed into a complex bureaucracy which makes for difficulties in 
adjusting to changes in the economic conditions of the states. For 
example, the states have given self-sufficiency in agriculture top 
priority in their efforts to improve the standard of living of their 
populations, but the ECA programmes do not reflect this emphasis.
Finally, even though the basic aim of all the regional economic 
commissions was to assist in raising the level of economic activity in 
their respective regions and to maintain and strengthen the economic 
relations of the countries in each region, both among themselves and 
with other countries of the world, none was equipped with the necessary 
organs to allow them to implement project-oriented activities. By 
project we mean an activity with clear objectives and goals, which also 
has net value added, that is, that it must contribute to the national 
income of the respective states. It should also be possible to do a 
cost-benefit analysis and other forms of evaluation and we should be 
able to assess whether it contributes towards upgrading the physical 
living conditions of the people. By requesting projects rather than 
the general programmes offered, the member states were making demands 
which questioned the purpose of the Commission.
2. THE HISTORY OF THE ECA
In carrying out the pledge in Article 55 of the Charter 'to 
promote a higher standard of living, full employment and conditions 
of economic and social progress and development’, the United Nations 
created the five regional commissions and specialized agencies. The 
legal basis for the establishment of the regional economic commissions 
rests on two provisions of the Charter. These were Article 62(1) 
which provides, among other things, that ECOSOC ’may make or initiate 
studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, 
cultural, educational, health and related matters’, and Article 68 
which authorized ECOSOC to set up commissions in economic and social 
fields and for the promotion of human rights and such other commissions 
which may be required for the performance of its functions . ^
The origin of the first three regional commissions established 
may be traced to the United Nations' concern in 1946 with the 
reconstruction of war-devastated areas and other urgent economic 
problems arising from the war. Acting on a resolution of the General 
Assembly of 2 February 1946, ECOSOC established on 21 June 1946 a 
Temporary Sub-Commission on Economic Reconstruction of Devastated 
Areas (which was a part of the Economic and Employment Commission) to 
examine the nature and scope of the economic reconstruction problems 
of those countries which faced the great and urgent task in this field. 
The Sub-Commission divided itself into two working groups - one for 
Europe and North Africa and the other for Asia and the Far East.
On examining the reports of the two groups and in responding to 
General Assembly resolution 46(1) of 11 December 1946, the ECOSOC 
established the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the Economic
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Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE, now ESCAP), respectively, 
by its resolution 36(v) and 37(iv) of 28 March 1947. These resolutions 
also laid down their terms of reference, which are quite similar for 
all the commissions and will be outlined later. On 11 August 1947, 
the Council, by another of its resolutions - 70(v) - established the 
third commission - the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, 
now ECLAC); and, by its resolution 72(v) requested the Economic and 
Employment Commission to examine and report to the Council on the 
general questions involved in the creation of the commissions as a 
means for the promotion of the aims and objectives of the United Nations. 
The Council noted that the Temporary Sub-Commission on Economic Re­
construction of Devastated Areas had not reported on the reconstruction 
problems of North Africa and Ethiopia. After taking note of this, the 
Temporary Sub-Commission terminated its activities.
Once the three commissions were established, ECOSOC lost the
momentum for establishing the rest. It can be said that the ECA had
an uneasy birth, following years of pressure for it to be established.
The first initiative to establish it was made on 11 March 1947, when
the representative of India introduced a draft resolution in ECOSOC
for the establishment of a special economic commission for North Africa
and Ethiopia, but no action was taken. In 1950, when the request was
repeated, the majority of the members of ECOSOC "thought that the
establishment of such a commission would be premature, as it could be
established only with the agreements of the principal governments in
the area and the representatives of the governments administering the
2
territories in Africa were not in favour of such action". Instead, 
the UN Secretariat was requested to prepare a review of economic 
^conditions in Africa. Subsequent requests, in 1951 and in 1956, were 
also turned down by ECOSOC.
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The question was raised again by Ghana at the twelfth session
of the General Assembly in 1957 during the debate in the Assembly’s
Second (Economic and Financial) Committee. It was argued that African
countries needed an organ which would help assemble information on its
economic problems and to promote concerted action to solve them and
help expediate economic development. The Assembly was urged to
give some thought to the possibility of establishing a United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa in the near future. The suggestion was
supported by representatives of six countries and the discussion resulted
3
in the introduction of a draft resolution on the subject by 29 sponsors. 
It recommended ’’that for the purpose of giving effective aid to countries 
and territories of Africa and in accordance with Article 68 of the 
Charter of the UN, ECOSOC should at its next session give prompt and
4
favourable consideration to the establishment of the ECA".
Those holding a contrary view, for example, Belgium and the United 
Kingdom, claimed that Africa was not a homogeneous region and that a 
commission might not be able to cope with the complexities of the 
continent.^ The General Assembly finally approved the draft resolution 
unanimously on 26 November 1957 as resolution 1155(xii). This was 
perhaps the first time when the United Nations had to state as its 
reason for establishing a regional commission the giving of "effective 
aid to countries and territories". In the equivalent resolution for 
ECAFE it had been sufficient to request that ECOSOC should "at its
next session give prompt and favourable consideration to the establish-
7 3
ment of an ECAFE". According to Akintan (1977) the introduction
of the words "for the purpose of giving effective aid to countries and
territories of Africa" did not mean that the functions to be performed
J>y the ECA were expected to be different from those being performed
by the other regional economic commissions. Rather the words should
- 28 -
be regarded merely as a disclosure of some of the possible disadvantages 
emanating from the non-existence of such a commission in a particular 
region of the world. The argument put forward by Ghana in 1957 certainly 
reflected this view when it argued that Africa needed a body like the 
ECA for assembling information and for joint action to promote its 
economic development.
This view of the ECA’s origins and purpose has been echoed on
9
numerous occasions by African statesmen. For example, Rawlings (1983) 
stated that "because Africa was for a long time considered a mere 
geographical extension of Europe, whereas all the other regions had 
their respective commissions a year or two after World War II to help 
with their reconstruction and development, it took the international 
community thirteen odd years after World War II to establish the ECA 
to undertake the economic and social development of Africa". His 
Excellency Senator B.M. Nsibandze, Deputy Prime Minister of the Kingdom 
of Swaziland, spoke of the ideals that brought the Heads of State and 
Government together in April 1958 to formally establish the Commission.
He said the ideals were the same which bound Africa together in their 
quest for total economic independence and development. It was their 
commitment to the "task of eradicating all forms of poverty and depri­
vation among our people".^ Dr. Samuel K. Doe, Head of State of the 
Republic of Liberia, depicted the era when it was established, when he 
stated thus, "it will be recalled that the birth of ECA came at a time 
when most African states were witnessing the intensification of the 
struggle for independence. At that time, African leaders were pre­
occupied with the problems rooted in the colonial legacy of international 
economic exploitation, psycho-cultural degradation and underdevelopment".^^ 
,^The Late H.E. General Seyni Kountche, Chairman of the Supreme Military 
Council and Head of State of Niger, also spoke of this era, when he
- 29 -
said that it was established at a time "when the vast majority of
states represented were still under the colonial yoke, the ECA became
the first form in which inter-African solidarity was organized and the
first forum within which our governments began together to ponder on
12
the common destiny of the African people".
ECOSOC eventually yielded to pressure from the General Assembly.
On 29 April 1958 the ECA was established. Resolution 671 A and B(xxv)
also defined its geographical scope, laid down the operational policy
13
and chose Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as the Commission’s headquarters.
The tasks assigned to the Commission were laid down in its terms of 
reference. Acting within the framework of the policies of the UN and 
subject to the general supervision of the ECOSOC, shall, provided that 
the Commission takes no action with respect to any country without the 
agreement of the Government of the country:
(a) initiate and participate in measures for facilitating con­
certed action for the economic development of Africa, including its 
social aspects, with a view to raising the level of economic activity 
and levels of living in Africa, and for maintaining and strengthening 
the economic relations of countries and territories of Africa, both 
among themselves and with other countries of the world;
(b) make and sponsor such investigations and studies of economic 
and technological problems and developments with the territories of 
Africa as the Commission deems appropriate, and disseminate the results 
of such investigation and studies;
(c) undertake or sponsor the collection, evaluation of such 
economic, technological and statistical information as the Commission 
deems appropriate;
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(d) perform, within the available resources of its secretariat, 
such advisory services as the countries and territories of the region 
may desire, provided that such services do not overlap with those 
rendered by other bodies of the UN or by the specialized agencies;
(e) assist the council at its request in discharging its functions 
within the region in connection with any economic problems, including 
problems in the field of technical assistance;
(f) assist in the formulation and development of co-ordinated 
policies as a basis for practical action in promoting economic and 
technological development in the region;
(g) in carrying out the above functions, deal as appropriate
with the social aspects of economic development and the interrelationship
14
of economic and social factors.
Two points should be made about these terms of reference. First, 
they are identical with those of the other regional economic commissions. 
Secondly, the breadth of the terms of reference has proved to be a 
source of weakness for the ECA. When it came to determining the scope 
of its activities and its functions in Africa, the Commission has had 
to interpret the functions stipulated above through various measures 
such as the carrying out of studies, seminars and workshops. It has 
also attempted to act as a think-tank and created several subsidiary 
institutions. The wide scope made it difficult for the Commission to 
evolve a distinctive role in Africa. There was no clear indication 
about the aspects and sector in which it was to limit its activities.
The wide scope of activities also meant that the ECA meant different 
things to different people.
- 31 -
Earlier indications of what the Commission could do came in
speeches made during the ceremony for its establishment. Its role as
a forum for the exchange of ideas was recognized at the time. In his
welcoming speech the late Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, stated that
"... only a few years ago meetings to consider African 
problems were held outside of Africa, and the fate of its 
peoples was decided by non-Africans. Today, the tradition 
of Berlin and Algeciras has been repudiated, and it is
thanks to the Conference of Accra and now of Addis Ababa
that the peoples of Africa can, at long last, deliberate 
their own problems and future." 15
The Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, in his message, 
also defined the role which the United Nations expected the Commission 
to play:
"New states are emerging with geographic boundaries which, 
in most cases, are not best suited to the requirements of 
rapid economic growth. If such growth is to take place, 
concerted action and joint endeavours will be needed among 
countries and territories, each with its own particular 
political status. New economic links are to be forged 
among entities belonging to different monetary areas. And 
all of this should be achieved without losing the present 
advantage deriving from existing relationships with the 
rest of the world. These complicated processes can be 
greatly enhanced and facilitated by the existence of some 
flexible institutional arrangement such as the Commission 
can provide." 16
The UN recognized the fact that the new states could not achieve rapid 
economic growth due to their fragmented economies and the smallness of 
some of the populations, and it recommended joint ventures as a way 
forward for the attainment of development. It saw the Commission as 
the institutional framework to facilitate and encourage joint ventures. 
The UN assumed that the search for development was going to be pursued 
to a greater extent, through the Commission —  the then Secretary- 
General felt that African states faced the same problems of development 
"as industrialized countries and therefore they must seek common solutions
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to common problems. He hoped that the states will operate in the model 
of the EEC, where members were working towards a Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), for example. He based his argument on existing theories 
of development which emphasized the role of industrialization, the 
complementaries of the economies and possible advantages of economies 
of scale to be obtained with joint co-operative ventures.
The objectives of development may be the same for all countries 
the world over, but there were factors peculiar to Africa, such as mass 
poverty, extensive droughts and famine, issues relating to nation- 
building and the uneven distribution of population, mineral and natural 
resources. Also, most of the states lacked the skilled manpower resources 
and the necessary technology which are important factors in the quest 
for development. Finally, the new states held on to the principle of 
national sovereignty and their newly acquired political independence 
to the extent that they were not prepared to allow either the Commission 
or any other institution an upper hand in determining development 
prospects. Each state preferred the option of devising and implementing 
its national development plan. In the final analysis, it has to be said 
that African states took full responsibility for their own development 
the Commission was more or less reduced to a talking shop. Secondly, 
the states began to question the usefulness and purpose of the Commission 
in the late 1970s when they realized that past development strategies 
adopted from the industrialized nations had failed to bring expected 
development to Africa. But even more disheartening was that the prospects 
for eliminating mass poverty remained elusive. By 1979 African govern­
ments were asking the Commission to devise a development philosophy and 
strategy which was tailored to their peculiar needs. They also grew 
.-tired of rhetoric and the endorsement of countless resolutions and were 
now putting more emphasis on actual projects. We have to remember
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that the ECA drew up the agenda and programmes for the meetings of the 
policy organs without consultation with the states. The latter attend 
the meetings to deliberate on the drafts and pass the resolutions.
(See Chapter 2, especially the section on work programmes.)
The effort of changing the emphasis from the collection of data 
and the dissemination of ideas to the implementation of projects is to 
question the original functions of the Commission. It also shows that
the states have higher expectations of what the Commission can do than
in its earlier years.
The Commission's own view of its role is also vital. To an extent
this has dominated its activities and made it difficult for it to change.
In other words, the Commission has always maintained that it has been 
providing valuable services to its member states and has defined its 
role in various publications. Section 4 of this chapter deals with the 
Commission's own claims in this regard.
3. MEMBERSHIP
The membership of the Commission is confined to independent African 
states. It traded its colonial links and non-white membership for an 
African composition and the trend was finally established with the 
expulsion of the Republic of South Africa in 1963 and that of Rhodesia 
in 1965. Zimbabwe joined after its independence in 1980.
In 1958 it had 16 full members - nine of which were African 
states, namely, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, 
Tunisia and United Arab Republic. The six non-African states with 
full membership included Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and
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and the United Kingdom. (The Union of South Africa was granted full 
membership before the expulsion.) Nine associate members were also 
admitted by ECOSOC in 1958 which were: the Federation of Nigeria,
Gambia, Kenya, Zanzibar, Sierra Leone, British Somaliland Protectorate, 
Tanganyika, Uganda and the Italian-administered trust territory of 
Somaliland.
The African states expressed concern over two issues which dominated
the debate at the time. The first was the admission of non-African
states as full members, for example, the United Kingdom and France.
The second issue had to do with the idea that some non-self-governing
territories were not given associate membership, for example, Basutoland
(now Lesotho), Bechuanaland protectorate (now Botswana) and Fernando Po.
The Africans took the view that it was their collective responsibility
"to take decisions affecting Africa without the said decisions being
influenced by the oppposing votes of non-African powers".^ They, then,
insisted that the full membership status of the colonial powers be
terminated or changed and for an African participation on behalf of the
18
non-self-governing territories. Italy was the first to withdraw its 
membership in 1960 when it gave up its territorial responsibility for 
what has now become the Republic of Somalia.
Belgium did the same thing in 1962 when the Belgian Congo (now
Zaire), Rwanda and Burundi became independent. France, Spain and the
United Kingdom later agreed to the status of associate members in 1963
and the non-self-governing territories under their administration were
19
given direct representation as associate members. In the same year, 
Fernado Po and Rio Muni (administered by Spain) and Mauritius, Basutoland 
(now Lesotho), Bechuanaland Protectorate (now Botswana), Swaziland, the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyassaland, and Gambia (all administered by
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the United Kingdom) became associate members. In 1964 Fernando Po and 
Rio Muni were, at their own request, admitted as a single associate 
member under the name of Equatorial Guinea. After the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyassaland (the Central African Federation) was dissolved - 
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and 
Nyassaland (now Malawi) attended as separate associate members in 1964.
Continued pressures were mounted on South Africa. Members were
opposing its apartheid policies and were not satisfied with the fact
that it had full membership status. ECOSOC eventually suspended South
Africa from participating in the work of the Commission - a policy which
has remained until the present. Also, in 1963, the Commission expelled
Portugal from membership for non-compliance with resolutions of the
20
Commission and the General Assembly. The Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) by Ian Smith in 1965 was not recognized by the General 
Assembly of the UN and consequently the associate membership status of 
Rhodesia was withdrawn. Thus, by 1965, the ECA had become totally 
African in its composition.
Apart from this change, the next remarkable thing was the growth 
in membership. From the initial nine members, by 1988, the ECA had a 
membership of 50 independent African countries, excluding South Africa. 
These are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cape Verde, The Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Congo,
Cr<£ v \ o < m ? & ? ckvv^ W k tv y  ^Gcva.\v\€jD, ca.vv<A C*v\\v'vexx (
Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia .(the Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, the Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the 
Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Republic of Cameroon, 
the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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There are still two categories of membership: (a) full member
and (b) associate member. To qualify for full membership a country 
must be independent, a member of the UN and belong to the African 
continent and its associate islands. This gives them the right to 
participate in the regular sessions of the Commission but they cannot 
vote. However, representatives of associate members may participate 
and hold office in the subsidiary bodies of the Commission. Namibia 
is presently the only associate member. The Commission may also invite 
any national liberation movement recognized by the OAU to send observers 
to participate in its consideration of issues which were of interest 
to the movement. Such observers have the right to submit proposals which 
may be voted upon at the request of any of its members. As of June 1988, 
the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and 
the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) had fe&e observer 
status.
Like other regional commissions, the ECA is authorized to invite 
any member of the UN to pariticpate in its work in a consultative 
capacity especially for issues of concern to non-members. In the past, 
Austria, India, the USSR and the USA have attended depending on their 
contributions and interests in programmes of the Commission. Under a 
special arrangement, Switzerland is invited to sessions of the Commission 
as observer - this is because Switzerland is interested in ECA programmes 
but an observer at the UN General Assembly.
With regard to voting rights, Rule 55 stipulates that "Each member
21
of the Commission shall have one vote". The decisions of the Commission 
are taken by a majority of members present and voting, while members 
who abstain are considered as not voting. The members usually vote by 
show of hands, except that any member may request a roll-call, which
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is taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members,
22beginning with the state whose name was drawn by lot by the Chairman.
The issue of membership was a thorny one in the earlier years of 
the Commission. It took roughly six years to settle. It was one of 
the reasons why it can be said that the Commission had an uneasy birth.
The other was the fact that the colonial powers, especially the United 
Kingdom and France, did not want a Commission created for African states - 
the latter challenged their authorities and claims to the territories. 
Rather than concentrate on its precise functions, the earlier years 
were used to debate on issues such as: (a) whether Africa should have
a Commission in the first place; (b) the composition of such an entity 
once established; and (c) the size and structure of its secretariat. The 
colonial powers - France, Spain and the United Kingdom - helped to prolong 
the issue of membership because of their desire to keep control of their 
colonies and their ill-judgement that Africa was not in need of and 
ready to have a Commission. But these were issues^which African govern­
ments were not willing to ease up.o r . Their attitudes were borne out 
of their determination to take full responsibility and keep control 
over their affairs and because they were determined to hold on to their 
newly won political independence. Sovereignty became the key to their 
relationship with the outside world and a ticket to participation in 
the UN. It also became the basis on which they could make claims and 
perform duties in the international political and economic systems.
4. THE RELEVANCE OF THE ECA
The ECA has maintained that through its terms of reference it 
has been able to perform some functions. In all, it sees itself as an
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institution providing six distinct services for its member states.
We shall discuss these with reference to its activities. The intention 
is to find out whether it has been able to perform the functions 
successfully and the problems it has encountered. It will also be 
relevant to figure out whether African states recognize these functions.
First, the Commission sees itself as a useful forum for negotiations
and decisions on common problems and for evolving joint positions on
international issues in the economic, social and technological fields.
In 1983 it stated that the realization of the goal of collective self-
reliance and the establishment of an African Common Market, would require
23
it to expand this aspect of its role. But for such negotiations to 
succeed the ECA needs the active participation of its member states.
Its mandate does not allow the Commission to act independently of its 
members and it possesses no powers of enforcement. It can only operate 
if the states so wish.
The necessity of winning support for its programmes and action
has led to its special relationship with the OAU since the 1960s.
The relationship has had both elements of conflict and collaboration.
24
Magee (1979) recorded the impact of the establishment of the OAU on
the ECA. He pointed to the disinterest in, and disillusionment with,
the ECA by African leaders. He stated that "the OAU, created in May
1963 at Addis Ababa, became the most prestigious African assembly of
ministers and heads of government for debate on key political issues.
After 1965 the ECA's biennial sessions naturally came to focus on less
25
politically compelling and newsworthy issues". Moreover, "the decline 
of African interest in the ECA at the time when it became more ambitious 
forced the secretariat to formulate a new conception of its role. It 
^attempted to concentrate on organizing and advocating regional and
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subregional co-operation and it argued that it ought to have the 
decisive role in co-ordinating the economic and social programmes of 
the UN family in Africa".^
The two organizations operate in the same region and both have 
their headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, but rather than complement­
ing each other, the early years witnessed increased friction and clash 
of interests, spearheaded by the leaders. Magee (1970) described the 
bitter quarrel between the ECA and OAU as most disastrous in its
impications for African development because the executive heads of the
27
two organizations became bitter rivals. The most spectacular of those 
clashes were between Diallo Telli, the first Secretary-General of the 
OAU, and his counterpart of the ECA, Robert K.A. Gardiner, in the 1960s, 
and Edem Kodjo (OAU) and Adebayo Adedeji (ECA) especially during the 
First Economic Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Goverment 
of the OAU in 1980. Kodjo (then the Secretary-General of the OAU) tried 
to prevent the ECA from submitting its papers relating to economic 
problems of the states. He wanted the OAU to have an upper hand during 
the deliberations. The drama began when the delegates were split into 
committees for detailed discussion of the OAU documents. In one of the 
committees, the representative of Ethiopia wanted to find out whether 
the committee had read the paper presented by its government. At the 
same time, thgofficials of the ECA had distributed the latter*s 
documents to every room in the hotels occupied by delegates and a few 
of them had glanced through them before attending the committees. These 
persons wanted to find out if others had seen and read the ECA paper.
What eventually emerged was the fact that the two organizations 
had prepared different documents for the summit. The ECA paper had 
more substance and was more coherent and properly written than the OAU*s.
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Nigeria formally introduced that of the former and Edem Kodjo was
2 8
said to have left the meeting in anger and frustration.
The delegates continued with the discussions in the absence of 
Edem Kodjo. It was clear that they wanted the two organizations to 
work together to solve the economic problems facing Africa. The delegates 
eventually endorsed the ECA document, which became the Lagos Plan of 
Action - the blue-print for African development. In the final analysis, 
they were not interested in whether there was a personality clash between 
the leaders of the two organizations as was suspected; they were guided 
instead by the need to get to grips with their economic problems and 
the sense of duty they owed their peoples. This is perhaps the key 
to understanding the relationship between the OAU and the ECA. Since 
1980 the situation has improved. Although conflicts may exist, they 
both realize that they need to collaborate.
29
Gruhn (1985) noted that there have been reciprocal represent­
ation and participation at meetings and some joint use of information, 
with many documents and working papers carrying an ECA/OAU designation. 
However, she pointed out that it is also the case that "most of the 
actual work, the writing of reports, the undertaking of feasibility 
studies, have been done by the staff of the ECA. So, what often appears 
to be joint work of the ECA and the OAU frequently is not more than a 
co-sponsorship of the final ECA product or activity. But while the OAU 
has profited by having some role and expertise in the vital economic
realm, the ECA has profited from the legitimizing cover provided by
30
the OAU. It has been a marriage of convenience".
Fieldwork for this thesis confirmed the utility of this argument. 
^OAU officials were on friendly terms with their counterparts at the 
ECA. The former usually- made use of the Conference Complex of the
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Commission, which is popularly known as Africa Hall. The translators 
for both organizations were also free to use the Complex. By so doing 
both organizations demonstrated that the search for and the struggle 
for political and economic independence and development were not the 
exclusive preserve of any specific institution. Both have to collaborate 
in the interest of the continent and their roles have to be complementary. 
The consensus which the ECA needed is provided for through the OAU.
The only problem is that the OAU seems to have more credit once the 
states have endorsed an ECA activity - it becomes that of the OAU. It 
is really the price which the ECA has been forced to pay. The other 
problem for the ECA was that important decisions were not only taken 
within the OAU, some aspects were tackled through other subregional 
bodies such as the ECOWAS, the PTA, the SADCC and the ADB. Depending 
on the issues, these other institutions were in direct competition with 
the OAU. Moreover, other specialized agencies such as UNIDO, UNDP and 
UNESCO were also competing with the ECA as fora for the exchange of 
ideas and where decisions are taken. The ECA has thus lost its original 
pre-eminence: it is only one of the avenues for discussions and not
the centre or main forum for negotiations.
The second function it serves relates to its activities in the 
area of research, data collection, analysis and dissemination, organiz­
ation of conferences, expert meetings, workshops and seminars. The 
ECA has concentrated on these activities and they constitute its 
traditional role. It has become one of the leading sources of data 
on socio-economic matters. But as was noted in the introduction, the 
member states now want less of these activities. Even the ECA recognized 
the need for change, when in 1983 it stated that "they will have to
^re-orient its activities so as to become more practical and a catalyst
31in the development of the member states". In its earlier years
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this aspect of its role was both necessary and vital as there were no 
statistics on African economic and social conditions. The data need 
up-dating annually but members want the ECA to divert to projects in 
the 1980s.
The third function has to do with institution building for the 
promotion of economic co-operation amongst member states. This aspect 
has been treated in detail in Chapter 4. It is sufficient here to note 
that the ECA has established more than 30 inter-governmental institutions. 
It takes the position that Africa needs even more institutions but it 
has not been too successful obtaining agreement for them because its 
institutions are widely perceived as acting more like obstacles 
than agents of development. This is due to factors such as overlapping 
activities, lack of membership and non-payment of subscriptions. Member 
states feel that there are far too many institutions and due to their 
own economic problems have frequently declined to pay their subscriptions. 
Even some of the institutions it has created have not become fully 
operational. For example, the ECA is still acting as interim secretariat 
for at least seven, including the Port Management Association of Eastern 
and Southern Africa (PMAESA); the Trans-East African Highway Authority 
(TEAHA): the Federation of African Chambers of Commerce (FACC); and the 
Southern African Labour Commission (SALC).
Another problem for the ECA was the fact that some of its institu­
tions were competing with it. For example, the PTA has functions which 
overlap those of the ECA MULPOC based in Lusaka. Some member states 
have also set up alternative entities for economic co-operation which 
also compete with those of the ECA, for example, the SADCC in southern 
Africa. So in general the ECA can claim that it has established 
numerous institutions but they face several problems, and are sometimes
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perceived as obstructing the process of co-operation. In this aspect 
of its role, therefore, the ECA has met with limited success.
Fourth, the ECA describes itself as the promoter of economic 
and technical co-operation. What this entails is technical assistance 
such as the drawing up of treaties and protocols for the setting up of 
regional economic groupings. It is true that the ECA officials drew 
up the documents for such organizations as the PTA and the Economic 
Community of Central African states (ECCAS). It also attends the 
meeting of ECOWAS and others in an observer status. It encourages such 
activities because they tie in with its ideas for the establishment of 
an African Common Market by the year 2000. The Commission also argues 
that collective self-reliance was vital and a pre-requisite for develop­
ment in Africa, given some of the factors which will be treated under 
section 5 of this chapter. Although it plays an active part in promoting 
and encouraging economic and technical co-operation, it is rather 
difficult to quantify and assess its successes and failures. The ECA 
seems to be actively involved with the member states but evaluation is 
elusive. The Commission also faces constraints in trying to perform 
this role because the activities of the regional economic groupings 
cut across national boundaries and once established, such entities take 
on a life of their own as the members strive to bargain and protect 
their interests. The whole question of sovereignty of the states is
brought to the fore and the result is that the role of the ECA dwindles
to that of observer status. This status may allow the ECA to attend
the meetings and be properly informed but it cannot be a party to their
deliberations.
The Commission describes its fifth role as that of a regional 
32
’think-tank". It played an important part in the formulation and
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drafting of the documents such as the Revised Framework of Principles
for the Implementation of the New International Economic Order in Africa
1976-1981-1986, which formed the basis for the Monrovia Strategy and
eventually the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). The main objective of the
Monrovia Strategy was the establishment of self-sustaining development
and economic growth based on collective self-reliance. Its aim was to
improve the standard of living of the mass of the African people and
33
reduce mass unemployment (For details of the Lagos Plan of Action, 
see Chapter 3). However, in this case the OAU received the credit 
because the final product has its designation, that is, the OAU Lagos 
Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000.
It is widely held in the literature that the missing ingredient 
in the ECA's case has been a distinct development strategy for Africa,
"without which talk about priorities, co-ordination and operations
34 33
makes little sense". Gruhn (1984) pointed out that under the leader­
ship of Raul Prebisch, the ECLA (now ECLAC) developed an ideology which 
held that the economic disadvantage of Third World Countries stemmed 
from the fact that they were situated in the periphery of an international 
economic system that has resulted from and was perpetuated by giving 
the Third World unfavourable terms of trade. To attack these disadvan­
tages, industrialized 'core' states would have to be persuaded to 
reverse this pattern and create in its stead a mechanism that would 
guarantee preferential status for the LDCs in the periphery. Latin 
American regional co-operation and integration was perceived as an 
essential step in the reorganization of centre-periphery relations.
Gruhn stated that "the ECLA made it its mission to influence international 
thinking about, and understanding of, the nature of under-development 
^with the aim of changing the international economic structure. In this 
sense the ECLA conceived of itself as a lobbyist for Latin American
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interests and, more broadly, Third World interests in general".
Although a lot can be said about the ECLA's strategies, its
achievements and failures, what is relevant here is that "the ECLA,
unlike the ECA, was perceived both in its own region and internationally,
as a truly Latin American organization, and not as an administrative 
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arm of the UN". It is true that the ECLA was the source of dependency 
theory, but apart from it, no other regional economic commission has 
developed a distinct ideology for development in their respective regions. 
Nevertheless, the ECA has been the fore-runner on the principles of 
self-reliance and self-sustained economic growth. It may not have 
formulated a coherent strategy but the principles which form the basis 
of the LPA offer hope and a long-term strategy for development.
The last but by no means the least of the ECA’s roles refers to 
its operational level. This refers to its efforts to decentralize to 
the subregions with the aim of identifying the problems of each area 
bringing its activities ’on the ground’. The closeness also aims at 
allowing the member states to participate more actively in its programmes 
and activities. But decentralization has not been properly implemented 
because its subregional organs lacked autonomy in financial, personnel 
and administrative matters. The ECA headquarters was in direct control 
of their activities. Besides, the ECA experienced all the internal 
constraints at the subregional level j that are present at headquarters. 
These manifest themselves in the form of inadequate manpower and 
financial resources, concentration on research, workshops and seminars 
rather than projects, vague objectives and lack of time-frame for the 
programmes. In the case of North Africa, the ECA has little influence
there as member states are more interested in the Arab League (see
/
Chapter 9). This suggests that the ECA's operations are also hampered
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by external factors such as competition with other existing institutions 
in the subregions. In effect, the Commission has not yet succeeded at 
the operational level.
The problem with all the functions outlined above is the fact that 
the ECA has tried to carry them out at the same time. With its limited 
resources, it is no wonder that it has been incapable of fully exploiting 
a particular role. The same reason is responsible for the fact that 
it cannot boast of perfection of any of the roles. Its mandate may 
have allowed it to extend its functions but such wideness has resulted 
in seriously undermining its ability and the extent to what it can do.
The main reason why it has failed is because it is an arm of the 
UN and therefore it has to operate within broad and vague guidelines.
This problem applies to all the regional economic commissions because 
they have the same terms of reference. As has been suggested by member 
states of the West African subregion in 1987 (see Chapter 6), there is 
a great need for the redefinition of its functions and scope of activities 
to put it in proper shape to tackle the pressing development needs of 
the member states. By this request, the states were questioning the 
relevance of the Commission. What can it do for them? The answer to 
the question lies in the potential which it has. We know that it has 
varied functions, an established bureaucratic complex and good communic­
ation links with its member states. It also has professional staff, 
although limited in number. Also its terms of reference gave it broad 
options to choose from. Part of its potential lies in what it has done 
so far, but more importantly what it can do in the future. Since African 
states place more emphasis on projects, the Commission has to balance 
out its resources and re-orient itself to enable it to implement them.
From its numerous surveys and studies, the Commission is conversant
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with the socio-economic problems facing the states. All that remains 
is for the Commission to gear itself towards solving them with carefully 
planned and executed projects, for which it will need to establish 
organs for planning, execution, co-ordination and monitoring. (These 
are lacking at present both at the headquarters and in the subregions.)
Inspite of the handicaps of the Commission, there are advantages 
to being a UN affiliate. Financially, it gets its regular budget from 
the UN headquarters in New York and has to approach member states, 
industrialized countries and other specialized agencies of the UN, 
especially UNDP, UNIDO and FAO for its extra-budgetary funds (see 
Chapter 2). It also gets its volumes of stationery, communication 
equipment and essential transport. Such resource inputs, including 
expertise, would not have been possible without the financial resources 
from New York. Moreover, the ECA received more funds each year than 
is the case with the OAU. The Commission has been able to extend its 
resources to the OAU by allowing the latter to use its Conference 
Complex often - the African Hall. The ECA also provides the technical 
expertise for drafting documents for the OAU.
5. THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC CRISIS: AN OVERVIEW
The survey of the economic problems facing African countries is 
necessary at this point because it is at the heart of the difficulties 
facing the ECA itself - the fact that it has not been able to carry out 
programmes and activities reflecting their development needs. The 
African economic crisis is both multi-dimensional and persistent in 
nature. The heavy reliance and emphasis on regional economic co-operation 
and integration by the ECA offers long-term hopes for development. But
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the problem is what to do at present. As Africans place emphasis on 
projects, there is also the need for the ECA to begin to address some 
aspects of the crisis. The fact that the ECA seems to ignore the problems 
while carrying on with countless surveys and research is one of the 
reasons why it has remained unpopular in Africa. There is also doubt 
as to whether the ECA can really assist these states in any positive 
way, that is, in solving rather than debating their economic and social 
problems.
Towards the end of the 1970s, African governments were becoming 
concerned over the economic stagnation affecting the continent. The 
escalation in energy prices exacerbated inflation and gave rise to 
unfavourable terms of trade for their commodity prices. Then the African 
leadership showed their concern at the OAU and the ECA while the Governors 
of the African central banks requested the World Bank to undertake an 
investigation and analysis of the crisis. What were the components 
of the crisis?
There was a fiscal element to the crisis, which involved the burden of 
debt service and rescheduling, the conduction of negotiation with bi­
lateral and private creditors, bargaining over conditionality packages 
with the IMF and World Bank, not to mention the costs of structural 
adjustment and devising new development policies and strategies.
Factors such as the oil price rises of 1973 and 1979; drought, recession 
in the West forced down the demand for and price for commodity exports; 
increasing OECD protectionism; and generalized inflation in the world 
economy led to the accumulation of debt. When credits and direct 
foreign investment dried up, foreign aid also tapered off.
While accepting that these external factors affected African 
economies, there were also domestic factors which had serious effects.
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The constant change in policies resulting from frequent change of 
governments, brought about by military intervention in countries such 
as Nigeria, Ghana and Ethiopia, merely prolonged the economic problems. 
Each new regime was prepared to try. out something new and not enough 
time was given for the end results before it was time to have yet 
another government and another set of policies - the consequences of 
coups and counter-coups. Then there were incidents of mismanagement 
and embezzlement, especially during, for example, the Shagari regime 
in Nigeria. The cumulative effects of such political and economic 
instability was to further worsen the crisis. The real causes of the 
crisis, then, were domestic factors.
Even though drought, recession and generalized inflation pre­
dated the OPEC oil shocks, they aggravated the effects. By the early 
1980s the situation had become disastrous. Between 1980 and 1984, the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of African countries declined on average 
by 1.4 per cent per year, with per capita Gross National Product (GNP)
by an average of 4.4 per cent per year, export volume 7.4 per cent per
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year and import volume 5.9 per cent per year. The World Bank has
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recently designated 22 sub-Saharan African states as "debt distressed", 
meaning that their projected ex ante debt service ratios (including IMF 
'repurchases1) for 1988-90 are more than 30 per cent.
In 1974 the total debt of sub-Saharan Africa was about $14.8
billion, but by 1986 it had reached $102 billion according to World
Bank figures. Of the $102 billion, 82.4 per cent or $84.1 billion,
40
was public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term debt. The 
breakdown was as follows (as percentage of the total $102 billion): 
bilateral, 36.8 per cent; private bank, 22.5 per cent; World Bank,
13 per cent; other multilateral, 6.6 per cent; and
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suppliers credits, 3.5 per cent. The remaining 17.6 per cent or 
$17.95 billion was as follows: private non-guaranteed medium- and
long-term debt, 4 per cent; short-term, 7.4 per cent; and IMF, 6.2 per 
cent. In 1985, 13 per cent of Africa's external debt was in arrears.
(For more information on the external debt of sub-Saharan Africa, see 
Appendix 1.)
By comparison to Latin American debt, the total amount is not 
large: it is about 10 per cent of total developing country debt and
less than that of either Mexico and Brazil. There is a low percentage 
of private bank debt which makes up the greater bulk of Latin American 
debt. Also a large percentage of Africa's private bank debt is guaranteed 
by OECD country public agencies, such as the US Export-Import Bank. As 
a consequence, this debt is rescheduled through the Paris Club mechanism 
rather than by the banks themselves, that is, the London Club. Finally, 
a greater portion of African debt is owed to the IMF and the World Bank, 
6.2 and 13 per cent, respectively. This type of debt cannot be re­
scheduled.
The following countries are sub-Saharan Africa's major debtors
(billions of US dollars, end 1984): Nigeria, 19.7; Ivory Coast, 7.4;
Sudan, 7.2: Zaire, 5; Zambia, 4.8; Kenya, 3.8; Tanzania, 3.3; Cameroon,
2.7; Zimbabwe, 2.1; Senegal, 2; Ghana, 2; Madagascar, 2; Congo, 1.6;
Ethiopia, 1.5. Inspite of the low percentage of debt owed to private
creditors, six countries owe more than two-thirds of their 1985-87 debt
service to private sources - Benin, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Nigeria
41
and Zimbabwe. According to Callaghy (1988) the African debt has 
grown faster than any other region in nominal terms. The annual growth 
rate between 1970 and 1984 was 20.4 per cent (which was slightly higher 
than that of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), and between 1975 and 1980
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it was 25.5 per cent. Medium- and long-term debt quadrupled between 
1975 and 1983.
The World Development Report 1981 indicates that overall debt- 
service ratios are likely to rise moderately for oil-importing Africa 
through the 1980s (see Table 1.1). (The debt-service ratio is the 
ratio of interest and amortization payments to export earnings.)
r*f
Table 1.1 Actual and Porjected Sub-Saharan African Debt-Service 
Ratios (per cent)
Category 1977 1978 1980 1985 1990
Oil importers 8.4 10.6 15.8 17.6 19.8
Low income 8.4 10.4 19.2 9.5 19.9
Middle income 8.1 10.1 13.6 16.2 19.3
Oil exporters 1.8 3.3 3.5 4.6 4.1
Source: The World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa: An Agenda for Action, Washington, D.C., 1981, 
p. 129.
While the ratios for the low-income countries are estimated to remain 
unchanged at around 19 per cent, those for the middle-income countries 
are expected to rise from 13.6 per cent in 1980 to about 19 per cent 
in 1990. For oil-exporting countries the debt-service ratio is 
projected to rise through 1985 and then decline.
Projections of debt-service ratios are highly dependent on assump 
tions about trade prospects, import requirements and capital flows. 
According to the World Development Report 1981, some countries that
experienced severe debt-servicing difficulties during the 1970s 
(Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Zaire and Zambia) are likely to continue 
to do so in the 1980s due in part to the impact of the earlier debt 
reschedulings and to amortization requirements for outstanding oblig­
ations. Other large borrowers in the 1970s (such as Cameroon, Ivory 
Coast, Senegal and Tanzania) could face difficult debt-servicing 
problems if export performance falls. Debt-service obligations are 
likely to become a more important element in the balance of payments 
of many African countries and may compel more of them to use the Paris 
Club - it refers to ad hoc meetings of representatives of the governments 
of Western creditor countries, and other arrangements for debt relief.
The terms of borrowing also worsened over time. In 1979, 54 per 
cent of debt was on concessional terms; by 1981, it was only 35 per 
cent. In addition to these, African countries were finding it difficult 
to repay the debts. The low capacity to service the debt was reflected 
in the number and frequency of reschedulings. Between 1975 and September 
1987, Zaire had rescheduled 14 times (8 Paris Club’s and 6 London Club’s) 
and Sudan rescheduled 8 times (5 and 3). By 1984, Madagascar, Senegal 
and Togo each rescheduled 7 times (5 and 2 each). Four countries 
rescheduled 5 times: Ivory Coast (3 and 2), Liberia (4 and 1), Niger
(4 and 1) and Sierra Leone (4 and 1). Zambia rescheduled four times 
(3 and 1). The reschedulings have caused alarm both in the West and 
and in Africa, to the point where the African debt has become a topical 
issue for conferences and seminar papers. But no solutions have been 
agreed upon by either the African countries or the creditors. : The 
former, however, recognized the need to unite in their fight against 
creditors. At a conference sponsored and organized by the ECA in Abuja, 
Nigeria, in 1987 on the African crisis, the delegates issued a statement 
referred to as the Abuja Statement. It urged the African governments
- 53 -
Table 1.2 Basic Indicators
Reg'On A - , . ,n Population Gross National Proouci DiStriOutfOn 'ot GDP ii'  198' Adult L ife  Expec- Percentage G row th  m Value ot
O* In flec t" ooo So in Millions Per Capua 
US Dollar 
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N
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Rata 1960-81
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1970-81
Im ports
1970-81
E xports in 
US Dollars
A F R IC A  
L O W  I N C O ME  
B e n in i9 6 0 113 3 6 32 0 0 6 44 13 7 43 28 50 15 -7  0 5 0
B u rk in a  Faso 1960 274 6 3 240 1.1 41 16 12 43 5 44 11 7 .3 7 6 10
B u ru n d i 1962 28 4.2 230 2.4 56 16 9 28 25 45 2 — _ 1
C a g e  V e rd e 1975 4 0.3 340 — — - - — — 61 — — — _
C e n tra l A fr ic a n  Rep 1960 623 2 4 320 0 4 37 13 6 50 33 43 29 1.9 -1 .9 29
C h a d 1960 1 284 4 5 110 -2 .2 — — — — 15 43 19 -7 .2 -3 .8 _
C o m o ro s 1975 2 0.4 320 0.7 — — — - — 48 — — — _  -
E th io p ia 1.222 32 0 140 1 4 50 16 11 34 15 46 14 -0  8 — 1
Gambia 1965 11 0 6 370 2.5 - — — — 15 42 — — — _
Guinea-Bissau 1974 36 0.8 190 28 37 — - — _
Guinea Equatorial 1968 28 0.3 180 — — — - — — 48 — — — _
Ghana 1957 239 1 1 8 400 -1.1 60 12 7 28 54 37 -7 .1 -5  0 _
Guinea 1958 246 5.6 300 0.2 37 33 4 30 20 43 20 — — _
Madagascar 1960 587 9.0 330 -0  5 35 14 — 51 50 48 19 - 2 5 -3  1 24
Mali I9 6 0 1.240 6.9 190 1 3 42 11 6 47 10 45 19 7.1 7 4 _
Malawi 1964 118 6.2 200 2.7 <3 20 13 37 25 44 10 5.9 2 4 31
Mozambique 1975 783 12.5 250 0.1 — — — — 33 47 9 15.0 -1 6 .7 _
Niger 1960 1.267 5.7 330 -1 .6 30 32 8 38 10 45 13 23 4 1 3 4 _
Namibia
Rwanda 1962
823
2 6
1.0
5.3 250 1.7 46 22 16 32 5 0 46 4 0 4 10.7
Sao Tome & Principe 1975 1 0.1 370 0.0 — - — — — — — — _ _
Sierra Leone 1961 72 3 6 320 0 4 31 20 6 50 15 47 22 -4  4 -1 .6 _
Somalia 1960 6 3 8 4 4 280 -0 .2 - - — - 60 39 31 6.7 3 .2 1
Sudan 1956 2.5 0 6 19.2 380 -0 .3 38 14 6 48 32 47 26 - 5 2 4 2 1 5
Tanzania 1961 94 5 19.1 280 1.9 52 15 9 33 79 52 12 -8  1 2 83
Togo 1960 56 2.7 380 2.5 24 27 7 48 18 48 21 1.5 1C 3 20
Uganda 1962 236 13.0 220 - 0 6 75 4 4 21 52 48 9 -9  8 -9  1 __
Zaire 1960 2 .3 4 5 29 8 210 -0.1 32 24 3 44 55 50 36 -3.1 - 1 1 9 -
Country'Region Yeer Area in Population Gross National Proauct Distripution ot GDP iri 1981 Adult Lite Expec­ Percentage G row th  in va iue  of
ot Inaeoen 000 Sa in Millions Per Capita 
US Dollar 
1981
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N
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1981
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1970-81
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1970-81
Ex pons in 
US Dollars
LOW ER-M IDDLE INCOME  
A n g o la 1975 1.247 7 8 440 - 2.1
_ 42 2 2 -1 2 .7 0 .2
B o tsw a n a 1966 600 0.9 1 .0 1 0 7.9 — — — — 35 57 — - — —
C a m e ro o n 1960 475 8.7 880 2 8 27 2 0 8 53 — 50 36 4.9 6 .9 50
C ongo 1960 34 2 1.7 1 .1 1 0 1.0 9 I 53 5 38 — 60 46 16.8 6 .7 39
D jib o u ti 1977 2 2 0.4 480 — — — — — 1 0 45 — — — —
Egypt 1936 1 .0 0 1 43.3 650 3.5 21 38 32 41 44 57 44 0.4 9 4 333
Ivo ry  C oas t 1960 322 8.5 1 .2 0 0 2.3 27 23 12 50 35 47 41 5.1 5 .7 2 1 2
Kenya 1963 583 17.4 420 2 9 32 21 13 47 47 56 15 -1 .9 - 1.8 2 1 0
L ib e ria 1822 111 1.9 520 1.2 36 27 8 37 25 54 34 1 .2 -1 .5 2 0
L e so th o 1966 30 1.4 540 7.0 31 21 5 48 52 52 1 2 — — —
M a u r ita n ia 1960 1.031 1 .6 460 1.5 28 24 7 48 17 44 24 -0 .3 3 .2 —
M a u r it iu s 1968 2 0.9 1.270 2.1 — — — — 85 65 — — — —
M o ro c c o 1956 447 20.9 860 2 4 14 34 18 52 28 57 41 2 .2 5.4 565
N ig e r ia 1960 924 87.6 870 3.5 23 37 6 40 34 49 21 0.5 17 8 137
S e n e g a l 1960 196 5.9 430 -0 .3 2 2 ! 26 15 52 1 0 44 34 -1 4 2 .5 72
S w a z ila n d 1968 17 0 .6 760 5 5 — i — — 65 54 — — — —
T u n is ia 1956 164 6.5 1 420 4.8 16 37 14 47 62 61 53 4.0 9 .2 801
Z a m b ia J  1964 753 5.8 600 0 .0 18 ! 32 18 50 44 51 44 - 0 .2 - 6 .8 —
Z im b a b w e 1980 391 7.2 870 1 .0 18 37 27 45 69 55 24 - — -
UPPER M IDDLE INCOME  
A lg e r ia 1962 2.382 1 9 6 2.140 3.2 6 55 11 39 35 56 44 1 .0 1 2 .0 49
G a b o n 1960 268 0.7 3 .810 4 9 — — — — — 48 — — —
S e y c h e lle s 1976 0 3 0  1 1.800 2.9 - - — - — 6 6 — — - —
S o u th  A fr ic a 1 .2 2 1 2 9 5 2.770 2.3 7 53 23 40 — 63 50 7.2 -1 4 5.166
HIG H INCO M E  
Libya 1952 1.760 3.1 8  450 4.7 2 71 3 27 _ 57 54 -7 .5 15.7 78
OTHERS
In d ia 1947 3 .288 690 .2 260 1 4 37 26 18 37 36 52 24 4.6 3 .2 4 .117
Korea South 98 38.9 1.70C 6 9 17 39 28 44 93 6 6 56 2 2 0 10.9 15.722
J a p a n 3 72 117 6 10.080 6.3 4 43 30 53 99 77 79 9 0 3 9 124.027
U n ite d  S ta te s 9 .363 229.8 12.820 2 3 3 34 23 63 99 75 77 6  5 4 4 147.336
Source World Bank Development Report <983. ana otners — Figures not available
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to consider "setting up an African consultative machinery to enable
member states to exchange information and harmonize their position for
42
the meetings with creditors in the Paris and London Clubs". But the 
governments have not yet set up such machinery.
Another dimension of the African economic crisis was the food 
crisis, especially of 1983-85. It led to African governments being 
committed to the alleviation of hunger. Food was central to African 
development. But the countries have been unable to produce enough to
feed their populations. Per capita food production declined from 1970
43 44
to 1983 by 17 per cent. According to Hopkins (1988) this was a
major factor in the general economic malaise of that period. And
because of the importance of food in employment and in household
expenditure, instabilities in production leads to disruption in national
economic life and in that of fiiie individuals. Those in areas hardest
hit by shortages migrate, burdening other regions and causing the loss
of capital resources. Terms of trade are severely altered and wealthy
herdsmen become impoverished. Employment shrinks, demand for non-food
goods falls and the formal economy is increasingly circumvented by
informal exchanges. These effects have led to heavy dependence on food
aid.
The third aspect of the crisis is reflected in the usual basic 
indicators such as gross income per capita, adult literacy ratios; life 
expectancy; distribution of GDP between agriculture, industry, manufacturing 
and services; urbanization; volume of exports and imports and value of 
manufactured exports. It has to be said that there is an absence of 
figures for these indicators in some African countries and a lack of 
proper information but, nevertheless, institutions such as the IMF, the 
World Bank and the ECA produce estimates which allow us to make some
- 55 -
generalized statements about the trends in development. Table 1.2 is 
one of such estimates used here for illustrative purposes. It shows 
the development standards to be found in the continent. According to 
the World Bank Atlas 1981, the average per captia was only US$ 810 
compared with US$ 12820 in the US and US$ 2420 for the world as a whole. 
(This was the average for the continent as a whole and it included th 
oil and mineral exporting countries such as Libya, Nigeria, Gabon and 
Botswana. Excluding these countries the average for the rest of Africa 
was only US$ 381.)
As indicated on Table 1.2, some countries have fairly high per 
capita income, for example, Gabon with US$ 3810, Libya US$ 8450 and 
Algeria US$ 2180. But the high figures do not mean that they are 
developed or industrialized. For example, Libya has a high per capita 
income, but manufacturing accounted for 3 per cent of total GDP. The 
Libyan economy was predominantly agrarian in character/Agriculture
tK/
accounted for 71 per cent of total GDP-_ An indication that Libya is 
not developed.
The existence of oil and substantial mining activity accounts for
the small contribution of agriculture to the GDP of these countries.
In Zambia and Libya, agricultural development was far behind the level
achieved in such countries as Kenya, Malawi and Ivory Coast which have
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lower per capita income. Even though per capita incomes are not a 
reliable indicator of development, we can draw some lessons from the 
figures. Firstly, they indicate the lack of development or the general 
level of acute mass poverty. Secondly, the low per capita incomes 
indicate that the process of monetization of the economy has not gone 
very far. Many economic activities take place outside the monetary 
sector and are therefore not covered in statistical exercises. (For
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more information on growth of GNP, see Appendix 2.)
On the whole, Africa is by far the most underdeveloped of the
Third World countries. According to the Overseas Development Council
(ODC) indicators of development, Africa contains the majority of the
nations classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In an ECA
A 6
review (1987), there are 27 LDCs in Africa, which are characterized
by formidable structural deficiencies such as their extremely low per
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capita income estimated at an average of $158 in 1985. They find 
it difficult to raise adequate savings necessary for development 
financing. They depend on single export commodities which face inelastic 
demand and declining prices in international markets. Industrial pro­
duction is limited to import-substitute processing activities with high 
import-content, a condition which exerts pressure on meagre foreign 
exchange resources to import raw materials and spare parts. Inadequate 
physical and social infrastructure present major impediments to the 
maximization of their economic capacities, particularly with respect 
to production structures.
So just as there is an unequal, asymmetrical relationship between 
Africa and the world economic powers, so are there increasing inequalities 
among African states themselves. The uneven rates of growth have resulted 
in steadily increasing inter-state inequalities. In the 1980s there 
was a further intensification of inequalities in income and wealth dis­
tribution. Ann Siedman suggests that in most African countries since 
political independence, a newly emergent class - sometimes referred to 
as the ’bureaucratic bourgoisie1 - has used the state political-economic 
machinery to enrich themselves. This has been at the cost of perpetuating 
and worsening income distribution and bargaining away the nation’s 
potential benefits to outside intertests due to reliance on foreign
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investment. Whatever the explanation for African poverty and under­
development - legacy of colonialism, size handicaps, dependence, internal 
inequalities, political conflicts and instability, natural disasters 
such as drought, famine and flooding, to mention but a few - their 
existence is unquestioned.
All the three executive secretaries of the ECA - Mekki Abbas (1958- 
1962), Robert K.A. Gardiner (1962-1975) and Adebayo Adedeji (1975 to the 
present) - have tried ideas and schemes based on a common theme - regional 
economic co-operation and integration, in their efforts to serve the 
states. Both Gardiner and Adedeji were constantly aware of the difficult 
economic conditions facing African countries. Also given the geographical, 
economic, political and social diversities, they promoted the idea that 
regional economic co-operation was one of the vehicles for development.
So since the early years of the Commission, its structure, organization, 
programmes and resources have been geared towards the promotion of both 
regional and economic co-operation. These aspects of the Commission 
are treated in Chapter 2.
In the 1970s the ECA set out to mould the opinion of African 
countries with reference to the development options which were more 
appropriate to their economic conditions. Even though the Commission 
did not come up with a coherent and distinct philosophy, the ECA 
was able to contribute to the debate by putting forward principles such 
as self-reliance and self-sustained economic growth and self-sufficiency 
in agriculture, which formed th^basis for the Lagos Plan of Action.
The ECA's intellectual contribution to the debate on development is 
treated in Chapter 3.
One of the major strategies adopted by the Commission for the 
promotion of regional economic co-operation is the establishment of
- 58 -
inter-governmental institutions such as the African Development Bank 
(ADB), African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) 
and the Preferential Trade Area for Southern and Eastern Africa (PTA).
The importance of such institutions cannot be underestimated, but the 
strategy met with difficulties such as states’ refusal to join and pay 
subscriptions, competition from national equivalents of such institutions 
and the existence of too many inter-governmental institutions, especially 
in West Africa. The role of the Commission as an institution builder 
is treated in Chapter 4.
In an effort to respond adequately to the demands of each subregion 
and to provide effective and efficient service, the Commission made 
efforts to reorganize its secretariat and subregional structures and 
organs - a move it referred to as decentralization. This process was 
also meant to bring the work of th^Commission closer to the states and 
to encourage the participation of the latter in its activities. The 
historical analysis of the Commission's efforts is discussed in Chapter
5. Its subregional structures are referred to as the Multinational 
Programming and Operational Centres - MULPOCs.
Chapters 6-9 form the second part of this thesis and they consist 
of the activities, policy organs, work programmes, resources and problems 
encountered in each subregion - north, south-eastern, central and west 
Africa. Each subregion has a MULPOC, except for central Africa which 
has two. The chapters illustrate that the process of development was 
both complex and multi-dimensional. The ECA's task of satisfying the 
expectations and demands of member states had to be put in the context 
of its organization, structure, work programmes, financial and manpower 
resources allocated to the subregions. The Commission faced major 
constraints such as lack of manpower and financial resoruces, heavy
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reliance on the headquarters and delays in implementation of programmes.
Chapter 10 which is the conclusion deals with the summary of the
thesis. The main point made here is that the ECA is an unlikely forum
for the initiation of measures to combat underdevelopment in Africa.
As an arm of the UN, it cannot be easily sensitized to Africa's economic
and social problems. Moreover, the magnitude and persistent nature of
the economic crisis are such that the ECA is neither a catalytic agent
49
nor can it play a position role in development.
6. CONCLUSION
The ECA serves as one of the fora for negotiation and discussion 
of ideas pertaining to socio-economic development. Its mandate has 
given it wider scope of activities as stated earlier, but the Commission 
still has the tasks of choosing programmes given its limited resources.
The breadth of its terms of reference has been a form of handicap, 
especially in west Africa where the states have requested for a re­
definition of the purposes and scope of the activities of the Niamey 
MULPOC. The request indicates that the relevance of the ECA is in 
question.
The debate concerning membership dominated its earlier years, but 
the issue has been settled with the Commission having two sets of 
members - full and associate members.
The attention of the member states is now focussed on what the 
Commission should do for them. Africa's impact in the international 
political and economic settings is a negative one in that they are neither 
in control nor active participants in the process of decision-making.
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Moreover, most of the states have debt repayment problems, political 
instability and balance of payments deficits, for example. Although 
there are differences between the 50 countries - a number of them such 
as Nigeria and Ghana have more economic and political weight than 
others - all the states face common problems. Also the ECA views the 
continent as a collective unit, reinforcing the similarities between 
the states. But the severe nature of the problems facing them and the 
fact that there are no definite solutions to their economic conditions 
make the tasks and responsibilities of the ECA both urgent and daunting.
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CHAPTER 2
STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION, LEADERSHIP, RESOURCES 
AND WORK PROGRAMMES OF THE ECA
1. INTRODUCTION
Given the economic problems facing African states, their 
expectations and demands on the ECA discussed in the previous chapter, 
in this chapter we are examining the structure and organization, as 
well as the leadership, programmes and resources of the Commission.
For an organization to function effectively, it must be sensitive to 
the environment. The leadership has to provide for and encourage proper 
and effective management. The status and skills of its staff is also 
an important factor for its operations. Moreover, the organization 
must not only survive but grow in scope if it is to have an effect on 
the continent. In order to generate demands for a wider jurisdiction, 
the organization’s output has to please the member states and inspire 
them to make financial contributions and more demands. On the whole, 
the efficiency of the ECA will depend to a large extent on the perform­
ance of its secretariat and subsidiary organs. The performance is 
determined by its resources both financial and manpower and how it uses 
them to achieve the objectives of its programmes. The quality and 
usefulness of the secretariat are in turn dependent upon the quality 
and dedication of its staff.
2. STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION
The activities and programmes of the Comnjission are centred on
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its secretariat while major decisions are made by its policy-making 
organs established at both the continental and subregional levels. But 
first our attention is towards the secretariat. This is an executive 
organ headed by the Executive Secretary, appointed by the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations. The functions of the secretariat are 
stipulated in Rule 28 of its terms of reference which states that "The 
Secretariat shall interpret speeches made at meetings; shall receive, 
translate and circulate the documents of the Commission, its committees 
and its subsidiary bodies; shall publish and circulate the records of 
the sessions, the resolutions of the Commission and the relevant 
documentation required. It shall have the custody of the documents in 
the archives of the Commission and generally perform all other work 
which the Commission may r e q u i r e . I n  performing these functions, the 
Commission has gradually established itself as a modern international 
civil service. The growth of the secretariat has been the subject of 
debate in the 1970s and 1980s especially with the recent efforts to 
streamline the United Nations System.
The ECA secretariat took part in the improvement exercise of the 
UN System in the 1970s with the aim of making the Commission more 
responsive to the development needs of the region and providing the 
basis for more effective and efficient performance. Through its Director 
of Administrative Management Services, the secretariat conducted a study 
in 1975 and recommended that the structure of the ECA be revised and 
streamlined. Since then the ECA has been implementing the recommendations 
of the study with reference to its substantive divisions, sections and 
units. The substantive divisions correspond to the main programmes of 
the Commission. Currently, the programmes are grouped into 10 areas - 
socio-economic research and planning; food and agriculture; industrial 
development; international trade and finance; social development,
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environment and human settlement; natural resources and energy; 
transport, communication and tourism; public administration, manage­
ment and manpower; statistics; and population. There is an extra 
division for the administration and conference services. This caters 
for the personnel, clinic, budget, general services, Library and 
communication centre. In all, the ECA currently has 11 substantive 
divisions (see Figure 1). Each division is in turn split into sections 
for specialization and efficiency. For example, the ECA/FAO agriculture 
division has three sections - food and agricultural policy and planning; 
agricultural production, institution and service; and agricultural 
marketing. In some cases the sections are further divided into units. 
For example, the transport, communication and tourism division has a 
section and a unit, that is, the transport and tourism section and the 
communications unit.
The changes that occurred during the period 1968 to 1987 are shown 
in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1 Organizational Changes of the ECA Secretariat
Dates
No. of 
Substantive 
Divisions
Sections Units
Overall
Total
1968a 7 22 38 67
1975^ 10 35 13 58
1982° 11 30 15 56
1987d 11 32 12 55
Source: Information compiled from:
(a) Organizational Chart of ECA 1968;
(b) Organizational Chart, reference 075-215, 1 March 1975;
(c) Organizational Chart 1982;
(d) Secretariat of the ECA, Chart 084-200, issued by the 
documentation unit, ECA, 1987.
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The major reorganization of the ECA took place in the period 1968-1975 
when the divisions were expanded by three, the sections had 17 additions, 
while the units were reduced by 25. The period 1975-1987 saw slight 
variations in the number of divisions, sections and units.
In its present form the secretariat consists of the Cabinet Office
of the Executive Secretary (COES), under which are the following offices:
Policy and Programme Co-ordination Office (PPCO); Office of the Secretary
of the Commission; Economic Co-operation Office; Technical Assitance
Co-ordination and Operations Office (TACO); African Training and Research
Centre for Women (ATRCW); Information Services Unit; and the Security
and Safety Unit. This is followed by its 11 sustantive divisions, 32
sections and 12 units as shown in the organizational chart (Figure 1) .
Between 1975-1982 the substantive divisions were increased from 10 to
11. The new addition was the public administration, management and
manpower. The increase was justified on the grounds that the social
development, environment and human settlement division was too big and
also because of the importance of public administration and manpower
development needs. Although the total number of divisions, sections
It,
and units has decreased somewhat, the apartments are still quite many.
In 1968 the overall total for them was 67, it decreased to 58, 56 and 
then 55 in 1975, 1982 and 1987, respectively (see Table 2.1).
In practice its organizational structure reflects an interplay 
and pursuit of different patterns of operation. Each division operates 
with its set of objectives, goals and programmes independent of the 
other. The revision of the structure of the ECA has been accompanied 
by rigid bureaucratic rules and procedures. The results include delays, 
postponment and abandoning of programmes and, to an extent, the by-passing 
of certain aspects in order to meet datelines. For example, programme
managers draw up the programme proposals for each division without 
prior consultation with the states. The latter do not get to discuss 
the programme budgets before they are forwarded to the Secretary- 
General. This is because its text is prepared by the secretariat in 
the form which is almost final and members have neither the means nor 
the time to undertake major changes to the drafts.
As was indicated earlier on, the ECA has policy-making organs 
at both the continental and subregional levels. For the former, the 
Conference of Ministers is its main legislative organ. It was esta­
blished in 1969 and initially held meetings biennially up to 1979 and 
annually thereafter. The biennial meetings created a vacuum in getting 
urgent economic matters dealt with. The Commission had to change the
timing Mso that ministers can meet more frequently to discharge their
2
duties and responsibilities ..." It is made up of ministers of economic 
development and planning for all the member states. The main functions 
of the Conference of Ministers are to:
(a) consider matters of policy and the priorities to be assigned 
to the programmes and other activities of the Commission;
(b) consider intra-African and international policy issues and 
make recommendations on such issues to member states;
(c) review programme implementation during the preceding years 
and approve at every other meeting the proposed biennial 
programme of work and priorities;
(d) consider reports submitted to it by the Technical Preparatory 
Committee for the Whole;
(e) consider questions relating to the representation of the African
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region on international and inter-governmental bodies dealing 
with economic and social matters;
(f) consider and endorse for onward transmission to the Economic 
and Social Council, and General Assembly proposals emanating 
from sectoral ministerial conferences; and,
(g) consider the work programmes of the MULPOCs and integrate these 
with the overall programme of work and priorities of the 
Commission.3
Although the Conference of Ministers has to perform these func­
tions, they face fundamental problems in the sense that the policies 
and programmes of the ECA are not formulated within this major organ.
In fact, the secretariat presents documents of its programmes in a 
semi-final draft form. The Conference of Ministers has little time 
to deliberate on them. But since endorsement has to be given, the 
ministers usually do so. They seldom deviate from ECA drafts. In 
effect, the ministers meet annually to endorse policies, priorities 
and strategies of the ECA and not those put forward by the member 
states.
Before 1979, the Commission had two other principal organs 
assisting the Conference of Ministers. These were the Technical 
Committee of Experts and the Executive Committee. The former was the 
organ through which the overall ECA work programmes were channelled 
to the conference of Ministers. Its meeting preceded that of the latter. 
The Executive Committee was originally a small body of 16 member states, 
representing the whole region in between the biennial meetings of the 
Conference of Ministers. It dealt with routine matters but lacked 
effective representation of the various opinions of African governments.
- l i ­
lt was the organ which submitted the Revised Framework of Principles 
for the Implementation of the NIEO in Africa 1976-1981-1986. (This 
was the document that formed the basis for the formulation of the 
Lagos Plan of Action.) Due to its unrepresentativeness, the Committee 
requested the Executive Secretary to circulate the document to all 
member states because it spelt out African strategy for development 
for a 10-year period and also they felt that it offered a change in 
approach. A second and more representative meeting was convened to 
discuss the document before it was finally adopted.
Despite the move to send the documents directly to all member 
states, the Executive Committee continued to exist. It met four times 
in between the biennial meetings of the Conference of Ministers but its 
decisions did not have the same legal basis as those of the former, 
even though it was the same ministers who attended both. Secondly, 
the Commission realized that it was better and cheaper for the Confer­
ence of Ministers meeting to be held annually and decisions to be taken 
on issues before it, than hold four meetings of the Executive Committee 
whose decisions had very limited legal basis and could not therefore 
be implemented until they have been approved by the Conference of 
Ministers. The Commission, therefore, sought to abolish the Executive 
Committee and it endorsed the recommendations because it felt that "not 
only will it lead to substantial reduction in the number of meetings,
it will also enhance the Commission’s effectiveness as it can take
4
decision on issues coming before it at its annual meetings".
The Conference of Ministers at its fifth meeting in Rabat, Morocco, 
in 1979 decided in its resolution 330(xiv) to abolish the Executive 
Committee and the Technical Committee of Experts and created instead 
a Technical Preparatory Committee of the Whole (TEPCOW). The TEPCOW
1- I l ­
ls composed of high-level officials representing member states of 
the Commission and deals with the various matters submitted for the 
consideration of the annual meetings of the Conference of Ministers.
The Committee meetings still preceded those of the Conference of 
Ministers. After discussing the various matters to come before the 
ministerial conference it adopts a report reflecting its deliberations 
and containing its observations, conclusions and recommendations. So 
in effect, the Commission has two main policy organs rather than the 
original three.
In addition to the policy organs, the Commission established some 
subsidiary organs to cater for specific sectors. The first set of 
these are the sectoral ministerial conferences. Each conference is 
composed of ministers of the government of member states responsible 
for a particular development sector. Each conference is also assisted 
by a Committee of Officials drawn from the ministries responsible for 
such development sectors and nominated by their governments on the basis 
of their specialized knowledge. The meeting of the Committee of Officials 
immediately precedes that of the ministerial conference in question.
Presently, there are at least eight sectoral conferences on industry; 
trade; social affairs; transport and communications; human resources 
planning; development and utilization; regional conference on the inte­
gration of women in development; and that on Africa1s least developed 
countries.
The subregional policy organs are grouped under this section as 
well and, as at the continental level, there are two organs. At the 
ministerial level, the policy organ is the Council of Ministers. It
is composed of the ministers for development planning of each country
y
in the subregion. The organ acts on behalf of the regional ECA
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Conference of Ministers and is the supreme policy organ of the MULPOC.
The Council of Ministers is assisted by a Committee of Officials who
are usually principal or permanent secretaries for development planning.
The functions of the organ include the identification of programmes;
preparation of a detailed work programme for the approval of the Council
of Ministers; monitoring and evaluation of approved programmes; and
advising on personnel and administrative structure of the MULPOCs and
£
assisting in mobilizing resources. The organ also meets prior to that 
of the Council of Ministers. The Commission has the two organs esta­
blished in Central, Eastern and Southern, and West Africa. In the case 
of North Africa it has only a Council of Plenipotentiaries, which is 
a meeting of envoys and officials chosen by the countries. The Council 
of Plenipotentiaries is different in the sense that no high-ranking 
officials of ministeries of development and planning attend. Ambassadors 
and representatives of embassies attend who may not be versed in the 
development issues in the area. The main reason for this state of affairs 
is the political conflicts between the states, for example, the Algerian- 
Tunisian conflict and Western Sahara dispute. (The subregional policy 
organs have been dealt with extensively in Chapters 6-9.)
The Commission also has specialized subsidiary bodies and currently 
three are in existence, namely, the joint conference of African planners, 
statisticians and demographers; the inter-governmental committee of 
experts for science and technology development; and the joint inter­
governmental regional committee on human settlements and environment.
When on considers that all the major policy, subsidiary and 
specialized organs have to meet each year and the number of documents 
they have to work through, it is no wonder that hardly any concrete 
decisions and programmes are endorsed. Reading through the countless
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reports of these meetings is an agonizing, tedious and unproductive 
exercise because one does not get the feeling that any vital programmes 
are endorsed. The secretariat produces similar reports each year.
There are no set targets for programmes, neither do the documents con­
tain estimates of the costs of the studies and research to be carried 
out from year to year. Another problem is the lack of time-span for 
the studies. And although the various decision-making organs have the 
function of monitoring and evaluating programmes, they are not equipped 
with an organ to do such things. The result is that there is no 
systematic monitoring and evaluation of programmes. Therefore, the 
Commission has no proper way of indicating whether its programmes are 
yielding negative or positive results. Again, the Commission is 
duplicating its efforts. It not only established policy organs at the 
continental level but also subregional and specialized ones. All these 
organs have done much to turn it into a meeting-machinery. Officials 
spend so much time preparing the drafts for the various meetings and 
there seems to be no end in sight for such meetings.
3. LEADERSHIP OF THE ECA
A number of articles have been written about the leadership of 
the ECA. In the literature the dominating aspect is the comparison 
of the last two Executive Secretaries of the Commission, that is,
Robert K.A. Gardiner and Adebayo Adedeji. But first, let me correct 
an impression which flows from such writings that the former was the 
first Executive Secretary of the ECA.^
The first Executive Secretary in 1958 was the late Dr. Mekki 
"Abbas of Sudanese nationality. During his term of office, he was the
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acting Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the Congo, 
now Kinshasa. He served up to 1962 and in 1963 became the Assistant 
Director-General to the Food and Agriculture Organization’s department
g
of Economic and Social Affairs. The late Dr. Abbas served only one 
term of office and the point to be made is that the Commission was still 
in its early years and so it is difficult to assess the era and his 
contribution.
9
Robert Gardiner took over from 1962-1975, while Adebayo Adedeji 
has been in office since 1975. A period of 27 years has afforded authors 
the opportunity to assess their roles and leadership style. In summary, 
Gardiner has been portrayed as a moderate international civil servant, 
while Adedeji is seen as a dynamic and politically oriented leader.
Gruhn (1979; 1984)^ described Gardiner's style and posture as that of 
a national and international civil servant, whose intention was that 
the ”ECA should steer a neutral course and not get into the fray of 
inter-African and national African politics. In true UN style, studies 
and documents written by the ECA were not supposed to offend governments. 
It was to be the ECA's task to show African leaders and governments what 
was feasible and to provide the informational background upon which 
decisions could be made".^ She added that throughout Gardiner’s tenure 
”his leadership and style did not produce either a well-defined organiz­
ational ideology or a sense of intellectual excitement that would inspire
the dedication of the ECA staff or give its work output an identity and
12
visibility among its clients". She concluded that "indeed, when
Gardiner retired in 1975, few leaders and governments in Africa believed
13
the ECA to be a potent instrument".
On the Adedeji era, Gruhn stated that "given his background and 
personality, it was assumed that he would perceive his role as Executive
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Secretary of the ECA more as a lobbyist and salesman for African needs 
and strategies, and less as an international civil servant. Indeed, 
the record to date indicates that under his stewardship the ECA is
14
more visible and activist, especially on the African continent itself".
She also pointed out that in his first years in office, Adedeji appeared 
to have devoted more attention to generating visibility for himself 
and the ECA on the African continent than "attending to the badly needed 
organizational capacity building at the ECA headquarters itself".^
The problem is that despite reorganization, the bureaucratic 
malaise within the organization and its functional effectiveness show 
no visible signs of improvement. In a sense the same criticisms made 
against Gardiner’s era is true of Adedeji1s because his style of leader­
ship has neither produced a well-defined organizational ideology nor 
a sense of intellectual excitement that would inspire the dedication 
of the ECA staff. While discussing with a cross-section of officials 
at the headquarters, the impression one got was that they were happy 
to work at the ECA because they earned so many dollars (see Appendix 6) 
and the fringe benefits allowed them to send their children to the best 
schools in Addis Ababa and abroad. They were also able to afford good 
accommodation and drove expensive cars. These were the reasons why 
they were at the ECA and not because they believed in what the latter 
was all about.^
The observation made during the fieldwork was that the present 
Executive Secretary, that is, Adedeji, spent much time outside Addis 
Ababa. His critics among the staff accuse him of honouring every 
ridiculous invitation from Africa and foreign governments and organiz­
ations. Such critics argued that he was taking advantage of the travelling
s '
allowances of about US$ 300 which he is entitled to each time he travels
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out of Addis Ababa in an official capacity. Speaking to delegates 
attending the opening session of the 45th meeting of the Council of 
Ministers of the OAU in February 1987, they widely agreed that Adedeji 
was a highly articulate man who has travelled around the world and was 
aware of the many economic and social problems facing Africa presently 
but they were weary of his constant rhetoric and pessimistic warnings.
What they needed most was solutions to the problems and not words.
The feeling was that the ECA has failed to provide solutions, well- 
defined and concrete programmes in Africa. As a result, the Commission 
was in danger of losing its credibility in Africa.
In an interview with Professor Adebayo Adedeji,^ he defended 
his actions. He admitted that he had to travel often because there was 
the great need to be in touch with African governments and other special­
ized agencies as a means of persuading them to provide more funds for 
the ECA through the extra-budgetary arrangements. Through his travels 
he was also able to consult and advise African governments on how best 
to tackle their problems. On the question of the ECA not implementing 
tangible programmes, he said that this was due to lack of funds. He
pointed out that lack of adequate finance was the greatest constraint
18
on the Commission. As for research, this was important and 
necessary because of the dearth of information on socio-economic matters 
in Africa. He therefore saw research and studies as vital activities 
of the Commission.
According to West Africa, "Adebayo Adedeji has now been so long
in his job that he seems a permanent fixture of the African scene, so
19
much so that he is in danger of being taken for granted". It is now 
14 years since he has been in Addis Ababa and there is a danger of this 
happening, especially if the ECA does not come .up with tangible programmes.
But after speaking to him, the impression was that he was willing and 
eager to continue at his post. He sees himself as a capable salesman 
whose job is to tell Africa what to do. He was a very able speaker 
and confident of what he was doing.
But there is a problem when making comparisons of styles and
leadership qualities when there is very little by way of reference
point. To put the distinguishing characteristics of the personalities
in a proper perspective begs the questions, (a) What is the Executive
Secretary supposed to do? (b) To what extent has he done his duties?
The answers to these lie partly in the stipulations in the terms of
reference on the role of the Executive Secretary. What is required
of the leadership is cast in a general form. The Executive Secretary
"shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Commission, its
committees and subsidiary bodies. He may designate another member of
20
staff to take his place at any meeting". He shall "direct the staff
provided by the Secretary-General and required by the Commission and
21
any subsidiary bodies". He shall be "responsible for keeping the
members and associate members of the Commission informed of any ques-
22
tions which may be brought before it for consideration". At the
beginning of each session the Executive Secretary "shall present a
23
report on the work programme of the secretariat". He may make "oral
as well as written statements to the Commission, its committees and
24
subsidiary bodies". He shall be "responsible for all the necessary
arrangements for meetings of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies".
The expenditure proposal has to be circulated to member states before
26
being approved by the Commission. And most important of all "the
Executive Secretary in carrying out his functions shall act under the
27
-authority and on behalf of the Secretary-General".
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The functions stipulated here show that the Executive Secretary
has to act within the context of the UN system. Therefore, the idea
of the ECA having a dual mandate of being an arm of the UN and an African
28
organization is absurd. Gruhn argued that under Gardiner’s stewardship,
the ECA rather than resolving its dual mandate, sought to serve in
29various capacities as an arm of the UN system. The ECA is not a
truly African regional organization like the OAU. Like other regional 
economic commissions, it is the creation of both the General Assembly 
and ECOSOC. The ECA does not have an independent existence of its own 
outside the UN System. Its budget is part of the regular budget of the 
UN. The staff are recruited by the Secretary-General of the UN and are 
therefore subject to the UN staff rules and regulations. Under these 
circumstances, the Executive Secretary can only function and has been 
doing so within the UN system and therefore there is no question of the 
ECA having a dual mandate.
Both Gardiner and Adedeji have carried out their duties within 
the set guidelines. In fact, there are elements of conformity and 
continuity between the two personalities. For example, Robert Gardiner 
laid the foundation for unity through regional economic groupings with 
ECOWAS as its first creation. Adedeji took up where Gardiner left off 
by creating even more regional economic groupings such as the Eastern 
and Southern African Preferential Trade Area (PTA). The ECA is pressing 
ahead with its plans to create a similar body in North Africa by 1990.
The promotion of regional economic groupings is one of the cornerstones 
of ECA activities. The second element of continuity has to do with the 
eagerness to convene meetings and the tons of documents prepared each 
year on research and surveys. Quoting from the West Africa, "It is 
^the intellectual and statistical input into the formulation of Africa’s 
own strategies that has always been a key part, of the ECA’s vocation
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and it is this that Adedeji has maintained and developed". The 
Commission has thus developed as the primary source of basic socio­
economic data on Africa.
But perhaps the point that has to be made about style and leader­
ship is that within the general guidelines given, the Executive 
Secretaries in each case had tried to respond to environmental pressures.
Put in this context, their functions and abilities can be understood.
Looked at from this perspective, the executive secretaries became victims 
of circumstances because there is the need for them to function as part 
of the UN System and at the same time to be seen responding to demands 
of member states. For instance, Robert Gardiner was operating in an 
era when most African states had gained political independence and had 
embarked on nation-building. The ECA was in its formative years and he 
was getting to know the member states. Development issues and strategies 
were still being explored and what was considered as African interests 
were not clearly defined. Also there were no clear visions, expectations 
and demands of member states on the Commission. The setting was therefore 
such that the ECA was trying to cope with its teething problems as well 
as those of the newly emerging states. The Commission was operating 
with unknown variables both in terms of setting up its secretariat and 
the external environment.
The leader of the Commission naturally had to be cautious and 
experimental, a requirement which no doubt largely explains Gardiner's 
moderation. In Adedeji's case African governments had greater expect­
ations of the Commission. They wanted the ECA to come up with a
development philosophy with a specifically African flavour. They wanted
31
concrete programmes which gave value for money. On the ECA's programmes, 
P.S. Mmusi, Vice-President of Botswana, urged that the "ECA should
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establish clear priorities" and warned that "an all or nothing approach
32
will merely add to our under-achievement". So on the whole, the present 
Executive Secretary is operating in an era where there is growing dis­
satisfaction among member states about the activities of the Commission 
and their unwillingness to make financial contributions. On the other 
hand, the Secretariat is highly developed but faces administrative and 
financial crisis. It seems the natural course for Adedeji to steer is 
in his present role as salesman and lobbyist on the continent. When 
we pitch the styles and leadership within the context of the operational 
environment, some of the allegations of Gruhn and others lose their 
effectiveness. As with other aspects of the Commission, the Executive 
Secretary faces constraints which have their origin in the UN System 
of which the ECA is a part. Arguments about personalities and styles 
may satisfy our subjective views but we cannot overlook such constraints.
In the long run, each aspect such as the Secretariat and its 
leadership cannot provide the complete picture of what the Commission 
is all about. We have to consider its financial resources. For any 
organization to be able to function, it must have finances. What it 
can do will depend on this. Also its opportunities and choices will 
be determined by the financial resources at its disposal at any given 
time.
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4. FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER RESOURCES
The Commission has two main sources of finance. There is the 
regular budget which is usually approved by the General Assembly. The 
second is referred to as the extra-budgetary funds, which is a combin­
ation of funds from other IGOs and specialized agencies of the UN, 
bilateral arrangements and contributions from the member states. It 
began in 1958 with a membership of nine African states and an annual
regular budget of US$ 0.5 million. This grew to US$ 4.65 million by 
33
1968. The budget continued to rise, growing by about 160 per cent
from US$ 13.9 million for 1974-75 to about US$ 36 million for 1982-83,^^
although much of the increase was due to inflation. In real terms, the
regular budget has increased only by about 1.7 per cent annually. The
budget officer of the ECA pointed out that in the period 1984-87 the
35
growth rate of the ECA’s budget was about 2 per cent. He said that 
with such a minimal growth rate, it was difficult for the ECA to carry 
out its programmes and activities.
The ECA has the same basic programme structure, similar patterns 
of budgetary growth and generally similar budget size as the other 
regional commissions (except for the Economic Commission for Western 
Asia (ECWA) which is the newest and smallest of the commissions). The 
comparative figures in 1980-83 are given in Table 2.2.
During the decade from 1974-1983 the total ECA programme budget 
direct costs had grown steadily from US$ 18.3 million in 1974-75 to
O £
US$ 71.5 million for 1982-83, an increase of about 700 per cent.
This represents a shift in the nature of ECA funding. In 1974-75 less 
than one-quarter of its biennial budget came from extra-budgetary 
sources, but for 1982-83 half the total budget was financed from this 
source. /
Table 2.2 Comparative Budget Situation for the Regional Commissions 1980-1983
1980-
Budgets (US$m)
•1981
Prof:. :Staff
1982-
Budget (US$m)
■1983
Prof . Staff
RB XB TOTAL RB XB TOTAL RB XB TOTAL RB XB TOTAL
ECA 29.1 30.1 59.1 194 21 215 36.0 35.4 71.4 196 18 214
ECLA 42.2 20.9 63.1 187 50 237 61.2 17.5 78.7 188 35 223
ECWA 14.5 7.5 22.0 98 15 113 16.8 5.6 22.4 99 13 112
ESCAP 26.1 33.3 59.4 117 43 220 32.4 59.7 92.4 191 37 228
Source: Report on the ECA: Regional Programming, Operations, Restructuring and Decentralization,
Doc. JIU/REP/82/1, prepared by Alfred N. Ford and Miljenko Vukovi, Geneva, January 1982, p. 4.
Key: RB is Regular Budget
XB is Extra-budgetary Funds
ECLA is Economic Commission for Latin America
ECWA is Economic Commission for Western Asia
ESCAP is Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
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In addition to the shift in the nature of its funding there is
also a change in the sources of the fund. In the mid-1970s most of
the extra-budgetary funds came from bilateral sources. But in the
late 1970s and the 1980s, the UNDP has become the dominant outside
source of funding. The latter provided US$ 22 million of the estimated
US$ 47 million for the period 1978-81, including technical training and
assistance specifically intended to help develop the ECA’s programming,
project management and operational capabilities and most of the funding 
38
for the MULPOCs. The United Nations Fund for Population Activities
(UNFPA) also provided funds to the ECA and is the second largest source.
Its contribution for the period 1970-1983 was US$ 16 million, equivalent
39
to 14 per cent of available resources. Much of its contribution goes 
to finance regional advisory services in demographic statistics, inform­
ation gathering and national workshops in population and development.
The third source of funding since 1979 has been the contribution
of African governments through the United Nations Trust Fund for African
Development (UNTFAD). The governments make pledges at UNTFAD conferences
held biennially and resources totaling US$ 6 million have been used to
40
implement programmes. Governments usually make their contributions
to specific programmes. For example, Nigeria provided seed money for
the African Institute for Higher Technical Training and Research (AIHTRR).
The Secretariat also negotiates with donor governments and institutions
of the developed countries for direct grants-in-aid as well as provision
of expert services under non-reimbursable loan agreements. From
US$ 434,000 in 1970, this programme has increased to approximately
41
US$ 3 million annually today.
The ECA is facing difficulties as far as its extra-budgetary funds
/
are concerned. The summary of the pledges made at three biennial UNTFAD
Pledging Conferences 1977-81 reveal that at each conference, member 
states and other institutions have successfully pledged less than on 
previous occasions. Some states have still not paid up and the situ­
ation remained basically unchanged.. The summary is as follows:
Table 2.3 Status of UNTFAD (in US dollars)
Pledges Payments Balance
Lagos, April 1977 2 963 133 2 807 724 155 409
Rabat, March 1979 2 344 590 1 437 663 906 927
Free Town, April 1981 1 763 513 497 711 1 265 802
7 071 236 4 743 098 2 328 138
Source: UNTFAD: Proress Report on pledges and payments by member
states and institutions, project implementation and 
expenditures for the period 1981/82, E/ECA/CM.9/17,
March 1983, p.l.
The figures show that financial support to UNTFAD was waning from
US$ 2,963,133 in 1977 to US$ 1,763,513 in 1981. But perhaps more
striking were the differences in pledges arid actual payments - the
figures reflected in the column for balance. In 1977, the outstanding
balance was US$ 155,409. The amount increased to US$ 906,927 and
US$ 1,265,802 in 1979 and 1981, respectively. The Executive Secretary
saw no end to this trend. Out of 50 African states, 20 countries
43
paid their pledged contributions in full. A total of 14 countries
44
made partial payments, while 6 countries did not pay any part of
45
their pledged contributions. 10 countries have never pledged at any
46
of the conferences. (The actual amounts pledged by each country and 
institutions for the period 1978-83 are shown in Appendix 3. For
- 86 -
pledged contributions unpaid by each country, see Appendix 4, and for 
a summary of unpaid pledged contributions, see Appendix 5.)
Not only are the contributions falling as indicated in the tables
above, but also the ECA faces delays in processing the money pledged.
The Technical Assistance Co-ordination and Operations Office (TACO) is
responsible for the operational activities of the ECA and most of the
funds collected through the UNTFAD are processed by this unit. TACO
is also responsible for administering and monitoring of the extra-
budgetary funds. The unit is supposed to invite programme managers to
submit programmes for its approval before approaching the donors. But
in practice, TACO gets the money first and then calls for the programmes
and approves them, on the basis of money received. An officer of the
unit explained that this is due to delays in processing the money. He
pointed out that even when states actually pay their pledges, it takes
47
between 3-6 months for the money to get to TACO in Addis Ababa. He 
explained that if a country like Nigeria makes a pledge and then remits 
the money, the fund has to be channelled through the Manhattan Chase 
Bank in New York, through Lloyds Bank in London, before getting to the 
ECA headquarters. Such delays hold back the recruitment of consultants 
and the actual implementation period for the programmes.
The priorities of the ECA's spending was another source of anxiety.
The priorities have remained fairly constant over the 1974-87 period. 
Development issues, transportation, statistics, industrial development, 
food and agriculture and international trade have been the major programmes. 
But based on total funds, the priorities among programmes are considerably 
different because of factors such as donors preferred sectors and the 
actual extra-budgetary funds. The assessment of ECA funding priorities
s''
is complicated by whether they are measured by regular budget funds,
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extra-budgetary funds, total funds or as part of total African-wide 
funds for development in any given sector.
The main heads of expenditure covered by the ECA budget are 
expenditure relating to established posts, consultancy, travel and 
supplies of materials. Manpower resources accounted for the largest 
share of its budgets. The reason is that the bulk of the Secretariat's 
work consisted mainly of research and studies. For example, the 
resources for established posts increased from US$ 639,500 in 1960 to 
US$ 3,362,000 million in 1970, representing a growth in professional 
staff from 50 in 1960 to 142 in 1970; and between 1971 and 1981, man­
power resources increased from US$ 3,456,000 million to US$ 8,563,300
million respectively, which represented a growth in professional staff
48
from 164 in 1971 to 194 in 1981. Since a greater part of its expend­
iture goes on administrative costs the Secretariat experiences constraints 
because it has less funds for its programmes. It is also operating with 
a regular budget with a growth rate of about 2 per cent and in an era 
when its extra-budgetary funds are diminishing. The officials are well 
aware of these financial constraints but there is an added element of 
uncertainty in the sense that the Commission has limited chances of 
improving its financial situation. In the final analysis, the ECA has 
inadequate funds to support its elaborate structure and organization.
For the reasons stated above, the argument is that lack of finance is 
the most important constraint on the ECA.
Another constraint for the Commission relates to its manpower 
resources and its management, although it is also true that its major 
resource is the total number of established professional or regular 
budget posts. For the categories and salary scale of these posts, see 
Appendix 6. The top posts of Under-Secretary General and Assistant
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Secretary-General are political appointments. The same applies to 
that of the Director. The posts of principal officers D-l down to 
Assistant Officer P-l are civil servants who are appointed through the 
normal recruitment procedures of the UN. Below the posts of Assistant 
Officer (P-l), the ECA has general service staff, employed locally.
The posts are made up of administrative officers and their assistants, 
executive officers, secretaries, typists, drivers, cleaners, messengers 
and security officers. The categories of general service staff range 
from GS 1-9.
There has been a huge increase in the number of general service 
staff employed, while the number of professional posts has declined 
during the 1974-84 period. The professional posts increased rapidly 
in the 1960s but faced decline in the mid-1970s and the 1980s. The 
early build up of ECA staff is shown in the following figures:
Table 2.4 ECA Staff 1960-68
December Professionals
Non-
Professionals Total
1960 42 63 105
1961 46 114 160
1962 80 160 240
1963 113 167 280
1964 117 175 292
1965 117 175 292
1966 136 235 371
1967 136 235 371
1968 137 236 373
y
Source: A Venture in Self-Reliance : Ten Years of ECA 1958-1968,
ECA, Addis Ababa, 1968, p. 183.
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Between 1960-64 both the number of professional and non-professional 
staff increased. But between 1965-67 there was no increase in either 
professional or non-professional staff. The period corresponds with 
the time when the subregional offices were being evaluated. The 
Commission was about to re-organize its structure and policy organs.
By 1974-75 the ECA had 226 professional posts (of which 62 were
extra-budgetary) but by 1982-83 the number had dropped to 214 posts
49
(of which 18 were extra-budgetary). Although the total number of 
staff, that is, both professionals and general service staff employed, 
rose to about 1000 in 1987, the number of professionals is still below 
300."^ The general service posts grew from 294 in 1974-75 to 427 in 
the 1982-83 period.^
General ECA programme support funding and staff growth has been
restricted. From the 1974-75 biennium to 1982-83 funding has grown
52
from US$ 5.2 million to US$ 15 million (up 190 per cent). Programme 
support has thus fallen behind the 290 per cent total budget growth 
during this period, and even more drastically behind the 700 per cent 
growth in extra-budgetary funds mentioned earlier. The area of 
expenditure which has grown rapidly in the past decade is executive
direction and management, which has moved from US$ 0.6 million in 1974-75
53
to US$ 10.8 million for 1982-83. It has become the second largest 
single programme element. (The first is administration and common 
services.) The growth has primarily been due to the addition of the 
Programming and Policy Co-ordination Unit (PPCO) and the MULPOCs 
functions to the Cabinet Office of the Executive Secretary (COES) 
following the restructuring of the UN System in the 1970s. The re­
structuring exercise saw the ECA attempting to combine its research, 
conferences and studies with programme implemet^fation for UN agencies
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and its MULPOCs. But the ECA management and administrative system had 
been overtaken by the extra responsibilities.
Its total programme budget and activities have grown substantially
but the management support systems have fallen far behind operational
needs and are hamstrung by rigid bureaucratic procedures. For example,
administrative rigidities affect posts in ECA joint divisions - thus
although the ECA/FAO in theory operate a joint unit for agriculture
and the ECA/UNIDO for industry, in practice the joint units are not
administered as integrated units. Programme managers complained that
this hampered programme performance. They pointed out that "savings
from vacant ECA posts could not be used for short-term recruitment for 
54
FAO posts." Some ECA officials expressed dissatisfaction at the way 
the bureaucracy makes them conduct their affairs on an ad hoc and last 
minute basis; and others felt that the programmes were not responsive 
to changing economic situations in Africa.^ The catalogue of management 
problem areas was extensive and included factors such as lateness of 
reports on financial and personnel status; unsteady flow of information 
on extra-budgetary funds; heavy workload on divisional or headquarters 
staff; inadequate planning of missions from ECA headquarters; inadequate 
staffing for conferences, translation and reproduction services; limited 
equipment and considerable work backlogs; limited consultant rosters 
hampering operations; and restrictive recruitment practices.
There are several reasons for these administrative problems. In 
addition to the size and structure of the ECA, there are problems 
relating to limited finances. But the major reason has to do with the
i i. ~
ECA’s efforts to decentralize to the subregions^ Hack of careful 
planning and execution of programmes on behalf of the MULPOCs. Although 
it divided Africa into four subregions and established five MULPOCs in
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Tangier, Niamey, Yaounde, Gisenyi and Lusaka, with their respective 
policy organs, the ECA Secretariat actually formulates and implements 
the programmes of the MULPOCs. It is in control of management and 
personnel matters as well. Decentralization has not taken place in 
practice as programming, finance and authority are still centralized.
The overall result is that the headquarters staff are doing the jobs 
for both headquarters and subregional organs.
Secondly, the JIU report puts the blame for the administrative
problems on a management development vacuum within the ECA. The report
states that "the Executive Secretary must travel extensively to meet
the many calls for co-operative action on the continent, keep up with
the current needs and problems, attend required inter-governmental
meetings and consult with other development organizations. It is
therefore impossible for him to give daily attention to the problems
56
of management development within the ECA". There is also a management 
development gap which is due to inadequate number of senior staff.
One Under-Secretary-General and one principal officer in the rank of 
D-2 are not sufficient to manage a US$ 71 million biennial programme 
with regional scope and complexity.
Thirdly, management bears some of the blame for sticking to rigid 
procedures. The administrative processes are often slow. The attitudes 
of the staff are similar to what one finds in most international organ­
izations. They go to work and leave their offices at the required time, 
except for conference periods when the staff of COES especially have 
to endure longer hours. The respond to questioning with the usual 
bureaucratic jargon and are familiar with UN procedures. They do not 
feel that they are in an organization committed to specific goals or 
missions. They do not see themselves as champions of any known cause
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relating to socio-economic development.
There are added problems relating to personnel and recruitment.
The increasingly short-term nature of many posts creates much insecurity
and disruption for the staff members involved and severe difficulties
for many programme managers who are worried that key posts and related
work may be abruptly terminated. It also makes the posts unattractive
to potential staff, and the many categories and frequent renewals of
contract create an extra burden for the ECA personnel section. The
personnel records indicate that professional staff turnover in regular
budget posts for 1977-80 averaged about 15 per cent, that is, about
58
one-seventh of this staff group leaves the ECA each year. The chief, 
staff services unit did not see this as a serious rate of turnover, 
but it does exceed the UN System average of 13 per cent for the same 
period.
Another problem with personnel is the slow and complicated 
recruitment process. The ECA has the authority to recruit general 
service staff, some short-term staff and the experts, so long as they 
reside in Africa. All other recruitments, extensions, promotions and 
classifications are made by or shared with the UN headquarters, and are 
therefore subject to the rigid and slow UN recruitment procedures and 
rules. Recruitment of regular and expert staff currently takes six 
to nine months. Once people are eligible for advertised positions and 
have been duly selected, they are given fixed term or temporary appoint­
ments initally. After a period of two years, the Secretariat reviews 
their competence. After the review they are now placed on probation 
for three years, at the end of which they can be either retained or asked 
to leave. The uncertainties which result from waiting to get a permanent 
job after five years can be partially responsible for the staff turnover.
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People will always move to jobs which require shorter probation 
periods.
ECA staff recruitment and retention are hampered by a modest
grade structure. A 1979 post classification survey by the Office of
Personnel Services (OPS) confirmed that the ECA has fewer staff at P-4
and above levels than other regional commissions. It recommended
59
upgrading of 27 posts and only three for downgrading. About half of 
the recommendations were included in the 1982-83 programme budget, 
with the rest not yet implemented as at April 1987. Another problem 
is the lack of training facilities for staff. The ECA provides training 
in English and French languages for its predominantly Ethiopian secret­
aries but no technical training for others dealing with formulation of 
policies to keep them informed about trends in the debate on development 
in Africa and the world over. Moreover, the staff do not write nor 
publish occasional papers like those of the IMF, which can allow them 
to share their views with academics, students and other international 
civil servants. The only person who seems to be publishing material 
extensively is the Executive Secretary.
Finally, the personnel division faces the problem of geographical 
distribution. The ECA has to an extent achieved the Africanization of 
its Secretariat which began in the 1960s. At present about 75 per cent 
of its staff are Africans. The remaining 25 per cent is made up of 
Europeans and Americans. It instituted desirable ranges for the 
geographic distribution of posts in 1981 but there was still an element 
of over-representation. Many of its best potential candidates come from 
10 of the 50 African member states. (These are Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire.) The 
bulk of the general staff are Ethiopians. The difficulties encountered
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by the Secretariat as a result of the reticence on the part of member 
states to release their competent officials to work at the ECA continues 
to be a major barrier to its Africanization policy. Until now the 
Secretariat had offset this shortage by recruiting Africans as consult­
ants when their national obligations did not allow them to work at the 
ECA for longer periods of time. This has enabled the Secretariat to
benefit from th expertise of 262 Africans out of 447 consultants between
60
January 1979 and November 1980. In 1982 the ECA recruited 255 Africans
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out of the total of 315 posts available. These data reflect the 
increase in the number of Africans whose skills have temporarily been 
placed at the ECA’s disposal to reinforce the permanent staff. But 
it gives a patchwork effect to the personnel structure. The consultants 
temporarily increase the numbers but once they have submitted their 
reports, they disappear for now, leaving the permanent staff to conduct 
any follow-up work that may be required. Factors such as the patchwork 
personnel structure, declining regular posts, staff turnover, modest 
grade levels, slow recruitment and geographical distribution constraints 
seriously undermine the capability of the ECA'S manpower resources. 
Moreover, the limited regular posts mean that the Secretariat has 
inadequate manpower resources.
5a. WORK PROGRAMMES OF THE ECA
The ECA has 10 sectoral programmes. These are in the field of 
food and agriculture; social development, environment and human settle­
ment; natural resources and energy; industrial development; international 
trade and finance; transport, communications and tourism; popualtion; 
public administration, management and manpower; statistics; and socio­
economic research and planning. The substantive divisions are
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established on the basis of these programmes as mentioned earlier.
Each sector/division sets its objectives, goals and strategies once
the Secretary-General of the UN gives the instructions and guidelines.
The co-ordination of the programmes are shared between three departments,
namely, the PPCO, TACO and ECO. The Policy and Programme Co-ordination
Office (PPCO) is responsible for co-ordination and overseeing the work
programmes of the divisions. It is also responsible for formulating
basic policies and strategies. TACO, as stated earlier, is responsible
mainly for co-ordinating programmes originating from extra-budgetary
sources, that is, technical co-operation programmes, while the Economic
Co-operation Office (ECO) deals with the overall promotion, co-ordination
and appraisal of economic and technical co-operation. But there are
no mechanisms for ensuring that approaches and strategies are shared
and that overall programming is orderly and well co-ordinated. The
PPCO issues guidelines and instructions but frequently the programme
managers ignore them. This presents more problems to the Chief of PPCO
as programme managers are often told to re-write their proposals. This
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has earned the PPCO the name "Permanent Policy Commission".
Also the co-ordination of programmes is on an ad hoc basis and 
very informal. There is no formal monitoring mechanism for the programmes 
except the preparation of the required UN programme performance report. 
This is because the ECA lacks programme information and programme 
management plans. On top of these shortcomings it does not possess an 
organ to evaluate its programmes. The Commission's evaluation activity 
has been confined to participation in UNDP evaluation exercises. The 
Chief of PPCO saw the lack of the organs for co-ordination, monitoring 
and evaluation as major problems for the Commission. Their absence is 
^largely explained by the fact that the ECA was not set up for the 
implementation of concrete programmes in the first instance. It is
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not clearly stated in the terms of reference that the Commission will 
do so.
The ECA has a peculiar programming cycle. The complete cycle is 
made up of four main elements, which are: (a) Medium-term plans;
(b) Programme budgets; (c) Reports on programme performance; and
(d) Evaluation reports. Each of the above corresponds to one phase in 
the programme planning cycle and consequently serves as a framework for 
subsequent phases.
The medium-term plan sets out the objectives of programmes and 
subprogrammes, the problems to be addressed and the strategy to be 
adopted in their implementation. It is a six-yearly plan which is 
subsequently divided into three biennial programme budgets. So the 
1984-89 medium-term plan provides a framework for the preparation of 
programme budgets for 1984-85, 1986-87 and 1988-89, respectively.
The reports on programme performance are supposed to be made up 
periodically to assist member states in monitoring the implementation 
of work and priorities during the biennium. But the ECA does not 
produce these often.
Evaluation reports determine the relevance, efficiency, effective' 
ness and impact of the activities in the programme budget in relation 
to their objectives. The ECA carried out evaluation missions with the 
UNDP in 1975 and 1982.
The programme budget has two elements - the programme arid the 
budget. The programme elements are determined and justified by the 
requirements of output delivery to member states in accordance with 
^the strategy proposed in the medium-term plans. The budget elements, 
on the other hand, are based on the programmed activities and presented
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in financial terms and work-months. The programme budget approval 
process is rather complicated. Firstly, the proposals are prepared by 
the different divisions and sent through the PPCO, to be submitted to 
the Secretary-General on his request. The programme data are then used 
as proposals in the proposed programme budget which is submitted by the 
Secretary-General to the General Assembly through the Fifth Committee, 
the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination (CPC) and the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). The ACABQ 
advises the General Assembly through the Fifth Committee on the level 
of financial resources to approve. The CPC, on the other hand, examines 
the programme elements and advises the General Assembly through the 
ECOSOC on what activities to approve. In effect, we have two bodies 
for the two elements of the programme budget. It is then left to the 
General Assembly to approve the programmes and the associated budget.
The Executive Secretary of the ECA has to submit the proposals 
without consultation and discussion with the member states. The result 
is that their views are usually not available to the Secretary-General 
before he finalizes his proposals. This is because "the policy organs 
may not have met and even when they do, their views and recommendations 
have always arrived too late to have a serious impact on the deliberations
£ O
of CPC". Although in 1986 the Secretariat gave a time-table that will 
assist in presenting the views of the ECA Conference of Ministers for 
consideration before finalizing its proposals, it has not been able to 
implement it. There was an added problem of programming^ the medium- 
term plans were produced years in advance. For example, the draft 
medium-term plan for 1990-95 was already prepared and submitted to the 
Conference of Ministers in April 1987. How can the programme managers 
pe sure that the proposals will be all right for the period envisaged?
Such an approach does not. allow for fluctuations in the economic
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conditions in Africa.
We found that there were not much differences in the style and 
contents of medium-term plans. In fact, the 1985-89 plan is very 
similar to that of the 1990-95, with one major exception. The Secretary- 
General requested an extension of the former for two years to 1991 
instead of presenting the proposal for 1990-95. This was due to the 
on-going reforms resulting from General Assembly resolution 41/213 on 
the review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial function­
ing of the UN and the desire of the resolution which emphasizes the need
for member states to be actively involved in the consultative process
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for the formulation of the medium-term plan. This is a healthy sign 
but it is too early to say whether this will become the norm. One is 
not also sure how this will work out in practice for the whole programming 
process. The dates for submission to the Secretary-General remain the 
same. This also applies to the dates for policy organ meetings of the 
ECA. The only point that can be made here is that the medium-term plan 
for 1990-95 has been suspended due to the extension of the previous one 
to 1991.
The bulk of the ECA’s programmes centre on conferences, meetings, 
workshops and seminars held each year, but the dominant aspect is reseach. 
It is this aspect which has been criticized in recent times by member 
states. In 1986, for instance, delegates stressed the "need to go beyond 
problem identification studies into practical and concrete proposals .... 
The only sector where the Commission has attempted to implement concrete 
programmes is transport and telecommunications, where it is involved 
with the purchase and installation of equipment and cables, and the 
training of technical staff. In the Eastern and Southern African sub- 
region, the Lusaka MULPOC purchased locomotives and shunting machines
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for the railway network (see Chapter 7). This sector is used here to 
highlight some of the potential and problems encountered by the ECA.
The ultimate goal is the development of transport and communic­
ations as a means to expand and diversify inter- and intra-regional 
links, with special attention to the special problems of landlocked, 
island and LDCs. Although the programme is geared towards assisting 
the LDCs, there is no indication of the aspects of transport or 
communications which the ECA wants to concentrate on. The medium-term 
plan for 1984-89 (extended to 1991) seeks to promote the development 
and integration of the transport and communications network in Africa; 
support the development and modernization of infrastructures and
equipment, and among other things, promote the development of tourism 
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in Africa. The programmes are part of the UN Transport and Communic­
ations Decade in Africa (UNCTACDA 1978-88). The principal goals of the 
strategy tie in tightly with the objectives outlined above. The goals 
are supposed to be realized through the implementation of projects at 
the regional, subregional and national levels. The Secretariat adopted 
two phases for implementation: Phase 1 (1980-83) and Phase 2 (1984-88).
It went further by creating 10 subprogrammes in the road sector; rail 
and maritime transport; ports; air transport, inland water transport; 
multimodel transport; telecommunications; broadcasting and postal 
services.
Roads and road transport was the largest subsector in the programme 
with 236 projects (see Table 2.5) for the period 1984-87. Out of these 
62 projects were reported completed. For rail transport, the Secretariat 
planned for 84 projects but was able to obtain information on the 
implementation status of 70 projects. (Five projects were cancelled 
from the approved programmed.) 14 projects were completed. Out of the
\
Table 2.5 Progress in Implementation of Phase II Programme 1987
Total no. of 
projects in 
programmes
No. of projects 
monitored
Projects completed 
to date
Projects under 
implementation
1984 1985 1986 1987 1984 1985 1986 1987 1984 1985 1986 1987
Road 236 74 82 155 201 2 14 50 62 27 49 64 70
Rail 84 23 31 58 70 0 2 16 14 7 19 31 40
Maritime 38 3 0 11 13 0 0 2 7 0 0 9 2
Ports 70 18 38 55 55 0 1 9 4 1 14 26 30
Air 94 24 34 57 69 1 5 5 11 9 12 23 31
Inland Water 45 5 7 17 19 0 0 1 2 1 3 5 5
Multimodal 11 2 4 5 7 1 1 3 4 0 2 2 2
Total Transport 578 149 160 341 434 4 22 78 109 50 99 160 180
Telecommunications 215 30 102 135 149 2 12 22 34 10 45 54 60
Broadcasting 120 33 46 64 100 6 9 11 15 7 17 22 33
Postal 125 33 53 74 115 1 3 6 6 4 14 25 30
Total Communications 470 104 201 273 364 9 24 39 55 30 72 102 123
Total Programme 1048 253 381 614 798 13 46 117 164 80 171 261 303
Source: United Nations Transport and Communications Decade in Africa: Report on progress in the implementation of
the second phase of the decade programme, Doc. E/ECA/CM.14/15, 3 March 1988, p. 4.
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38 projects in maritime transport, only 7 have been completed. For 
the 70 projects for ports, only 9 were completed. In air transport 
only 11 projects were completed out of a total of 94. The same picture 
runs through the whole sector, that is, the low rate of implementation and 
the large number of programmes in each subsector.
The Commission admitted that the prospects for achieving the
objectives laid down in transport and communications programmes remained 
6 7
dim. Its main reason for stating thus is the falling investment rate 
in Africa. There was the lack of growth in assistance from major 
financing institutions. Its efforts to mobilize resources for the 
programmes were fruitless because the two co-financing meetings scheduled 
for the transit corridor projects of Eastern and West Africa had to be 
postponed to 1988-89. This meeting has still not taken place as at May
1989, the main reason being that member states are facing financial
difficulties and funds from financial institutions have not been pledged.
But one telecommunications subsector, the Pan-African Documentation and 
Information System (PADIS), offers potential both in the sense that 
the ECA itself purchased equipment and computers and because this service 
is vital in Africa. PADIS is treated under a subheading below.
5b. PADIS AS AN EXAMPLE OF A CONCRETE PROGRAMME
PADIS is an attempt by the ECA to implement a real project. It
is a programme which is relatively easier to evaluate in terms of costs 
and benefits, something one cannot do with other ECA programmes such 
as research or workshops. When fully established, PADIS will play an 
important role in establishing communication links between states and 
in enhancing information-gathering. PADIS has been conceived as a
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development project, continental in scope, to fill the existing void 
in the information needs of the member states. During the OAU Economic 
Summit in 1980 African Heads of State and Government requested an 
information system to combat the dearth in information on socio-economic 
issues. The ECA responded to the request with the proposal for PADIS.
Its main objective is to provide ready access to information for policy­
makers, technicians, planners, institutions and financiers. In terms 
of its operational structure, the ECA proposed three main components:
(a) PADIS-DEV which is the economic and social development 
information component. This is a reference file including the develop­
ment plans of African countries, facts, trends and analysis, prescriptions 
for decision-making, operational experiences, consequences and evaluations. 
Information is to be stored in a computer installed at PADIS Central 
Co-ordination Office (CCO) and be made available through interactive 
computer terminals and user-oriented information retrieval software.
(The CCO is at the ECA headquarters at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.)
(b) PADIS-COM which is the collection of other complementary files 
prepared in collaboration with regional institutions such as ADB and 
IDEP; subregional institutions such as ECOWAS and the PTA; national 
documentation centres as well as the assistance of the ECA substantive 
divisions.
(c) PADIS-NET, that is, the telecommunication network for systems 
interconnection and information dissemination throughout Africa. This 
will be designed in collaboration with the European Space Agency (ESA).
The geographical structure of the entire project will be based on the 
subregions, namely, North, Central Eastern and Southern, and West Africa.
The overall budget for the 10 years of the PADIS project is
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approximately US$ 160 million for which the preliminary breakdown
has been tentatively estimated as:
(US$m)
African governments 16,000,000
UNDP 4,500,000
International Development 
Centre (IDRC)
Research
2 ,000,000
African Development Bank (ADB) 1 ,000,000
Other sources 141,500,000
Total (1980-89) 160,000,000
Source: PADIS: Programme of Assistance of the Commission of the
European Communities, PADIS/80/11/19/03, ECA, Addis Ababa, 
1980, p. 9.
The estimated costs of the project are as follows:
(US$m)
1 . Personnel 28,088,500
2. Consultancy 820,500
3. Training 2,510,000
4. Basic equipment 24,932,500
5. Telecommunication satellite 41,310,000
6 . Development of paricipating computerised
centres 30,694,300
7. Ground stations 31,246,000
8. Others 398,000
Total 160,000,000
Source: Establishment of PADIS: Progress Report and Future
Development Programmes, E/CN.14/TPCW.11/6, ECA, Addis 
Ababa, 25 November 1980, Annex 1.
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PADIS is to be implemented in three phases: Phase 1 (1980-82) 
is for setting up the PADIS Central Co-ordination Office; training of 
staff on methodology including input and output standards, the PADIS 
thesaurus for the PADIS-DEV, PADIS-COM components, installation of the 
computer centre with a HP 3000/111 and the MINISIS formation management/ 
storage and retrieval software, preparation of a PADIS index (DEVINDEX) 
and issue of a preliminary test version covering development information 
on Africa; Phase 2 (1982-86) is the operational phase with PADIS-DEV, 
PADIS STAT data bases coming into existence. This involves the 
implementation of an integrated PAN-AFRICAN data bank with files covering 
sectors such as transport, energy and education, training of experts 
for the collaboration centres, organization of technical assistance at 
subregional level, installation of computer facilities at the subregional 
level and the design of a telecom network (PADIS-NET extension) inter­
connecting these centres by us-ing satellite technology; Phase 
3 (1986-90) deals with the installation of the PADIS system and netwrok 
devices at the subregional, national and user level (ministeries, 
institutions, universities and companies). It implies the full exploit­
ation of the PADIS telecommunications satellite extension to all African 
countries. The Executive Secretary of the ECA said that when completed,
the system will make the storing and delivery of non-numerical data
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available to Africa for the first time. It is expected to have an 
integrated Pan-African data bank from which it will be able to provide 
decision-makers, researchers and scientists with files on such topics 
as transport, trade, industry, agriculture and technology. It is also 
expected that from 1990 PADIS will be supported completely by the African 
states with reference to funding.
The Commission has made considerable efforts to implement the 
components and phases of PADIS but it is facing problems of finance,
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restricted manpower needs, the legal requirements for setting up the 
subregional centres to mention but a few. The implication of these 
problems is that the ECA is not implementing the project according to 
the timetable.
In terms of the staff needed to support such a big project, the 
PADIS Central Co-ordiantion Office has four professional level staff, 
that is, the Director, the Chief of User Services, the Chief of Computer­
ized Data Base Development and the Chief of Training. There are also 
four technical staff or documentalists including a micro fiche technician, 
a computer technician and secretary. None of the posts is paid for from 
the ECA regular budget - all are paid from technical assistance project 
funds contributed by the UNDP and a grant from the International Develop­
ment Research Centre (IDRC) Canada. The funding of the former is up
to 1990, while that of the IDRC will last to the end of 1988. Dependence
on extra-budgetary funds for posts in PADIS creates uncertainty because 
once the funds run out, the ECA will have problems retaining the staff.
The Chief of User Services pointed out that "clearly problems are 
encountered in securing funding for the staff of PADIS for the future, 
since the project donors cannot be expected to continue funding salaries 
and in view of the financial crisis at the UN, one can hardly expect
the UN regular budget to take up all the posts listed above at a time
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when its resources are being cut".
For the establishment of PADIS at the subregional level, the ECA
has purchased the computers and other related equipment and software
for the Central Africa Documentation and Information System (CADIS) and 
for the others - WADIS, NADIS and ESADIS, but there are a few teething 
problems. (Details of the stages reached for each subregion are treated 
under work programmes in Chapters 6-9.) In preparing the strategy and
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work plan for PADIS, the Regional Technical Committee in 1986 requested
its members (recommendation 5, E/ECA/CM.12/33) to submit comments on
the draft strategy by the end of September 1986. The comments received
show some of the problems. They relate to the sites, purchase of
equipment, legal matters, duplication of effort and reservations on
the ambitious nature of the project. In its capacity as Chairman of
the North Africa Regional Technical Committee, Morocco commented that
the strategy presented "resembled more a work programme than an actual
strategy. A detailed, timely activity plan needed to be worked out for
the project".^ They also felt that the plans for the bibliographic
data base on African development literature (PADIS-DEV) were very
ambitious.^ Regarding this data base, both Algeria and Morocco
expressed caution because "the experts were difficult to identify and
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the data was of short-term reliability".
There is the other problem of duplication of effort. For example, 
in North Africa, the Arab League is already providing similar services.
In fact, an interim arrangement has been made with the Arab League 
Documentation Centre (ALDOC) to house the North African Documentation 
and Information System (NADIS) for a period of three years. The ECA 
hopes to benefit from the expertise, experience and training facilities 
provided by ALDOC by so doing. There are other systems such as the 
Arab Information System Network (ARIS NET) and the Resau Sahelien d f 
information et de documentation scientifique et technique (RESADOC). 
Moreover, UNESCO is providing similar services in Africa. The represent­
ative of UNESCO remarked that "the programme on PADIS was too broad and 
lacked focus. Part of the strategies relating to information infra­
structure building, standardization, training and improvement of access
Jlo information, would create a problem of overlap and duplication with
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the UNESCO PG1 programme". Thus, UNESCO suggested that the PADIS
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programme focus on building the regional system, and that the infra­
structure building aspect be carefully considered. A mechanism should 
be set up instead to co-ordinate the overall implementation of the 
programme with UNESCO. But all the indications are that the ECA wants 
to continue with the programme as planned because no alternative plan 
has been proposed - neither has a meeting been arranged by the two 
institutions.
The main threat to PADIS is lack of finance. The contributions 
so far include:
(a) UNDP's (regional project reference RAF/79/078) for the 
purchase of a Hewlett Packhard HP 3000/111 mini computer with the 
complemetnary equipment for storage and retrieval activities at the 
cost of US$ 5000,000;
(b) ADB contribution of US$ 125,000 for the purchase of re­
prographic and printing material and a micro fiche laboratory;
(c) The IDRC, for the salary of the Technical Adviser of the 
project and for the organization of user seminars and training at the 
cost of US$ 497,000. (The MINISIS information storage and retrieval 
software was also supplied free of charge);
(d) ECA allocation for salaries and additional equipment of 
US$ 424,000;74 and
(e) Government of Zaire contributed US$ 30,000 for training and 
advisory services to be delivered to the countries of Central Africa 
in 1987.75
The total of these contributions stands at US$ 1,576,000, which 
means that the ECA has had less than US$ 2 million for PADIS. When
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we remember that the total costs of the project are put at US$ 160 
million and that the programme has one more year from now if it is 
to accomplish the implementation of phase 3, the magnitude of its 
financial problems becomes very obvious. It is therefore doubtful 
whether the ECA can implement most of the PADIS programme. However, 
the ECA has implemented some aspects of phases 1 and 2. PADIS-DEV
7 6data base has 1500 new references, bringing the total number to 6500.
The Pan-African statistical Data Bank (PADIS-STAT) covers the period 
1970-85 and it now contains more than 160,000 statistical series.^
PADIS COM which is the second main component acquired the following:
(a) AGRIS-FAO data base containing references to all aspects 
of agriculture, including rural sociology, animal industry and food;
(b) DEVSIS-Canada-IDRC data base containing over 8000 biblio­
graphic references on socio-economic development;
(c) ISU-data base of the UN Department of International Economic 
and Social Affairs (DIESA) containing unpublished United Nations reports 
on socio-economic development; and
(d) LABORDOC - a supplementary data base from the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) containing 2584 references on socio-economic 
development.^
The ECA is also going ahead with its plan to establish the sub­
regional centres. Agreements were signed and site preparation undertaken 
for Eastern and Southern Africa centre (ESADIS) in Lusaka and that of 
WADIS in Niamey. The meeting of plenipotentiaries from the Yaounde and 
Gisenyi based MULPOCs held in April 1987 decided to accept the offer 
.-of the government of Zaire to host CADIS which covers both the Great 
Lake countries and the rest of Central Africa. (We must remember that
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although they are two MULPOCs in Central Africa, the decision is that
CADIS will cater for the member states of both.) As mentioned earlier,
NADIS is going to be housed at ALDOC for three years, after which it
will be at the ECA MULPOC Secretariat in Tangier, Morocco. For the
third component, that is, PADIS NET, it has succeeded only in the sense
that 20 African countries have been designated national centres for
79
participation as focal points in the PADIS network by 1987. 20
countries out of a possible 50 show that the ECA still has a long way 
to go as its target is for the 50 states to be national centres.
Although PADIS has potential, the project faces major problems - it is 
an ambitious project requiring huge sums of money which the ECA has 
little prospect of obtaining in the future. It also has limited staff 
to support the entire project. Even though the ECA hopes to achieve 
a single goal, namely, the provision of data on socio-economic develop­
ment in Africa, the programme needs to be planned and areas of specializ­
ation identified. For example, PADIS can concentrate on agriculture 
and industry or say trade. This will be more meaningful than handling 
all aspects of development.
6. CONCLUSION
The ECA has developed into an elaborate international civil 
service structure, with 11 divisions, 32 sections and 12 units. But 
its growth has been marred by rigid bureaucratic rules and procedures. 
The lack of an identifiable organizational ideology has given rise to 
its expansion in all directions both at its headquarters and subregions. 
The Commission has too many divisions, sections and units. This is 
--partly responsible for it not being able to focus on particular 
development needs and for the fact that a complex bureaucratic
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procedures and rules have emerged with its expansion. There is a need 
o
for simplifcation and for developing clearer lines of authority, respons- 
A
ibility, accountability and communications, if the ECA is to react and 
respond favourably to the economic situation of African states. Moreover, 
the substantive divisions are so geared up to formulating the same 
programmes year in year out to the extent that the Secretariat is unable 
to respond to emergencies. This explains why the ECA was unable to assist 
African states during the periods of drought and famine 1984-86. The 
ECA was neither able to offer possible solutions nor deviate from its 
set programmes.
The institutional growth has not paid sufficient attention to 
overlapping of agendas and duplication of work. Management capacity 
has also lagged behind the institutional growth and the result is 
administrative inefficiency. For example, the ECA is running at least 
four major programmes, namely, the United Nations Industrial Decade for 
Africa (1980-90); the United Nations Transport and Communications Decade 
in Africa (1978-88); Regional Food Plan for Africa (AFPLAN) and the 
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1981-90).
Each programme has its own set of goals and strategy but they are not 
integrated, the programme for the industrial decade is not integrated 
with that of AFPLAN. The two programmes run parallel, even though 
development in agriculture should be linked to agro-based industries, 
in terms of provision of raw materials.
The Commission has potential with reference to the breadth of its 
terms of reference; however, choosing to operate on several programmes 
at the same time is one of the reasons it is ineffective. The emphasis 
on conferences, seminars, workshops and research makes it difficult for 
one to assess what the ECA has done for three decades. However, a
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programme with potential is PADIS but the Commission is unable to 
continue with the scheduled proposals for a number of reasons, ranging 
from the scheme being ambitious, lack of financial and manpower resources 
to sustain it, duplication of work as similar services are provided by 
ALDOC and UNESCO, and the slower pace of establishing the national centres.
The Commission's lack of effective leadership is attributed to 
its peculiar status. The Executive Secretary has to operate within UN 
guidelines and options. The only leverage to what he can do lies in 
the type of activities he chooses to concentrate on. We cannot therefore 
aportion the blame for his failures on him per se. The fault is with 
the UN system for not providing a clear role.
The formulation of programmes without due consultation with African 
governments is unrealistic. If the programmes are for the benefit of 
the member states, then it is essential to consult them and also device 
programmes relating to their priorities. Also the Commision is not 
equipped to implement and sustain projects because it lacks the organs 
for co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation. Finally, the ECA does 
not have a dual mandate of being an arm of the UN and an African 
Organization. It is an arm of the UN geared towards socio-economic 
development of Africa.
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CHAPTER 3
ECA AND THE DEBATE ON DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
1. INTRODUCTION
The need for the ECA to do more than it has done in the past has 
been expressed in the demand that the Commission should be more oper­
ational. In this regard, operational activity can be construed as a 
continuing search for a strategy for African development, together with 
increasing effort to induce African states to formulate and implement 
development programmes realistically. Developing Africa comprises 50 
independent countries, each of which has unique features and individual 
country programmes for development. Within national frameworks domestic 
effort is supplemented by a wide range of bilateral and multilateral 
assistance sometimes provided in a way that is particular to individual
countries, sometimes conceived, at least in principle, as part of a
wider regional programme. If, however, these countries have particular 
characteristics, the majority have much in common. Most, for example,
caught in the toils of nation building, are substantially agrarian in
terms of economic structure, and relatively small in terms of population 
and market size. All are committed to the rapid attainment of economic 
and social development. In these circumstances, it is of the utmost 
importance that policy formulation and policy execution should have a 
continental perspective.
In the early 1970s, some African countries began to query the 
relevance and realism of the existing theories and models of development 
^and economic growth to the objective realities of African economies. 
There were also disquieting voices about the theory and practice of
development planning with its emphasis on savings and investment and 
the concentration on monetary indicators as targets to be achieved.
In general, growth targets were never achieved despite the inflow of 
aid and grants, foreign private capital, expatriate managerial, admin­
istrative and technical skills because of the huge outflow of foreign 
exchange due to external debts and payments of dividends and interest..
The discussions centred on how to change the situation with reference 
to orientation. By 1979 Africans were redefining development. They 
wanted not only economic development but self-reliance, independence, con­
trol of foreign intervention in the economy and politics of the country, 
participation of the masses and protection of their culture and life­
styles. In essence, they wanted the right to development. Their basic 
economic needs involved the drive for modernization - the demand for 
a better life in the foreseeable future. According to His Excellency, 
the late Dr. William R. Tolbert Jr., President of the Republic of Liberia, 
"Africa wants more than mere basic human needs. She wants new assets 
and new stature; new capabilities and new opportunities. These, she 
is entitled to have. Her corporate relations must not be iniquitous.
And her access to technology, no less than technical learning, must not 
be impeded or inhibited."^ The participants of the Monrovia Symposium 
in 1979 organized by both the ECA and OAU were convinced that Africa 
can embark upon a strategy that gives it complete control over its own 
needs and over the cultural, social, technical, economic and financial 
instruments that are capable of promoting appropriate action and 
guaranteeing success in its bid to change the life in Africa. Although 
the participants did not come up with a well-defined ideology and 
strategy, the trend of the debate during the symposium was that Africa 
needed a development strategy which reflected its unity, culture,
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values, geopolitics and history. They wanted a strategy which
would incorporate the use of its natural, mineral and human
resources. Also they hoped for a development which would cater
for the right type of technology and advancement in science
and at the same time one which would be kind to the environ- 
2
ment.
The ECA has not yet come up with a coherent development philosophy 
incorporating these aspects, but it has nonetheless laid the foundations 
and played a pioneering role in the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action 
(LPA) as the blue-print for future development in Africa. This chapter 
is, therefore, a consideration of its contribution to the intellectual 
debate on African development. With its inputs the ECA became an advocate 
of collective self-reliance and self-sustaining economic growth. It 
has not done as much as the ECLA which developed a very different and 
distinct development ideology based on the dependency theory under the 
leadership of Raul Prebisch. But it has set out broad principles which 
are worth considering. The significance of the LPA was the fact that 
most African states endorsed it. But in practice, they have not been 
able to implement it. Even the ECA has yet to change its priorities 
and programmes to reflect those of the LPA at both regional and sub­
regional levels. Also the ideas in the LPA were not new but have been 
re-introduced at different times by the ECA. Moreover, there has not 
been any follow-up conference on the content of the LPA, since it was 
adopted in 1980, to allow African governments and scholars alike to be 
aware of and understand its full implications. Perhaps the main 
contribution of the ECA was that it continued to hammer the idea about 
the pessimistic economic outlook facing Africa year after year. Secondly, 
''it provided funds, technical staff and also organized and co-sponsored
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the major conferences on the African economic crisis such as the OAU 
Economic Summit in 1980 and the Abuja Conference on African Economic 
Crisis in 1987.
Much has been written about the long-term development problems
of Africa. The debate on the future of Africa has centred on two sets
of proposals put forward in the 1980s. The ECA with its mandate to
assist in the formulation and development of co-ordinated policies as
a basis for practical action in promoting economic and technological
3
development in Africa, as stated in the already mentioned document: 
The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa: 
1980-2000 (LPA). In 1983, the Commission issued another document - 
Africa's Development 1983-2008: A Preliminary Perspective Study*
The other set of documents was published by the World Bank in 1981 - 
Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, 
popularly known as the Berg Report. It followed this with two more 
reports in 1983 and 1984, respectively. However, the aim of this 
chapter is to locate the ECA's inputs to the debate. The focus, then, 
will be on three questions:
(1) Can we identify ideas originating from the ECA?
(2) How has the ECA diffused such ideas to member states?
(3) Have such ideas led to a change in the policies on development
in Africa?
The first part of the chapter deals with the ECA's diagnosis of the 
African economic crisis; the second deals with the ECA's ideas since 
1960; part three evaluates the LPA in the light of the Berg Report and 
the ECLA's dependency theory; and part four is the conclusion.
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2. AFRICAN ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE ECATS DIAGNOSIS
The nature of the crisis confronting African leaders was eloquently 
summarized by Ex-President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere in his Chairman’s 
Report to the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in 
Addis Ababa on 18 July 1985. He said:
"We are dealing with serious problems on which the lives 
of our people and the future of our nations depend. We 
must approach these questions with fresh minds, without 
being restricted by orthodoxies of left and right - or 
centre. Where nothing will serve except radical solutions, 
we must not be afraid of them. At the same time we have 
to be very realistic. Africa is being changed by events 
beyond our control, and we want to get control of that 
process of change so that it works for our benefits - 
or at least does us the minimum harm. And we have limited
resources of time, of manpower, and of wealth.
Some aspects of the crises have been dealt with in Chapter 1, but
it was necessary to re-state some of the points raised, especially as 
the development options and strategies expounded by the ECA were the 
product of its perception. Over the years the ECA carried out surveys 
and reviews of the economic and social conditions in Africa through 
which it has built up its own explanations and diagnoses. It found 
that certain characteristics were common to most African states. For 
example, Africa was the youngest continent in terms of political 
independence.^ For economic and social development, Africa was the 
least developed of all the developing regions - in fact, all but five
of the countries classified by the United Nations as the poorest and
least developed were in Africa. Even those African countries not in 
that category were very poor and weak, in terms of high-level and skilled 
manpower, and diversification of the foreign exchange earning base. The
number of sovereign entities, also, made the continent the most divided
in terms of language and ethnicity (Africa has 50 states). Their economies 
were for the most part small in economic terms, as a result of low average
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incomes and small populations. Of the 50 states, 24 had fewer than 5
£
million people. Africa has specialized economies, most of them agricul­
tural, dependent on the export of two or more primary commodities. All have 
tropical climatic conditions with the exception of Lesotho and Swaziland.
Africa was also a region of great diversity. It encompasses Nigeria, 
with about 80 million people, producing some 44 per cent of regional 
output. It included a number of very small countries such as Burundi,
Gambia, Swaziland and Lesotho. There were countries rich in oil and 
mineral resources, such as Botswana, Gabon, Guinea, Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. Then, also, there were countries of tropical rain forest 
and those of the semi-arid interior, in addition to landlocked countries 
such as Burundi, Botswana and Zimbabwe, and those fronting the ocean, 
e.g. Ghana, Nigeria and Togo.
The nature of the economic crisis facing the continent was similar 
to what was happening the world over. But, perhaps, what makes it peculiar 
in the case of Africa, is that the situation has continued to deteriorate, 
with little hope of solution. Secondly, the crisis has persisted over 
a relatively longer period of time when compared with other parts of the 
world. In the 1960s, which was the first decade of independence, African 
states were full of high hopes and expectations for the future. But the 
rates of economic growth were less encouraging, falling mainly towards 
the lower end of the 3-6 per cent range. With the population increasing 
at an average 2.5 per cent, the growth per capita GNP averaged out at 
1.7 per cent for the oil importers, substantially below the 4.1 per cent 
for the industrial nations.^ In the 1970s, the pace of growth was not 
maintained. Annual per capita growth rates for black Africa dropped to 0.4 
per cent for the low income oil importers. Current account deficits in the Sub- 
Saharan region rose from a modest $1.5 billion in 1970 to $8 billion in 1980.
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External indebtedness climbed from $6 billion to $32 billion between 
1970 to 1979, and debt service increased from 6 to 12 per cent of 
export earnings in the same period. Foreign exchange reserves, which 
were comfortable in 1970, fell sharply so that by 1979 reserves could
g
cover only 3.3 months’ imports. For the 1980s, the World Bank Report
1981 gloomily forecast no measurable growth in per capita income for
Africa, and for the poorest African countries it held out the prospect
of further negative growth. In 1984, the World Bank President, A.W.
Clausen, described the crisis as "the worst economic crisis any region
9
of the world has known since the Second World War". According to a 
study by the ECA, African countries' exports decreased in volume terms 
at a rate of 3 per cent a year, their overall current account deficit 
reached $31.8 billion in 1981, before falling to $24.5 billion in 1982, 
to $17.3 billion in 1983 and to an estimated $10 billion in 1984, mainly 
because of the drastic import curbs that most countries have had to 
undertake. At the same time, the continent's external debts have been 
rising, reaching an estimated $150 billion in 1983, and $158 billion 
in 1984, representing about 190 per cent of Africa's exports of goods 
and services. The debt service alone is estimated at about $12 billion 
a year, at a time when the flow of external resources into the continent 
is also declining.^ The effect of all these developments has been to 
accelerate the process of economic decline throughout the continent.
The ECA concluded that with no money to begin the urgently needed 
rehabilitation, few people see any prospect of significant improvement.
Several reasons have been advanced for the economic crisis. The 
recent experiences of droughts, famine,^ floods and civil wars have, 
no doubt, exacerbated the situation, but the real causes are more 
deep-rooted than these. As stated earlier, this chapter deals mainly 
with the diagnosis and explanations given by the ECA. The Commission
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agrees with the general characteristics of the economic crisis and 
the nature of the African economies. Its annual surveys of the 
economic and social conditions in Africa also reveal the pessimistic 
and rather gloomy pictures of life in Africa but its explanations
are slightly different from those of the World Bank. While 
the latter blames domestic policies or lack of it as the main cause 
of the African crisis, the ECA addresses both the issues of domestic 
policies and the effects of the international economic system on 
African economies.
The ECA said of the African economic crisis:
"The African continent is more drastically affected than 
the other regions of the world by the negative achievements 
of the development strategies adopted by most countries 
whose failure, aggravated by the social crises which the 
industrialized countries are currently undergoing, harldy 
needs emphasizing. Africa is unable to point to any signi­
ficant growth rate or satisfactory index of general well­
being . The problem of under-employment and unemployment 
is more and more serious. The use of resources is well 
below its potential. The state of inter-African co-operation 
is a far cry from the decisions and hopes that were clearly 
enunciated by the higher authorities of the countries 
concerned. Commitments undertaken by heads of state remain 
a dead letter in a great many cases where their implentation 
could represent an effective contribution to improve the 
standard of living of the people. Africa is equally familiar 
with the sombre reality of death - massive infant mortality, 
violent death in all forms. The prospect of impending 
disaster is not just a figment of the imagination."10
It has also continually stressed the fact that the basic economic 
structures of African countries have not changed fundamentally. Most 
countries were still dependent on the export of a narrow range of 
primary commodities which were subject to changes in external market 
conditions. Poor performance in the agricultural sector, reflected a 
long-term deterioration in the trend for agricultural production and 
„per capita food production. According to the Commission, "the heart 
of what appears to be a veritable dilemma for policy is the low
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productivity of African economies; the heavy dependency of domestic
production on imports; failure to diversify into new types of exports
and the absence of domestic linkages. It will thus be clear that lack
of structural transformation and widespread low level productivity of
the African economies are the fundamental causes of their continued
13
underdevelopment and persistent economic crisis".
The diagnosis by the ECA gives a striking picture of the past
and current economic situation in most of the African countries.
African states are aware of the points raised and have admitted the
mistakes they have made through speeches and other government statements.
There is also a stronger desire to make corrections through the initi-
14
ation of domestic and foreign economic policies. But although the
governments have accepted their mistakes and application of wrong
domestic policies, they also blamed the unjust international economic
system in which they were mere appendages of the rich countries. For
example, there was a strong belief that lender's reform packages were
designed to keep their countries in that role.^ As Ex-President -
Shehu Shagari of Nigeria explained, "We have been victims of mass
exploitation and we call on the developed world to join us in working
16
out an equitable redistribution of the world's wealth". Ex-President
Nyerere of Tanzania, for his part, said that "it was the people of
Africa who must fight the poverty of Africa. National development was
not enough: it had to be part of a wider African experience".^ In the
final communique issued at the end of the OAU Economic Summit held in
Lagos, Nigeria, 28-29 April 1980, African leaders stated thus, "it
is first and foremost incumbent upon Africa itself to define the
conditions and accept direct responsibility for the rehabilitation of 
18
,^the economy". Both the ECA and African countries agreed, that the 
overriding development problem facing the continent was the need to
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reverse the decline in the living standards of the people. That 
challenge, they also agreed, lay solely with the African governments. 
They have to find the solutions to their problems, a task that requires 
continental, as well as individual efforts. African governments have 
also turned to the ECA and asked for a development strategy reflecting 
the African economic conditions and one that is likely to lead to an 
improvement in the standard of living of the people. The ECA, on the 
other hand, has been involved in the promotion of the ideas such as 
collective self-reliance, self-sustaining economic growth, regional 
economic co-operation and south-south co-operation as options for 
African development. The next section traces the origin of such ideas 
since the 1960s.
3. ECA AND THE EVOLUTION OF IDEAS ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT
The decade of the 1960s was a difficult one for the ECA because 
the Commission was in its formative years. It had to tackle the question 
of its purpose of existence and it also had to establish its organiz­
ational structure and employ the required staff for the task ahead. Then 
there was the issue of its membership, given that initially the colonial 
powers were also full members. Italy, for instance, ceased to be a member 
of the Commission in 1960 upon the cessation of its territorial respons­
ibility for what has now become the Republic of Somalia* Right from 
the start, the African member states expressed opposition to the apartheid 
policies of the Republic of South Africa, which was then a full member 
as well. ECOSOC eventually suspended her from participation in the work 
of the Commission in 1963 by resolution 44(iv) and 88(v).
The ECA also had to solve the problem of the dearth of
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information on African economies. As the countries gained political 
independence, there was the realization that very little was known about
each entity. These countries were governed by different colonial powers
who used different methods of management and administration, ranging 
from the policy of assimilation by the French to that of indirect rule 
by the British. Each colonial power accounted for its territories and 
no more. Therefore, the Commission devoted resources and energy to the 
task of information gathering, surveys, training and studies on various 
aspects of the socio-economic conditions in Africa.
On the political front, the African states were gaining their 
independence. The ideology of the time was Pan-Africanism, which was
echoed in the ECA’s deliberations. The latter became the forum for waging
the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid war. It has been said that during 
this decade, the ECA gave priority to issues such as colonialism, neo­
colonialism, racism and apartheid in South Africa. The annual ECA sessions
were a reflection of this emphasis. So, the ECA took on the character
19
and direction of the Pan-African movement.
Apart from the task of defining its role within the context of 
its mandate, the Commission had another responsibility thrust upon it.
It was responsible for the formulation of a strategy for development 
in Africa. The task required it to develop its philosophy for development. 
But the Commission was not able to do so in the 1960s due to its complex 
history and organizational structure. It had to cope with these aspects 
and it only echoed the ideas of the Pan-African movement. Here the 
activities within its environment dictated what the Commission could do 
and the direction it took. Even though the members were united in their 
views on colonialism and apartheid, the fact remained that on other issues, 
e.g. intervention in their domestic affairs, African Unity, boundary
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disputes and the issue of secession, there were divergence of views and 
fundamental positions. For an organization which had been newly esta­
blished, this situation made it difficult for the Commission to agree 
upon policy measures for the economic and social advancement of Africa.
The issues took up most of the time and resources of the Commission 
and so the issue of African development was not given top priority.
Besides, there were not many facts on the continent pulling the 
ECA at the time towards a continental concept of development.
This was mainly because so many of the prerequisites for devel­
opment on a continental scale were missing. This was one of 
the reasons why the Commission concentrated on research and 
studies of socio-economic conditions.
During the Ninth Session of the ECA, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
in February 1969, the African countries discussed at length the issue
of development. They expressed their dissatisfaction at the lack of
development on the continent. They expressed doubts as to whether foreign
aid and investment could carry the main burden of promoting development
and economic growth. It was during this meeting that the idea of self-
reliance growth was first discussed as an alternative path to development.
For self-reliance, the delegates’ emphasis was on the energies, imagination
and competence of the African people. The ministers argued that self-
reliance should constitute the foundation for long-term development and 
20
economic growth. They wanted the ECA to be involved in the search 
for a development strategy that would reflect this emphasis and also 
African conditions.
The ECA noted these demands and in 1970 it prepared a document 
referred to as "Africa’s Strategy for Development in the 1970s". It 
also formed its contribution to the global International Development
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Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade. Indeed, it 
was the first time that it had made an attempt to diagnose African 
economic conditions and to present its own strategy for development.
The document was submitted and endorsed at the Tenth Session of the 
Conference of Ministers, held in Tunis, Tunisia, 8-13 February 1971.
In it the ECA stated that Africa's share of total assistance to develop­
ing countries was declining steadily, the decrease for the period 1960-67 
was 12 per cent. At the same time the flow of investment income out
of Africa had tripled. The outflow of income earned in Africa varied
21
from 12 per cent to about 42 per cent of net official inflow. To this 
outflow it added Africa's increasing external debt. The total of 
reported external debt increased from $3.3 billion in 1960 to $8.7 
billion in 1968; service payments of these debts in 1968 amounted to 
6.4 per cent of total commodity exports. Repayment of debts accounted 
for almost a quarter of Africa's total exports of goods and services 
or some 24 per cent. Africa's profit on exports was far below this 24 
per cent. The reason given by the ECA for this state of affairs was 
that Africans were not in control of economic activity; native parti­
cipation in the productive sectors remained insignificant. It blamed 
the situation on the activities of the multinational corporations and
expatriate personnel who siphoned off a large proportion of total gross
22
income since they were the principal generators of income.
On the basis of its review of the economic conditions, the ECA 
concluded that the development strategy which appeared more suitable 
for Africa, should be based on certain guiding principles, which were 
as follows:
(a) reshaping the economic infrastructure so as to adapt it to suit 
the new independent status of the countries and the requirements
of economic growth, with special reference to new potential 
patterns of trade and to overcoming the dualism in African 
national economies by developing effective social economic and 
physical links between rural and urban communities;
(b) rectifying the extraordinary small size of national markets, 
through economic co-operation and integration;
(c) re-orientating and re-shaping socio-economic institutions in 
such a way as to facilitate the process of innovation and 
modernization; and,
(d) providing an infrastructure designed to meet the requirements
of self-sustaining development, especially in the field of
23
education, science, technology and management.
According to the Commission, "Africa's strategy for development in the
1970s" aimed at structural changes in the continent's economy. It
aimed at th£creation of an association of African countries producing
primary commodities which will permit the producers to take the steps
necessary to protect their interests in the world market for primary
commodities. Robert K.A. Gardiner, who was then the second Executive
Secretary of the ECA, saw the document as a contribution towards
24
defining Africa's options for development. He said that it provided
a framework for assisting the individual countries in their sovereign
task of designing strategies tailored to their own particular circum- 
25stances.
The principle of self-reliance was adopted as the central theme 
of the document and the ECA was also convinced that the main objective
of all efforts should be towards the establishment of self-sustaining
26
economic growth and welfare. Although no full definition was given,
the ECA saw self-sustaining growth as one which "goes on and on and
27
reaches higher and higher limits". The ECA recommended that the 
strategy for individual member states should be concentrated on a 
limited number of key areas and activities and suggested a series of 
issues and measures which required special attention in the context 
of the economic, social and institutional development of each individual 
state during the 1970s. The key areas included trade, industry, agri­
culture, human resources development, transport, science and technology, 
to mention but a few. In trade, the appropriate strategy stipulated 
two basic objectives: (a) to generate structural changes by being a 
vehicle for transforming African economies from a traditional, almost 
exclusively primary-producing basis, to a dynamic combination of
agriculture and manufacturing; (b) to provide foreign exchange earnings
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for the financing of development. In industry, the Commission hoped 
for: (a) the development of small-scale industries based on innovative
technology and using local raw materials; (b) the development of agro­
allied industries and those providing inputs for agriculture such as
fertilizers, agricultural machinery and implements; (c) the development
29
of export industries; and (d) the promotion of industrial research,
while the objective in agriculture was to raise the growth rate from
30
2 per cent to a minimum of 4 per cent per annum.
The Commission felt at the time that it was in no position to
devise a strategy for development for all its member states. In pointed
to its limited field representation, with its regular professional
31
staff of only 142 and some 30 regional advisers. It also felt that 
its limited resources made it difficult to discern an identifiable ECA 
impact on national development problems. It stated that, "at the very 
least, however, the ECA does recognize that the desire to seek a method 
is itself proof of the existence of method, and recognition further that,
in present African circumstances the essence of method lies in the
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determination of priorities". Thus, it placed emphasis on research 
and planning, mobilization of domestic resources, trade, industry, 
agricultural transformation, human resources and manpower training.
Apart from the limited resources, the ECA also felt that it was not 
possible to have a central theme and theory of development. The 
Executive Secretary pointed out that a common theme could not be found 
for the member states because their priorities inevitably differed.
That was why the document had options and it was, then, the responsi­
bility of individual countries to determine their development policies
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in the light of their resources and objectives. This indicates that 
the Commission was not very conversant with the nature and extent of 
the economic problems facing its members. Secondly, it treated each 
as an entity in its own right and it did not try to establish whether 
they faced similar economic problems.
The African ministers, however, gave the document a mixed reception. 
They felt that the strategy was merely a set of guiding principles on 
specific objectives in priority areas such as planning, trade and the 
development of human resources. Several Committee members suggested 
that the strategy should be focused on a central theme. They wanted a 
strategy peculiar to African conditions; bearing in mind that Africa 
had the sole responsibility for improving th^standard of living of its 
people. The only consensus (during that Tunis Conference of 1971) 
between the Commission and its member states was the fact that they 
agreed that African countries should harmonize their views from then 
on, in order to arrive at joint African positions in all international 
channels in which problems affecting their trade and development were 
being discussed.
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During the second ECA Conference of Ministers held in Accra,
Ghana, from 19-23 February 1973, the issue of African development 
was raised once again. It is worthwhile remembering that on 12 
February 1971, the devaluation of the American dollar threw the 
financial authorities of the entire world into confusion. It resulted 
in a 10 per cent reduction in the value of all debts to African 
countries payable in dollars. It brought home to African leaders the 
extent to which their national economies were governed by the Inter­
national Monetary System. The effects of the devaluation formed part 
of the background of the discussions at the conference. The delegates 
realized that African states might not succeed in playing their rightful 
role in the world economy if they continued to disperse their efforts 
through individual action. The idea that regional co-operation was 
essential to African development then took shape and was to dominate 
the deliberations of this and subsequent conferences. It was an idea 
which the ECA had put forward since the 1960s, but was not fully 
considered until this time. The participants spoke of co-operation 
in the form of establishing multi-purpose groupings and also co­
operation between the OAU and the ECA to resolve African economic 
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problems. They also re-stated the need for an African position on 
major development issues. But even though they wanted a central theme 
on development, they themselves did not propose one,* nevertheless, they 
expected the ECA to come up with one.
In 1975 the OAU decided to convene a meeting of experts to be
serviced jointly by the ECA and African Development Bank (ADB), to
harmonize African views and formulate an African position on the issues
jtvJL'
before the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations Genearl Assembly 
.devoted to Development and International Economic Co-operation held 
in September 1975. The ECA prepared a briefing document containing
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more or less the same guidelines of the previous document, that is, 
"Africa’s Strategy for Development in the 1970’s". The delegates once 
again were dissatisfied. The states were still worried about the 
fluctuating prices of their exports, and the declining terms of trade, 
while the rise in the price of oil provided partial explanations for 
the deterioration in their current account figures throughout the 1970s. 
It was also the case that the price elasticity of demand for most of 
their primary products tended to be low. That meant that lowering the 
price did not greatly increase the quantity sold. It also meant that 
Africa was unable to accelerate its growth through the expansion of 
exports of its primary products. The confrontation with these realities 
forced African leaders into a reassessment of their development options 
in the light of the then prevailing demand for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO). This was part of the North-South debate and the 
demand was based on the proposition that a rearrangement of the inter­
national economy in such a way as to remove constraints on international 
trade would facilitate the acceleration and diversification of economic 
growth in the world on an equitable and fair basis.
The main negotiation issues from the perspective of the Third 
World for restructuring the international economic system were:
(a) commodity stabilization; (b) discrete treatment of Third World 
debts; (c) restructuring of international trade and removal of protec­
tionists policies in industrialized countries; (d) massive transfer 
of resources from the industrialized North to the udnerdeveloped South;
(e) easy access to Western technology; (f) redeployment of world 
industrial production capability in favour of Third World Countries; 
and (g) the reform of the international monetary and financial system, 
that is, the World Bank and the IMF. Almost all of the above called 
on the rich countries to give away something, to erode their favoured
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position with its concomittant loss of economic, political and cultural 
hegemony. The Third World Countries believed that the establishment 
of a NIEO would be a great action of benevolent generosity by the rich 
nations and that the countries of the South should not queue up, to 
beg for its final emergence.
Through the OAU and ECA African leaders requested a proposal and
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framework for the implementation of the NIEO. The ECA having been 
saddled with this responsibility began to seek an alternative strategy 
for development. The search was for a strategy that was genuinely 
African-oriented, rather than one which initiated the lifestyles of 
existing societies in the industrialized nations. It was a necessity 
as the revolution of rising expectations following political independence 
in the 1960s, was replaced by the revulsion of unfulfilled economic 
dreams. Since past strategies had failed, there was the need to re­
examine options so that the many potential opportunities available for 
higher and more stable rates of growth could be made use of.
The ECA embarked on the process of reappraising the development 
models which African governments have been applying since independence. 
Eventually it produced another document in 1976, entitled, "Revised 
Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International 
Economic Order, 1976-1981-1986", Doc. E/CN.lA/ECO/90/Rev.3. (This 
document became the forerunner to both the Monrovia Strategy 1979 and 
the Lagos Plan of Action 1980.) It provided the main intellectual and 
theoretical foundation for the two. Its main objectives were the pro­
motion of self-reliance; acceleration of internally located growth and 
diversification; the eradication of unemployment and poverty. The ECA's 
basic proposition was that an increasing measure of self-reliance and 
-self-sustaining economic growth and development was the most important
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counterpart to political independence since it would lead to the 
economic decolonization of Africa. The "Revised Framework" was approved 
by the ECA in 1976 and was later endorsed by the OAU Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government in June 1977. Between 1976 and 1979, the ideas 
contained in this document were expanded and improved upon through a 
series of specialized meetings such as the Joint OAU/ECA Colloquium on 
Perspectives of Development and Economic Growth in Africa up to the year 
2000, held in Monrovia, in February 1979, and the Joint ECA/UNEP Seminar 
on Alternative Patterns of Development and Lifestyles for the African 
region, held in Addis Ababa, in March 1979.
Having not participated effectively in the preparation of strategies
for the earlier decades, the ECA was now more determined to ensure that
its voice was heard and that it played a crucial role in determining
the content and scope of the International Development Strategy (IDS).
It prepared the Development Strategy for Africa during the third United
Nations Development Decade (1980-1990). This document was an up-dated
version of the text of the "Revised Framework". During the same period,
there was an invitation by the Secretary-General of the OAU for a
symposium on the future development prospects of Africa towards the year
2000. It was held in Monrovia, Liberia, from 12-16 February 1979. At
the symposium, African leaders accepted that they were responsible for
defining the elements of their own development strategy. They agreed
that the time was ripe for a change of strategy, when they concluded
that "without profound change, without a revolution in our aspirations,
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there is no possibility of political stability". The ECA agreed with 
the need for a change.
Following the symposium, the Commission formulated a draft
s''
Declaration of Commitment on Guidelines and Measures for National and
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Collective Self-Reliance in Economic and Social Development for sub­
mission to the OAU. African leaders endorsed the draft in 1979 and 
it became known as the Monrovia Strategy for Economic Development in 
Africa. By the Monrovia Declaration they called on Africans to rally 
around a programme of mutual support and development, self-reliance 
and economic integration. To make more adjustments to the generalized 
framework, the two organizations prepared a more extensive document 
suggesting steps to be taken to achieve the objectives of the Monrovia 
Declaration and Strategy. The revised document was adopted at the 
extraordinary session of the OAU in Lagos, Nigeria, in April 1980 and 
it became known as the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development 
of Africa 1980-2000 (LPA for short).
With reference to the first question posed at the beginning of 
the chapter, the answer was that there were ideas on African development 
whose origins can be traced to the ECA. The idea of regional co-operation 
and integration with its ultimate objective of establishing an African 
Economic Community by the year 2000 dates back to the early 1960s when 
the ECA was about to create its subregional offices. It divided the 
continent into four main subregions and it also considered factors such 
as geography and economics, when it concluded that African economies 
were weak, small and too dependent to take advantage of economies of 
scale. It also argued that the dependence on primary products made 
the economies vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity markets. 
Therefore, it proposed that one of the keys to African development was 
through regional co-operation and integration. The principles of self- 
reliance and self-sustaining growth can also be traced to ECA papers 
in the 1970s especially. They were developed due to two factors.
^.First, constant criticism from African governments and pressures by 
them for a development strategy which suited the African conditions.
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Secondly, the ideas for a NIEO did not really materialize as there were 
stalemates in the various negotiations. The North has always argued 
that the development problems of the South were due to the implement­
ation of wrong domestic policies. Besides the arguments of the South 
were based on moral grounds with reference to the injustice brought 
on by colonialism and the effects of the international political and 
economic system which failed to take account of the challenges to 
development in the South. Also there was a realization by African 
governments that even if a NIEO were established the African continent 
would not benefit from it because, in the League of the Third World, 
Africa was at the bottom with more severe economic and political 
problems. Therefore, African adherence to the demand for a NIEO was 
merely a symbolic gesture, to show solidarity with and sympathy for 
the Third World countries. They then turned their attention to the 
re-appraisal of past development strategies and why they failed, and 
gave ideas to the ECA of what they would like the development philos­
ophy for Africa to contain. Through subsequent drafts, meetings and 
seminars, the ECA continued to put forward the ideas of self-reliance 
and self-sustaining economic growth and development for the long-term 
prospects for Africa.
On the question of how the ECA has diffused the ideas, it had 
done so through its annual policy organ meetings. But we must remember 
that here the ECA deals mainly with the Ministers responsible for 
development planning of member states. But it needs the consensus of 
the Heads of State and Government, and for this it has had to work with 
the OAU. Finally, on the international scene, the ECA also made 
presentations to the General Assembly especially through the Special 
Session on the Economic Crisis in Africa (1986). It also prepared 
documents for the first, second, third and subsequent development
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decades of the United Nations. These are in addition to attending 
special seminars and symposium^on development sponsored by the OAU 
and the Commission.
4. THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION: WHAT STRATEGY FOR AFRICA?
The LPA is a genuinely historic document because it represents 
a continent-wide effort by Africans to forge a comprehensive and unified 
approach to economic development. It represents the hopes and aspirations 
of the drafters and the frustrations created by the failures of past 
and present strategies of development in Africa. In terms of strucutre, 
it consists of 13 chapters, of which seven focused on sectoral topics: 
food and agriculture, industry, natural resources, human resources, 
transport and communications, trade and finance; and, energy. The re­
maining six address the issues of science and technology, technical 
co-operation, the environment, the least developed African countries, 
women and development planning, statistics and population. A single 
theme runs through the 13 chapters, which is that Africa must strive 
to reduce its dependence on industrialized nations and replace this 
with a self-sustaining development strategy based on the maximum 
internal use of the continent's resources. This is referred to as a 
'self-reliant' strategy for development.
The objective of the LPA is not only to provide the development 
of the nations and peoples of Africa, but also their progressive 
integration over great regional areas; and its ultimate goal is to set 
up an African Economic Community by the end of the century.
The strategy is collective self-reliance through a partial de- 
linkage of Africa from the global trading system, and great emphasis
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on intra-African trading rather than on exports (although production 
for export remains an important secondary focus).
There is no costing of the LPA, but the source of funds includes 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), private loans and investments 
both foreign and domestic. However, it provides a growth projection 
target of 7 per cent for the decade of the 1980s but it does not dis­
close how this figure was derived nor the assumption for it.
The LPA has both international and domestic assumptions. Inter­
nationally it assumes a continuation of ODA and co-operative attitute 
on the part of multinational corporations (MNCs) in terms of investment, 
credit and technological transfer. It assumes that the decision to 
delink will not provoke retaliation by the industrialized nations on 
a scale sufficient to destabilize the effort. The final assumption 
is that Africa can retain its financial credibility in world capital 
market rates. This is one example of the inconsistency of the LPA.
The idea of delinking is in contrast with having co-operation with the 
MNCs. Is it possible to delink and at the same time argue for more 
financial assistance in the international economic system? Domestically, 
the assumption is that African leadership will genuinely embrace regional 
co-operation and integration as a prerequisite for development. They 
will be willing to impose the necessary auterity entailed by delinkage, 
and to live with the discontent precipitated thereby. On the other 
hand, the LPA assumes that the African public will accept the austerity 
and will rally to the call. Finally, it is assumed that adequate 
indigenous management and technological expertise will be forthcoming 
to carry out the bulk of the LPA without excessive reliance on expatri­
ates .
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The domestic assumptions, in particular, show how the ECA had 
attempted to incorporate one of the options advocated by the dependency 
theorists. The relationship between the Third World and the industri­
alized countries is basically explained by the centre-periphery analysis, 
in which the periphery was involved in outward-oriented development 
through the export of commodities. This was incapable of permitting 
the full development of the peripheral countries because the type and 
extent of their linkages to the centre depended largely on their resources 
and their economic and political capacities for mobilizing them. This 
conditioned the economic structure and dynamism of each peripheral 
country. The result was the siphoning of income and resources to the
centre. Historically, the role of the periphery had been mainly restricted
37to the supply of primary products. According to Raul Prebisch (1984), 
the pattern of trade had been a factor in the survival of the historical 
hegemony of the centres over the periphery. The hegemony is buttressed 
by the fragmentation of the developing world and the economic and 
technological superiority of centres. The extreme dependency 
theorists, such as Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin, had re­
commended a. radical delinking from the centres. The ECA advocated 
delinking in favour of intra-African trade and development. African 
states were to re-orientate their economies through diversification and 
other measures to reduce their vulnerability to fluctuating commodity 
prices and their dependence on industrialized nations for food and other 
items by developing their natural resources and applying appropriate 
technology for development.
In relation to key issues, the LPA gave priority to agriculture.
The reason being that over the past two decades, the food and agricultural
^situation in Africa deteriorated to drastic proportions - food production
38
and consumption per person fell below nutritional requirements. So
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self-sufficiency in food production was top priority. For the attainment 
of this objective, the LPA recommended that farmers should be given 
strong cash incentives to produce. There should be support for farmers’ 
co-operatives and integrated rural development approaches. Food imports 
were to be eliminated, while the production and consumption of local 
foods should be encouraged. The agricultural sector was to provide the 
necessary inputs to the processing industries, as well as markets for 
the products of the domestic industrial sector.
Since Africa was the least developed region in the world, the
second priority of the LPA was industry. For this it recommended that
the years 1980-90 should be the Industrial Development Decade in Africa.
In the long term, that is, by the year 2000, Africa should manage to
39achieve 2 per cent of world industrial production, and in the short
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term (1980-85) 1 per cent. Initially, resource-based industries were 
to be developed as a support to agriculture through the supplying of 
necessary agricultural inputs. Subregional marketing arrangements must 
be negotiated to ensure that basic industries can operate at an effective 
scale. The local industry must be protected until it can be competitive. 
Also the local market should carry mainly goods to satisfy basic needs. 
Non-essential and other imports should be restricted, so as to conserve 
foreign exchange and reduce inventory costs.
In recognition of the significance of natural resources in providing 
a sound base for national socio-economic development, Africans were asked 
to acquire a thorough knowledge of their natural resource endowments, and 
should aim at the rational development and utilization of those resources 
employing technologies that are appropriate to their local conditions and 
paying due regard to aspects such as conservation of natural resources.
The LPA recognized that Africa’s greatest asset was its human
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resources, therefore, the recommendation was for the "full mobilization
and effective utilization of the labour force (men, women and youth,
both trained and untrained) for national development and social progress
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should be a major instrument of development". A primary objective of 
socio-economic development was the improvement of life for the entire 
population. Here the elimination of poverty was of high priority. For 
the attainment of this, the LPA argued for full participation of all 
segments of the population in gainful and productive employment and the 
provision of all essential services for the enrichment of the life of 
the community, plus the extension of basic services to as much of the 
population as possible.
How do the ideas in the LPA compare with those proposed by the 
World Bank - the Berg Report? We must remember that the two documents 
have dominated the debate on development in Africa in the 1980s.
The LPA and the Berg Report disagree fundamentally on the causes 
of and solution for the African crisis. In fact, the two documents were 
not addressing the same problem. While the LPA sketches out a strategy 
which Africa might use for its long-run development, the latter was a 
tactical programme which Africa was urged to adopt to ward off an 
immediate crisis. The LPA blames external dependence and advocates 
internal self-reliance, whereas the Berg Report blames internal defici­
encies and advocates external exchange. The OAU asserts that 'moderniz­
ation1 can never produce development; the Bank argues that 'trickle-down* 
effect rquires more time, care and input. The Berg Report prescribes an 
efficient export-led growth path as a way of getting African economies 
on a sound footing, but the LPA has discredited this approach and seeks 
for new direction and strategy - collective self-reliance via partial 
delinkage of Africa from the global trading system and enlarged emphasis 
on intra—African trading rather than on exports.
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The African governments rejected the Berg Report’s claim that 
it was compatible with and built upon the LPA. They were also dis­
satisfied with the paternalism: "We are ... concerned about the general
tone of the report which tends to suggest that the region's problems 
are entirely of its own making and that unless outsiders are allowed
to come with aid and new policies, the crisis would get out of hand and
42
the result would be catastrophic." The African governors of the Bank 
also rejected the proposals of the report. They were particularly 
unhappy about its failure to recognize external causes, despite its 
emphasis on outward-oriented solutions. Africa alone cannot be respons­
ible for its own condition given that it imports many of its difficulties:
"... certain questions have not been dealt with in the World Bank report, 
problems such as the soaring of interest rates in the international 
financial markets, global negotiations with a view to establishing a
43
new international economic order, and stabilization of commodity prices."
Most African leaders are ambivalent over what they perceive to be their
inadequate share of the benefits in the world system. They are also
under domestic pressure as the recession intensifies, inflation increases,
unemployment, peasants return to subsistence, scarce foreign exchange,
44
the spectre of anarchy looms.
The World Bank has modified its stand since the publication of 
Accelerated Development. The aggressive expression of faith in its first 
report in what appeared to be textbook neo-classical economics, has 
been toned done in a move towards a more conciliatory approach. The 
theme of "getting the prices right", which dominated its early discussion, 
has been acknowledged as but one element of a solution that is inadequate 
unless accompanied by an overall reform package that includes increased 
inputs. Much greater attention has been given to the effects of exogeneous 
factors on Africa’s poor economic performance, particularly the decline
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in the terms of trade, which Accelerated Development appeared to go 
out of its way to deny.
Faith in the ability of agricultural exports to lead a recovery 
has also been tempered in the face of criticisms that rested in part 
on the Bank’s own pessimistic projections of future commodity prices. 
Accompanying this, in Towards Sustained Development, is an acknowledge­
ment that high priority to greater self-sufficiency in foodstuffs may 
be more rational than Accelerated Development allowed. In its report, 
Financing Adjustment with Growth, the Bank admits that "it is important 
to realize that the region’s performance has not been uniformly poor.
The region has its success stories, some of which are better than average 
for the developing world".^
Beyond these general themes, however, there is a disagreement both 
on instrumentalities and on how policy reforms might best be implemented. 
It has been easier to reach agreement on measures which are appropriate 
for the immediate future rather than on long-term principles, largely 
because African governments have few policy alternatives available to 
them.
Turning to the third question posed in the introduction as to 
whether the ideas in the LPA have led to a change in the policies on 
development in Africa, the main answer was that it was now nine years 
since the LPA was endorsed, but it has not been implemented to a large 
extent. Some of the reasons for this can be found in the criticisms 
made about the document, but suffice to state that even the ECA has 
been unable to change its programmes and activities to reflect the aims 
and priorities of the LPA. Part of the answer was that the Commission 
has built up a complex bureaucracy which makes it difficult for it to 
adapt easily to new ideas. Most of its programmes were still based on
-<
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proposals of the ’Revised Framework’, with emphasis on demand for a 
NIEO.
4 6
According to Browne and Cummings (1985), the LPA, in its present 
form, specified a destination for Africa but provided only a sketchy 
outline of the directions for getting there. They concluded that for 
the journey to take place it would require considerable refinement, which 
the Africans would have to carry out. Technically speaking, both also 
criticized the presentation of the document. They pointed out that it 
was not the product of a single drafter and it was apparently not sub­
jected to even minimal editing and review. The result was the uenvenness 
of the sections, variations in style and form, the overpowering redundancy 
and the disproportion in the length and treatment of the topical chapters 
(e.g. the chapter on science and technology was almost four times as long 
as any other chapter).
Another criticism of the LPA was the fact that most of its concepts 
were not new. For example, the concept of self-reliant development goes 
back at least to the sixties and shares parentage with such popular 
economic development formulations as the centre-periphery analysis and 
growth without development. But also two decades of ineffective develop­
ment programming brought about a realization that even in countries 
where some growth seemed to be taking place, the plight of the poor 
people was hardly being touched. The realization of this led to the 
growth of the development approach of the latter 1970s, that is, the 
basic human needs (BHN) approach to development. It emphasized the 
critical importance of raising the income and improving the social 
conditions of the poorest segments of the population and doing so 
directly rather than by waiting for benefits to trickle-down to them 
"from programmes directed toward the middle and upper classes. The
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idea was that once the mass of the population became mobilized effect­
ively for development, the whole development process would be speeded 
up and mass poverty would be eliminated. The BHN approach was a useful 
one but in the African context the governments had turned their attention 
to immediate problems, scarcity of foreign exchange, external debts and 
high servicing ratios, fall in ODA and natural disasters such as famine, 
drought and flooding.
The LPA offered a long-term strategy for development and did not 
provide answers to immediate economic problems. Four major circumstances, 
which were not foreseen when the LPA was adopted, added to the increasing 
difficulties of African countries, namely, (a) the widespread, severe 
and persistent drought; (b) the acceleration of the desertification 
process; (c) persistent and destructive cyclones in the Indian Ocean; 
and (d) the intensification and destabilization attempts of South Africa 
on neighbouring African countries, especially the Frontline states of 
Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique. These factors dominated the minds of 
African leaders and they felt that something had to be done to halt the 
downward trend. They wanted a short-term programme geared towards 
recovery and some countries such as Nigeria implemented policies for 
Structural Adjustment of their economies.
Based on the idea of the LPA and after more deliberations and with 
the collaboration of the ECA, the OAU adopted the "Africa’s Priority 
Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990" (APPER), at its 21st Ordinary 
Session in July 1985. Its main priority was the rehabilitation of 
agriculture. APPER envisaged the spending of $115.9 billion for the 
implementation of priority projects of which agricultural development 
accounts for $55 billion. African countries were committed to mobilizing 
$80.1 billion or 70 per cent of the total cost of the priority programme.
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The international community was expected to provide supplementary
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financing for the balance of $35.8 billion or 30 per cent.
Although APPER continues to pay lip-service to the LPA, it in­
corporates what are probably the two most central arguments in the
Berg Report. The first is an acknowledgement in APPER that domestic
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policy errors have contributed to Africa's economic woes, whereas 
the LPA place the blame exclusively on historical, structural and 
external factors. APPER candidly acknowledges that the shortcomings 
in development policies have been partly responsible for the rapid and 
continued deterioration in the region's social and economic structures. 
The programme is, therefore, an unambiguous sign of full commitment 
on the part of the African leaders to undertake a number of policy 
measures that will remedy the shortcomings of past approaches.
Secondly, new emphasis has been given to improving the performance 
of agriculture, whereas this was treated in a perfunctory manner in the 
LPA, being accorded only eight pages of exhortative and often tauto­
logical statements which lacked analysis of the problems experienced.
Now the OAU member states have committed themselves to raising the share 
of agriculture in national public investment to between 20 and 25 per
cent by 1989, and have pledged $57,400 million or 44.8 per cent of the
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total investment under APPER to this sector. APPER was accepted as 
the general framework of international assistance to Africa. It turned 
out to be the heart of the United Nations Programme of Action for African 
Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD), ^  which was 
adopted after th UN Special Session on the Economic Situation in Africa. 
But the international community have refused to support both APPER and 
the UN-PAAERD. They have not contributed the 30 per cent of the amount 
"'needed for the priority programmes. On the other hand, the economic
- 149 -
problems are such that the African governments have been unable to 
provide for their share, that is, 70 per cent. They have turned their 
attentions to the balance of payments problems. Currency devaluations 
continued notably in Sierra Leone, Ghana, Tanzania and Nigeria. Most 
African countries including Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi and Mauritius 
have also demonstrated a capacity for effective structural adjustment.
Self-reliance has already been declared as a national strategy 
among countries such as Angola, Benin, Ethiopia and Tanzania. But the 
idea of collective self-reliance is yet to gain a real foothold in 
Africa. This is because it requires, among other things, positive 
policies of good neighbourliness, concentration on economic objectives, 
willingness to accept existing country boundaries, tolerance at home 
and towards other countries and effective continental organizations. 
These conditions are yet to exist in Africa.
African governments are responsible for the actual implementation 
of the LPA, with the OAU and ECA overseeing the process. In their 
joint report in 1982 (Doc. E/ECA/CM.9/1), the Secretary-General of the 
OAU and Executive Secretary of the ECA reviewed the progress towards 
implementation for 1980-82 and concluded that their work was hampered 
by lack of feedback by African states.
But there is another problem which has affected the LPA. Since 
it was endorsed in 1980, the ECA and the OAU have not organized a 
conference to publicize the ideas and to provide proper explanation 
for the concepts. A review of the LPA is essential especially as it 
offers the long-term path to development. Although the OAU member 
states reiterate their full commitment to the principles and objectives 
of the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos, which are more valid today than 
ever before, they admit that these "have neither always been translated
into concrete action nor reflected in national development plans.
The reasons, they conclude, lie in either ignorance of the requisites 
of the LPA and Final Act, or sheer inertia or lack of political will 
or all three in varying measures."^
Perhaps the biggest problem of the LPA is the fact that its con­
cepts do not form a consistent and coherent theory of development.
Instead, they are a set of principles and strategy which both the OAU 
and ECA hope that individual states will strive to implement. It does 
not offer a distinct philosophy as in the case of the ECLA which developed 
and expounded on the dependency theory. But then, it has to be stated 
that apart from the ECLA, no other regional economic commission has come 
up with another distinctive philosophy. The case of the ECLA is there­
fore a unique one.
There is lack of faith in the prescription of the LPA, in particular 
the absence of specific short- and medium-term measures to cope with 
Africa’s crisis, as well as the commitment to establish regional integra­
tion schemes (and ultimately a continental common market) as the principal 
mechanism for stimulating self-reliance and industrialization. African 
governments have every reason to doubt the efficacy of the latter proposal
to date, Common markets have done more to hamper rather than to promote
52
regional co-operation in Africa.
5. CONCLUSION
Over the years, the ECA has made valuable contributions ot the 
intellectual debate on African development. It played a pioneering role 
in the evolution of the ideas, but the role was forced on the ECA because 
of the failures of the past development strategies and options and the
■V
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demand by African governments for a development philosophy which was 
a true reflection of their socio-economic conditions. Most of the 
concepts such as self-reliance, self-sustaining economic growth and 
regional economic co-operation and integration dated back to the 1960s 
and 1970s. The ECA re-introduced them and they have been incorporated 
in the LPA.
However, the point has to be made that most African governments 
prefer to approach the IMF/World Bank than implement the ECA/OAU’s 
Lagos Plan of Action. There are three main reasons for this: First,
the ECA/OAU have no money and a way of assisting to implement the LPA.
So the IMF triumphs because of the persuasive power of the purse.
Secondly, the depth of the African economic crisis, particularly 
its manifestations in balance of payments deficits and debt problems 
has left African governments with little practical alternative but to 
seek massive assistance from the World Bank and IMF, and to subordinate 
themselves to the conditions that the two institutions wish to apply 
to such finance.
And thirdly, the LPA is concerned with long-term development. 
African leaders are concerned with immediate problems and remedies.
Despite the lack of implementation, the LPA remains an important 
document in the sense tht it re-orientates Africans towards another 
path to development. It is a regional strategy with its emphasis on 
African ideals, its use of natural resources and the use of appropriate 
technology. It also encourages African governments to utilize the human 
resources which the continent is endowed with. But above all, it is 
a reminder that the African states are arbiters of their own destiny.
""Therefore, the responsibility for development lies entirely in their
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hands. Herein lies the significance of the LPA.
Meanwhile the plight of the continent continues to be character­
ized by gloom and despair. African governments were implementing 
structural adjustment programmes and reforms to arrest the immediate 
problems such as balance of payments deficits, huge external debts and 
debt servicing ratios, increases in oil prices and natural disasters 
such as famine, drought and flooding. On the continental level, the 
ECA may not have come up with a distinct and coherent philosophy for 
development, but through ideas such as self-reliance and self-sufficency 
in agricijtZAire, it has indicated the options and direction which African 
governments should consider.
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CHAPTER 4 
ECA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING
1. INTRODUCTION
As has been stated earlier, there are three broad categories of 
ECA’s activities, namely, (a) traditional activities relating to 
its status as an arm of the UN. These include, data collection and 
dissemination, pre-feasibility and advisory services; (b) Those 
relating to its role as a builder of inter-governmental institutions 
(IGOs). For this the ECA has concentrated on the promotion of regional 
economic co-operation and integration. In addition to the IGOs, it has 
also established its subsidiary organ with the aims of extending its 
activities and network to the subregions; and (c) promotional activities 
geared towards the formation and sustainment of subregional groupings 
such as ECOWAS and the River Basin Authorities.
It is on the activities of category (b) that this chapter is 
concerned, in particular with its establishment of the IGOs. The issues 
relating to the ECA's subsidiary organs are covered in detail in Part II 
of this thesis. The ultimate goal of the Commission is the creation of 
an African Common Market by the year 2000. The creation of IGOs has 
become one of the major strategies for the attainment of its goal. To 
date, the Commission has established more than 30 of the IGOs and it 
maintains that "all its institutions are contributing vigorously to the 
implementation of the objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action and the 
Final Act of Lagos, namely, the establishment of an African Economic 
^Community by the year 2000".^ The Commission further argues that "in 
terms of size and needs of Africa, the number of these institutions
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is still grossly insufficient. Hence, the problem is now to determine
ways and means of financing their activities so that the burden of
2
financing them by member states can be lightened". But an ECA ad hoc 
Committee (1984) recommended that "no new institutions should be esta­
blished until after a comprehensive study of existing ones has been 
carried out, and that no new institution be allowed to commence oper­
ation prior to the signature of the necessary headquarters agreement
3
with the host".
But the ECA is going ahead with its arrangement to set upa PTA in 
North Africa (1990).
The chapter addresses three broad issues which are:
(a) the reasons for and the ECA's approach to institutional building;
(b) the types and their objectives; and
(c) the ECA’s assistance to them and the problems they face.
The aim is to assess its role and whether the institutions are contribut 
ing to development in a positive way.
2. THE REASONS FOR AND THE ECA’S APPROACH TO INSTITUTION BUILDING
Regional co-operation is an old and complex phenomenon. There 
are no acceptable definitions for it but broadly speaking it includes 
any interstate activity with less than universal participation designed 
to meet some commonly experienced and expressed needs. The need can be 
military, political, economic, social, technical or cover a residual 
public interest. Co-operation and unity for collective betterment have 
^remained at the centre of African International Relations since the 
1960s. As an idea and a continental movement Pan-Africanism was
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predicated on co-operation and unity. The struggle to develop new 
patterns of post-colonial, regional co-operative arrangements were all 
aspects of the move to institutionalize Pan-Africanism. The desire for 
regional co-operation is vaguely present in all parts of the world, but 
in particular it is expressed by African states in their dealings in 
the ECA. The ECA has continued to emphasize the co-operative spirit 
in the economic sphere in general and through the establishment of 
institutions.
In establishing the institutions, the peculiar nature of the ECA 
has been brought to the fore, that is, the fact that it is an arm of the 
UN. The Commission adopts a paternalistic approach to most of its 
activities. It works on the basic assumption that whatever it does, 
it must in a broad sense be good for Africa. It also approaches regional 
issues in the context of the North-South debate with reference to the 
demand for a NIEO. Even though it stresses economic co-operation, the 
Commission has not been specific in terms of areas of concentration.
For example, co-operation can be in the following areas - financical, 
trade, agriculture, industry or communications. Instead, the Commission 
attempted to spread its activities to cover promotional work for ECOWAS 
and other IGOs, setting up of the PTA and encouragement of subregional 
groupings. It has no clear direction in which it is operating. It 
rather depends on the existence of salient factors which affect and shape 
co-operative arrangements in Africa, that is the objective arguments 
that can be advanced in support of them. It is a truism that the same 
economic problems which plagued African countries in the 1960s prevail 
in the 1980s with perhaps elements of desperation and severity attached.
The problems include, the vulnerability of African commodities to changes 
^in world market prices, external debts, a rate of population growth 
which exceeds that of productivity, and natural disasters such as flooding,
- 160 -
drought and famine. So regional economic co-operation is still an 
attractive goal but there is the need to promote it within an established 
framework. For example, if the states opt for customs union, common 
market or free trade area, the ECA should then channel resources to such. 
At the moment the ECA’s activities are too loosely organized and not 
clearly defined. The outcome is that given its limited financial and 
manpower resources, its impact in institution building is minimal. To 
start with, very little is known of the 32 inter-governmental institutions 
it has created (see Table 4.1).
There are two main factors which have provided the interest in, 
and attractiveness for, the ECA’s role in institutional building. The 
first is the failure of Africa to devise a consistent and coherent 
philosophy for development which reflect African conditions. This has 
meant that development by and large is being carried out on a piece-meal 
basis. Secondly, the structure of most African economies has a wider 
implication for development. For example, small states have limited 
development options and most African states are small in population and, 
therefore, market size. Only six of the 50 states have a population of 
more than 15 million people, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, 
Tanzania and Zaire. 24 number less than 5 million each and 12 have a 
population of fewer than one million. Moreover, long-term solutions to 
the special problems of the landlocked, usually poor, states require 
regional approaches. For states such as Swaziland, Lesotho, Rwanda and 
Burundi, their economic viability and development will best be met in a 
regional co-operative arrangement. Both nationally and regionally, 
development implies an increase in economic co-operation, so that African 
economies may become more reliant than at present on the abundant natural 
^and human resources they possess. Co-operation, it is believed, will 
enhance their capacity to adapt to change in the international economic
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system: only in this way will African states be able to overcome the
limitations imposed on them by smallness of markets, geographical 
isolation and rigid economic structures.^
When the Commission was established, the only existing inter­
governmental institutions in Africa were those established by France 
and Britain in the colonial territories and they were designed to pro­
mote the interests of the metropolitan powers. The independent African 
states had no history of economic co-operation among themselves and 
were only then beginning to get used to each other as sovereign states. 
These states faced numerous economic problems. Decolonization did not 
lead to the expected improvement of the standard of living. The 
economies inherited from the colonial powers were poor and dependent - 
characterized by the dominance of subsistent products; fragmented 
national markets, which made it difficult to establish viable productive 
units; undeveloped and under-utilized material and human resources; and 
dependence on ex-colonial metropolitan countries for food, consumer 
goods and manufactures, technology and technical know-how. It quickly 
became clear that political independence by itself would not bring 
about the economic restructuring required for the eradication of the 
economic problems in the aftermath of colonialism. Therefore, the African 
elites and governments committed themselves to promote the idea of building 
a new economic order for the benefit and welfare of the peoples. From 
the start, the ECA saw economic co-operation as a major and indispensable 
vehicle for achieving this goal, that is, for the transformation of 
African economies and societies.
The Commission's very first session laid stress on co-operative 
action among African countries in practically all economic spheres. The 
first of its resolutions called upon the secretariat to establish liaison
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with all existing IGOs in the continent working in the field of 
economic and social development. Then resolution 86(v) adopted at its 
fifth session in 1963 requested the Executive Secretary to "undertake 
intensive studies on major problems relating to the establishment of 
and African Common Market, and, having regard to balanced integration 
of the economic development of the African countries".
The goals of regional co-operation can be achieved through the 
establishment of economic groupings to create large markets, with the 
possibility of establishing viable production capacities in industry 
and the primary sector, increasing the capacity of absorption and 
adaptation of technology, creating viable transport networks, pooling 
manpower and financial resources and promoting the exploitation of 
natural and mineral resources. The ECA responded by arguing that to 
promote development in a fragmented continent, there was the need to 
establish institutions to assist African countries collectively to 
develop the capabilities and infrastructures essential for their 
economic and social development. The Commission has since been pre­
occupied with the promotion of regional co-operation. This preoccu­
pation is derived from its mandate which, among other things enjoined 
the Commission "to initiate and participate in measures for facilitating 
concerted action for the economic development of Africa, including its 
social aspects, with a view to raising the level of economic activity 
and strengthening the economic relations of countries and territories
£
of Africa both among themselves and with other countries of the world". 
In effect when it set up the IGOs the ECA was responding to the develop­
ment needs of the continent and the fact that in the 1960s Africa lacked 
co-operative institutions.
The first two institutions to be established were the African
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Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) and the African 
Development Bank (ADB). They were to deal with the training of staff 
indispensable for socio-economic development and the mobilization of 
capital through concerted efforts. For these and subsequent institu­
tions the ECA justified its actions by pointing out that there was "the 
need for the creation of institutions which individual countries are too 
poor to establish and operate on their own, but which are indispensable 
to the accelerated economic and social development of the African 
continent through collective self-reliance or which for reasons of nature, 
scale and optimality are best established at regional level . ..."^ For 
the ECA, the collective self-reliance approach to development implies a 
measure of delinking from those components of the international system 
in which a balanced relationship cannot be established. Its actions aim 
at reducing dependency on the industrialized countries, providing 
opportunity to expand productive capacity and to promote self-sustained 
growth, and, providing the means by which knowledge may be shared in the 
process of productive or trading activities, scientific works, social
g
research and advanced education.
The IGOs were to promote long-term objectives of development and
for those established to serve a particular subregion; the ECA hoped
that they would have "a trickle-down effect, beyond the service area,
9
embracing ultimately in one form or another, all states". In other 
words, the Commission adhered to the principal of universality as the 
common philosophy and bond of all its IGOs; and this idea is enshrined 
in their constitutions. But, in practice, there is little evidence 
that universality has been achieved especially as the IGOs compete with 
each other as will be illustrated later.
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3. CATEGORIES AND OBJECTIVES OF ECA-SPONSORED INSTITUTIONS
In order to understand and distinguish the various IGOs created, 
we have to consider their classifications and objectives. There are 
three main types of IGOs established and sponsored by the ECA. In 
Category I, we have the subsidiary organs of the Commission, namely, 
the multinational programming and Operational Centres (MULPOCs). (There 
are five MULPOCs in existence in North, Eastern and Southern, Central 
and West Africa. The MULPOCs are discussed extensively in Chapters 6-9 
of this thesis.)
Category II are the ECA-sponsored institutions. These are IGOs 
established by ECA resolutions. They are conceived, planned and esta­
blished by the ECA Secretariat under mandates and directions of African 
states through regional and subregional policy-making organs. Examples 
include the ADB, AATPO, IDEP and the PTA in Eastern and Southern Africa.
Category III are the ECA/OAU and ECA/United Nations System sponsored 
institutions. These institutions have the same constitutional relation 
with the ECA as those in Category II. Although they are established by 
the resolutions of the ECA, and are part of its work programme, the 
mandates for their establishment are also derived from the OAU and/or 
the UN General Assembly or other agencies of the UN System. Examples 
include the African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT) and the African 
Centre for Applied Research and Training in Social Development (ACARTSOD).
They are not backed by any ECA resolutions and, therefore, have 
no constitutional links with the Commission. In some cases, the ECA 
provided interim secretariat for them until such a time that they were 
^strong enough to have their own secretariats. Examples include the West
African Rice Development.Agency (WARDA) and the Association of African
/
Central Banks (AACB).
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Table 4.1 Classification of ECA-Sponsored Institutions, Dates 
Established, Geographical Coverage and Functions
[Key: R is for institutions with regional coverage
SR is for institutions with subregional coverage]
A. FINANCIAL AND BANKING SERVICES
1. African Development Bank (ADB; established 1963, R). Its func­
tion is to contribute to the economic and social development of
member states either individually or jointly by promoting the 
investment of private and public capital.
2. Association of African Central Banks (AACB; 1968; R). To promote 
co-operation in the monetary, banking and financial spheres in 
the African region and assist in the formation of guidelines 
along which agreements among African countries on monetary fields 
can proceed.
3. African Centre for Monetary Studies (ACMS; 1978; R). This is a
subsidiary of the AACB and it acts as its Secretariat.
4. West African Clearing House (WACH; 1975; R). To promote the use
of the currencies of the member states for subregional trade and 
other transactions; bring about economies in the use of foreign 
reserves; encourage liberalization of trade and promote monetary 
co-operation.
5. Association of African Tax Administrators (AATA; 1950; R). To
promote co-operation in the field of taxation policy, legislation 
and administration among African countries.
B. EARTH RESOURCES SERVICES
6. Regional Centre for Training in Aerial Surveys (RECTAS; 1972; R). 
For training, research and advisory services in aerial surveys 
with particular emphasis on the African environment.
7. Regional Centre for Services in Surveying, Mapping and Remote 
Sensing (RCSSMRS; 1975; SR). To provide maintenance of surveying, 
mapping and remote sensing equipments; provide training for 
nationals of the member states; and provide advisory services.
8. African Remote Sensing Council (ARSC; 1979; R). To harmonized 
and co-ordinate the policies of remote sensing and to foster the 
use of remote sensing for the assessment and development of the 
natural resources of Africa.
./cont.
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9. Eastern and Southern African Mineral Resources Development 
Centre (ESAMRC); 1977; SR). Advisory services, operational and 
laboratory specialized services, guidance in planning and execu­
tion of mineral promotion of co-operation.
10. African Association of Cartography (AAC; 1975; R). Concerned 
with the promotion and harmonization of cartographic activities 
within its member states.
11. African Regional Centre for Solar Energy (ARCSE; 1979; R). To 
aid member states in carrying out research in solar energy, to 
strengthen existing centres, to encourage co-operation with 
regard to the practical use of solar energy.
12. Central African Mineral Resources Development Centre (CAMRDC; 
1981; SR). Provides advisory services, operational and labor­
atory specialized services, guidance in planning and execution 
of mineral development projects and training on the job.
13. Regional Remote Sensing Centre (CRTO; 1977; SR). To receive, 
process and distribute satellite information and to assist 
African countries in the utilization of this information for 
development projects.
C. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICES
14. African Regional Centre for Engineering Design and Manufacturing 
(ARCEDM; 1979; R). To assist African countries in laying the 
foundation for engineering industries by promoting accelerated 
rational and integrated development of designing and manufacturing 
capability in engineering goods.
15. African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT; 1977; R). To 
generate increased consciousness of the role of technology in 
national development; promote development of technology within 
Africa and bring about a more judicious approach to the acquisi­
tion of technology.
16. African Regional Organization for Standardization (ARSO; 1977; R). 
To promote standardization activities in Africa, elaborate 
regional standards, promote common protection and human safety 
and harmonization of views of members in the field of standardiz­
ation.
17. African Institute for Higher Technical Training and Research 
(AIHTTR; 1979; R). To assist member states in acquiring and 
developing adequate technical manpower capability for the trans­
formation of African economies and exploitation of the tegion’s 
natural resources.
18. Industrial Property Organization for English-Speaking Africa 
. (ESARIPO; 1976; R). For the promotion and development of
industrial property laws (relating to patents, industrial designs, 
trade marks) of member states, assistance to African countries in 
their acquisition and development of technologies appropriate to 
their national priorities and establishment of training schemes 
and common services.
./cont.
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D. SOCIAL, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT
19. African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP; 
1964; R). To train experts and senior officials engaged in 
economic development and planning and to undertake social and 
economic development research in support of training.
20. Regional Institute for Population Studies (RIPS; 1972; R). To 
provide training courses in population and related fields to 
persons particularly those of the English-speaking countries of 
Africa, organize and undertake research on all aspects of popu­
lation and related fields.
21. Institute de formation et de recherche demographiques (IFORD; 
1971; SR). To organize intensive training courses, refresher 
courses and workshop in population-related fields; undertake 
research in demographic trends and socio-economic development in 
Africa and to provide consultancy services on population-related 
fields.
22. African Centre for Applied Research and Training in Social 
Development (ACARTSOD; 1977; R). To deal with problems of social 
development in Africa and to undertake research and training in 
this field.
23. Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI; 1980; 
SR). To promote sound management in the public and parastatal 
enterprises of member states by improving the performance 
capabilities of administrators and managers at both national and 
inter-governmental levels through training consultancy services 
and research.
24. Southern African Labour Commission (SALC; 1980; SR). To look 
into the possibility of stopping labour migration by independent 
African workers to the Republic of South Africa.
E. TRADE AND TANSPORT
25. Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations (AATPO; 1977; 
R). To foster regular flow of information and communiation between 
African countries in trade matters.
26. Port Management Association of West and Central Africa (PMAWCA; 
1972; SR). To seek the improvement, co-ordination and standardiz­
ation of African ports operations, equipment and services.
27. Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA; 
1973; SR). To seek the improvement, co-ordinatin and standardiz­
ation of African ports operations, equipment and services.
./cont.
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28. Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African 
Countries (PTA; 1981; SR). To promote co-operation and devel­
opment in all fields of economic activity; to establish a 
common market as a first step to the creation of an economic 
community.
29. Federation of African Chambers of Commerce (FACC; not yet a 
legally constituted institution, but has interim secretariat at 
ECA; R). To promote activities of national and subregional 
chambers of commerce and the encouragement of African enterprises 
and joint ventures.
30. Trans-African Highway Authority (TAHA; 1981; SR). To co-ordinate 
the planning, improvement, construction, maintenance and efficient 
use of the Trans-African Highway linking Lagos to Mombasa and its 
feeder roads.
31. Trans-East African Highway Authority (TEAHA; 1982; SR). To co­
ordinate the planning, improvement, construction, maintenance 
and efficient use of the Trans-East African Highway linking Cairo 
(Egypt) with Gaborone (Botswana) and its feeder roads.
32. African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC; 1969; R). A consulta­
tive body whose purpose is to provide a framework for the 
discussion of measures for the co-ordination and co-operation
of the civil aviation activities of its member states and to 
promote the co-ordination and orderly development of African air 
transport.
In all, the ECA has established 32 inter-governmental institutions. 
Of these 17 are regionally based, while 15 are subregional. The Commis­
sion proposed two new institutions. The first was for an African Centre 
of Meteorological Applications for Development (ACMAD). It stated that 
Africa needed a system of climatological and hydrological watch over 
the climate-related natural disasters such as drought, floods, cyclones 
and storms. Regarding the location of ACMAD, only Cairo (Egypt) and 
Nairobi (Kenya) had the necessary infrastructure on which to build.
These two and three other regional meteorological centres (Dakar, Niamey 
and Oran) were considered in an ECA/WMO study. Although member states 
have accepted the ACMAD was needed, they have nonetheless expressed 
concern over the financial implications of establishing i t . ^  This 
concern has slowed down the setting-up of a PTA in North Africa for which
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the Commission has obtained consent in principle from member states 
The timetable has been drawn up and the PTA will be established in 
1990.
4. ECA’S ASSISTANCE TO, AND PROBLEMS FACING, ITS INSTITUTIONS
One major assistance of the Commission to its institutions is 
that it has continued to act as interim secretariat. Of the 32 
institutions, there are seven which are not fully established and for 
which the ECA is still their interim secretariat. These are: (a) the
Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA);
(b) the Trans-East African Highway Authority (TEAHA); (c) the Central
African Mineral Resources Development Centre (CAMRDC); (d) the African
Regional Centre for Solar Energy (ARCSE); (e) the Association of
African Tax Administrators (AATA); (f) the Federation of African
Chambers of Commerce (FACC); and (g) the Southern African Labour 
Commission (SALC). There is a danger of the ECA not being able to 
establish fully-fledged secretariats for them because of the financial 
demands they make on member states. So far states have not been paying 
the required subscriptions to existing institutions. Also the ECA has 
been acting for some over a long period of time. For example, the 
PMAESA was established in 1973, while the ARCSE came into existence 
in 1979. When will these two have their own secretariats?
The cost of being an interim secretariat has wider implications 
for the Commission. It exerts considerable pressure on its limited 
resources. The officials of the substantive divisions related to the 
institutions have to prepare and organize the meetings for their policy 
organs. They are also involved in promotional activities on their
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behalf and draws up their annual reports. Finally, the officials have 
to keep the minutes and records of the meeting of each institution.
(In February 1987, when the ECA organized a weekend conference in the 
holiday resort of Nazareth, Ethiopia, for the executives of its institu­
tions, it gave one first-hand knowledge of the effort and preparation 
which go with such meetings. The ECA officials remarked that they were 
always busy organizing meetings and conferences. These left them with 
little time to handle routine tasks and workloads.^
Still on the ECA's assistance to its institutions, there is a 
formal relationship existing between them. At the ministerial level 
the ECA deals with their chief executives directly through the Confer­
ence of the Chief Executives of the ECA-sponsored regional and sub­
regional institutions, which takes place once a year. The Chief 
Executives in turn deal with the relevant substantive ECA divisions 
which have liaison officers to follow up on all matters in respect of 
the institutions concerned. But the ECA does not always comply with 
the requests of the Chief Executives. For example, it has failed to 
work out the staff model and financial regulations of the institutions 
up till the present. The Chief Executives made the request in 1980 
and they asked the Commission to prepare a paper on the subject for 
submission to their respective governing councils for due consideration. 
Secondly, there was no agreed common legal administrative, management 
and audit service to assist all the institutions in the auditing of 
accounts. The request was made in 1980 as well. There is no evidence 
in the minutes of the meetings of the Chief Executives to suggest that 
the ECA has complied with the request. Thirdly, the Commission did not 
provide a model host government agreement which it could rely upon for 
^establishing the institutions. There seems to be different arrangements 
each time. Finally, the flow of information between the ECA and the
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institutions was slow. The Commission reported that "there were
constraints in the form of lack of adequate human and financial
resources. These hampered the effectiveness of information activities
both at the ECA headquarters level and at that of the Commission’s
operational arms in the field and other inter-governmental organiz-
12
ations concerned with socio-economic development in Africa". In 
effect, the activities of the institutions were suffering due to 
manpower and financial deficiencies in the ECA.
Apart from the ECA’s assistance to the institutions, the UNDP 
is an organization which has provided finance for some of them. It 
is this assistance which has enabled them to carry out their activities 
in the light of irregular and non-payment of subscriptions by their 
members. For such institutions the UNDP has been the main source of 
funding for the 1982-86 period. (See Table 4.2 overleaf.) The ECA 
has made presentations to the UNDP requesting continued assistance for 
the 1987-91 period. The UNDP has yet to respond and renew its commit­
ments.
From the examples above, the assistance offered to the institutions 
include provision of personnel to service the meetings of their policy 
organs, promotional activities and acting as the interim secretariat 
for seven. In addition, the Commission also prepared and submitted the 
constitutions of all the institutions.
Most of the ECA-sponsored institutions encounter numerous problems.
These range from administrative and financial to constitutional ones.
We trace these problems to one main source, which is the strategy by 
which they were established. They were conceived, planned and established 
on the principle that they were necessary for economic co-operation and 
good for Africa. They were also established in sectors to which the ECA
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Table 4.2 Estimated UNDP Funding 
(1982-1986)
for ECA-Sponsored Institutions
Institution
UNDP Inputs 
(US$)
Approved
Period
1. African Regional Centre for 
Engineering Design and 
Manufacturing (ARCEDEM) 1,051,057
Approved up to 
April 1988
2. African Regional Oragnization 
for Standardization 1,400,000 ii
3. African Regional Centre for
Services in Surveying, Mapping 
and Remote Sensing (RCSSMRS) 92,750 ii
4. African Institute for Economic 
Development and Planning (IDEP) 1,401,746 ii
5. African Regional Centre for 
Technology (ARCT) 106,704 ii
Total 4,051,357
Source: Tabulated from information in Progress Report on UNDP/ECA
Co-operation under the UNDP Fourth Cycle Regional Programme 
for Africa 1987-1991, Doc. E/ECA/CM.14/29, ECA, Addis Ababa, 
9 February 1988, pp. 4-7.
accorded priority on the basis of their usefulness to African states.
Once the Commission has done the necessary studies and preparation of 
the constitutions, it then approaches the states for their consent on 
the establishing and terms of reference of each proposed new institution. 
The ECA persuades them to endorse the resolutions and urges them to sign 
the respective constitutions and protocols. By so doing, the ECA attempted 
to impose them on the states because it was not the latter who made the 
move for the institutions. And another major fault is that there is no 
-master-plan for the establishment of the institutions. The cumulative
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effect of these is that the institutions have been established in a 
haphazard manner. The other problem is that African states are wary of 
institutions created to foster inter-state co-operation because there 
are too many of them in existence already. So when it comes to payment 
of subscriptions and signing of constitutions, the states opt for those 
they think are necessary and in conformity with their own development 
priorities. In an era of limited foreign exchange earnings, the issue 
of choice becomes paramount. The ECA has defended its position by 
stating that there was nothing wrong with the institutions as such; 
what was wrong was the lack of political, financial and other material
13
support of the very countries that had clamoured for their establishment. 
The statement also reveals the conflict of interests between the Commission 
and the member states. While the former argues that the states clamoured 
for their establishment, the latter have argued that there are far too 
many of the institutions. They have not perceived them as necessary and 
so have hesitated to join and pay subscriptions. In circumstances where 
the states share the ECA’s perception of need with anticipated real 
benefits, they have not only agreed to their establishment in principle, 
but also gone on to support them financially and otherwise. This applies 
to institutions such as ADB, IDEP and ACMS.
The problem is not only related to the strategy the ECA has adopted 
but also to the ineffective way it has set out to promote their activities. 
In short, the states are not fully aware of the potential and activities 
of some of the institutions. To quote from the final report of the 10- 
member state Ad hoc Committee (Doc. E/EC/CM.II/17/Add.I): "If African
countries set up multinational institutions, it is incumbent on them to 
make use of them. More often than not, it is the case that African 
^countries do not seem to be aware of the institutions which have been 
established and seek help from foreign institutions which lure them by
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supplying so-called experts free of charge." The quotation reveals 
that there is no awareness of the existence of such institutions as 
ESAMI and RECTAS which provide training facilities and that African 
states have an alternative in services rendered by non-African organ­
izations on a free of charge basis. Such organizations include UNIDO,
UNDP and UNESCO. Also if states are not aware of what is on offer by 
the ECA, they can neither accede nor pay their subscriptions. And so 
long as services are rendered free of charge, the attractiveness of 
ECA-sponsored institutions will be reduced.
The relevance of some institutions, such as ADB and IDEP, is not 
in question: they are designed to overcome genuine deficiencies, for
example, in trained manpower, information dissemination and research 
in the economic and social sectors. The issue to be addressed is the 
problems arising from the proliferation of institutions. There are too 
many performing similar or interrelated functions and the question is 
whether the same results could not be achieved at less cost if their 
activities were better co-ordinated.
Another problem relating to the ECA's strategy has to do with the 
lack of focus for the institutions. The objectives of some (of the 
institutions) are so vague that in the wider context of their role in 
development it is difficult to determine their contribution. For example, 
the Central African Mineral Resources Development Centre (CAMRDC) was 
established in 1981 to provide advisory, operational and laboratory 
services, guidance and execution of mineral projects and training on 
the job. There is no mention of the type of mineral resources nor an 
indication as to whether the projects are designed by the states or the 
ECA. We know that they are instruments for promoting economic co-operation, 
but their ultimate goals and targets are neither very clear nor precise.
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More distressing is the fact that their activities are not 
integrated. Each operates independent of the others even when they 
have similar functions. For example, the ARCEDEM, ARCT and the AIHTTR 
have similar objectives but their activities are neither co-ordinated 
nor rationalized. The consequence of non-integration of activities is 
that they compete directly with each other for functions and funding.
For example, both the African Association of Cartography (AAC) and the 
African Remote Sensing Council (ARSC) have similar functions and operate 
in the general field of cartography. Also the AATPO and WACH share 
similar functions.
Apart from competition and duplication of efforts, the ECA also 
established the practice of creating separate institutions for the 
English-speaking and French-speaking countries. This is another source 
of problems for member states. Examples of this action is the Eastern 
and Southern African Mineral Resources Development Centre (ESAMRDC) and 
its counterpart in Central Africa - CAMRDC; the Regional Institution 
for Population Studies (RIPS) and the Institute de formation etude 
recherche demographiques (IFORD). The implication is that one institution 
cannot cater for all countries in Africa. The Ad hoc Committee is in 
favour of having one Secretariat for all the states as a way of ration­
alizing their activities and cutting down on costs.
The Commission’s claim that its institutions were "mutually 
complementary in their aims and activities and should therefore help 
in each other's development,"^ is an understatement. It further defends 
its actions by stating that "African states rejected a proposal to dis­
band one of its institutions which was not enjoying adequate political
16
and financial support of African governments".
/
This sounds like a propaganda exercise as it failed to mention the
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name of the institution. The evidence points to competition, duplic­
ation of functions, inconsistency, fragmentation and great difficulties 
in paying assessed contributions. These factors have rendered the 
institutions ineffective. The problems that the foregoing pose have 
been recognized, particularly in West Africa where the countries have 
requested the ECA to prepare a study and proposals for strengthening 
economic co-operation which would assist in harmonizing the activities 
of the over 32 inter-governmental organizations operating there.^ 
Although the institutions in question are not ECA-sponsored ones, they 
nevertheless present the same problems to development. It is therefore 
worth mentioning the findings of the study team set up by the ECA in 
1988 in response to the request. The team was headed by Dr. O.^dewoye, 
Reader in History at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
It concluded that the more than 30 economic co-operation and 
integration arrangements in West Africa, taken individually as well as 
collectively, have not contributed as much as was expected to develop­
ment in the subregion. They stated that "there has been no major break­
through in terms of a common, well-articulated programme of economic 
integration or even an effective machinery for its realization. 
Consequently, the impact of the IGOs on the development of the countries
of the subregion has been marginal. West African countries are still 
18
basically poor." The team found that the most fundamental obstacle 
to economic integration was the fact that West African states have not 
genuinely accepted it as the only viable weapon for fighting poverty 
and economic dependence. This is illustrated by the failure of govern­
ments to implement decisions commonly arrived at in matters of economic 
co-operation and the failure to meet their financial obligations to the 
-^iGOs. More important, and in conformity with the central argument in 
this chapter, is the fact that the team considered the multiplicity of
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IGOs as another obstacle to economic integration. They have over­
lapping membership; their objectives and integration strategies vary 
but "in the absence of any serious effort at ensuring that they work 
in harmony, they represent a considerable dissipation of energy. As 
they are now, they constitute multiplicity of wheels of co-operation
and not a composite machinery with every part having a definite task 
19
to fulfil. ECOWAS will serve as the Secretariat of all the institu­
tions while the ECA MULPOC for West Africa based in Niamey, Niger, will 
assist in the planning and execution of projects. They also strongly 
recommend the merging of institutions with similar functions such as 
the two research arms of the Inter-State Committee for the Fight Against 
Drought in the Sahel, that is, the Institute du Sahel in Bamako, Mali, 
and the Regional Agro-Meteorological and Hydrological Centre (AGRHMET) 
in Niamey, Niger Republic. But the study has led to no change. The 
report has ended upon shelves of government and at the ECA. The officials 
of the latter were quick to point out that the issue of closing down 
institutions has acquired political connotations. States which play
host to such institutions are not prepared for closures because of job
20
opportunities and the prestige to the governments. The problems high­
lighted by the study were similar to those affecting the ECA-sponsored 
institutions.
The question of lack of finance and membership of ECA institutions 
are both interrelated and acute. Apart from the ADB, ACMS, AACB and 
the WACH, the rest of the institutions suffer from lack of financial 
support from member states, several of whom fail to pay their subscrip­
tions or, if they do, pay it so irregularly as to adversely affect the 
running and development of the institutions. This in turn militates 
.against the mobilization of assistance from donor agencies and countries 
which only support viable institutions. Also several do not have the
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full complement of membership. In many cases, institutions of sub­
regional coverage have only about half the number of African countries 
as members. For example, since its inception, the Regional Centre for 
Training in Aerial Surveys (RECTAS), established in Ile-Ife, Nigeria,
in 1972, has had only four West African member states, Benin, Ghana,
21
Nigeria and Senegal. Its potential membership is the 16 countries of
West Africa. The ECA reported that the RECTAS has not had sufficient
funds to undertake any curriculum or physical development. The Sister
Centre for Services in Surveying, Mapping and Remote Sensing (RCSSMRS)
in Nairobi, Kenya, has also suffered the same fate. Of the 18 Eastern
and Southern African countries which are supposed to constitute its
membership only five countries, namely, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia
22
and Malawi, were members. Malawi expressed its intention of leaving 
the Centre by the end of January 1980, although the records show that
at present she is still a member.
The situation is no better with the regionally-based institutions.
For example, the African Remote Sensing Council (ARSC), established in
23
1979, has only 14 members out of a potential membership of 50. The
net effect of the financial and membership problems is the growth of
the institutions is limited, disillusionment sets in and the collective 
self-reliance of African countries is undermined.
An examination of the financial situation of the ECA institutions 
reveals that non-payment of subscriptions has resulted in arrears of 
outstanding debts for members. The budgets of 11 of the institutions 
were as shown in Table 4.3.
The lack of finance is borne out by the arrears indicated for each 
Institution listed overleaf. The same problem goes for almost all of 
the ECA's institutions. But the solutions proposed by the ECA for this
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Table 4.3 Financial Standing of ECA-Sponsored Institutions
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
AATA (up to February 1984 (US$)
Assessed Contributions 
Amount paid 
Arrears
146,700 
73,487 (slightly above 50%) 
73,213
RECTAS (budget 1973/74 to 1983/84) (US$)
Expected contributions from members 4,601,958
Amount paid 3,329,261
Arrears 1,271,597
RCSSMRS (budget 1975/76 to 1982/83) (US$)
Contributions expected from members 8,516,445
Amount paid 4,448,685
Arrears 4,067,760
ESAMRDC (budget 1978/79 to 1984/85 (US$)
Assessed contributions from members 2,131,660
Actual payments 1,115,183
Arrears as of December 1984 1,016,487
ARCSE (1985 budget)
Operational budget estimated at $1,563,050. Gabon is the only 
member state which has made contribution of $11,123.46. (It is 
one of the institutions for which the ECA is acting as an 
interim government and is regionally based.)
CRTO (budget 1981 to 1984) 
Assessed contributions 
Amount paid 
Arrears
ARCT (budget 1978 to 1984) 
Contributions expected 
Amount paid 
Arrears
ARSO (budget 1978 to 1983) 
Contributions expected 
Amount paid 
Arrears
IDEP (budget by end of 1983) 
Contributions expected 
Amount paid 
Arrears
(CFA Franc)
856,102,300
155,135,146
700,967,154
(US$)
(US$)
(US$)
7,374,251
1,864,937
5,507,314
1,491,000.00
979,032.95
511,967.05
4,925,496.44 
- 832,854.11
4,092,642.33
IFORD (budget 1982 to 1984) (CFA Franc)
Contributions expected 287,500,000
Amount paid 76,966,687
Arrears 210,534,313
AATPO
The arrears for the years 1975 to 1982 are as follows: (US$) 
1975-1977 109,562.59
1978-1979 251,255.93
1980-1981 296,859.01
1982 359,058.26
Total US$ 1,016,735.79
Source: Compiled from Profile of ECA- and OAU-sposored institutions
including their financial standing, Doc. E/ECA/CM.II/17/ADD.2, 
ECA, Addis Ababa, 11 March 1985, pp. 5-55.
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and other related problems discussed so far are unrealistic. According 
to the Commission, "what is required is some method of ensuring that 
such institutions achieve full membership and that sufficient funds are
24
available to them to ensure their effective and efficient functioning".
But this cannot be achieved given their numbers, particularly as in many
cases states are not aware of their existence. Even the ECA apparently
accepts this diagnosis: "strange as it may seem, except for such
prestigious institutions as ADB and IDEP, very little is known outside
^  the limited circle of ministers and senior civil servants immediately
concerned with the institutions sponsored by the secretariat, about
those institutions, the progress they are making in implementing their
objectives and the way in which they can contribute to the economic and
25
social development of African countries."
Even if the countries were aware they would still not be in a 
position to pay subscriptions because of the sheer number in existence 
and scarcity of foreign exchange. The solution therefore to the problems 
facing the institutions has to be drastic and at the same time rational. 
In 1980, the chief executives of the IGOs discussed the various problems 
and requested a review of their activities.
The ECA constituted an Ad hoc Committee in 1984 to conduct the 
review. In 1985 the Committee recommended that: (1) there should be
better co-ordination or integration of the activities of institutions 
with similar or overlapping interests; (2) that careful review should 
be made as to the possibility of integrating the activities of those 
institutions temporarily located within the ECA secretariat with those 
of existing ones; (3) that one institution such as the ECA should 
collect the contributions due from members to all the IGOs sponsored
s''
by it, except the ADB, AACB and WACH, and pay them over promptly to
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the respective institutions; (4) that it was essential to demonstrate
to African countries how they stand to gain by being members; (5) that
membership of the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute
(ESAMI) and the Industrial Property Organization for English-speaking
Africa (ESARIPO) should be open to all African member states, so that
their full potential could be more fully utilized; (6) that in selecting
chief executives of the institutions, the qualities of leadership and
competence rather than political considerations should be the paramount
elements to be taken into account; (7) that no new institutions should
2 6be established unless it is absolutely necessary.
The ECA has been slow in implementing the recommendations. However, 
it has acted on one aspect, which concerned the merging of the ARSC and 
the AAC - the two institutions were performing complementary roles of 
co-ordinating the cartographic and remote sensing activities. The ECA 
convened a meeting in February 1988, where the participants adopted an 
agenda which included the signing of the constitution of the organization; 
consideration of its budget for 1988 and the appointment of the Secretary 
General of the ’new’ organization. Algeria was recommended to host the 
organization. Dr. Chedly Fezzani was appointed Secretary General and 
the merged organization will be known as the African Organization for 
Cartography and Remote Sensing (AOCRS). The next meeting is scheduled 
for 1989 when matters relating to the AOCRS will be finalized. (The actual 
date for the meeting has not yet been decided.)
5. CONCLUSION
The ECA has attempted to establish itself as a major continental 
institution builder. It has set up more than 30 inter-governmental 
organizations as instruments for the promotion of economic co-operation.
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But increasingly they have become obstacles to development in general 
and economic co-operation in particular because they are too many and 
their activities overlap in some cases. For example, the ARCEDM, the 
ARCT and the AIHTTR which operate in similar areas of technology design 
and technical manpower training - the result is duplication of efforts. 
Also members have refused to accede to most of the institutions and 
those who have done so, have refused to pay their subscriptions. The 
result is arrears of outstanding debts. But most important of all is 
the fact that African states are not aware of their existence and that 
they also face competition from foreign institutions offering training 
facilities, free of charge.
Most of the problems encountered by the institutions can be traced 
to the approach and strategy adopted by the ECA to set them up. There 
is no integrated or master plan. The ECA has failed to tackle the 
problems of the IGOs relating to co-ordination, inadequate financing, 
lack of membership and duplication of efforts. It has largely ignored 
the recommendation of the Ad hoc Committee (1984) that no new institution 
should be established unless it was absolutely necessary by going ahead 
with its plan to establish a PTA in North Africa in 1990. The countries 
are not yet ready for the PTA especially with the political conflicts 
stemming from the Western Sahara dispute and issues raised by the Camp 
David agreement 1979. Most of the states belong to the Arab League and 
are hostile to Israel, for example. Secondly, there is no formal 
relation between the states at the ministerial level, so it is difficult 
to see how negotiations will be conducted. Finally, most of the countries 
trade with the West and there is little trade between them. Therefore, 
there is the absence of previous experiences and institutional framework 
for co-operation in trade, for instance.
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The ECA was so deeply committed to the quest for economic 
integration but was somewhat intolerant of nationally-based regional 
initiatives, such as the East African Community in the 1960s and SADCC 
in the 1980s. The latter cross-cut the subregions defined by the ECA 
and is far from the standard PTA and common market theoretical model 
sequence. (The Lusaka MULPOC does not deal directly with SADCC.)
Due to its leadership, economic and technical emphasis, the 
Commission has not given adequate attention to the need to involve 
states more fully in designing their subregional groupings. The ECA 
designs the protocol, treaties and institutional structures of the 
institutions. The result is that the states do not identify with the 
latter. For these reasons, the role of the ECA as an institution 
builder has largely been unsuccessful.
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CHAPTER 5
THE DECENTRALIZATION OF THE ECA TO THE SUBREGIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s and 1970s, the ECA made two major attempts to de­
centralize to the subregions. Its main objective was to promote the 
establishment of regional economic groupings which would eventually 
lead to the creation of an African Common Market. This has remained 
the central intention and emphasis of its activities since its inception. 
However, it has to be stated that the two attempts failed because of 
the discrepancy between stated intentions and actual practice. The sub­
regional organs established were ill-equipped to perform and they faced 
serious structural problems such as spoor administration, limited funds, 
inadequate manpower and the fact that they did not implement real pro­
grammes .
Even more important was the fact that the ECA failed to decentralize 
in terms of allowing the subregional organs to have autonomy in finance, 
management, formulation and implementation of programmes. The headquarters 
was in complete control of the major aspects of the organs. On the other 
hand, member states continued to demand a positive image and role for 
the subregional organs, as depicted in 1987 by the request of the West 
African states that there should be a review of the scope and objective 
of the Niamey MULPOC. The MULPOCs celebrated their tenth anniversary in 
1987 without any hint from the ECA that their objectives, structure and 
activities would be reviewed. In their present form they are inactive 
-and act as obstacles to development. This chapter seeks to examine why 
this is the case. It starts by looking at the reasons for decentralization,
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followed by the phases and problems encountered by the process.
2. REASONS FOR DECENTRALIZATION
Decentralization is identified primarily with the United Nations 
operational programmes. These are considered as activities undertaken 
with the object of sustaining or enhancing economic and social well­
being. The activities generally involve the transfer of resources to 
developing countries. It is useful to distinguish between those oper­
ational activities of a co-operative character that seek to mobilize or 
increase the potential for development and increase the capabilities of 
countries to promote economic and social developments, and those for 
which the purpose is immediate sustenance, that is, activities of an 
emergency character. The former may be grouped into four broad categories:
(a) capital assistance made available in the form of grants and loans 
with the intention of contributing to the financing of a capital scheme;
(b) commodity assistance, including the supply of food aid; (c) technical 
co-operation; and (d) external finance provided on a non-project basis
to support the overall development efforts of the recipient countries, 
for example, budgetary and balance of payments support. The ECA's efforts 
to decentralize are more related to technical assistance to states in the 
subregions than to the other categories.
Decentralization involves the removing of authority, activities 
and responsibility for making decisions, either in parte or in toto, 
from a single centre and distributing them. It embodies an examination 
of the ways and means of providing capabilities to the subregional offices 
(in terms of financial, manpower and monitoring resources) to execute 
programmes and projects. The idea of decentralization of the UN system
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was that a greater degree of authority and responsibility should be 
delegated to regional and country levels and that regional co-ordination 
of activities should be strengthened.^- Decentralization is proposed 
at two levels - one from the UN headquarters in New York to the secre­
tariats of the regional commissions with the other from the headquarters 
of the latter to the subregions. In both cases the reference is to 
administrative decentralization. By implication the ECA handled aspects 
of both forms of decentralization and instead of strengthening its 
position, the exercises were not fully understood and implemented.
Since the 1960s, the members of the UN system have demanded de­
centralization. The legislative basis for decentralization from UN 
headquarters to the regional commission was set by EC0S0C resolution 
793(XXX) of August 1960, which urged a change in emphasis from head­
quarters work to fieldwork, utilization of regional commission services 
to plan and execute development programmes. Resolution 32/197 adopted 
by the General Assembly on 20 December 1977, now commonly known as the 
’restructuring resolution' constituted a step taken to define the roles 
and functioning of the regional economic commissions within the United 
Nations development system. It was intended to make the UN system more 
fully capable of dealing with problems of international economic co­
operation and development in a comprehensive and effective manner.
Together with resolution 33/202 of 27 January, 1979 by which the commis­
sions were accorded executing agency status in their own right, the 
'restructuring resolution' redefines their roles by providing about nine 
guidelines. Although this chapter is not about these aspects of 
decentralization, it is necessary to mention some of the guidelines 
because they made the exercise more complex for the ECA. The ECA was 
^trying to cope with the decentralization from UN headquarters and at 
the same time from its own headquarters in Addis Ababa. The 'restructuring
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resolution' stipulated that the regional economic commissions exhibit
team leadership and have the responsibility for co-ordiantion and
co-operation at the regional level. The ECA is involved with building
institutions for regional co-operation and it plays an advisory role
in Africa, but it is not yet regarded as the team leader. It shares
responsibility in promoting development with the OAU. In fact, without
the consent of the OAU, it cannot carry out its programmes. It is also
ineffective in implementing its programmes and various UN system officials
were still sceptical that the ECA could serve as team leader without
2
increased capabilities and improved operating performance.
Another point made by the 'restructuring resolution' was that the 
regional economic commissions should provide inputs to the UN global 
policy organs through its regional strategies and contribute to special 
sessions and conferences. The ECA had been very active in this regard 
especially with its submission to the special session on the African 
economic crisis in 1986 but the inputs do not have much impact on global 
deliberations relative to the considerable time and effort required to 
prepare them. Also the executive secretaries do not participate in the 
ACC machinery whose activities have great implications on development 
co-operation at the regional level. They do not appear regularly before 
the Second and Fifth Committees of the General Assembly or the CPC.
The regional commissions are also urged to adopt a common definition 
of regions and subregions and identical location of offices. UN system 
regional and subregional offices in Africa were in 14 different cities 
and only the ILO's regional office was co-located with the ECA and OAU 
in Addis Ababa. The situation has not changed and a common definition 
of regions and subregions has not been achieved by either the ECA or 
any other regional economic commission. In 1979 they were given the
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status of executing agency for projects of other UN agencies. For this 
the ECA has had a close relationship with the UNDP. It executed the
3
latter’s projects to the tune of US$ 22 million in the 1978-81 period, 
but it still has to deal with managerial, personnel and subregional 
office problems. The ECA has not been too successful in implementing 
aspects of decentralization from UN headquarters to its secretariat. 
Nonetheless, the attempt to carry them out became more complicated 
because African governments were also requesting that the ECA should 
in turn decentralize to the subregions. In fact, since the 1960s the 
member states have supported both types of decentralization. Why was 
this so? The demands made on the ECA were part of the demands made on 
the UN system as a whole. As demands grew for New York to decentralize, 
they trickled-down to the regional commissions and the specialized 
agencies.
The ECA itself also favoured decentralization so far as it would
strengthen it and hence the authority within the UN system of those
persons most sympathetic to the developing regions and in the best
4
position to analyze and prescribe for their problems. There was also 
a strong argument in favour of concerted regional and subregional attacks 
on development problems. Planning, supervision and provision of services 
can be better developed in the light of specific requirements of the 
area served, hence a general endorsement of subregional offices of both 
the regional commissions and the specialized agencies. Theoretically, 
the subregional offices were viewed as units catering for the local needs 
and for dealing with practical problems. They would implement projects 
within the framework of the overall programmes approved for the regional 
level. They were also expected to give feedback information to the 
^regional headquarters of the specialized agencies and commissions to 
enable them to deal appropriately with the problems. In some regions,
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such as Africa, it has been found necessary to decentralize because 
of its vastness and for other reasons, including uneven market economies, 
lack of communication links and infrastructures. The intention in such 
instances was to bring the commissions' activities closer to the problems 
of the countries of the subregions concerned. According to the Joint 
Inspection Unit Report 1975, "their purpose is to bring the work of the
commissions closer to the realities and the needs of the subregions they
u 5 cover .
In the replies of governments to the Secretary-General's question­
naire for the study on regional structures in the early 1970s, some 
governments suggested that the present regional arrangements and structures 
of the UN and its subsidiary organs, and of the specialized agencies, 
responded to needs which, in most cases, were no longer relevant to 
current circumstances, since they had been devised to meet much more 
modest needs than those which had led to the gradual establishment of 
the whole complex structure of the UN over the years. The activities 
of the UN system, according to some of the governments, "had not always 
kept pace with the various countries' needs'1.^ African governments 
re-echoed this argument through the main inter-governmental organ of 
the ECA in 1979. At the fifth conference of Ministers of the ECA held 
in Rabat, Morocco, in March 1979, resolution 255(VIV) was passed recom­
mending that the Executive Secretary should, in the overall interest 
of the Commission, decentralize the operational activities and resources 
of the Commission to the Multinational Programming and Operational 
Centres (MULPOCs). These are subsidiary organs of the ECA designed to 
carry out its operational activities. Member states argued that an 
improved organization of the ECA secretariat with the objective of being 
more responsive in meeting the needs of the African region, as well as 
providing the basis for more effective and efficient performance, was 
a necessity.
- 192 -
Apart from this, the states were also making other kinds of 
demand which boosted the need for decentralization. In 1988 the ECA 
celebrated its thirtieth anniversary amidst increasing demands from 
its member states for it to formulate and implement concrete and 
realistic programmes which gave value for money. Fit. Lt. Jerry J.
Rawlings stated that it should use its expertise and invaluable data 
to advance action-oriented proposals within the framework of a well- 
defined analysis of and strategy of development based on African needs 
and interests.^ For ECA programmes, P.S. Mmusi, Vice-President of 
Botswana, urged that it should establish clear priorities and warned
g
that "an all or nothing approach will merely add to our underachievement". 
The Executive Secretary pointed out that it was evident from the debate 
at the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly during its fortieth
9
session that member states were more and more asking for value for money. 
The combination of these demands, the pressures for structural changes 
in the UN system, the climatic, ecological and economic reasons were 
responsible for the ECA's move to decentralize. However, the approach 
it adopted seemed to have reflected mainly the economic arguments for 
decentralization. The Commission responsded to the vastness of the 
continent and the fact that national markets were small and fragmented, 
with human and material resources under-utilized. It therefore become 
imperative that one of its primary objectives was to create larger 
markets where economic activities could be profitably carried out 
because of the enormous potential for economies of scale. It was in 
this vein that the ECA proceeded to create subregional economic units 
which would be the prelude for the establishment of regional integration - 
a theme which became the cornerstone of its activities. Accordingly 
it set up the subregional offices as its first step towards decentraliz­
ation.
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3. PHASES OF DECENTRALIZATION
a. The Subregional Offices
The theme of economic co-operation was both part of the decen­
tralization efforts and part of the wider context of Pan-Africanism 
which adopted as an ideal for African relations with the West. From 
the Pan-African perspective, the states talked about the need to create 
an African Council for Economic Co-operation, the establishment of a 
joint African Development Bank and an African Commercial Bank. They 
called for the formation of an African Common Market, an African Payment 
Union and an African Bank for Economic Development. The common theme 
was the call for continentally based economic co-operation. But the 
attainment of economic co-operation based on this approach met with 
little success due to factors such as the absence of transport and com­
munication links, differential needs of each state and the subregions, 
the complexity of socio-economic problems following independence, the 
vastness of the continent and differential political ideologies. The 
ECA was well aware of these factors and they forced it to reconsider 
its approach. Rather than go for a continentally-based approach, it 
opted for a more realistic one. At its third session, it adopted 
resolution 23(111) which stated that the best immediate practical 
approach to overcoming obstacles to regional economic co-operation was 
to make provision for dealing with "economic problems peculiar to the 
subregions11. ^  Thereafter, integration at the subregional levels 
became the key element of the ECA’s development strategy. Based on 
geographical factors, economic and political conditions which existed 
in the 1960s, the ECA, with the consent of member states divided the 
continent into four subregions, namely, Eastern and Southern, Central,
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North and West Africa. In accordance with the division, four sub­
regional offices were established in Niamey (Niger) in 1963, Tangier 
(Morocco) 1963, Lusaka (Zambia) 1964, Kinshasa (Congo, now Zaire) 1965.^ 
The division relied on the cultural links between the states, the common 
history and boundaries. It enabled the states to think of themselves 
as operating in the same area and sharing similar problems. The states 
also understood that the best way out of their economic and political 
predicament was to work together. Also the ECA by the division was 
relying on the existence of some form of on-going inter-state organiz­
ations in the subregions which might provide the nucleus for grouping 
together the larger number of states into a still more viable economic 
unit. The earlier steps taken on economic co-operation consisted of 
the reconstruction of arrangements which were inherited from the colonial 
period. For example, the defunct East African Community was rebuilt 
to stress the fact that Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were independent 
states rather than colonies whose trade and economic policies were 
determined by a metropolitan power. The common market which France built 
up in its colonies in West and Central Africa were also given new 
institutional forms and a re-defined content.
The subregional offices were to (a) provide liaison between the
ECA headquarters and the governments in the subregions; (b) provide the
headquarters with direct information on the needs and problems of each
subregion through the collection of statistical and other information
and research; (c) provide advisory services requested by governments;
(d) the organization of training courses and seminars; (e) co-ordinate
development and trade policies and provide a centre for consultation
with the briefing of government officials, visiting missions, regional
12
^advisers and technical assistance experts. The ECO at the headquarters 
was responsible for co-ordinating their activities and the offices
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were funded through the regular budget of the ECA. Their directors 
were the representatives of the Executive Secretary. So in theory, 
the subregional offices were supposed to do for the subregions what 
the headquarters were doing at the continental level. The activities 
scheduled for them conformed to the traditional role of the ECA as an 
arm of the UN, that is, amongst other things, information gathering 
and dissemination, providing a forum for exchange of ideas and advisory 
services. The activities formed the basis of accusations and criticisms 
of the Commission especially as member states saw it as a research- 
oriented body. Even when the offices were created, the ECA had not 
responded to such criticism because they were mirrored images of the 
headquarters. There was no indication in their terms of reference that 
they were supposed to implement actual projects in each area. Moreover, 
they lacked organs for formulation, monitoring and implementation of 
such programmes. While the subregional offices continued to offer 
technical assistance and other services short of concrete projects, 
member states turned their attention to the formation of economic 
groupings and a pattern of behaviour developed towards the ECA. The 
practice was for the states to seek the ECA's advice and request surveys 
and feasibility studies, where applicable, for the creation of the 
economic groupings.
Once established the states tended to concentrate on the activities
of the groupings rather than those of the subregional offices. This
was the case with the establishment of the Union Douaniere et Economique
de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) in 1966. In North Africa, the Maghreb
Standing Consultative Committee was more effective for the states and
their activities within it overshadowed that of the Tangier subregional 
13
^offices. In some cases, member states initiated and established the 
economic groups independent of the ECA's initiatives. Two examples
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were the Communaute Economique de l ’Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) and the 
Mano River Union (MRU), both established in 1973.
The problems of the subregional offices were compounded by the 
fact that they lacked coherent work programmes. Indeed, they had no 
work programmes of any kind. Structurally, the offices were handicapped 
because the headquarters failed to give them distinctive roles in each 
area. The headquarters, while bowing to demands for decentralization, 
failed to consider its full implication. If, for instance, the object 
of the exercise was to bring the work of the secretariat closer to the 
subregional governments, how come the subregional offices had no formal 
inter-governmental organ to allow for the interaction of the represent­
atives with its officials? In terms of manpower resources, the activities 
of the offices were organized and controlled by a relatively small number 
of staff sent from headquarters. Throughout their existence the head­
quarters only provided skeleton staff for them. The secretariat explained 
that budgetary limitations had prevented the posting of more ECA staff
members to the subregional offices, so the few officials sent there spent 
14
long periods. Table 5.1 confirms that very few persons were sent to 
all the subregional offices.
For the period 1966-75, only Kinshasa and Tangier subregional 
offices had directors. The secretariat relied on the senior officers 
and general service staff to run the Lusaka and Niamey offices. There 
were far more general service staff than the professionals in all the 
offices. A similar composition was repeated for the 1968-71 period 
(see Table 5.2). If the subregional offices were there to emphasise 
fieldwork and closeness to the problems of the subregions, it became 
imperative that the secretariat needed professionals to run the offices 
instead of the skeleton staff. But for the period 1966-71 the subregional
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Table 5.1 Staff Resources 1966-1978
Subregional offices
D-l P-5 P-4 P-3
P-2/
P-l G.S
a. Lusaka 1966(A) _ 1 _ _ 3 4
1967(B) - 1 1 3 4
1968(C) - 1 1 3 5
b. Kinshasa 1966(A) — _ 1 3 5
1967(B) 1 - 1 2 4
1968(C) 1 1 - 2 5
c. Niamey 1966(A) - 1 -  - 2 6
1967(B) - 1 - 2 4
1968(C) - 1 - - 2 5
d. Tangier 1966(A) 1 - 2 1 — 9
1967(B) 1 - 2 1 - 8
1968(C) 1 1 2 1 9
Source: ECA 
Doc.
Annual Report 
, E/4354, UN,
(24 February 
New York, 1967,
1965-25 February 
p. 184.
1966) 9
Key
D-l is the head of the subregion (director). He is responsible
for the overall functioning of the office and the represent­
ative of the Executive Secretary.
P-5 to P-l are the senior officers and the economic affairs officers
who undertake studies and research. They assist the 
director in the management of the office and are the 
technocrats.
G.S These are staff recruited locally. They are made up of
administrative officers and their assistants, secretaries, 
telephonists, clerical officers, drivers, cleaners and 
messengers.
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Table 5.2 Staff Resources 1968-1971
Subregional offices
P-2 /
D-l P-5 P-4 P-3 P-l G.S
a. Kinshasa 1968 1 _ , 1 3
1969 1 - — _ 1 4
1970 1 - - _ 1 4
1971 1 - - - 1 4
b. Lusaka 1968 _ 1 1 1 4
1969 - 1 - — 1 4
1970 - 1 - - 1 4
1971 - 1 - - 1 4
c . Niamey 1968 _ 1 _ 1 5
1969 - 1 — 1 _ 5
1970 - 1 — 1 _ 5
1971 - 1 - 1 - 5
d. Tangier 1968 1 _ _ 1 8
1969 1 - — 1 _ 5
1970 1 - — 1 _ 5
1971 1 - - 1 - 5
Source: ECA Annual Report (1 March 1968-14 February 1969), Doc. E/4651/
Add.1, UN, New York, 1969, p. 6.
Note: This table has the same key as Table 5.1.
offices had fewer professionals. However in 1971-75 the ECA increased 
their number - for the actual composition see Table 5.3. But even with 
the improved situation there were far too many countries in each sub- 
region: with the complexity of their socio-economic situations, it is
rather difficult to see how the few professionals could have handled 
the situation efficiently. On the whole, the subregional offices were 
ineffective due to lack of manpower resources and all the other problems 
mentioned so far. They were not properly equipped for specific roles 
in integration and development. The decision to have them was logical 
"'and due to pressures from member states, but their abilities were not 
enhanced by appropriate decentralizaiton of functions, such as entrusting
Table 5.3 Organizational Chart of Sub-Regional Offices of ECA 1971-1975
SUB-REGIONAL OFFICES 
OF ECA SECRETARIAT D1 P5/D1 P5 P4/5 P4 P3/4 P3 P2/3 P2 Pl/2 PI G.S.
TOTAL TOTAL (PLUS) 
PROFS (G.S.)
Kinshasa (Central Africa)
Director
General Economic planner 
Agricultural production economist 
Manpower training & development specialist 
Industrial economist
Economic geographer (natural resources) 
Associate economic affairs officer
*4
1
1
1
1
1
1 17
Lusaka (East Africa)
Director
General economic planner 
Agricultural production economist 
Manpower training & development specialist 
Industrial economist
Economic geographer (natural resources) 
Associate economic affairs officer
*4
1
1
1
1
1
1 17
./cont.
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Table 5.3 (cont.)
SUB-REGIONAL OFFICES TOTAL TOTAL (PLUS)
OF ECA SECRETARIAT D1 P5/D1 P5 P4/5 P4 P3/4 P3 P2/3 P2 Pl/2 PI G.S. PROFS (G.S.)
Niamey (West Africa)
Director
General Economic planner 
Agricultural production economist 
Manpower training & development specialist 
Industrial economist
Economic georapher (natural resources) 
Associate economic affairs officer
*4
1
1
1
1
1
1 17
Tangier (North Africa)
Director 1 *4 1
General economic planner 1 1 1
Agricultural production economist 1 1 1
Manpower training & development specialist 1 1 1
Industrial economist 1 1 1
Economic geographer (natural resources) 1 1 1
Associate economic affairs officer 1 1 1 17
* Including 2 General Services staff for Documentation Centre (or Library)
Source: Second Meeting of the Executive Committee, Addis Ababa, 27-31 October 1969. ECA, Addis Ababa, Annex III, pp. 1-2.
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them with specific tasks and giving them some form of autonomy and 
perhaps authority. Instead, they were treated as extensions of the 
secretariat especially with no inter-governmental organs to promote 
interaction with the respective governments.
The failure of the offices led to even more demands for decen­
tralization and the states continued to express their dissastisfaction 
at their inactivity. Acting on a decision made during the ninth session 
of the ECA in 1969, the delegates agreed that the structure of the four 
subregional offices be re-examined with a view to making them effective 
and operational. They wanted them to be more effective and suggested 
that they should be equipped with adequate staff and financial resources 
which should relate to the functions to be carried o u t . ^  The states 
also wanted a strengthening of the General Service Staff as well as the 
provision of a well-organized documentation centre for briefing of experts 
and for making information readily available to the secretariats of the 
subregional offices and other economic groupings.^ There was the great 
need to demonstrate in a more practical sense that the ECA seriously 
intends to provide concrete solutions to the problems of Africa since 
it operated within the continent. The demand for decentralization was 
not intended to imply that all UN activities or indeed that of the ECA 
should be decentralized. What was eventually proposed by the Executive 
Committee of the ECA was that the latter should consider aspects that 
it felt the subregional offices were more competent to deal with by 
virtue of their accumulated knowledge and experience in certain 
activities, as well as its familiarity with the socio-economic problems 
in the continent.^
The pressures for more effective subregional offices coincided 
with demands for a development philosophy which reflected the true
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position of African economies. The ECA continued to stress the 
vitality of regional co-operation, a theme which echoed the revival 
of the commitment of African economic development through collective 
action as stated in the resolutions and declaration adopted by the 
OAU and ECA. The African Declaration on Co-operation, Development 
and Economic Independence adopted by the African Heads of State and 
Government in 1973 stressed the importance attached by African countries 
to collective self-reliance and provided the framework for sectoral, 
subregional and regional economic co-operation. The ECA took up this 
when it formulated its strategy for the sixth and seventh special ses­
sions of the General Assembly held in 1974 and 1975, respectively.
Although member states shared the general thrust of the ECA 
strategy, they really wanted the practical application of the idea.
They continued to argue that the ECA should have a more positive role 
in development through the implementation of relevant projects. The 
demand was made through the policy organs of the secretariat and in 
the General Assembly of the UN. The latter responded by establishing 
the United Nations Inter-disciplinary Development and Advisory Teams 
(UNDATs). The UNDATs were in response to resolution 2563(XXIV) of the 
General Assembly of 13 December 1969, which requested the Secretary- 
General and the executive secretaries of the Commission to intensify 
their efforts to meet the requirements of the member states in develop­
ment planning, public administration and management, especially by 
organizing continuous advisory services. They were established under 
the auspices of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, with 
the collaboration of UN specialized agencies, such as UNDP, UNCTAD and
UNIDO. But in a move by African governments in 1971, they resolved
18
fhat the African teams be put under the direction of the ECA. The 
ECA was to be an overseer but was to supervise the teams without
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prejudice to the normal supervision of the Department of Economic and 
19
Social Affairs.
There were three main reasons for the UNDATs. The first was to
assist the countries in attacking their development problems more 
20
effectively. Secondly, the EC0S0C, in resolution 1552(XLIX) of 
30 July 1970 considered that the provision of such technical assistance, 
in the form of advisory services, through the subregional teams might 
be a useful way of assisting some of the developing countries to build 
up their own services in those fields. Thirdly, the teams were required 
by their mandate to sponsor and organize (at the request of individual 
countries), training courses at both the national and subregional levels 
and to participate in the execution of specific projects in the rural 
areas. In theory, the UNDATs were designed to complement the efforts 
of the subregional offices and the specialized agencies. In practice, 
they were competing with the latter because the ECA was also providing 
advisory, technical assistance and training facilities. Perhaps, the 
UNDATs were established to show the inadequacies of the ECA in providing 
such services in the past.
Three UNDATs served Africa: the Niamey-based one served seven
countries in West Africa, namely, Niger, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), 
Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. Yaounde served six countries 
in Central Africa, namely, Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, the Central African 
Republic, the Congo and Equatorial Guinea. The Lusaka-based UNDAT 
served 14 countries, namely, Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
Burundi and Rwanda. The last two countries were included in the Eastern 
and Southern subregion, although they also belonged to the Central 
African subregion. The Lusaka UNDAT was an integral part of the ECA
- 204 -
subregional office for Eastern and Southern Africa. It was the only-
one which had this link. The lack of financial resources was responsible
for the fact that no UNDATs were established for North Africa and the
three states which made up the Economic Community of the Great Lakes
21
Countries, that is, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. The UN assumed full 
responsibility for the direct funding of the teams, the UNDP also agreed 
to provide assistance of about US$ 200,000 per annum for each UNDAT
22
operating in countries covered by the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa.
For their manpower resources, the Yaounde UNDAT had provision for
seven experts and three junior experts. A total of 16 programmes were
carried out in the field of road and maritime transportation, crop
development, employment, cereal in Chad, Cameroon and Central African
Republic. The majority of the programmes were studies. The Niamey
UNDAT had eight experts and three junior experts. Its resources had
been put at the disposal of the Permanent Inter-state Committee for the
Fight Against the Drought in the Sahel (CILSS) to assist in finding
solutions both in the short and long terms for the ravages resulting
from the cycle of drought. The Lusaka UNDAT had an initial staff
23
strength of 10 experts and four junior experts. Its programmes 
consisted also of studies.
Although the creation of the UNDATs made it possible for the ECA 
to obtain additional resources for its programmes, they soon created 
additional problems for development. Since they were advisory in their 
orientation they could not implement projects either. Several states 
saw them as competing with the ECA and so were not satisfied with the 
duplication of efforts. The states expressed the need to define their 
terms of reference more clearly so as to ensure that the UNDATs were 
"fully committed to the concept of economic co-operation and that they
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did not operate at cross purpose to the ECA. There were other 
questions that remained unsolved, one of which was the issue of the 
precise relationship to be established at the field level between the 
UNDATs, the ECA and the UNDP. The UNDATs were part of the ECA secre­
tariat but at the same time their financing was sought from sources 
other than the UN regular budget. Secondly, they lacked the organs 
to allow for effective participation by governments in the preparation, 
implementation and follow-up of their activities. Thirdly, there was 
the failure to integrate the activities of the West and Central African 
UNDATs with those of corresponding ECA subregional offices. Moreover, 
the activities of the UNDATs were purely advisory in nature, therefore, 
their terms of reference were more restrictive than those of the ECA 
subregional offices. In view of these deficiencies, the ECA Conference 
of Ministers recommended in resolution 24(XI) of 1973 that the terms 
of reference of the UNDATs should be re-oriented in such a way that 
they would be more operational in the identification and implementation 
of projects and that for this purpose additional resources should be 
sought both within the UN system and from donor countries.
In 1975 a joint ECA/UNDP mission was appointed at the request of 
member states to evaluate the performance of both UNDATs and the sub­
regional offices and it was hoped that they would recommend the course 
of action for the future. The evaluation mission found that the UNDATs 
were more active and effective than the subregional offices and in their 
report submitted in 1976 they recommended that the three existing UNDATs 
should be strengthened and that four more be created in Africa. Their 
next recommendation was that the activities of the UNDATs should be 
integrated with those of the subregional offices, so that the former 
would become the operational arms of the ECA, while the subregional 
offices should be phased out. If the mission felt that the latter were
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performing valuable services, they would not have recommended their
being phased out. For each UNDAT, they recommended that policy organs
at the ministerial and technical levels be established to supervise
25
their administrative and substantive activities. It was clear that 
the evaluation mission wanted to give the UNDATs some sort of autonomy 
and practical role. The recommendations were examined by the Executive 
Committee and the Conference of Ministers of the ECA. In 1977, they 
decided to replace the subregional offices and the UNDATs with the 
Multinational Programming and Operational Centres (MULPOCs).
b . The Multinational Programming and Operational Centres (MULPOCs)
The MULPOCs constitute the second phase of decentralization by 
the ECA. It may be true that they have inter-governmental organs to 
allow the governments to participate, but they are not all that different 
from the subregional offices. They are not autonomous in any sense.
Their finances, administration and programmes are controlled by the 
headquarters. Participation for the states is a one-sided affair 
because the ECA draws up the programmes and then approaches them for 
endorsement. The states are not consulted when the programmes are 
drawn up. Although they are an improvement on the subregional offices, 
the ECA is yet to implement actual decentralization.
Since the 1960s the strengthening of economic relations among 
African countries with a view to raising the level of economic activity 
has remained the key development strategy for improving the standard 
of living of the African people. This strategy was re-emphasized in 
the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980. It also formed the ultimate objective 
for the establishment of the MULPOCs. By resolution 311(XIII) of
s''
1 March 1977 of the Conference of Ministers, the ECA established five
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Map 1 The Distribution of MULPOCs in Africa
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MULPOCs with headquarters in Lusaka (Zambia), Gisenyi (Rwanda),
Yaounde (Cameroon), Niamey (Niger) and Tangier (Morocco). This 
resolution was as a consequence of the evaluation exercise by the 
UNDP/ECA mission. Their objectives include the following:
(a) To promote subregional economic co-operation through multi­
national projects with an integrationist impact potential;
(b) To promote assistance to member states and/or their inter­
governmental organizations with a view to identifying areas suitable 
for economic co-operation and projects likely to strengthen such 
co-operation;
(c) To secure the commitment of the governments concerned to 
the projects identified;
(d) To undertake prefeasibility and feasibility studies related 
to such projects;
(e) To provide assistance to governments and/or inter-govern-
26
mental organizations in the implementation process. For the 
distribution of MULPOCs see Map 1. The objectives outlined above are 
fairly routine stuff except that in (c) the ECA was seeking the 
commitment of the member states and in (e) it mentioned that it wanted 
to assist the states in the implementation process. However, it was 
not clear whether it was for implementation of ECA programmes or the 
development projects of the states. The rest of the objectives were 
rather vague. They do not tell us whether the ECA intended to formulate, 
implement and monitor projects either. Later on it tried to clarify 
the roles of the MULPOCs by stating that they have both remote and
immediate objectives. Their proximate objective was to mobilize groups
y
of African countries towards the identification and implementation of
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a limited number of projects in recognition of the fact that sub­
regional and regional economic integration would take many years to 
accomplish; their ultimate aim was to promote economic co-operation
with a view to creating a common market. The MULPOC machinery was
27
intended to be the modus operandi for achieving these objectives.
They were different from the subregional offices in terms of 
their structures and policy organs. We have to remember that these 
features were absent in the latter. It was an attempt by the ECA to 
communicate with the officials of each member state, so as to under­
stand what their economic and social problems were and it was a way of 
getting the states committed to the programmes - something also lacking 
with the subregional offices.
The structures and policy organs were established on three levels. 
At the ministerial level was the Council of Ministers, made up of 
ministers responsible for development planning of the member states.
It was the supreme policy organ which made all the major decisions on 
and approved the programmes and activities for each MULPOC. Its 
meetings were held annually. Next was the Committee of Officials, a 
subsidiary body made up of the permanent secretaries for development 
planning of each state. This was the technical arm of the policy organ 
and its function was to identify programmes, prepare the detailed work 
programmes and to make recommendations to the Council of Ministers.
It also had to advise on personnel and administrative matters, but of 
course, this was in theory. In practice, all decisions pertaining to 
such matters were considered by ECA headquarters alone. The meetings 
were also held annually but they always preceded those of the Council 
of Ministers. (As from 1989, however, these organs will meet once 
"every two years.) Finally, there was the Supervisory Committee which
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could be created every three months to review the activities of the 
MULPOC when the two main organs were not in session. But this 
Committee lacked a legal basis and its decisions were not binding on 
member states. Moreover, it was costly to have three or four such 
meetings and so the idea of creating supervisory committees was not 
very fruitful.
With the exception of North Africa, the other MULPOCs possessed 
the two policy organs. In the case of North Africa, the supreme policy 
organ was the Council of Plenipotentiaries which had a different 
composition form the Council of Ministers. The former was made up of 
ambassadors, embassy officials and any high-ranking official chosen by 
the respective member states. The risk of having such persons was that 
they were not versed in development issues and there was lack of 
continuity of ideas because different persons could turn up at each 
meeting. It also meant that instead of dealing with the correct high- 
ranking officials, the ECA dealt mainly with envoys who have been 
instructed on what to say by their governments. The North African 
MULPOC has not been able to establish proper policy organs up till the 
present. The political conflicts, such as the Western Saharan crisis, 
have created a high degree of political friction. The states were not 
relating to each other at the ministerial level. The organ they
accepted back in 1978 was the Council of Plenipotentiaries and it has
remained so ever since.
Since their establishment, the MULPOCs have depended on the UNDP
and the UN technical assistance regular budget for funding, even though 
the UNDP was supposed to provide seed money. The ECA put forward the 
argument that because they were new structures, the MULPOCs were not 
yet part of the UN regular budget. The UNDP provided US$ 200,00^per
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28annum for each MULPOC for the period 1979-81, but warned that it
would not support them for much longer. It was in 1984 that the MULPOCs
were actually financed through the UN regular budget. That level of
UNDP funding was sufficient for a core staff of only three professional
officers per MULPOC, that is, the team leader and two experts. So for
a MULPOC which had more than three officers the deficit was met from
ECA resources. For example, Lusaka had five staff members, two of whom
were paid from its regular budget. The contribution from the UN regular
budget for technical assistance was US$ 54,200 for 1978 and US$ 58,500
for 1979; and practically all of it was absorbed in administrative 
29
expenses.
Since the MULPOCs began operation, the UNDP has contributed 
approximately US$ 8 million to their infrastructures as follows:
(US$ million)
1977 0.7
1978 1.0
1979 1.4
1980 2.2
1981 2.6
7.9
30
The 1982 level of programming was approximately US$ 2 million.
The combined budget of the four MULPOCs south of the Sahara for the
period 1977-81 was US$ 2.5 million annually, with the UNDP as the
largest contributor at the rate of 66 per cent while that of state
31
members was 18 per cent. Although the former stopped financing them 
on 31 December 1982, it still allocated the sum of US$ 300,000 to the 
Lusaka and Gisenyi MULPOCs for the fourth Programming Cycle 1987-1991. 
"The amount is to support their institutions established for manpower 
training and other regional economic ventures.
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Most of the support by African governments to the MULPOCs was
in kind in the form of buildings, equipment and provision of general
level and other personnel, and in their willingness to host the annual
meeting of the two policy organs. Even though the contribution from
member states was the third main source of funding, the evidence in
Chapter 2 of the thesis shows that the states are facing financial
difficulties which have led to a fall in their financial contributions.
The Executive Secretary, Adebayo Adedeji, attributes the fall primarily
to problems arising from the energy crisis, inflation and the mounting
32
burden of debt-servicing.
The lack of financial resources dominated most of the meetings 
of the MULPOCs especially when the UNDP warned that it was no longer 
going to fund their programmes. The ECA prepared a document proposing 
that they should be funded from the regular budget of the UN and made 
its submission to ECOSOC and the General Assembly. A decision was 
taken by resolution 37/138 of December 1982 by which the General 
Assembly placed their financing on the regular budget. This became 
operational in 1984 and it was meant to cover mostly their programmes. 
The ECA also made provisions for their professional staff to be funded 
through the regular budget as shown in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 gave the picture of the staffing position of the MULPOCs 
before the proposal for funding through the UN regular budget. For 
the existing posts only the Tangier MULPOC had a director and so the 
proposal made provision for others to have one each. It was striking 
to find that the Yaounde MULPOC at the time had no staff of its own.
It was hoped that the proposal would improve its situation. Up till 
then it depended on the officials at the headquarters for its meetings 
and activities. The proposal made no provisions for new posts for
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Table 5.4 Proposed Staffing of the MULPOCs through the Regular 
Budget of the UN
Total
D-l P-5 P-4 P-3 Profs G.S. Total
a. Tangier
Existing posts 1 - 1 - 2 4 6
Proposed new posts - - - - - - -
Total 1 - 1 - 2 4 6
b. Lusaka
Existing posts - - 1 1 2 4 6
Proposed new posts 1 1 - 2 4 2 6
Total 1 1 1 3 6 6 12
c. Gisenyi
Existing posts - - - 1 1 - 1
Proposed new posts - - - 1 2 1 3
Total 1 - - 2 3 1 4
d. Niamey
Existing posts - - - - - 3 3
Proposed new posts 1 1 - 2 4 2 6
Total 1 1 - 2 4 5 9
e. Yaounde
Existing posts - - - - - - -
Proposed new posts 1 - - 2 3 1 4
Total 1 - - 2 3 1 4
Total (a) to (e)
Existing posts 1 - 2 2 5 11 16
Proposed new posts 4 2 - 7 13 6 19
Grand Total 5 2 2 9 18 17 35
Source: Report of the ECOSOC on financing of the MULPOCs of the ECA on
an established basis. Statement submitted by the Secretary 
General in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure 
of the General Assembly. Doc. A/C.5/37/92, 9 December 1982, 
UN, New York, p. 3.
Note: This table has the same key as in Table 5.1.
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the Tangier MULPOC. This was to do with the fact that it was the 
least active of them all. The reasons which have been treated in 
Chapter 9 included the fact that the political conflicts between the 
states was having a profound effect on the activities of the MULPOC 
and because not many programmes have been implemented. Also Tangier 
was an isolated spot and therefore communication between ECA head­
quarters on the one hand, and the MULPOC and member states on the 
other, was difficult. Delegates travelling from Sub-Saharan Africa 
to its meetings have to spend at least two days before getting to 
Tangier as there are no direct flights to the city. Table 5.4 also 
revealed that Niamey which was the second largest MULPOC with 16 member 
states only had three general service staff to run the place. The 
largest MULPOC was Lusaka with 18 states. The provision was for it to 
have four professionals and two additional G.S. staff. Lusaka, on the 
other hand, was to have two additional professionals and two more general 
level staff. Gisenyi, the smallest MULPOC with only three member states, 
was to have two extra professionals and one more general service staff.
On the whole the MULPOCs were facing the same problems as the earlier 
subregional offices. They had rather few professionals to cater for 
all the states.
The provision of a core of 13 professional staff (four of them 
for Lusaka) for the MULPOCs was still not sufficient, given that they 
operated more or less on the same number of sectors as the ECA head­
quarters. In fact, the lack of manpower resources has remained as one 
of the major constraints on the MULPOCs up till today. Each MULPOC 
has been dealt with in turn in Chapters 6-9 and so to avoid repetition, 
the point has to be made that the skeleton of staff could not cope with 
^the development problems in each subregion. It is true that the 
secretariat continued to provide technical support to the meetings of
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the meetings of the MULPOCs and it was solely handling the formulation 
and implementation of their activities; but this was what it had done 
also with the subregional offices. The MULPOCs were therefore not 
different in their organization and management. They were completely 
controlled and administered by the ECA headquarters. The relationship 
between substantive division officers and those of the MULPOCs were 
not always smooth. The directors of the latter were political appointees 
while the former saw themselves as the professionals who were not of 
equal standing with such directors. Some steps were taken between 1977-79 
to establish a good working relationship between the two sets of staff 
through a series of consultative meetings with divisional chiefs. The 
main decisions to come out of those meetings were, first, that the 
project staff of the MULPOCs should be subject to the professional 
guidance of appropriate divisions of the ECA and, second, that the 
divisions should endeavour to post some officials to work along side 
their MULPOC counterpart for shorter periods of 3-4 months on specific 
projects. For further alignment, all chairmen of the Council of Ministers 
of the MULPOCs were made ex-officio members of the ECA Executive Committee. 
In practice, these decisions were not uniformly administered especially 
as officials of the substantive division complained about heavy workloads 
which were consequences of the decisions. It was also difficult to keep 
track of what the latter did and also to co-ordinate the activities of 
staff at the headquarters especially when they left for the MULPOCs.
The MULPOCs started off with a different programming process from 
those of the ECA headquarters. While the former had yearly programmes 
the latter was implementing six-yearly medium-term and biennial programmes. 
It is hoped that from 1989 all the MULPOCs will run a biennial work 
^programme for the purpose of synchronizing with the headquarters. For 
the moment they have to continue to face problems of inconsistency and
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lack of harmonization of programmes.
Although the MULPOCs were improved a step further in that they 
had individual programmes which the subregional offices lacked, the 
states did not participate in drawing up the programmes. Moreover, 
the programmes were not drawn up at each of the MULPOCfs offices but 
at the ECA headquarters. The semi-finished drafts were then presented 
to the two policy organs for endorsement. Such method did not allow 
the governments to make inputs on the programmes. Participation for 
the states meant accepting programmes which originated from the ECA.
We have to remember that one of the reasons why the subregional offices 
were phased out was to ensure that states were committed to the new 
structures, that is, the MULPOCs and also because the ECA wanted to be 
closer to the states so as to understand their problems. And yet it 
never gave the governments the chance to state their problems nor 
discuss how they would want the problems solved. It barely acted as 
an arm of the UN providing advisory services to African states and there 
was no evidence to suggest that the states saw the MULPOCs or the ECA 
as truly African inter-governmental organizations.
Apart from the fact that the states could not identify with the 
work programmes of the MULPOCs, there was an added problem. The drawing 
up of work programmes at Addis Ababa by officials who may not have 
travelled to the subregions meant that the actual problems of the areas 
were not included. There was no chance therefore for discussion of 
possible solutions. And so the ECA was operating as though no problems 
existed. When will it really tackle the peculiar problems of each 
subregion? This question is important because it holds the key to the 
future of the ECA. If it continues to be insensitive to African problems, 
then it will continue to be unpopular and have little influence on the
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development issues of the continent. That team leadership which the 
UN expects of the ECA and all other regional commissions will remain 
an illusion. The states of West Africa have already questioned the 
usefulness of the Niamey MULPOC when in 1987 they asked the ECA to 
review its scope of activities and to redefine its terms of reference. 
The ECA is yet to implement the recommendations of an ad hoc committee 
set up for the purpose. The main recommendations were that the ECA 
should narrow the scope of activities, and give the MULPOC specific 
objectives to be fulfilled within a given time-frame.
Finally, attention has to be drawn to the growing expectations 
of the member states and the limited resources, the lack of focus of 
the activities of the MULPOCs. The member states want projects that 
are cost effective and positive inputs to their economic development. 
The MULPOCs have no resources for such ventures, and their terms of 
reference make no provision for organs necessary for implementing, 
co-ordinating and monitoring of real projects.
4. CONCLUSION
The two attempts by the ECA to decentralize have met with little 
success. Although the MULPOCs were an improvement on the subregional 
offices in the sense that the former had inter-governmental policy 
organs, the ECA continued in its tradition of not granting the sub­
regional structures any form of authority and autonomy. Every aspect 
of the MULPOC was decided upon by the ECA headquarters. In effect, the 
ECA has failed to decentralize.
However, it seems that amongst the UN's original commissions it 
is only the ECA which attempted to decentralize at all. All activities
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of the ECE and ECWA are concentrated at their respective headquarters.
In the case of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP), it established a Pacific Liaison Office in Nauru in 
1980 to ensure a more continuous presence and improved communications 
between the Pacific countries and territories and the ESCAP secretariat. 
In 1984, with the endorsement of member states and associates, the ESCAP 
merged the Pacific Liaison Office and the Fiji-based UNDAT into the 
ESCAP Pacific Operations Centre (EPOC) at Port Vila, Vanuatu. One of 
EPOC’s major aims is to further strengthen co-ordination and co-operation 
with the South Pacific Commission (SPC), the South Pacific Bureau for 
Economic Co-operation (SPEC) and UNDP offices in Suva, Fiji; Apia, Samoa; 
and Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. Just as in the case of the MULPOCs, 
the EPOC activities included advisory missions, consultancy services 
and the provision of training programmes for member states. So when 
it comes to the issue of the type of services and activities provided 
by the ECA and other regional economic commissions the fact that they 
cannot carry out actual projects is due to the purposes set out for them 
by the UN rather than their own shortcomings. They cannot do more than 
provide advisory services because that is what their terms of reference 
allow. Perhaps it is time to review their objectives in the light of 
demands for them to be actively involved in the development of each 
region.
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CHAPTER 6
ECA IN WEST AFRICA: THE NIAMEY MULTINATIONAL PROGRAMMING 
AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE (MULPOC)
1. INTRODUCTION
The West African MULPOC is based in Niamey, the Republic of 
Niger. Its geographical area of jurisdiction covers the 16 members of 
the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), namely, Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo (see 
map overleaf). It is the second largest MULPOC - the largest is the one 
of Lusaka with 18 countries. The 16 countries cover approximately one- 
fifth of the land mass of the African continent - a total area of about 
6.2 million sq. km., 2^ million sq. miles). Officials of the ECO 
division describe it as the most active of all the five MULPOCs.'*'
2. SALIENT FEATURES OF WEST AFRICA
West Africa is one of the major geographical regions of Africa.
It is bounded in the south and west by the Atlantic Ocean and in the 
east by the Cameroon-Adamawa highlands which separate West Africa from 
equatorial Africa. The northern boundary is less clearly defined and 
is generally considered to follow the southern limit of the Saharan 
Desert. It is, however, convenient to consider the northern boundaries 
of Mauritania, Mali and Niger as the northern boundary of West Africa.
Geographically, West Africa is an area of great contrasts. It
Map 2 General Reference Map of West Africa
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Source: Economic Geography of West Africa, (eds.) J.O.C. Onyemelukwe and
M.O. Filani (London: Longman, 1983), p. xii.
* Now Burkina Faso
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can be divided into three main ecological zones - the desert and sahel, 
the savannah and the forest zones. The sahel and desert is characterized 
by acute aridity of its soil accentuated by desertification and a rainfall 
pattern irregular both in volume and frequency. This zone includes 
countries like Mali, Mauritania and Niger. It has within the present 
decade experienced two cycles of drought. As a result food production 
has fallen drastically, the result has been the dependence on the import 
of food. The states were also affected by oil price rises and they faced 
other constraints having to do with transport and communications defici­
encies. States such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are landlocked and 
Cape Verde as an Island are compelled to transit their goods through the 
ports of neighbouring countries. Cape Verde being one of the smallest 
states lacks sophisticated port facilities. This further increased the 
difficulty and cost of transporting goods.
The savannah zone has relatively regular rainfall albeit with 
pockets of occasional drought. For these countries too drought contribute 
to disorganize and reduce agricultural production, consequently worsening 
the food deficit.
The third zone is the forest with regular and heavy rainfall. At 
least 203 cm. (80 inches) and as much as 381 cm. (150 inches) can fall 
each year. The temperature rarely drops below 26.6°C (80°F) and the air 
is 80 per cent moisture. The countries with this type of ecological 
feature include Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone.
The area represents the most heterogeneous conglomeration of states 
in all Africa, and has the largest number of mini-states. The 16 countries 
jtogether occupy a geographical area of 6,141,151 sq. km., and shared 
[among themselves] a total population of almost 150 million in 1980.
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However, they vary both in size and population. Cape Verde, the
smallest of them, has an area of only 4,033 sq. km. and a population
of less than half a million. The corresponding figures for Niger are
1,267,000 sq. km. and 5.3 million, while Nigeria has a total area of
923,768 sq. km. and an estimated population of 84.7 million, represent-
2
ing nearly 60 per cent of the subregion’s total population. About 
half the total population of black Africa is in this subregion.
It also contains the largest number of inter-governmental organ­
izations (IGOs). There are at present about 32 such organizations 
dealing either with general economic integration matters, such as 
ECOWAS and the Mano River Union, or concerned only with limited sectoral 
activities, for example, the West African Rice Development Association 
(WARDA) and the Gambia River Basin Organization (OMVG). This multi­
plicity of IGOs imposes a heavy burden on the budgets of individual
states without necessarily providing them with corresponding benefits
3
and it creates widespread duplication of activities.
Half of the countries in the region are classified as least 
developed (LDCs). (The General Assembly in 1981 identified 36 countries 
on the basis of their very low per capita income, very low literacy 
rate and low contribution of manufacturing industries to Gross Domestic
4
Porducts (GDP).) These are Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo. Any disturbances in their economies, 
either natural or manmade, inflicts immeasurable suffering on large 
number of their people.
Most of the countries in West Africa thrive on exports of primary 
commodities to the developed market economies. In most countries, 
with the exception of the Niger and Nigeria, the export sectors are 
dominated by agricultural commodities such as cocoa in Ghana, Ivory
\Table 6.1 Area, Population and Density of the West African Subregion in 1980
Date and Year of 
Independence km2 %
Population 
,000 inhabitants %
Growth*
Rate
Density 
per km2
Former Colonial 
Power***
Benin Aug. 1, 1960 112,600 1.8 3,530 2.5 2.6 31.3 France
Cape Verde July 5, 1975 3,929 0.1 332 0.2 1.9 84.5 Portugal
Gambia Feb. 18, 1965 11,295 0.2 601 0.4 2.7 53.2 United Kingdom
Ghana Mar. 6, 1957 238,537 3.9 12,275 8.7 4.5 51.5 United Kingdom.
Guinea Oct. 2, 1958 245,856 4.0 5,006 3.5 2.5 20.4 France
Guinea Bissau Sept. 24, 1973 36,125 0.6 570 0.4 1.9 15.8 Portugal
Ivory Coast Aug. 7, 1960 322,463 5.2 8,020 5.7 3.4 24.9 France
Liberia July 26, 1847 111,369 1.8 1,837 1.3 3.2 16.5 None
Mali Sept. 22, 1960 1,240,142 20.2 6,623 4.7 2.4 5.3 France
Mauritania Nov. 28, 1960 1,030,700 16.8 1,480 1.0 2.3 1.4 France
Niger Aug. 3, 1960 1,267,000 20.6 5,338 3.8 3.0 4.2 France
Nigeria Oct. 1, 1960 913,073 14.9 76,982 54.6 3.2 84.3 United Kingdom
Senegal Aug. 20, 1960 203,793 3.3 5,641 4.0 2.5 27.7 France
Sierra Leone Apr. 27, 1961 72,328 1.2 3,449 2.4 2.6 47.7 United Kingdom
Togo. Apr. 27, 1960 56,785 0.9 2,540 1.8 2.7 44.7 France
Upper Volta** Aug. 5, 1960 274,200 4.5 6,814 4.8 2.3 24.9 France
WEST AFRICA 6,140,195 100.0 141,038 100.0 3.1 55.5
* Growth rate 1975-1980 
** Burkina Faso
*** Additional information not in original source
Source: Proposals for Strengthening Economic Integration in West Africa, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1984, p. 90.
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Coast and Nigeria; cotton in Mali, Benin and Burkina Faso; groundnuts 
in Senegal, Nigeria and the Gambia. The countries also have major 
mineral resources, such as petroleum in Nigeria; bauxite in Guinea; 
diamonds in Ghana and Sierra Leone; iron ore in Liberia and Mauritania; 
and uranium in Niger. Also varieties of food crops are grown for internal 
markets, including yams, cassava, millet, sorghum, maize, onions, kolanuts, 
plantains and rice among others. The marketing of export crops by state 
monopolies is another striking feature.
The two main languages used are English and French. The former 
French colonies, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Senegal and Togo use French as their official language. The four 
former British colonies, the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
use the English language. Then there are Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau 
using Portuguese. For their dates of independence and former colonial 
powers, see Table 6.1. The differences in languages are reinforced 
by differences in politics, culture, administration, systems of education, 
all of which in turn affect the interaction and responses of countries 
in international relations. This means that there is political fragment­
ation of the region corresponding to former colonial links. This is 
a direct result of the intense competition for trade and territorial 
control that took place among the European powers between the 15th and 
20th centuries.
3. NIAMEY MULPOC: STRUCTURES, ORGANS, FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER 
RESOURCES
There is an ultimate reason for the establishment of MULPOCs, 
which is the promotion of multinational economic co-operation at the
- 228 -
subregional levels with a view to the creation of some form of sub­
regional common market or customs union as a step towards regional 
economic integration. The ECA argued that this objective was important 
because of the dominance of the subsistence sector in most African 
economies, the existence of small fragmented national markets, the 
underutilization of resources and excessive external orientation of 
African economies. These factors combined to make economic co-operation 
indispensable for the rapid and self-reliant transformation of the 
African region.^ In other words, the MULPOCs were instruments for 
promoting multinational co-operation through a subregional approach 
to development problems.
But when the member states met to decide on the terms of reference 
for the Niamey MULPOC they were not thinking about the long-term objective. 
They concentrated on short-term objectives with emphasis on the peculiar 
and specific needs of the region. At the inaugural meeting of the 
Council of Ministers of the West African MULPOC held in Niamey, Niger, 
on 16-17 June 1978, they established the following terms of reference 
for the subregion:
(a) Under the aegis of the Council of Ministers of the MULPOC, to 
assist in the identification, execution and harmonization of the 
programme of the various inter-governmental organizations in West 
Africa;
(b) To facilitate co-operation among the inter-governmental organiz­
ations in West Africa;
(c) To provide, on request, technical assistance and executing agency 
services to the member states and inter-governmental organizations 
in West Africa;
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(d) To provide training facilities, particularly in the technical 
and managerial fields in the West African subregion for the 
benefit of member states and inter-governmental organizations;
(e) Acting, through the Executive Secretary of the ECA, to endeavour
to mobilize resources from outside the West African subregion,
and in particular from within the UN system, for establishing 
the training facilities mentioned in (d) above; and if requested 
to do so, for implementing feasible projects by governments or 
inter-governmental organizations;
(f) To serve as a forum for the exchange of information and technical
know-how among the IGOs in West Africa through the exchange of
documents and organizations;
(g) To undertake such other tasks and perform such other functions 
as the Council of Ministers of the MULPOC and/or the ECA 
Conference of Ministers may assign to it.^
The terms of reference of this MULPOC are wide and they give an 
indication of what the member states at the time wanted from the ECA.
The specific need of the area was to contain the proliferation of IGOs. 
There was, therefore, the need to co-ordinate, harmonize and control 
their growth, in order to avoid duplication, waste of resources and 
to reduce the strain on the limited resources of the states. The member 
states tailored the objectives of the MULPOC to reflect this need to 
a large extent. The MULPOC was also to act as a forum for exchange 
of ideas on the IGOs, in addition to providing training facilities and 
technical assistance to the IGOs. It has to also aid co-operation among 
the IGOs and above all assist in the identification, execution and 
harmonization of their programmes. However, the point has to be made
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that a wider scope of activities had led to the lack of focus of 
programmes. First of all, the terms of reference are not precise as 
to the real content and purpose of the activities of the MULPOC. 
Secondly, there is no timespan for the activities. Thirdly, the lack 
of precision makes it difficult for the states to decide where priority 
should be placed. For example, there are many IGOs in West Africa with 
their activities ranging from manpower training and cartography to 
mineral research councils. The ECA did not indicate the thrust of its 
assistance to the IGOs. It did not have a period of time in mind for 
them either, that is, whether from 1978-81 the Commission would help 
finance IGOs or so.
Despite the wider scope of activities set out, the terms of 
reference indicate that the MULPOC suffers from a fundamental handicap. 
This has to do with the fact that it can only act with the consent of 
its member states. For example, it can only carry out programmes at 
the request of its member states. It then means that the role designed
for the MULPOC in the development of the subregion is marginal. By
its very nature, it can only play an indirect and marginal role by 
virtue of its terms of reference and by the fact that its activities 
consist mainly of studies and the provision of technical facilities
for the IGOs. With these sort of activities, it is difficult for one
to assess its tangible contribution and impact.
The concentration on the activities of the IGOs allows the MULPOC 
little time for other aspects of development. Since the MULPOC was 
established in 1978, a number of development problems have affected 
its member states. As in all other parts of Africa, these countries 
have had to face balance of payments deficits, debt problems, famine 
and drought, oil price increases and fluctuations in the prices of
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their agricultural commodities. The ways and means of solving these 
problems are not provided for within the terms of reference. These 
problems are well beyond the ability of the MULPOC: indeed, some were
not foreseen by either the ECA or the member states at the time.
Presently, it has stuck to the implementation of programmes agreed 
upon in the late 1970s, thereby re-emphasizing that there are no pro­
visions for the MULPOC to deal with such.
In addition to this, the problems have helped to show how inflexible 
the MULPOC structure is. Up to date, there have not been efforts to 
address and give priority to the immediate problems of the states as 
reflected in APPER. The realization that there are other pressing issues 
apart from the problems of the IGOs has led to the demand by member 
states for a review and redefinition of the MULPOC at a meeting of the 
Council of Ministers held in Lome, Togo, from 10-12 Feburary 1986; 
they decided that on account of economic development throughout Africa 
in general and the West African subregion in particular, the mandate 
and role of the MULPOC be reviewed and its scope of activity redefined 
in order to address the individual and collective needs of the states.^
To enable them to do this, the delegates established an Ad hoc Committee, 
made up of the Ivory Coast, the Gambia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and 
Togo. The proceedings of the meeting of this Committee were then 
circulated to all member states well in advance to enable the officials 
to make concrete proposals for the 1987 Council of Ministers meeting.
In the Ad hoc Committee's Report 1987, they tackled the issue
of the relevance of the MULPOC. They remarked that the MULPOC's mandate
and set objectives would have to be worked out on the basis not only
of the socio-economic realities of the subregion and the needs of member
8
states but also of the MULPOC's actual capacity to deliver. They
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recommended that the MULPOC should carry out a specific programme
9
with precise objectives over a given timeframe. This ties in with 
what we said earlier on about the terms of reference not being precise 
and specific. It also recommended that the policy of decentralization
should be pursued in favour of the MULPOCs as it is only out in the
field that experts can prove and ground their competence and many types 
of work can be carried out more economically at the MULPOC than if done 
at the headquarters.
The Economic Co-operation Office at the ECA Secretariat in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, is responsible for all the MULPOCs. This division 
provides the back up services to the MULPOC to a great extent. In 
addition, each substantive division has staff who participate in the 
meetings of the organs of the MULPOC. But the relationship between 
the ECA and all the MULPOCs is not very clear-cut. It is not very clear 
as to what aspects of the work of the MULPOC should be carried out by 
staff from the headquarters. And because of shortages of staff at the 
MULPOC, most of the programmes are drafted by the experts at the head­
quarters. So in some cases there are staff who have to do work for 
the headquarters and then the work for the MULPOC - a situation that 
officials are not too happy about, and one which has led to further
strain on the limited resources at the headquarters.
The ECA is reviewing its priorities and resource requirements 
for its programmes. As part of the review it has been suggested that 
each substantive division should consider dividing the work programme 
priorities into two sections. The first section will be the work 
programme and priorities to be implemented from the ECA headquarters.
The next one will be work programmes of the MULPOCs as established by 
MULPOC policy organs. Each division will then indicate which proportion
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of its resources will be utilized for the first section and which 
proportion will be devoted to the implementation of subregional projects. 
However, officials are still discussing these proposals and the criteria 
and policy for both sections have not yet been established. Therefore, 
there is no formal integration of the MULPOCs and the Substantive 
Divisions.
A number of problems have arisen because of lack of this type 
of integration. Since staff from the headquarters are sent to work 
at the MULPOC in an ad hoc and haphazard manner, each substantive division 
has no senior officer as the focal point for co-ordinating and keeping 
track of the MULPOC projects.^ The divisions did not send members 
of their professional staff, for short periods of six months to one 
year, to the MULPOCs as a practical demonstration of integration of 
the work carried out by the headquarters with the operational activities 
in the field.
The idea of doing the work of the MULPOC at the headquarters also 
means that the constraints of the substantive divisions are being 
transferred to the MULPOCs. They have to address many demands often 
with limited resources. Therefore, the assistance they can extend to 
the MULPOC can only be marginal. In most cases the work of the MULPOC 
is relegated to second place behind the concern of the divisions. In 
the Ad hoc Committee Report 1987,^ they pointed out that work done 
for the MULPOCs is neither accorded the priority nor the attention it 
deserves. On the whole, the policy of decentralization in favour of 
the MULPOCs has not yet been effected. The headquarters is very much 
at the centre of and in control of the activities of the MULPOC. In 
effect, the secretariat is running the activities of the MULPOC from 
Addis Ababa. But it is only in the field that experts can further
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prove and ground their competence. Programmes can be carried out more 
economically at and from the MULPOC than if done at the headquarters.
As has been mentioned in Chapter 5, the structure and policy organs 
of the Niamey MULPOC are on three levels. At the ministerial level is 
the Council of Ministers, which makes the decisions on major and priority 
programmes; monitors the implementation of projects; makes periodic 
reviews of programmes. It is the policy making body which decides and 
approves what the MULPOC should do. It meets once a year. This body 
is followed by a Committee of Officials, made up of mostly permanent 
secretaries responsible for development planning in their respective 
countries. Its function is to identify projects and prepare the detailed 
work to be sent to the Council for approval. The Committee of Officials 
is also responsible for monitoring, evaluating and implementing approved 
projects. It advises on both personnel and administrative matters.
It meets once a year also, but does so before the Council meets. In 
effect, this body is the technical arm of the MULPOC.
Finally, there is a supervisory committee of officials which can 
be created on a temporary basis to review the activities of the MULPOC/ 
charged with the responsibility of examining technical documents as 
well as issues and making recommendations thereof to the Council of 
Ministers. An example of this is the Ad hoc Committee that was set 
up to review the mandate and scope of activities of the Niamey MULPOC 
in 1986. Finally, this MULPOC has a follow-up Committee which is a 
new body created as a result of the redefinition of its new role. Since 
the two policy organs will be meeting only every two years from 1989, 
this Committee will also monitor the implementation of the work programme.
Member states attended the meetings of the various organs of the 
MULPOC but increasingly they are complaining of lack of funds to send
I.
II.
Ill
6.2 Summary of the Niamey MULPOC Cost Structure, 1978-1980
1978 1979 1980 TOTAL
m/m US$ m/m US$ m/m US$ m/m US$
Personnel Costs
Team Leader 12 60,360 12 59,900 12 64,680 36 184,940
Trade Programme 21 96,240 27 134,800 15 80,850 63 311,890
Transport Programme 51 253,290 60 299,530 6 32,340 117 585,160
Industrial Programme 63 291,100 69 344,430 6 32,340 138 667,870
Agricultural Programme 54 249,320 60 299,510 6 32,340 120 581,170
Energy Programme 2 9,250 8 39,950 8 43,120 18 92,320
Manpower Devn Programme 21 96,920 32 159,740 9 48,510 62 305,170
Sub-total 224 1,056,480 268 1,337,860 62 334,180 554 2,728,520
Administrative Costs
Administrative Officer 12 52,480 12 41,160 12 46,340 36 142,980
Administrative Support
Personnel 60,000 64,200 40,000 164,200
Travel 49,000 52,430 34,200 132,630
Meetings 30,000 35,000 30,000 95,000
Sub-total 12 194,480 12 192,790 12 150,540 36 537,810
Miscellaneous
Operations Costs
Office Supplies & Sundry 35,000 45,000 45,000 125,000
Operation & Maintenance 25,000 30,000 25,000 80,000
Office Facilities 20,000 26,000 26,000 72,000
Sub-total 80,000 101,000 96,000 277,000
Source: Financial and Manpower Requirements for the Implementation of the Work Programme of the Niamey MULPOC,
Doc. ECA/MULPOC/NIAMEY/3, April 1978, Table 7, p. 9 V
235
- 236 -
delegations. For its part, the ECA is also experiencing difficulties
with organizing the annual meetings. In its Performance Report on the
MULPOCs 1977-84, the ECA stated that "given the overall scarcity of
resources and other constraints, the fact that the meetings of the policy
organs are convened every year leaves precious little time for actual
12
implementation of the work programmes". This annual basis of meetings
had been an issue discussed during the Council of Ministers meeting
13
of the Niamey MULPOC in February 1987 and at other meetings. At the 
suggestion of some representatives, the Committee took the view that
the MULPOC policy organs should meet every other year. At the tenth
meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 18 February 1987, the delegates 
endorsed the idea. It is interesting to note that the fulfilment of this 
request has led to its adoption by all the MULPOCs. This is one of 
the reasons why this MULPOC has been described by ECA officials as the 
most active.
Financial resources constitute a vital part of any organization.
To a large extent they determine whether or not the entity can carry 
out its projects and activities from year to year. The lack of funds 
can put the programmes in jeopardy. Originally, the ECA did not have 
its own funds for the MULPOCs. This is due in part to the lack of full
conception of the purpose of the MULPOCs. For if this was very clear
from the start the ECA would have made adequate provision for funding 
them before they were established.
In fact, it was the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
which provided the initial funds. At the time the ECA pointed out that
this funding was only temporary. It was to give the ECA breathing space
14
to arrange for the permanent sources of funds for the MULPOCs. The 
next source of funding was the UN Regular Budget of Technical Assistance.
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The money had to be approved by the General Assembly, and remained 
fixed up to 1982. The annual contribution from this source had been 
US$ 120,000.15
The UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa agreed to provide US$ 200,000 
per annum for the period 1978-81 for the Niamey MULPOC. But resources 
for this and the UN Regular Budget constitute only a fraction of the 
total resources required. The ECA drew up the cost structure for the 
Niamey MULPOC for 1978-80, the summary of which is on Table 6.2. It 
contains information on personnel costs, administrative costs and 
miscellaneous operations costs. The figures indicated that the Niamey 
MULPOC needed to spend more on key personnel matters. The personnel 
costs were US$ 2,728,520 as compared to administrative costs of US$ 
537,810, and miscellaneous operations costs of US$ 277,000. The total 
amount needed for the period was US$ 3,543,330. But the actual amount
1 f i
received from various sources was US$ 960,000 only. The MULPOC still 
needed about US$ 2,583,330 to carry out its programmes. Table 6.3 
shows a breakdown of available or required resources for the period.
The table indicates the extent to which funds were lacking for the 
activities of the MULPOC. Even though the funds from the UNDP and the 
regular budget of the UN were made available, they were hardly enough. 
For one thing, the amounts remained constant throughout the period. 
Moreover, the funds were not index-linked. The contributions by member 
states were mostly in kind. These consisted of the provision of office 
space, equipment and personnel for the various programmes.
One striking feature of Table 6.3 is the contribution by the ECA
which amounted to US$ 283,300 for 1978-80. Its contribution is small
compared to the actual amount given which was US$ 1,866,789 for the 
17
1977-81 period. Since the programmes were initiated by the ECA, it 
was odd that it could only provide the basic, funding.
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Table 6.3 Available or Required Resources from Funding Sources (US$)
1978 1979 1980 TOTAL
Total resources required 1,330,960 1,631,650 580,720 3,543,330
UNDP Contribution 200,000 200,000 200,000 600,000
General Assembly 
Contributions 120,000 120,000 120,000 360,000
GAP* 1,010,960 1,311,650 260,720 2,583,330
Resources to be required 
from ECA 83,200 140,000 60,000 283,300
Governments 54m/ma 60m/m 26m/m 140m/m
Bilateral donors 680,170 827,190 60,480 1,612,840
Financial and Manpower Requirements for the Implementation of 
the Work Programme of the Niamey MULPOC, Doc. ECA/MULPOC/Niamey/3, 
April 1978, p. 1.
GAP refers to the resource gap. This is the difference between 
the demand for and the supply of resources. It is the difference 
in resources which will have to be filled by other sources.
stands for man-month. It refers to mannual labour and the number 
of months spent on particular tasks. For example, in 1978 the 
governments supplied staff who worked for 54 months.
The contribution from the states took the form of the supply of 
personnel. They provided staff for 140 man-months for 1978-80.
There were four main sources of funds for the programmes, with 
most of the money coming from bilateral donors. The second was the 
UNDP, while the third was from the UN General Assembly. Contributions 
through bilateral arrangements, the UNDP and member states from the 
extra-budgetary funds of the ECA. The amounts were donated through 
Jthe UNTFAD pledging conference every two years, while the money from 
the General Assembly was part of its regular budget. But even with
Source:
*Note:
a m/m
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the donations, the Commission still needed US$ 2,583,330 for 1978-80 
(see gap in Table 6.3). This was quite common in the sense that the 
ECA in most cases does not come up with the required resources for its 
programmes. Even though it gets less funds every year, the Commission 
has not tailored its programmes to fit within its limited resources.
The programmes for 1986-88 are still pending implementation because 
of lack of funds. Negotiations are still on with the UNDP - one of 
its major sources of extra-budgetary funds.
Funding of the Niamey and other MULPOCs had been a topical issue
for the ECA. This is because increasingly the ECA has found itslef
constrained by the lack of finance. As one official stated, "our major
problem at the ECA is that of lack of financial resources. We would
like to carry out the demands of the states but we do not have the
resources to enable us to do so".^ Due to pressures from the member
states the matter was taken to the United Nations General Assembly.
The ECA argued that to secure adequate funding, the MULPOCs should be
funded from the regular budget of the UN. In December 1982 the decision
was taken by the General Assembly to provide the MULPOCs with reliable
19
and predictable resources.
20
But according to the ECO division report 1984, the level of 
these resources, at least from the standpoint of project activities, 
is in all lower than was the case over the preceding period, i.e. 1977-82, 
when the UNDP was financing the MULPOCs. On the other hand, the UNDP 
Governing Council requested the UNDP Administrator to continue to 
provide financial support to the five MULPOCs during the whole of the 
third programming cycle 1982-86. But the ECA officials were quick to 
point out that due to financial stringency the UNDP has been unable 
to accede to this request. With the exception of the project on
- 240 -
multisectoral assistance to the CEPGL and the women's programme, the
21
UNDP has not been able to provide the expected additional resources.
At the same time the secretariat has not yet succeeded in identifying 
an alternative source of funds. As a consequence programmes have been 
abandoned and postponed as the information on work programmes reveal.
For example, the UNDP's withdrawal of funding led to the termination 
of the ECA's women programme both at the headquarters and the subregions.
Financial constraint is not the only obstacle preventing the Niamey 
MULPOC from carrying out its programmes. Another major constraint is 
to do with the manpower resources for the projects. Before 1982, the 
staffing of the MULPOC was grossly inadequate. In fact, apart from 
local level staff, this MULPOC had no professional staff for its programmes. 
In 1982, the ECA made proposals for financing the MULPOC through the 
regular budget of the UN. (See table overleaf.)
If we take a closer look at the figures for existing posts, we 
will find that as of 1982 the Niamey MULPOC had a permanent staff of three, 
and all were local level staff. There were no professionals, director 
and supportive senior administrative staff. The three local staff were 
paid from the overhead budget of the ECA, although this method of payment 
was abolished in December 1984. All staff were to be paid by the regular 
budget of the UN. The lack of professional staff working permanently 
in Niamey meant that for various projects, consultants were hired on 
a short term basis. None of the directors of the MULPOC, let alone 
the needed experts, had an employment contract lasting more than one 
year. The same was true of the general service staff - except for the 
secretaries and administrative assistants who had been temporarily 
assigned to the MULPOC from the ECA headquarters. The reason was that 
all the key posts were "project posts" and the contracts of project
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Niamey Staffing
Expisting posts 
Proposed new posts 
Total
D-l P-5 P-4 P-3
Total
Profs
Local
Level
3
2
Total
3
6
Source; Report of the ECOSOC on Financing of the MULPOCs of the ECA 
on an establihed basis, Doc. A/C.5/37/92.9, UN, New York,
Ke*:
December 1982, p. 3.
D-l is the Heads of MULPOCs (directors). The posts were for
principal officers who would be responsible for implementing 
programmes approved by the ECA MULPOC policy organ. They 
would also consult government officials at the highest level 
and in the UN agencies and other IGOs. These were political 
posts and could be made up of ex-ministers, academics and 
long-standing officials of international institutions.
P-5 & P-3 is for Senior Officers. Comprises economic affairs officers 
to undertake sectoral and topical studies; design multi­
national projects and conduct research; assist heads of the 
MULPOC in the management of the centres. These are Civil 
Servants.
Local Level is made up of General Servce staff, e.g. administrative 
assistants, typists, drivers, messengers.
staff were such that appointments could only be guaranteed for one year 
at a time. It was, therefore, difficult in this case to attract a high 
calibre of core staff that the MULPOC needed. The turnover of professional 
staff in all the MULPOCs was relatively high.
The shortage of staff in Niamey and the changing of directors all 
the time created uncertainty for its activities. The reason for both 
is because appointments are on a short-term basis, usually for 6-12 
months depending on the availability of funds. The short contracts 
are not attractive to would-be applicants. Secondly, member states are
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not prepared to release top officials to work at the ECA when they 
themselves need their services. In addition, directors were political 
appointees and therefore those chosen had to be acceptable to the 
member states. It meant longer periods before projects could be com­
pleted. In 1984 and for the first time, the professional core of the 
MULPOC staff including the chiefs or directors of the MULPOCs were 
given regular employment contracts made possible by the establishment 
of 13 professional posts and six local level posts for all the MULPOCs. 
The posts were to be financed under the regular budget of the General 
Assembly Resolution 37/138 dated 17 December 1982. Since 1987 this 
MULPOC has had 10 professional staff and about eight supporting staff.
The area covered by the staff includes economic integration, agriculture, 
water resources, industry, trade and finance and demography. Since 
there is roughly one professional in a sector the staffing level is 
still rather low.
There was another dimension to the staffing problem. This had 
to do with the authority attached to the higher level staff. For 
example, the MULPOC director was not held in high regard by the officials 
of the ECA secretariat. Since this was a political post, the ECA 
secretariat staff tended to look down on the directors. This situation 
was reinforced by the fact that the MULPOC director had neither the 
administrative power to recruit and manage staff, nor any budget manage­
ment authority. He had to seek clearance and authorization from the 
appropriate division at the secretariat for every decision that had 
to be taken. Practically every conceivable personnel action has to 
go through the ECA personnel section, and the MULPOC directors have 
no leeway whatsoever, for instance, when it comes to making use of 
^..surpluses that may arise under a budget line to offset shortfalls 
incurred in others. Often this creates a situation of inertia that
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adversely affects the running of the MULPOC. In addition, there is 
not delegation of authority in the day-to-day management of the MULPOC, 
backed up with necessary arrangements in the matter by the controlling 
authority vested in the ECO Division. So in effect the directors were 
puppets on a string to be manipulated by the officials of the ECO 
division and all other units of the ECA.
At the same time, the qualifications and role of the professional 
staff in the Niamey MULPOC as well as other MULPOCs have changed to 
the extent that the latter are now made up of development planners and 
economists, who may or may not have another field of specialization. 
Accordingly, they have to depend that much more on the ECA’s substantive 
divisions than was the case before. This makes it difficult to effect 
actual decentralization to the subregional offices.
4. NIAMEY MULPOC: WORK PROGRAMMES
The Niamey MULPOC has had programmes of various sectors since 
it was established in 1978. The programmes are of a general nature 
consisting of studies, research, seminars, workshops, advisory and 
consultancy services. In short, the programmes were another example 
of the idea that the ECA was an arm of the UN. It implemented them 
without due regard for the peculiar problems affecting the states.
Such problems include the proliferation of IGOs, drought and famine, 
problems of LDCs and land-locked states, to mention a few. For the 
programmes, the ECA substantive divisions draw up the proposals at the 
secretariat within the chosen areas of priorities, agreed upon by the 
Council of Ministers. The drafts of the proposals are then taken to 
the various organs of Ministers before they are implemented. The
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work programmes of the MULPOCs are drawn on a yearly basis. This 
creates some form of confusion in the sense that such programmes are 
not integrated into the overall work programmes of the ECA. The 
reason is that the ECA’s work programmes are designed on a medium- 
term basis, that is, six-yearly programmes. They are then taken in 
phases on a two-yearly basis and are referred to as the biennium work 
programmes. The lack of harmonization of the ECA work programmes with 
those of the MULPOC hampers progress towards implementation. The 
secretariat has endorsed the move to synchronize the programme with 
effect from 1989. The MULPOC programmes will be biennial from then 
on but it will have no medium-term plan.
The work programmes established at the inaugural meeting of the
Council of Ministers of the Niamey MULPOC held on 16-17 June 1978 in
Niamey, Niger, were considered by the appropriate organs within the
framework of the ECA’s strategy for the NIEO. The programmes grew out
of the ECA’s argument in the 1970s that Africa would be better off
if the international economy was organized in such a way that resources
were distributed on an equitable basis. In order to ensure political
support for their implementation, the priorities chosen reflected the
22
immediate objectives of the countries in their development plans.
In other words, the work programmes were drafted by the ECA on the basis
of how it interpreted the development plans of its member states and
not by asking the government directly what their immediate needs were.
The ECA further justified its position by pointing out that the drafted
work programmes were based on the findings of exploratory missions
23
carried out by the ECA to countries of West Africa. They were then 
debated in the Council of Ministers meeting. This method of arriving 
^at an agreed work programme indicates that African governments see the 
ECA as an arm of the UN and not as an African organization. For one
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thing the programmes originate from the ECA. The member states do not 
usually alter the draft proposals. They merely debate the grammar and 
wording of the proposal. If the ECA was truly an African organization, 
then it would have been up to member states to evolve their own programmes 
and then implement them through the organs of the MULPOC. They would 
decide on priorities for the programmes and greatly affect their content. 
But by its actions the member states see the MULPOC as an arm of the 
UN providing some form of advisory and technical services in the region. 
They do not really identify with the MULPOC. The other point that has 
to be made is that although the ECA is advocating the ideas in the LPA 
and has supported the APPER, it is still carrying out programmes based 
on the demand for a NIEO. For example, self-sufficiency in agriculture 
has been given top priority by both documents, but the ECA's programmes 
do not reflect this.
During the inaugural meeting in 1978, member states indicated 
the priority areas for which the MULPOC should operate. The sectors 
included trade, transport and communications, industry, agriculture, 
energy, human resources and assistance to IGOs. Within the sectors, 
two categories of specific programmes were established. Category I 
contained programmes for the biennium 1977-78, while Category II were 
programmes from which additional priorities would be selected during 
the period 1979-81. the MULPOC referred to these as programmes for 
the medium-term period, which usually lasts for six years. But 
inadequate funding makes long-term planning unrealistic. Also there 
is a discrepancy because the MULPOCs normally have annual programmes 
while headquarters implements medium term, that is, six yearly and 
biennial ones. As stated earlier the MULPOCs have decided that all the 
^programmes should be synchronized from 1989. But so far the programmes 
do not reflect the real problems of the area. , How could the MULPOC
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be so sure back in 1977 that these programmes would be appropriate
for the 1979-81 period? There is a problem with co-ordination as well.
Programmes for one period spill-over to another. Officials complained
24
of extra work resulting from unco-ordinated periods.
For both categories, the objectives of the programmes were the 
same. For example, for the IGOs, the aim was to provide training and 
technical assistance to them on request and also to identify areas 
suitable for co-operation among them in the field of agriculture, 
industry, transport, trade and natural resources based on their res­
pective work programmes. It was also to publish periodical bulletins
25
highlighting the major activities and programmes of the IGOs. In
the area of trade, the aim was to promote trade among the countries
of West Africa, but there was no mention of the aspect of trade or what
the promotion would entail. For transport and communications, the aim
was to encourage and help establish a multinational coastal shipping
line or company. In the area of industry, the aim was to promote
industrial development with specific reference to basic industries and
the establishment of multinational fertilizer plants. For human
resources, there was to be preparation of a programme for the integration
of women in the development process, and in agriculture, the promotion
26
of specialization in agricultural production and research. Again 
here, there was no specification of the aspect of agriuclture which 
the promotion was intended.
The ECA argued that the criteria used by the policy organs in
selecting priorities for Category I included availability of resources,
expressed willingness of the governments to take collective action in
their implementation, the expected impact of the projects on the economic
27
development of the countries.
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What were the specific programmes selected for 1977-78? They 
are treated sector-by-sector below. It suffices to point out that 
although the selection was done in 1978, the programmes were only 
approved in the 1981-83 period in most cases. Then the implementation 
took place in the 1983-86 period. (This ties in with the point made 
earlier about spill-over of programmes/periods leading to problems 
of co-ordination for officials.)
(a) Trade
For trade, two studies were carried out. The first one was a 
study on transit trade and transit facilities. It was approved in 1981 
and the preliminary study was conducted in 1982. The study was finally 
concluded in 1985. The second one was a study on the mechanisms and 
institutional framework for financing trade promotion in West Africa.
The study was approved in 1982 and was carried out in 1983. It has 
been submitted to the Association of West African Development Finance 
institutions. But there is no evidence in ECA literature to suggest 
that there was a follow-up on this programme to see whether the countries 
have adopted the recommendations and to what extent.
(b) Agriculture
The programmes also consisted mainly of studies. The study on 
climatic conditions in West Africa was approved in March 1983. It was 
completed and submitted in 1984. The study on the harmonization of 
pricing policies for agricultural products was approved in 1982. It 
was submitted to the policy organs in February 1984. The MULPOC, ECOWAS 
and the Inter-state Committee for the Fight Against Drought in the Sahel 
^(CILSS) were invited to harmonize their programmes on pricing policies. 
But there was no mention, of what aspects of agricultural products were
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studied. The study on the harmonization of pricing policies for 
livestock was approved in 1982. The terms of reference of the pre­
liminary study were approved in February 1984. But funding is being 
sought to carry out the full study estimated at US$ 500,000. Then 
there was the study on the status of national and subregional seed 
multiplication centres, approved in 1982 and completed in 1984; and 
also, the study on the status of national and subregional veterinary 
centres, approved in 1982 and completed in 1984.
(c) Industry
In the industrial sector, there was a pre-feasibility study for 
a second ammonia factory in West Africa, approved in March 1983. The 
study was completed and the policy organ of the MULPOC approved the 
recommendation on steps to be taken towards the implementation of the 
project within the framework of the Industrial Development Decade for 
Africa. There is no indication that this has been accomplished so far. 
An ECA team visited the phosphoric acid projects of Togo and Sierra 
Leone, a pharmaceutical plant in Sierra Leone and the Serekou quinine 
plant in Guinea. All the visits were in 1986.
(d) Transport and communiations
For this sector, two studies were carried out, namely, (i) study 
on ECOWAS transport system which was approved in 1982. The study was 
completed in 1984. (ii) Global study on the co-ordination of activities 
of national and multinational airlines in West Africa. The study was 
approved in 1983 and was completed in 1984.
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(e) Human resources
For human resources, the MULPOC was involved in the preparation 
of an inventory of specialized training institutions in the field of 
rural development. The move was approved in 1982 and the inventory 
was expected to be ready in 1986. The MULPOC has not reported that 
this has been done.
(f) Water resources and irrigation
28
The programmes also consisted of studies. The study on the 
appropriate techniques for the development and effective use of water 
resources for irrigation and horticulture purposes was approved in 1983. 
The study was done on a few West African countries initially. The 
MULPOC failed to give the names of the countries in its report. How­
ever, the policy organs directed at their 1984 meetings that the study 
should be extended to all West African countries. The study on national 
institutions for establishing and servicing water supply points in rural 
areas was approved in 1983. Here also the study covered a limited 
number of countries and the policy organs in 1984 requested that the 
study be extended to all member states. This was followed by a request 
for the establishment of a subregional committee on water resources.
The request was approved in February 1984. The committee was established 
by the policy organs in 1984 and it was agreed that the MULPOC should 
act as a focal point in co-ordinating subregional co-operation in water 
resources development. The MULPOC was to submit a report to the 1985 
meeting of the policy organs.
(g) WADIS
Lack of knowledge and information on a whole range of issues
- 250 -
affecting the area was discussed at various meetings. The suggestion 
was that there should be a West African Documentation and Information 
System (WADIS). The programme was approved in March 1983. The MULPOC 
reported that the equipment needed.was already in Niamey and would be 
in operation as soon as the appropriate arrangements had been worked 
out with the government of Niger. Efforts were being made to arrange 
either the site offered by the governemnt of Niger to house WADIS or 
the MULPOC office in Niamey by making a modest investment to accommodate 
the computer system already in place.
What is the implementation of the work programmes? The Economic 
Co-operation Office (ECO) conducted an evaluation of the programmes 
of all the MULPOCs for the 1977-84 period. The percentage rate of 
implementation per sector for Niamey was as follows:
Sector % Rate of Implementation
1. Trade 75
2. Agriculture 86
3. Irrigation & Water Resources 66
4. Industry 100
5. Transport 90
6. Human Resources 35
7. Assistance to IGOs 70
8. WADIS 75
Average (including women1s component) 66
Source: Performance Report of the MULPOCs 1977-1984, ECO
Division, ECA, Addis Ababa, p. 32.
The figures do not actually tell us the content of each sectoral pro­
g r a m m e  implemented, nor the length of time used.
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With regard to provision of technical advice, no advisory missions 
were programmed in this area and there was no request for assitance 
by the member states. At the request of the government of Niger, the 
experts in statistics and demography taught courses free of charge at 
the University of Niger. Also a national workshop to train documenta- 
talists was organized in Niamey from 9-20 January 1984. Fifty parti-
26
cipants took part on this workshop which was fully financed by the ECA.
A closer examination of the work programme approved and executed 
so far shows that the MULPOC was mainly occupied with carrying out studies 
for the approved sectors. The programmes were not concrete projects 
in the sense of building a dam or irrigation canals, construction of 
infrastructures, for instance. The studies may be important but they 
cannot make the required impact on development because they do not fully 
address the important issues of development. Secondly, the rate of 
implementation given by the MULPOC is misleading in that it disguises 
the fact that it took a lengthy period to implement the programmes.
All the studies were selected in 1978, but most were accomplished in 
1984. Now if the programmes meant for the 1977-78 period were finally 
concluded in 1984, what has become of the programmes for subsequent 
years? Apart from the obvious obstacles to implementation, the MULPOC 
is not really equipped with organs for co-ordination, monitoring and 
evaluating programmes. Without these vital organs it is difficult to 
imagine that it can successfully implement programmes. With the type 
of programmes that are being carried out, one can conclude that the 
work of the MULPOC is to a large extent research-oriented.
It is true that the real problems in West Africa cannot be tackled 
without the studies. But we need different studies for different problems. 
The studies have to be directly related to the problems. We have to
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remember that the real problems in this area include, mass poverty, 
dependence on the export of primary commodities, desertification, 
drought and famine, the burden of payment of subscriptions to IGOs.
The majority of studies carried out so far have failed to address these. 
For example, in agriculture, the MULPOC conducted a study on climatic 
conditions and another on the harmonization of pricing policies for 
livestock between the states. Climate is only one factor which affects 
agriculture. Secondly, the countries sell their commodities directly 
to the industrialized ones and very little trade takes place between 
them. Another example is in the field of human resources where the 
MULPOC chose to prepare an inventory of specialized training institutions 
for rural development. This exercise offers little solution to the 
problem of unemployment, except perhaps in the long run. Even if states 
are aware of the number of such institutions, the exercise will not 
be useful unless they can fund them from year to year.
The programmes do not seriously address the issues of importance
to African development, such as the use of appropriate technology; how
best to utilize the natural and mineral resources; and the elimination
of mass poverty and unemployment. The member states complained about
the lack of initiative from th MULPOC in carrying out development
activities, together with the lack of a more realistic approach which
30
took into account its limitations. Moreover, the programmes are not 
flexible enough to accommodate immediate needs and the ideas of the 
LPA and APPER. This, for example, explains why the MULPOC was unable 
to assist the states in a meaningful manner during th drought of 
1983-85.
Moreover, the member states are not properly briefed about the 
programmes. The Council of Ministers has recommended that starting
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from 1988 the Director's Report should be concise. It should cover 
the activities undertaken and explain why certain activities were not 
undertaken, giving the reasons. The report was also to describe the
human and financial resources that the MULPOC had for carrying out the
. . .  31activities.
5. THE PECULIAR PROBLEMS IN THE SUBREGION AND ECA'S RESPONSE
The countries face problems of desertification, drought and famine. 
Their dependence on the export of primary commodities such as cocoa, 
cotton and ground nut meant that they were vulnerable to fluctuations 
in world market prices. They all face financial burdens from belonging 
to several IGOs - they have to pay subscriptions, especially in this 
era of scarce foreign exchange.
The problems stem from the fact that there are too many IGOs in 
the subregion. There are at least 32 such organizations at present, 
and they include 15 multilateral IGOs with members exclusively from 
West Africa; three bilateral IGOs with members exclusively from West 
Africa; and at least two multilateral IGOs with many members from West 
Africa and with their headquarters in West Africa. These IGOs were 
created between 1952 and 1980. For a date of creation, composition 
and types of IGOs, see Table 6.4. Belonging to one or two IGOs would 
have been less of a burden, but some states belong to more than 10.
For example, Niger is a member of 25 IGOs, Burkina Faso (20), Senegal 
(20) and Ivory Coast (19) - see Table 6.6.
Taken individually as well as collectively, the IGOs have 
^ not _ contributed as much as was hoped for to collective self- 
reliance and self-sustaining growth and development in the area.
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Table 6.4 Date of Creation and Composition of West African Intergovernmental Organizations
Organization Date of Creation
Total No. 
of Members
No. of Members 
from West Africa Members
A. Multilateral IGOs whose 
members are exclusively 
from West Africa
1. Conseil de l 1Entente
2. Organization for Co­
ordination and Co-operation 
in the Fight Against Endemic 
Disease (OCCGE)
3. Central Bank of West African 
States (BCEAO)
4. Authority for the Integrated 
Development of the Liptako- 
Gourma Region
5. Economic Community for 
Livestock and Meat (CEBV)
6. West African Rice Development 
Association
1959
1960
1962
1970
1970
1970 14 14
Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory 
Coast, Niger, Togo
Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory 
Coast, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Senegal, Togo
Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory 
Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo
Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger
Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory 
Coast, Niger, Togo
Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Liberia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Togo
./cont.
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Table \>.4 (cont.)
Organization
7. Economic Community of 
West Africa (CEAO)
8. Organization for the 
development of Senegal 
River (OWVG)
9. West African Development 
Bank (BOAD)
10. West African Health 
Community (WAHC)
Date of Creation
Total No.
of Members
1972 (but dates 
back to the UDAO 
created in 1960)
1972 (but dates 
back to the OERS)
1972
1972
11. Mano River Union (MRU) 1973
12. West African Monetary 1973
Union (UMOA)
13. Economic Community of 
West African States 
(ECOWAS)
1975 16
No. of Members
from West Africa Members
Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal
Mali, Mauritania, Senegal
6 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory
Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo
6 Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone
3 Guinea, Liberia, Sierra
Leone
6 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory
Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo
16 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape
Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, 
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Togo
./cont.
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Table 6.4 (cont.)
Organization
14. West African Clearing 
House (WACH)
15. Organization for the 
Development of the Gambia 
River (OMVG)
B. Bilateral IGOs with members 
exclusively from West Africa
16. Benin and Niger Common 
Organization for Railways 
and Transport (OCBN)
17. Senegambia Permanent 
Secretariat
Date of Creation
1975
1978
1959
1976
Total No.
of Members
15
3
2
2
18. Electricity Community of 
Benin (CEB)
1970 2
No. of Members
from West Africa Members
15 Central Banks of all six
BCEAO Countries, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone
3 Gambia, Guinea, Senegal
2 Gambia, Guinea, Senegal
2 Gambia and Senegal
2 Benin and Togo
. /c o n t .
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Table 6.4 (cont.)
Organization
C. IGOs with half or more of
their members from West Africa
19. International Organization
Against the African Migratory 
Locust (OICMA)
20. Agency for Air Transport
Security in Africa (ASECNA)
21. Inter-state Committee for 
Water Studies (CIEH)
22. Cocoa Producers Alliance
Date of Creation
1952
1959
1960
1962
Total No.
of Members
17
14
12
23. African Groundnut Council 
(AGC)
1964 7
No. of Members
from West Africa Members
11 Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana,
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Togo, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo, Uganda, Zaire
8 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory
Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal, Togo, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo, Gabon, Madagascar
8 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory
Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal, Togo, Cameroon, Chad, 
Congo, Gabon
4 Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria,
Togo, Brazil, Cameroon, Gabon
6 Burkina Faso, Gambia, Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan
./cont.
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Table^6.4 (cont.)
Organization Date of Creation
24. Lake Chad Commission 1964
25. Common Organization for 
the Fight Against Locust 
and Fowl Pests (OCLALAV)
1965
26. African and Mauritian
Common Organization (OCAM)
1966 (but dates 
back to UAM created 
in 1961)
27. African Society for the 
Development of Millet and 
Sorghum-based Food 
(SADIAMUL)
1972
28. Inter-State Committee for 
the Fight Against Drought 
in the Sahel (CILSS)
1973
29. Niger Basin Authority 
(NBA)
1980 (but dates 
back to the Niger 
Basin Commission 
created in 1963)
Total No.
of Members
4 
10
9
5
8
8
No. of Members
from West Africa Members
Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon,
Chad
Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, 
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Senegal, Cameroon, Chad
Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory 
Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo, 
Central African Republic, 
Mauritius, Rwanda
Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Sudan
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Senegal, Chad
Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea 
Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Cameroon
./cont.
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Table'6.4 (cont.)
Organization Date of Creation
Total No.
of Members
No. of Members
from West Africa Members
D. Multilateral IGOs with many 
members from West Africa 
and with their Headquarters 
in West Africa
30. African and Malagasy Council 
for Higher Education (CAMES)
1968 17 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory 
Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
Togo, Burundi, Cameroon,
Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Zaire
31. African Solidarity Fund 1976 16 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory 
Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
Togo, Burundi, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, 
Gabon, Mauritius, Rwanda, Zaire
Source: Proposals for Strengthening Economic Integration in West Africa, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1984, pp. 18-21.
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Table 6.5 
Sector
1. Agriculture
2. Natural Resources
3. Industry
4. Transport and 
Communications
5. Manpower Development
6. Finance
7. Trade Liberation 
and Customs Union
8. Money
IGOs with activities in the sector
African Groundnut Council, OCAM, SADIAMIL, 
Liptako-Gourma Authority, Cocoa Producers 
Alliance, OCLALAV, CEBV, CEAO, ECOWAS, OICMA, 
CILSS, Lake Chad Basin Commission, MRU, 
Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission for Co­
operation, OMVG, OMVS, Niger Basin Authority, 
Senegambia Permanent Secretariat, WARDA.
(Total = 19)
OCAM, Liptako-Gourma Authority, CEAO, ECOWAS, 
CIEH, CILSS, Lake Chad Basin Commisison, MRLI, 
Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission for Co-operation, 
OCLALAV, OCCGE, OICMA, OMVG, OMVS, Niger Basin 
Authority, Senegambia Permanent Secretariat.
(Total = 16)
OCAM, SADIAMIL, Council of Understanding,
CEAO, ECOWAS, CEB, Lake Chad Basin Commission, 
Liptako-Gourma Authority, MRU, Niger-Nigeria 
Joint Commission for Co-operation, OMVG, OMVS, 
Niger Basin Authority, Senegambia Permanent 
Secretariat.
(Total = 14)
ASECNA, Liptako-Gourma Authority, OCBN, CEAO, 
ECOWAS, MRU, Lake Chad Basin Commission, Niger- 
Nigeria Joint Commission for Co-operation,
OMVG, OMVS, Niger Basin Authority, Senegambia 
Permanent Secretariat.
(Total = 12)
CAMES, CEAO, ECOWAS, CILSS, MRU, OCAM, OCCGE, 
WAHC, WARDA.
(Total = 9)
OCAM, African Solidarity Fund, Council of 
Understanding, CEAO, ECOWAS, BAOD.
(Total = 6)
CEAO, ECOWAS, MRU.
(Total = 3)
BCEAO, WACH, UMOA.
(Total = 3)
Source: Proposals for Strengthening Economic Integration in West Africa, 
ECA, addis Ababa, 1984, pp. 24-25.
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There is also an absence of a coherent overall design or framework 
for achieving this objective. As a result, the more than 30 IGOs are 
characterized by heterogeneity in objective and diversity in membership, 
with many of them active in the same economic sector. Lacking any 
effective central co-ordinating mechanism to ensure that they all pull 
together in the same direction, they often work at cross-purposes and 
end up wasting scarce financial and human resources, stalemating their 
individual efforts at promoting the socio-economic development and 
integration of their member states. If we take the IGOs in Table 6.4, the 
sector-by-sector the picture that emerges is as follows; in every 
sector several IGOs are active. In agriculture, for example, there 
are 19 IGOs with programmes. Do the states need so many IGOs in each 
sector, especially for agriculture, natural resources, industry, transport 
and communications and manpower development?
The problem does not stop with duplication of programmes; there 
are problems involved in belonging to so many IGOs at the same time.
Table 6.6 indicates the membership and types of IGOs. From the table 
the following ranking of membership emerges;
Niger 25
Burkina Faso 20
Senegal 20
Ivory Coast 19
Benin 18
Mali 17
Togo 17
Mauritania 12
Gambia 10
Nigeria 10
Guinea 7
Sierra Leone 6
Ghana 5
Liberia 5,
Guinea Bissau 3
Cape Verde 2
Table 6.6 The West African Intergovernmental Organizations and their Membership
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Cocoa Producers Alliance 
OCLALAV
Council of Understanding
CEBV
CEAO
ECOWAS
CEB
CIEH
OICMA
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
N i
O'
N>
./cont.
Tabl^ 6.6 (cont.)
cd cd cd p
a CU •H cd a) cu cd
•H CU X a e c CO
a (X u g cd •H •H (0
<u cd a) cd X p p *H
PQ u  > o o o o PQ
Cd Cd r—I
•H  I v-l cd cd
-M Vi -H  cd Vi U  GO Vi (U Vi cd
Vi CO CU -H  V i * H  CU <U CU Vi C  O  Cl) +->
o  Cd |H  P d  GO GO C  C U O  GO CX rH
>  o  iH  Cd cd Cd *H 'H  CU *H CU O  0 . 0
M U O l  S S - M 2  53 C/3 C /3 ,-1  H  O) >
Organization
CILSS X X X  X X X X  X
Lake Chad Basin Commission X X
Mano River Union X X
Niger-Nigeria Joint
Commission for Co-operation X X
OCCGE X X X X X X
OMVG X X  X
OMVS X X  X
Niger Basin Authority X X X X X X X
Senegambia Permanent Secretariat X X
West African Clearing House X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
BOAD X X X X
WAHC X X X  X X X X  X
UMOA X X X X X X
WARDA X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Total 18 2 10 5 6 3 19 5 17 12 25 10 20 6 17 22
ho
O'.
u>
Source: Proposals for Strengthening Economic Integration in West Africa, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1984, p. 90.
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The spread of membership is very wide, from a high of 25 in the case 
of Niger to a low of 2 in that of Cape Verde. The wider membership 
puts considerable strain on scarce foreign exchange; how can a country 
like Niger keep up with its subscription to 25 organizations?
With the exception of Guinea, the former French colonies belong 
to significantly more IGOs than other West African countries. Of the 
32 IGOs the membership of 17 is made up exclusively of French-speaking 
countries. These are CAMES, OCAM, SADIAMIL, African Solidarity Fund, 
ASECNA, Liptako-Gourma Authority, OCBN, BCEAO, CEB, CIEH, OCCGE, OMVS,
BOAD and UMOA. This is as a result of the geographical continguity 
among the French-speaking countries and also a reflection of their unity 
during colonial rule and their desire to maintain many of their previous 
ties.
What was the demand made by the West African states concerning 
the IGOS? In 1978 when the ECA drafted the work programmes of this MULPOC, 
it was merely satisfied with acknowledging the fact that the IGOs existed. 
It felt that the IGOs needed assistance in the form of training facilities 
and promotional exercises. Because the countries were not aware of 
all the organizations in terms of their functions and benefits, the 
ECA felt that the best thing to do was the publication of a bulletin 
and directory on them. Finally, the ECA decided that it was best to 
identify areas for co-operation among the IGOs especially as regional 
economic integration was a theme highly popular at the time. So these 
aspects of the IGOs were incorporated into the work programmes. Member 
states went along with the ideas of the ECA by approving them in the 
policy organ.
The ECA did its best to carry out the programmes designed but 
in the early 1980s, the activities of the IGOs feature greatly
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in the discussion of member states. This is still the case at present.
It is now accepted by the states that the existence of rival customs 
unions and at least 30 other IGOs operating in varying fields such as 
banking and finance, food and agriculture, river basin development, 
health, transport and communications, clearing and payments, constitute 
a serious threat to rational and harmonious economic integration and, 
in the long run, to socio-economic development. The proliferation of 
relatively small IGOs, several of which rival and overlap or duplicate 
each other, has also led to the dispersal of manpower and financial 
resources, conflicts of interest and divided loyalties and an instability 
due to countries being members of several IGOs themselves. The cumulative 
result is that there is a lack of co-ordinated strategies, policies and 
actions at the subregional level.
The West African states complain of being called upon, in this
era of recession to spend increasingly large amounts of scarce resources
on the running of the IGOs, without obtaining correspondingly adequate
returns and benefits. The states argue that the impact of the IGOs
on the process of economic development and integration of the subregion
32
has not only been minimal but has actually hindered that process. The 
member states through the decision-making organ of the ECOWAS referred 
to as the Authority of Heads of States and Government met to discuss 
the problems of the IGOs. At the sixth meeting of the policy organ 
of the ECOWAS held in Conakry, Republic of Guinea, in May 1983, they 
commissioned the ECA to prepare a study on the rationalization of economic 
co-operation efforts within West Africa.
A year before this decision was taken, the fifth meeting of the 
Council of Ministers of the Niamey MULPOC held in Banjul, Republic of 
the Gambia, February 1982, also commissioned the MULPOC to undertake
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a comprehensive review and evaluation of multinational economic co­
operation arrangements in the subregion, their structures, objectives 
and effectiveness in promoting subregional economic co-operation. The 
object of the exercise was to enable lessons to be drawn from past 
experiences of these bodies, so that solutions can be proposed for 
identified problems.
The ECA prepared the study commissioned by the sixth session of 
the Authority of Heads of State and Governemnt of ECOWAS, which was 
entitled: Proposals for Strengthening Economic Integration in West
Africa. The study was presented to the seventh session of ECOWAS held 
in Lome, Republic of Togo, in December 1984. After due consideration 
by this organ, the Authority requested by its decision A/DEC/2/11/84 
that additional studies be carried out with the assitance of the ECA 
on the subject of rationalization of the IGOs. The ECA carried out 
the study with a team headed by Dr. 0. Adewoye, Reader in History at 
the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and submitted the proposal entitled: 
Proposals for the Rationalization of Intergovernmental Economic 
Organizations in West Africa in 1984.
The main demand from the member states concerning the IGOs is 
that they should be rationalized, the states want fewer IGOs and they 
also want their programmes co-ordinated and their strategies harmonized. 
Some of the IGOs themselves have taken steps to co-operate in their 
activities. For example, in September 1984, ECOWAS officials met in 
Lome with representatives of two IGOs - the West African Health Community 
(WAHC) and the Organization for Co-ordination and Co-operation in the 
Fight Against Endemic Diseases (OCCGE). The meeting agreed on the need 
to create a single West African health institution which should be a 
'specialized agency of ECOWAS. Steps are yet to be taken towards the 
rationalization of this objective.
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A similar proposal was made by the study team. The only differ­
ence is that the latter recommended that all the IGOs should operate 
within the umbrella of ECOWAS. But before considering this, let us 
look at some of their findings. They found that the countries were 
not yet fully committed to the ideal of economic co-operation and 
collective self-reliance. With the exception of Cape Verde and Senegal, 
the development plans of others did not make any direct reference to 
collaborative efforts in the achievement of national economic goals.
"West African governments were still, by and large, isolationists in 
their economic thinking - a situation which is at once a reflection 
of the minimal impact of the existing IGOs and the limited nature of
the governemnt’s own commitment to the idea of economic co-operation
33
and collective self-reliance." Also in most countries matters of 
economic co-operation were not accorded the same priority in the official 
mind as primarily national issues. Therefore at the national level 
more has to be done to make existing IGOs serve as effective engines 
of development.
However, the team did not take the view that there were too many
IGOs. Their emphasis was on the relations between them. They stated
that "what’s fundamentally wrong with the organizations is not that
they are too many, but that they are operating parallel to one another
and sometimes at cross purposes. In theory each organization is a law
34
unto itself - with its own specific mandate and functions". The
organizations have not succeeded in working hand in hand. According
to the team "the existing level of co-operation among the IGOs leaves
32
much to be desired". Given the slow progress towards economic inte­
gration and the unsatisfactory and very limited gains from economic 
^integration, the study team recommended the restructuring of the entire 
framework for economic co-operation. The strategy lays stress on the
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integration of production rather than markets and the reduction of 
external dependency. The key features of the new framework will be 
four major community institutions - the West African Economic Summit, 
the Council of Ministers, the Economic Integration Planning Commission 
and Sectoral Commissions. The organizational structure for the new 
framework is as follows:
Figure 2 Proposed Framework for Economic Integration in West Africa
The IGOs
ECOWAS
Secretariat
West African 
MULPOC
West African 
Economic Summit
Economic Integration 
Planning Commission
Sectoral Commission
Council of 
Ministers
Source: Proposal for Strengthening Economic Integration in West
Africa, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1983, p. 70.
The West African Economic Summit of Heads of State and Governments 
is to decide on broad policies that affect the entire scope and process 
of economic integration. It will be in a position to decide on policies 
affecting all the IGOs. The Council of Ministers is to advise and assist 
•"the summit with its focus on the economy of the subregion and the role 
which the IGOs are playing (and should be playing) in it. It will have
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the powers to recommend policies and programmes for particular IGOs.
Its major function is to draw up annually specific programmes of 
economic development for the IGOs. The Economic Integration Planning 
Commission will be made up of a Chairman (Executive Secretary, ECOWAS), 
chief executives of developmental organs, one high level official 
representative of the Ministry of Economic Development and Planning 
of each state, a representative co-opted from the subregions solely 
on the basis of their expertise. It will be charged with the duty of 
synthesizing the programmes of the various sectoral commissions, and 
draw up broad prospective plans, with appropriate target sets, for the 
whole subregion.
The basic task of research and planning for economic integration 
falls on three institutions in the new scheme: ECOWAS Secretariat,
the sectoral commissions and the Economic Integration Planning Commission. 
The ECOWAS Secretariat serves the seven proposed sectoral commissions:
(a) Agricuture and Natural Resources;
(b) Trade and Industries (chemical, engineering, mechanical 
and metallurgical);
(c) Energy and Water Resources;
(d) Transport and Communications;
(e) Monetary and Financial Affairs;
(f) Science and Technology (including research and development);
(g) Social and Cultural.
In serving the commissions, ECOWAS takes the initiative=to prepare 
detailed position papers relevant to the task of each commission. The 
papers should take account of the work programmes of the IGOs. The 
^commissions will be made up of appropriate IGOs and ministries of 
governments of the countries. The primary task of each is to see how
- 270 -
best to integrate the economies of the member states in its particular 
sector and draw up workable work programmes accordingly. The study 
team proposed arrangements for the headship of each commission:
Commission Headship
1. Agriculture and Natural Resources
2. Energy and Water Resources
3. Trade and Industries
4. Transport and Communications
5. Monetary and Financial Affairs
6. Science and Technology
7. Social and Cultural
WARDA
Niger Basin Authority
ECOWAS
ECOWAS
BOAD
CEAD
Mano River Union
What the team proposed in effect was an arrangement for economic 
co-operation to be organized within one body. They based their argument 
on the fact that all the smaller organizations in their operation should 
be working within the one large organization provided they enjoy 
considerable autonomy in the implementation of their programmes. There 
are implications for this approach. First, the legal structure of the 
existing organizations would have to be reviewed. For example, ECOWAS 
would have to be given the formal powers of co-ordination as have been 
suggested. It is doubtful whether the present ECOWAS secretariat has 
the capacity to undertake an effective co-ordinating role. Secondly, 
there is also nothing to suggest that the IGOs will collaborate within 
the new framework proposed, especially as they have never done so in 
the past.
The study team had clearly underestimated the potential of the 
political implications of merging institutions or proposing for them
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to collaborate. Even the smallest of the institutions will not willingly 
give in to such proposals. It may be in the interest of the IGOs to 
foster economic co-operation but it is a political move that will bring 
it about and, therefore, this factor should not be down-played. Even 
if the proposals were workable, it would seem that the team had only 
addressed the question of co-ordination. They overlooked the issues 
of overlap of functions and the fact that there were far too many IGOs. 
Also the member states have no financial resources to make the necessary 
subscriptions. It is difficult to see how one subregion can sustain 
more than 30 IGOs. Besides the subregion is not yet ready for the kind 
of ideas proposed here and so it is not surprising that their proposals 
have ended up like most of the other studies conducted by the ECA - 
on the shelves of the ECA library, that of its officials and in obscure 
corners of ministries of Economic Development and Planning of the member 
states. To a large extent, then, the ECA has not found solutions to 
the problems of the IGOs in West Africa.
6. CONCLUSION
The MULPOC in West Africa is a dream that has not been realized.
It was established to extend the work of the secretariat to the sub- 
regions. The hope was that the impact of the secretariat would be felt 
by members states; that projects reflecting the needs of the subregions 
would be identified and implemented. But this has not happened. This 
is mainly because decentralization from the secretariat to the MULPOC 
has not been effected. The manpower and financial resources of the 
MULPOC are rather small.
The countries have warned that they cannot make financial
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contributions because of the economic crisis they are experiencing.
They asked the MULPOC to continue its search for funds without expecting 
3 6
money from them. The programmes are too many and consist mainly of 
studies and surveys. The programmes are based on a sector-by-sector 
approach and it means that they have independent programmes for each 
sector which are running parallel to each other. The periods for the 
execution of the projects are too long and the programmes do not 
reflect the immediate needs of the area - they include emergency relief 
action for drought and famine-stricken areas; programmes to counter 
the effects of desertification, to mention but two. Moreover, because 
they originate from the ECA instead of from the states, the latter do 
not identify fully with the programmes.
African states want the MULPOC to do more than carry out research
and surveys. They want meaningful projects that would aid tangibly
the process of socio-economic development in the region. Officials
also complained that the ECA does not send them the agenda for meetings
and programmes on time. So ministers arrive for conferences unprepared.
They also have shorter periods to go through a mass of documents.
The process of meetings becomes tiresome and in the end only a few issues
37
are treated fully. Although the initial complaints were made in 1979, 
officials still felt the same about the preparations for meetings in 
the 1980s. It is a problem which affects all the MULPOCs and headquarter 
meetings as well.
A pressing problem in the region is that of proliferation of the 
IGOs. The idea of rationalization is being discussed, but it is doubtful 
whether the MULPOC will be able to cope with the rationalization issue.
First, it has limited resources to carry out its own programmes, let
along those of the IGOs. Secondly, African states prefer the rationalization
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to be effected under the auspices of ECOWAS. This finding of the study 
team (1983) indicated that this is the case. So increasingly the states 
identify more with ECOWAS than with the MULPOC. Their support for the 
former was because they were in charge of its activities and took the 
necessary decisions. The MULPOC was part of the UN system for which 
they had very little role to play as far as drawing up and execution 
of programmes were concerned. With these and other issues discussed 
in this chapter, we conclude that the Niamey MULPOC is inefficient and 
ineffective in the process of socio-economic development in the subregion. 
It does not and cannot play a crucial role in the subregion because 
of constraints in its terms of reference, structure and organs, financial 
and manpower resources and above all its programmes which so far appear 
to be unrealistic. These constraints are the main reasons why the Niamey 
MULPOC is not a prime motivator nor a catalystic agent for subregional 
development.
The member states have initiated changes to two aspects of policy. 
First, they have asked for a re-definition of the purpose and scope 
of the Niamey MULPOC. Secondly, they succeeded in altering the timing 
of meetings of policy organs. The meetings are to be held biennially 
from 1989. The decision has been adopted by all the MULPOCs. So in 
terms of changes to policies the Niamey MULPOC has been both active 
and a forerunner.
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CHAPTER 7
ECA IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE LUSAKA MULTINATIONAL 
PROGRAMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE (MULPOC)
1. INTRODUCTION
This MULPOC was established in November 1977 and serves the 
geographical area of Eastern and Southern Africa. Its members are 
Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Seychelles,
Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. There are 18 
countries in all, making this the largest MULPOC. It was created at 
a time when the impact of the 1973-74 oil crisis began to be felt by 
the member states. It was also a period which was to mark the begin­
ning of a long and protracted drought in the subregion. For the 
countries, the decade has been characterized by the destabilization 
policies of South Africa.
At the international level it has been a decade marred by reces­
sion, high interest rates, protectionism and low prices of commodities. 
These factors have had a negative effect on the growth and development 
efforts of the countries. In essence, the MULPOC was operating in a 
hostile social and economic environment. The consequences of the adverse 
economic conditions served to heighten demands on the MULPOC but at best 
the latter was unable to provide sufficient services which were tailored 
to their needs. However, this MULPOC has faired better than the others 
because it had been able to establish the Preferential Trade Area for 
^Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). It is the only operating PTA in 
Africa so far. Before going into more details, a consideration of the
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main features of the area is necessary. If the ECA is to make an 
impact on development, its programmes will have to reflect the peculiar 
needs of the countries. For it to be influential, it has to have the 
participation and the consent of the states.
2. SALIENT FEATURES OF EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
One of the distinct features is the fact that half of the states 
are classified as LDCs. These are Botswana, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Somalia, Uganda and Tanzania. Their economies have 
structural deficiencies. With their low per capita income estimated at 
an averate of $158 in 1985,^ these LDCs find it difficult to raise 
adequate savings necessary for development financing. They depend on 
single export commodities which face inelastic demand and declining 
prices in international markets. Industrial production is limited to 
a few import-substitute processing activities with very high import- 
content, a condition which exerts, pressure on foreign exchange resources 
to import raw materials and spare parts. Also for most of the countries, 
the average level of living is far below the attainable possibilities.
The ECA defined the area both ecologically and economically as 
one subregion, where as in reality there are two distinct areas, that
is, the Eastern and the Southern parts. So, although all the countries
face the same challenge of development, namely, the urge to modernize 
their economies, the Eastern states have no direct links with South 
Africa. They are therefore not heavily dependent on the latter, neither 
do they suffer from its policies of destabilization. For the Southern
states, their efforts are geared towards the reduction of dependency
on South Africa.
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South Africa as the dominant power in the subregion has used a 
mixture of stick and carrot policies which has enabled it to stretch 
friendly arms to Malawi, for instance, while engage in border raids 
against ANC targets. Countries like Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique 
have been constant targets of such raids. Its raids on Maputo,
2
Mozambique, left six blacks and a Portuguese technician dead in 1981.
In 1985, 15 people were killed in a raid on Gaborone, Botswana.
3
Pretoria claimed that the ANC "nerve centre" was destroyed. It has
been estimated that this destabilization policy has cost the Frontline
States (FLS) about US$ 10 billion over the last five years in destroyed
4
infrastructure, apart from the vast destruction of human lives. The 
instability weakens the economies and creates political instability 
and conflicts.
The economic dependence of some states on South Africa is an 
important issue which has dominated their relations. For Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, their main trading 
partner is South Africa. They depend on her for imports and exports, 
especially migrant labour. For details of tradeable commodities and 
amounts involved, see Table 7.1. The urge to modernize and this 
economic dependence have given rise to patterns of economic co-operation 
ventures. The Lusaka Declaration 1980 led to the establishment of the 
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) for which 
nine states in the MULPOC are members - Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. According 
to Mmusi (1980.) ,^ SADCC "is an exercise in collective self-reliance 
in furtherance of the basic needs of our people for economic security 
and development. SADCC is a part of the broader efforts towards African 
.co-operation and development over the period 1980-2000, adopted by 
Heads of State and Governments of the OAU."^
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The emphasis of SADCC is on co-ordination of efforts and although 
the strategy adopted initially was the development of physical infra­
structure, especially transport and communication network, by 1987 it 
was broadened to include the productive sector. Its objectives include 
the reduction of economic dependence in general and that on South 
Africa in particular; the forging of links to create a genuine and 
equitable regional integration; the mobilization of resources to promote 
the implementation of national, inter-state and regional politices; 
and the concerted action to secure international co-operation within 
the framework of the strategy for economic co-operation.^ In a wider 
context, these objectives bear similarities to those of the MULPOC.
The only difference is the lack of emphasis on economic dependence of 
the states within the MULPOC. Secondly, the objectives coincide with 
those of a second institution in the area established by the ECA in 
1982, referred to as the PTA. Its aim is to eliminate tariff barriers 
on selected commodities produced. Its sectors overlap those of SADCC 
and also both institutions serve the same states, with the exception 
of Angola, Botswana and Mozambique which are members of SADCC but 
not in the PTA. For the ECA/MULPOC, the PTA is one of the shining 
examples of the measure of' success and achievement of regional co-
g
operation in Africa. The PTA is treated in detail at the latter part 
of this chapter, but it is necessary to note the setting of regional 
co-operation ventures.
Both SADCC and the PTA are necessary for the development of the 
sates,but there is the need to co-ordinate their activities with those 
of the MULPOC to avoid overlap and duplication of work. At the moment, 
SADCC has an informal relationship with.the PTA and none whatsoever 
.with the MULPOC. The PTA was an ECA’s idea. Its officials drew up 
the protocol and treaty and also provided technicians to work with the
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states during the negotiations and the conclusion of the treaty. The 
Commission also organized the publicity for the PTA. But once the 
latter took shape it strived to be an entity in its own right and at 
present the formal link with the Commission has been severed.
By 1983 it was obvious to the state members and the officials
of the IGOs that the MULPOC, the PTA and SADCC were operating within
similar sectors, such as trade, agriculture and industry. The member
states requested the ECA to look into the possibility of co-ordinating
of efforts and the latter responded by establishing a sub-committee
to consider the matter. But the committee did not operate by 1985.
The state repeated the request and through the Council of Ministers
meeting in 1986 they endorsed the idea that there should be a meeting
of the IGOs with similar functions to iron out the modalities for
co-operation. The organizations included the FAO, the PTA, SADCC,
Centro Internationale de Mejoriamento de Maize Y Trigo (CIMMYT) - the
English acronym is IMWIC (the International Maize and Wheat Improvement
Centre) - the Co-operation for Development in Africa (CDA) and the
9
International Centre for Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE). But 
again the IGOs have not yet met as at November 1988. It is not very 
clear whether the ECA has approached the IGOs from the meetings of its 
policy organs.
Other features of the area include the huge resources of minerals, 
a relatively well-developed level of agricultural technology in a few 
countries, especially Kenya and Zimbabwe, and the immense potential of 
hydro-electric power. With reference to the latter, the potential for 
the PTA is estimated at nearly 106,000 mw, it is capable of producing 
an average amount of about 600 billion kvh per annum. The current
s'
installed capacity is estimated at 6,382 mw, representing only 6 per 
cent of the potential available.^
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The major hydro-power resources are located on the Zambezi River
Basin whose technically exploitable potential is estimated at 16,023 mw.
Angola and Mozambique possess almost 30 per cent of this potential -
Angola has the largest potential with 23,000 mw, followed by Mozambique
with 15,000 mw, Zambia 12,000 mw, Tanzania 9,500 mw and Zimbabwe with 
12
3,800 mw. (Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zambia are self-sufficient in 
electricity production.)
In terms of mineral resources, Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania 
possess iron ore and natural gas. Uganda, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Angola 
and Rwanda also possess natural gas. Zambia and Tanzania have coal 
and the area is endowed with some of the highest grade bauxite, copper, 
cobalt, coal, gypsum and limestone. Phosphate rock deposits exist in 
Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, while potash deposits 
are found in Ethiopia. The brine used for potassium-based fertilizers 
is available in Botswana and Tanzania. Therefore, these states have a 
high potential for the production of fertilizers.
In addition to minerals the area has agricultural potentials.
Even though subject to periodic droughts and desertification, Zimbabwe 
and Malawi produce on average more than their domestic requirements of 
maize, the most important staple food of the area. Botswana, Zimbabwe 
and Kenya are major beef producers and have been important exporters 
of the EEC. There' is abundant agricultural land and a potential for 
irrigation. 60 per cent of the subregion is endowed with lakes and 
rivers and yet only a small percentage of their water resources is 
used. Also only a small proportion of their arable land is under 
utilization.^
Robert G. Mugabe, as Chairman of the PTA in 1985, stressed the 
importance and potentials of the region, when he stated thus: "In our
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subregion, there is a large market of about 140 million people and a
14
gross domestic product (GDP) estimated at $60 billion." He also 
referred to the mineral resources of the area being the envy of many 
countries in the world, and pointed out that the area stretching from 
South Africa to North Zaire has been referred to as the "gulf of 
mineral or the most critical piece of ground . .."^ Together, they 
produce most of the world’s diamonds, chrome, platinum and manganese, 
and a significant share of the world's uranium, coal, nickel, copper 
and cobalt.
In as much as there are similarities between the countries, we
cannot ignore the diversities, especially among the nine members of
the SADCC and PTA in particular and the MULPOC in general. Such
diversities relate to their populations, sizes, output per capita,
political ideologies and loyalities. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
are committed under the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) agreement
of 1969 to seek South African approval before entering into any other
trading arrangements. These states are often described as ’South
Africa’s economic hostages’. Customs revenue payments - handouts the
three get from South Africa in return for letting in South Africa’s
goods free of duty - are by far Swaziland’s and Lesotho's biggest source
16
of government revenue. They are second only to mining receipts from 
Botswana, which (unlike the two) is a large, sparsely-populated country.
The three depend on South Africa, not just for customs money. The 
South African company De Beers owns half of Botswana’s diamond mines.
The latter and Swaziland share long borders with South Africa, and 
Lesotho is entirely encircled. In addition to the three, South Africa 
is Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner.
All but three of the SADCC states - Angola, Tanzania and Mozambique -
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are landlocked. The three states are the natural entry and exit points
for the region's trade, but their roads, rail and port facilities are
inadequate. Terrorist disruptions (probably backed by South Africa) of
Mozambique ports, railways, roads and oil pipelines have discouraged
and sometimes prevented Zimbabwe and Malawi from moving goods through
Mozambique. Much traffic, therefore, has to go through South Africa.
At least 60 per cent of Zimbabwe's trade uses South African railways
and ports.^ About half of Zambia's imports and exports travel on this 
18southern route.
This mixture of uneasy co-existence and political dilemmas facing 
the states provides the uniqueness of the area. It also brings to the 
fore the idea of the inseparable nature of the politics and economics 
of the countries. We have a situation whereby, on the one hand, the 
states are in conflict with South Africa because of apartheid. On the 
other, the forces of development and the conflicts have forced the states 
into a tight corner by their dependence on South Africa. Although 
trading is first and foremost an economic venture, its political under­
tone is provided for by the fact that the states have to make the political 
decisions as to whether or not to trade with South Africa. Quett Masire, 
Chairman of the SADCC (1983), defined the common dilemma when he stated 
that "it is difficult for us to be seen championing the cause of sanctions
against South Africa when in fact it is going to hurt us before it hurts 
19
South Africa". It is the same force making for the political consider­
ations and decisions to establish co-operative ventures such as the SADCC 
and PTA.
A number of states have conflicting political and economic loyalties. 
These include the three states of the now defunct East African Community 
(Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), the two states with a history of mutual
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strife (Ethiopia and Somalia), and the three states - Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland - which as has already been mentioned are members of SACU.
Mozambique is tied to the South African economy by historical links
such as electricity supplies, railway and harbour connections, and migrant
labour remittances. Also, on 16 March 1984, the late President Samora
Machel signed a non-aggression and good neighbourliness pact with South
20
Africa on the Nkomqti River.
There are also ideological divisions, with Malawi, Lesotho,
Swaziland and Zambia as sceptics in the PTA. ic: ..
The believers are the FLS of Angola, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
The similarities of the states are provided for by factors such 
as the problems relating to food security, animal disease control and 
agricultural research exacerbated by current drought cycles, especially 
in the 1982-84 period; they face constraints of the lack of foreign 
exchange for the importation of food, manufactured goods and spare 
parts; they all share the view that economic development necessitates 
industrialization and this involves creating the capacity to convert 
their raw materials into manufactured goods; they want to decrease 
existing dependence on South Africa and they support the movement to­
wards political independence and majority black rule in Namibia, the 
abolition of apartheid and the subsequent establishment of real 
democracy in South Africa.
Two important points which cannot be ignored are: first, the fact 
that the ECA is aware of the economic potentials and the problems facing 
-the states especially the landlocked and LDCs. But the greater part 
of its programmes are wrong in the sense that they are studies not for
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the immediate use by the states. The details of its programmes are 
treated in a separate sub-heading later on. Issues such as raids on 
neighbouring states by South Africa and how to go about assisting the 
victims on a collective basis have not been put on the agenda of any 
policy organ of the MULPOC, neither have they included a programme for 
helping the drought victims. Also they have not carried out studies 
on how best to overcome the drought in the long term.
The Commission has a tradition of avoiding political issues in 
the subregions. But as in the case of North Africa, political and 
economic matters are not only interrelated, but also, shape the 
character of each area in general but also in Southern Africa in 
particular. A blend of programmes reflecting both aspects is essential 
and necessary if the Commission wants the states to participate in its 
activities.
3. STRUCTURES, ORGANS, FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER RESOURCES
The main objectives of this MULPOC are similar to that of others.
Its predominant role is to promote economic co-operation. By 1985 the
increase in the activities of the IGOs led the secretariat to consider
extending technical assistance to them if and whenever there were
requests. In particular, the MULPOC wanted to execute projects on
21
behalf of the IGOs. But although it has made its intention known 
it has not worked out the basis on which to operate and the sort 
of projects it wishes to concentrate on. But taking on additional 
tasks is bound to put a strain on the already limited resources of the 
MULPOC. It will also mean an increase on the workload of the officials
s''
at the headquarters.
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The MULPOC has two policy organs, namely, the Council of Ministers 
and the Committee of Officials. But the main tasks they performed were 
the endorsement of decisions originating from the headquarters, and the 
servicing of the meetings. The states do not participate in the drawing 
up of the programmes and activities for each period. Reading through 
the reports we noted that the meeting of the two main policy organs will 
be held every two years starting with 1989. The change was initiated 
by the Niamey MULPOC when member states argued that they needed more 
time to prepare for the meetings and that the timing will allow the 
MULPOC to carry out its programmes and then report to them.
This MULPOC also established technical committees, such as the 
Inter-governmental Negotiating Team (INT) which handled the studies and 
negotiation for the setting up of the PTA. A similar body exists in 
the MULPOC of North Africa (Tangiers) where the ECA is working towards 
the establishment of another PTA. The other committee which existed 
from 1981 to December 1987 was the subregional Committee for the Women’s 
Programme. But the ECA had to abandon the programme when the UNDP 
withdrew funding.
Subsequently, the Committee has been dissolved. Finally, the 
MULPOC has a Supervisory Committee made up of Ambassadors, Commissioners 
and Charges d ’Affaires of the member states accredited to Zambia and 
a representative of the government of Zambia. It was established in 
1981 and its meetings were held at least twice a year or as and when 
required for the review of activities and the discussion of briefings 
from the secretariat. The Supervisory. Committee acts as a liaison 
between the MULPOC secretariat and the member states, thus providing 
regular and extra channels of communication. Since the policy organs 
met once a year, there was the need for it to frequently maintain the
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flow of information with the secretariat.
But the Committees have not been functioning smoothly. There 
were instances where the activities of the INT extended to those of the 
Supervisory Committee. For example, the meetings of the latter at 
Gaborone (Botswana) in 1980 and Maseru (Lesotho) in 1981 were dominated 
by officials from the ministries responsible for external trade because 
of the INT negotiations on the PTA taking place at the time. These 
trade officials were then accredited to the meetings of the Committee 
of Officials as representatives of their countries in place of the 
regular officials from the Ministries of Economic Development. The 
evaluation mission 1982 reported that the move led to a break in con­
tinuity in follow-up and also decreased awareness in the activities of
22
the MULPOC among officials not responsible for trade. The incidents 
showed lack of control by the secretariat in letting the wrong set of 
officials into particular meetings. It also shows that they were not 
serious about using normal processes.
The UNDP provided the funds for the MULPOC secretariat from 1978 
to 1982 when for the MULPOCs including Niamey, Gisenyi and Yaounde 
were placed under the regular budget of the ECA. The Tangier MULPOC 
has always been financed through the regular budget. What this meant 
in practice was that the ECA provided for the running costs of the 
secretariat, while the UNDP provided the money for its programmes. In 
the case of the other four, they had to depend, on extra-budgetary 
funds for running costs as well as programme costs. The total amounts 
allocated by the UNPD during its second programme cycle (1977-81) were 
as follows;
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(US$)
RAF/76/024 - MULPOC (Lusaka) 
RAF/76/025 - MULPOC (Niamey) 
RAF/76/026 - MULPOC. (Yaounde) 
RAF/76/023 - MULPOC (Gisenyi)
2,482,180
1,866,789
1,916,308
1,188,501
7,453,778
Source; Report of the Joint UNDP/ECA Evaluation Mission 
of the Lusaka MULPOC by Damaka Mettaferia, ECA 
Consultant, 5 July 1981, p. 2.
The UNDP increased its contributions to the MULPOCs in 1979 by
US$ 1 million and the money was specifically for those projects related 
to the integration of women in the process of development. That increase 
was reflected in the figures above. It meant that Lusaka had the highest
amount with US$ 2,482,180, but it is understandable being the largest
MULPOC. However, the amount was quite low compared to the number of 
programmes which were scheduled for the period. What started out as 
temporary funding by the UNDP became the life-line of all the 
MULPOCs, with the exception of Tangiers. The ECA was unable to secure 
funding and when the UNDP warned that it was going to withdraw funding 
from the MULPOCs the ECA finally got the General Assembly to include 
them in the regular budget in 1982. But the growth rate of the regular 
budget of the former has remained the same.
Lusaka is suffering from lack of funds and so programmes have been 
terminated, abandoned or postponed. One of the programmes hardest hit 
by the withdrawal of UNDP funds was the Women’s Programme which was terminated 
for all the MULPOCs in December 1987. Since then the Commission has 
made various efforts to revive this programme and has made several present­
ations to the UNDP.
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The latter has been expressing dissatisfaction at the way the
ECA was utilizing its funds. So when the secretariat asked for further
increases the UNDP took the position that more funds would not be made
available unless there was a review and evaluation of previous programmes.
This formed the basis of the joint UNDP/ECA evaluation missions to the
Gisenyi, Lusaka, Niamey and Yaounde MULPOCs in 1987. The officer-in-
charge of the Lusaka MULPOC stated that "the amount to be obtained for
23
the UNDP Fourth Programming Cycle is yet to be determined".
The UNDP is unlikely to provide the funds for two reasons. The 
first has to do with the fact that it has established its own women’s 
programme in April 1987. Secondly, it has laid down conditions for 
future funding based on the finding of the evaluation missions. The 
report stated that money allocated was used for administrative costs 
such as payments of salaries of co-ordinators and travel costs, instead 
of the implementation of programmes. The UNDP/ECA mission, therefore, 
recommended that any proposal presented to the UNDP for the women’s 
programme should only be entertained if the ECA meets three conditions:
(a) take charge of the women’s co-ordinators’ costs at the 
subregional level;
(b) finance the subregional committee meetings; and
(c) provide a post in the ATRCW for technical support of 
the programme.
Clearly the UNDP wants the ECA to use its funds for the programmes. 
But with the present financial problems facing the latter, it is un­
likely to meet the conditions. This makes the lack of finance a major 
constraint on the MULPOCs. Contributions from member states have been 
mostly in kind, for example, the despatch of secondment of their nationals
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to the MULPOC secretariat when needed, and the provision of office
buildings by host governments. Financial contributions are mostly for
specific programmes. For example, Botswana contributed US$ 3,000 for
the women’s programme and a further US$ 3,428 for the promotion of food
25
for the 1982-87 period.
Another constraint on the MULPOC concerns the staffing level. 
Between 1977-82 the MULPOC had irregular staffing because the officials 
were recruited on a contract basis and once the studies and reports were 
made, the contracts were terminated. Then in 1982 the ECA made proposals 
to the General Assembly for the financing of the MULPOC through the 
regular budget. The following posts were proposed:
Lusaka Staffing
Total Local 
D-l P-5 P-4 P-3 Profs Level Total
Existing posts - - 1 1 2 4 6
Proposed new posts 1 1 - 2 4  2 6
Total: 1 1 1 3 6 6 12
Source: Report of the EC0S0C on Financing of the MULPOCs of the ECA 
on an Established Basis, General Assembly A/C.5/37/92,
9 December 1982, p. 3.
Key
D-l is the head of the MULPOC (Director), a political appointee.
He is responsible for implementing programmes approved by 
the policy organization. He consults government officials 
at the ministerial level and also officials of UN agencies 
and other IGOs. The position is open to academics, politicians 
and long-standing officials of international institutions.
P-5 and P-3 These are the senior offices/economic affairs officers who
undertake sectoral and topical studies: design programmes.
They assist the heads of the MULPOC and are usually civil
^ servants recruited through normal UN processes.
Local Level These are staff recruited for general service. They are made
up of administrative officers and their assistants, secretaries, 
telephonists, clerical officers, drivers, cleaners and messengers,
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The proposal revealed that the ECA was still aiming at providing skeleton
staff. It is difficult to comprehend what four professionals can do
given the size and structure of the MULPOC. It is also strange that the
MULPOC reported that "during the period 1977-83 when UNDP was the major
source of funding, the staffing of the Lusaka MULPOC was fairly satisfactory.
But since 1983 when the General Assembly decided to incorporate the funding,
the Lusaka MULPOC has only been operating with a core staff of only four
26
professionals ..." Looking back at the proposals indicating that for 
the existing posts, the MULPOC had two professionals and four local level 
staff, one can hardly call this a satisfactory level of staffing.
Ironically, the staffing position since 1983 is an improvement.
In addition to the four professionals, the UNDP provided for two additional
staff for the women’s programme under the United Nations Volunteer System 
27
(UNVS). Even with this increase the argument is that the level of
staffing is inadequate to support the activities of the secretariat. The
Commission acknowledged this when it stated that "it is obvious that with
such a relatively meagre staff component, the heavy responsibilities
28
entrusted to the Lusaka MULPOC will be difficult to achieve".
For the 1986-87 period, the secretariat reported that its manpower
resources remained the same. Even though three additional staff have
been assigned there, administrative and other constraints have delayed
29
their arrival in Lusaka. Low level of staffing was one problem, the 
other was high staff turnover. Failure to recruit and retain top level
professional staff in adequate numbers militated against the MULPOC. The
!
high turnover was due to contracts of at most 12 months at a time. The 
temporary appointments created a feeling of insecurity for the workers.
The short periods were given because funds were guaranteed by donors on
s''
a yearly basis only. The result is low morale and despondency.
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4. LUSAKA MULPOC: WORK PROGRAMMES
In 1977 the Council of Ministers adopted programmes in seven 
sectors - trade, transport, agriculture, human resources, integration 
of women in development. In the 1980s three more programmes were added, 
which were: assistance to liberation movements, ESADIS (1983) and industry. 
These were the priority areas selected by the ECA substantive division 
for the MULPOC and they were based on the work programme of the UNDAT.
This method of selection was used in the case of the Niamey and Tangier 
MULPOCs which had a history of being subregional offices. It does not 
mean that the ECA had checked to see if the programmes were still of 
relevance once the UNDATs were dissolved. For each sector chosen, the 
secretariat had sets of objectivs and strategies as will be shown later.
The work programme is formulated and to a large extent implemented 
by the ECA headquarters. There was no medium-term plan designed for 
the subregion. Between 1978-83 the programmes were drafted annually, 
but in 1984 a draft of planned activities for a three-year period 1985-87 
was proposed. The secretariat explained this as an attempt to synchronize 
the work programme of the MULPOC with those of the headquarters. It 
maintained that the move was to avoid duplication of efforts and to 
secure maximum utilization of all available resources.^ One might 
question the wisdom behind such a move, bearing in mind that the head­
quarters operates a six-yearly programme, which is then reviewed biennially. 
Why go for a three-year work programme then? Until the MULPOC adopts 
identical programming processes with those of the headquarters, synchron­
ization remains an illusion. There is evidence to suggest that the work 
programmes have been reformulated to reflect the objectives of the Lagos 
Plan of Action with its emphasis on agriculture as a top priority for 
the attainment of self-sufficiency in food production. The ECA was still
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carrying out programmes endorsed in 1978 as part of the demand for a 
NIEO.
(a) Transport
In this sector, the MULPOC aimed at the development of shipping 
services and pooling arrangements for the ocean and the coast, and the 
creation of national freight booking centres. It also aimed and imple­
mented programmes related to the United Nations Transport and Communic­
ations Decade in Africa. For the latter it implemented projects for the 
Tanzania-Zambia Railways (TAZARA) and these took the form of the purchas­
ing of shunting locomotives, wagons, cranes, construction of villas at 
the new Kapiri Mposhi Station; track rehabilitation; provision of
signalling facilities and financing of training abroad in new technologies 
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and management. Under manpower d e v e l o p m e n t  in transport, assistance 
was given to ESAMI in conducting a railways improvement course for SADCC 
member states and in the evaluation of a course on road transport fleet 
operations, maintenance and management. In 1981 the policy organs 
recommended that the terms of the national shipper’s councils be adopted 
and that the MULPOC should undertake missions to assist the countries 
in establishing their respective national freight bureau. This was not 
implemented and in 1984 the PTA decided to undertake a similar project.
The MULPOC is no longer handling the project. An ad hoc meeting of the 
member states and the EEC in July 1980 adopted the terms of reference 
for the establishment of a multinational coastal shipping line, and 
again in 1984 the PTA stepped in for its implementation. A feasibility 
study was conducted in 1981 on the establishment of a joint inland water 
transport venture on the lower Zambezi river and the definition of types 
of vessels suitable for the Zambezi, Kafue and Kabompo rivers. It also 
conducted a study on the harmonization of the various transport modes
- 295 -
in the subregion in 1985. With the help of UNCTAD, it completed a 
study on a priority transport programme for the landlocked states and 
the copies were made available to member states.
Finally, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
funded a prefeasibility study on the Cairo-Gaborone Trans-East African 
Highway (TEAH). Apart from the studies, the MULPOC purchased equipment 
for the TAZARA, making the transport sector one of the areas where the 
ECA was active and also where it was breaking away from the usual 
routine of conducting research, seminars and workshops.
(b) Agriculture
The promotion of animal health through the control of animal dis­
eases and the creation of multinational integrated rural development 
schemes for Tanzania/Zambia and Kenya/Ethiopia were the objectives 
proposed for the agriculture sector. We must remember the importance 
of this sector and the fact that the area had experienced spells of 
drought and desertification. Five programmes were considered in all.
The Kenya/Ethiopia project was approved in 1977. but no action was taken. 
In 1982 the policy organs decided to retain it in the work programme 
but until the end of 1988 nothing has been done. The same applied in 
the case of the Tanzania/Zambia project. Reading through the ECA 
literature there was no mention of the areas of interest nor the details 
of the integrated development schemes.
The control of of animal diseases was also approved in 1977 and 
in 1982 the policy organs endorsed the recommendation of the first 
meeting of the Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR) Advisory 
Committee on the methods of control. But this was the only action taken.
s-''
On the establishment of a Maize Research Centre, the proposal was
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approved in 1980 and the feasibility study was completed in 1983. In 
1984, the Council of Ministers decided to establish a small co-ordinating 
centre for the support and training of national officials at the MULPOC 
premises. A project document was prepared by the International Institute 
of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) to assist in the search for funds. It 
was hoped that the centre will go a long way in increasing maize pro­
duction of the area, thereby contributing to the achievement of self- 
sufficiency in food, improvement of nutrition and the income of farmers.
But the secretariat reported that "due to lack of funds the programme
32
has not been implemented".
Finally, there was the first ECA/FAO project analysis course, 
approved in 1982. The aim of which was to improve the analytic capa­
bilities of the countries. The programme did not get off the ground 
and the reason given was that "member states have not yet made any 
financial contribution to the programme in order to convince the other
donors such as the FAO that the governments were serious about its 
33
implementation".
(c) Human Resources Sector
The programmes for this sector aimed at the creation of multi­
national indigenous consultancy agencies, the conversion of technical 
schools and facilities at various national universities into subregional 
ones and the examination of the question of migratory labour. But the 
MULPOC put more emphasis on migratory labour because it was one source 
of foreign exchange especially for the SADCC countries. In 1980 the 
MULPOC was instrumental in establishing the Southern African Labour 
Commission (SALC). This is an inter-governmental organization made up 
p f Ministers of Labour. The MULPOC at present acts as its interim 
secretariat and also assists in the preparation of documents, projects
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in employment creation and also advisory services. The MULPOC also 
offers a continuous type of activity consisting of technical guidance 
on the harmonization of policies concerning migrant workers to South 
Africa. This is provided for by the officials of the ECA headquarters 
participating in the meeting of the SALC.
The MULPOC also converted the Eastern African Management Institute
(EAMI) into the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI)
based at Arusha, Tanzania, in 1980. This programme was approved by the
policy organ in 1977. Although ESAMI was one of the few ECA-sponsored
inter-governmental institutions which was able to generate funds to
finance some of its activities, it was still short of members. In 1986
it urged more members to sign its constitution and pay subscriptions to
34
enable it to fulfil its mandate.
But there has been no response to date. The reasons might be that
member states were putting their resources towards the programmes of 
SADCC, that is, for the Southern states. On the other hand, the Eastern 
states such as Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda are facing economic problems 
and the scarsity of foreign exchange.
The third programme implemented was the establishment of an 
Association of the Eastern and Southern African Consultancy Organizations 
in 1979. However, the proposal failed to materialize due to lack of 
funds. Finally, the MULPOC established the African Institute for Higher 
Technical Training and Research (AIHTTR) based in Nairobi, Kenya. In 
this sector, the MULPOC concentrated its efforts in establishing institu­
tions for both manpower training and for issues relating to migratory
labour. But establishing institutions is one thing, their ability 
-and capacity to operate effectively is another. As mentioned in Chapter 
4 such institutions have become obstacles rather than useful instruments
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for development because of duplication of their activities. For example, 
the activities of AIHTTR and the ESAMI are identical in the field of 
manpower training. Because of the sheer number of these institutions, 
member states are having problems in paying subscriptions. The result 
is that they refrain from joining and paying of subscriptions. And more 
importantly, most of the countries have provisions for manpower training 
on the national level and so do not see much point in using the subregional 
equivalents.
(d) Natural Resources Sector
One of its objectives in this sector was the establishment of the 
Eastern and Southern African Mineral Resources Development Centre (ESAMRDC) 
in Dodoma, Tanzania. ESAMRDC faced operational problems from its esta­
blishment in 1977. It has only six members and only three have contributed 
to its budgets - Ethiopia, Tanzania and Mozambique. The number is low 
when we realize that the figure for potential membership is 18. The
assessed contribution from members was US$ 2,131,600 for the period 
35
1978-85. Actual payments received was US$ 1,115,185, while the out-
36
standing arrears since December 1984 was US$ 1,016,487.
The development of water resources was another programme, approved
in March 1984. The Council of Ministers decided to establish a subregional
committee for it. However, financial and manpower constraints have
hampered progress in setting up the committee and in placing a water
37
expert at the secretariat. It also planned the setting up of another
subregional committee on energy, after the proposal was approved in March
1982. Again, it has not been able to go ahead with this and it attributed
its inability to "the lack of follow-up on the part of the substantive
38
.division concerned". This is an example of what can happen when the 
MULPOC depends too much on headquarters to implement its programmes.
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The programmes are usually delayed and somtimes abandoned. And now 
that the MULPOC is facing financial problems the chances of implementing 
these programmes by itself are slim.
(e) The Women's Programme
Since 1980, as an integral part of the MULPOC the operations of 
the women’s programme have encompassed a wide range of activities which 
aimed at providing women with knowledge and skills that will enhance 
their contribution in development. The ECA is keen on the utilization 
of human resources in Africa but this programme is rather ill-defined 
with no specific goals relating to the various aspects of development.
It makes sweeping statements such as the integration of women in the 
process development, but what does this mean? Also in which sectors 
does it intend to carry out the process of integration? The development 
problem envisaged to be solved by the programme relates to developing 
and effective utilization of human resources provided by women for the 
development of the countries.
The ECA took the position that development of women’s potential 
and promoting their full participation in development would advance 
them socially, economically, culturally and otherwise. It addressed 
the problem on one level by the training of women leaders, managers and 
trainers for programmes that benefit women. The training was through 
subregional and inter-country workshops, seminars, study tours and six 
workshops and two surveys. The programmes were implemented during the 
1980-86 period. The training courses were held at the Eastern and 
Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) with the theme, "Women, 
Management and Development Planning: An African Perspective" in 1982. 
-They also included one at the Suba Centre, Khartoum, Sudan, for skills 
in handicraft and small-scale industries and another at the Somalia
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Women's Democratic Oragnization Centre in Mogadiscis. One main flaw 
in all the training facilities provided is the fact that they were 
short term and were not repeated to reach a wider audience and the 
number of women who attended were not disclosed by the MULPOC. The 
programme designed to enhance the skills of senior women managers was 
held on 16-23 May 1983. Such a course is essential for manpower devel­
opment and would have positive effect if held from time to time. If 
held once as in this case it is difficult to assess its impact.
Another development problem tackled by the programme related to
increasing sensitivity of both men and women leaders, decision makers
and planners with regard to taking women's development needs and concerns
into full account in drawing national development plans and programmes,
according to the ECA. The approach used to address this problem was
the training of men and women leaders and planners, organizing technical
meetings sharing of experiences through advocacy during various regular
meetings, such as all ECA policy organs meetings. The ECA claimed that
the programme "ensured consideration of gender issues in the conceptual-
39
ization and the development of all relevant sectoral strategies ..."
The workshops organized in addition to the training were:
(a) subregional workshop on the utilization of research by national 
machineries for the integration of women in development, held in Harare, 
Zimbabwe, 1982; (b) national workshop on project planning, implementation 
and evaluation in Zimbabwe (1982) ; (c) women organizers and trainers 
in Swaziland (1982); (d) project formulation workshop for franco-phone 
countries, 15-27 February 1982. Representatives from Angola, Comoros 
and Madagascar attended, (e) workshop on the impact of government policies, 
structures and programmes on the involvement of women in development, 
in Kabwe, Zambia, 29 June-4 July 1981. It was co-sponsored by UNICEF,
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PAID and the ECA but there was no mention of the amounts contributed 
nor the reasons why the other two organizations contributed; (f) work­
shop on the role of women in agricutlure and rural development held in 
Nairobi, Kenya, on 3-8 December 1984.
The seminars conducted included one on fuel-wood and energy devel­
opment for African women held in Zambia on 18-23 April 1983. It was 
co-sponsored by the FAO - again there was no mention of the actual 
contribution made. The other was on information about establishing and 
strengthening of national machinery for integration of women in devel­
opment on 28 September-1 October 1982 in Malawi. Given the type of 
diagnosis the ECA made about the development problems, one cannot help 
but feel that the programmes implemented were unrealistic. Having 
pockets or small groups of women attending such activities can hardly 
make an impact on their needs.
Apart from being short-lived they failed to address the real
issues facing the women such as lack of access to education, employment
and housing to mention but a few. Moreover, the problems of women in
development are multi-dimensional and culturally-bound. Therefore,
organizing a workshop for technical skills will be advantageous for
women already in some form of employment, but for the unemployed it
is not so helpful. If the problem is, for example, lack of skills or
access to skilled jobs, education or housing, then the problems have
to be tackled at the national or regional levels, rather than the
approach of random selection of women to attend seminars and workshops.
Even the ECA admitted that its programmes for women were not very
successful in achieving the stated objectives when it warned that "abrupt
change and solution to the problems is not to be expected since such
41
problems are attributed to attitudes and structural set ups". However,
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it claimed that considerable impact has been achieved in increasing
sensitivity and awareness on gender issues, though it admitted also
that a lot more needs to be done through continued efforts to achieve
full equity and effective participation of women in the development 
42
process.
In the case of assistance to liberation movements, it was unable 
to carry out the two studies planned because of lack of funds. The 
secretariat offered them assistance by way of funding their represent­
atives at its policy organ meetings.
(e) Telecommunications
The secretariat is going ahead with its plans to establish the 
Eastern and Southern Africa Documentation and Information System (ESADIS) 
in Lusaka. The aim of ESADIS is to identify, collect, process and 
disseminate subregional information, to promote information exchange 
and to provide assistance to governments and IGOs in improving their 
information handling capabilities. It is part of the programme for the 
Transport and Telecommunications Decade in Africa. The computer and 
related equipments for the programme had been delivered at Lusaka in 
1984. In an effort to have more people trained in its methodologies, 
ECA/PADIS was negotiating with the University of Botswana to have the 
methodologies included in the syllabus of library studies. It is also 
arranging with the Government of Zambia for the site and as at June 
1988 ESADIS has not been operational. If established and managed properly, 
it will have potential becuase of its information data bank on the 
various aspects of socio-economic development of the area in particular 
and the whole of Africa in general. The delay is as a result of the 
-legal matters to be cleared, the question of funds, personnel to support 
the programme to mention but a few.
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(f) Industry
The programmes for this sector were not included in the work 
programme until 1979. The aim was to establish iron and steel engineer­
ing industries. A consultant prepared the report in 1984 and recommended 
that the member states should provide the Zimbabwe Steel Industry (ZISCO 
STEEL) with the relevant data to enable it to plan and implement its 
rehabilitation, expansion and diversification programmes. No progress 
was reported and the programme was omitted from the 1985-87 work programme.
The next programme was the establishment of chemical industries, 
for which questionnaires were distributed to the states. The response 
was rather poor. The states were a bit confused with the type of ques­
tions posed. The evidence for giving this reason was the fact that the 
policy organs directed that the secretariat should assist the states to 
fill out the questionnaires in 1984. This was done. The MULPOC then 
went on to encourage the states to purchase their ammonia and urea from 
Tanzania instead of outside Africa.
In 1984 a tour of five countries was undertaken by the ECA/FAO/
UNIDO Forest Industries Advisory Group for Africa (FIAG) to brief the 
states on the furniture market potential of the Gulf states and to agree 
on a follow-up export promotion programme. Potential donors, that is, 
the Arab League and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa 
were being contacted, but so far no concrete arrangements have been 
concluded.
The ECA gave the overall implementation rate of the work programme 
as follows:
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Sector % Rate of Implementation
1. Agriculture
2. Industry
3. Transport
4. Natural Resources
50
50
20
25
83
50
80
5. Human Resources
6 . Assistance to liberation movements
7. ESADIS
Average (including women's component) 63
Source: Performance Report of the MULPOCs 1977-1984,
ECO Division, ECA, Addis Ababa, p. 32.
Although the ECA does not actually state how it arrived at the 
figures for all the implementation rates of the MULPOCs, the following 
observations have been made: First, the low figure for the transport
and natural resources sector was reflective of the problems it was 
encountering. Financial and manpower constraints prevented the imple­
mentation of the majority of the programmes in the sectors. Secondly, 
the figure for human resources were much too high given that the two 
institutions established by the ECA, that is, the Eastern and Southern 
African Management Institute (ESAMI) and the African Institute for 
Higher Technical Training and Research (AIHTTR) were not functioning 
properly due to lack of members and finance. The rate for ESADIS is 
also very high especially as it has not yet been operational. The ECA 
has yet to train the staff to man the project and also conclude and 
sign the agreement with the host government, that is, Zambia for the 
establishment of ESADIS.
Another observation was that some programmes took long to imple­
ment. With the exception of industry, all other programmes were adopted
y
in 1977. (The ones for the industrial sector were included in 1979.)
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But most were implemented in the 1980-86 period. It made it difficult 
for one to keep track of the programmes because in the ECA reports 
there was no mention of dates when programmes were initiated or nearing 
completion. The programmes were also not adopted to the principles and 
strategy of the Lagos Plan of Action which was adopted by African states 
in 1980 as the blue-print for development.
A major problem was that some of the programmes were inappropriate 
to the needs of the states. For example, in agriculture the states have 
been stressing the need for self-reliance and self-sufficiency in food 
production. Drought and desertification were the major and immediate 
problems (see section on salient features of the area), but the MULPOC 
was putting emphasis on promotion of animal health through the control 
of animal diseases. The ECA concentrate on programmes which will be 
of benefit to development in the long term rather than immediate problems. 
This approach has its handicaps because it makes the ECA programmes less 
attractive and of no immediate interest to the states. When they read 
through the proposals and find that there is ho mention of programmes 
which have higher priorities and requiring immediate action or possible 
solutions the states will turn to alternative institutions and national 
options. For example, the states give top priority to the idea of reducing 
their dependence on South Africa and they turned their attention and 
resources to the functioning of the SADCC. For them SADCC projects offer 
relative benefits and attraction than ECA ones.
Comparatively speaking, Lusaka had the second highest figure for
its rate of implementation at 63%. The highest was 66% for Niamey;
Gisenyi scored 54%, with Tangier and Yaounde at 47% and 23.5%, respec- 
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tively. Lusaka has made considerable progress in the trade sector
y
with the establishment of the PTA (this is treated in subsection 6 of
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this chapter); and it was working towards the establishment of the 
ESADIS which involves the purchasing of a computer and its accessories 
and the training of technicians to operate the centre. The MULPOC was 
also able to buy shunting locomotives, wagons, cranes and it constructed 
villas at the new Kapiri Mposhi station for the TAZARA, that is, the 
Tanzania Zambia Railways. These programmes indicated that the MULPOC 
was also able to record limited successes in the transport and tele- 
communcations sectors.
5. THE PECULIAR PROBLEMS IN THE SUBREGION AND ECA'S RESPONSE
At the beginning of the chapter mention was made of the challenges 
of development, that is, the urge to modernize, dependency on South 
Africa and the effects of destablization policies of the latter, problems 
of the LDCs and landlocked countries. In addition, factors such as 
drought and desertification have served to worsen and prolong economic 
and social problems. It is the complexity and the combination of these 
factors which have made the goals of regional economic co-operation very 
attractive to the countries. As SADCC demonstrates, co-operation is 
essential especially in the transport, investment, production and trade 
sectors. To what extent has the ECA co-opted these challenges to 
development in its programme of the Lusaka MULPOC?
The Commission has been unable to implement policies and programmes 
to harness the hydro-electric power potentials in the area. However, 
it implemented programmes in the agriculture and transport and communic­
ations, as well as in the human resources sectors. But it is in the 
trade sector that it channelled most of its energies and succeeded in 
esbablishing the PTA. The latter is the only one of such an arrangement
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in Africa and it was of importance because up to 12 states were using 
the credit facilities which have been created. The PTA fits into the 
pattern of trade which emphasises co-operation on a subregional level 
and the ECA wanted to create a common institution for development for 
the two distinct groups of states, that is, the Eastern and the Southern.
6. THE PTA: HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND ORGANS, OPERATIONS AND PROBLEMS
(a) History of the PTA
The initial impetus for the PTA came from the policy organ meeting 
of the Lusaka MULPOC in 1977. Its origin can be traced to the determin­
ation of successive executive secretaries of the ECA to force the pace 
of co-operation among the states in trade, transport and industry through 
subregional co-ordinating bodies. Earlier attempts include the Economic 
Community for East and Central Africa established in 1965 for the 
harmonization of industrial development. This was followed by the 
establishment of the defunct East African Community (EAC).
The ECA began to revive the idea of a subregional economic co­
operation after the collapse of the EAC. In March 1978, at the first 
extraordinary meeting of Ministers of Trade, Finance and Planning held 
in Lusaka, 12 states signed a Declaration of Intent and Commitment on 
the Establishment of a Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern 
Africa as a first step towards the creation of a common market and 
eventually an Economic Community. The meeting also established the 
Intergovernment Negotiating Team of Officials (INT) and a timetable for 
negotiation of the treaty and its protocols.
The INT had eight meetings between 1978^81, while the Ministers
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of Trade, Finance and Planning had three meetings between January and 
October 1981. The PTA was established in 1982 with the ECA acting as 
its midwife during its interim period. The Commission provided technical 
support for the 1982-83 period. It also convened the series of pre­
paratory meetings for the PTA policy organs. Finally, in June 1982 the 
Commission convened the first meeting of the inter-governmental committee 
of experts and of the PTA Council of Ministers in Lusaka, Zambia, during 
which the PTA work programme, its budget and appointment of staff were 
adopted.
The objective of the PTA as stated in article 3(1) of the Treaty 
is "to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic 
activity, particularly in the field of trade, customs, industry, transport, 
communications, agriculture, natural resources and monetary affairs with 
the aim of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of fostering 
closer relations among member states and to contribute to the progress 
and development of the African Continent". In essence, the PTA is not 
confined to trade issues alone.
By 1987 its membership stood at 15: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti,
Ehtiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. If we exclude Burundi and Rwanda 
which are members of the Gisenyi MULPOC (Central Africa), the potential 
membership of the PTA is the same as that of the Lusaka MULPOC, that is,
18. Five countries, namely, Angola, Botswana, Madagascar, Mozambique 
and Seychelles have so far declined to join. Both Mozambique and Botswana 
are committed to SADCC and view the PTA as a duplication of efforts.
On the whole, the countries are interested in co-operative ventures 
-'And some of them commended the efforts of the ECA to set up the PTA.
A representative of Zimbabwe stated that the process was "in no small
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way due not only to the negotiating capabilities of participating states,
but also to the support, encouragement and guidance that has been so
44
readily forthcoming from the ECA". To the secretariat and especially 
to the Executive Secretary, Adebayo. Adedeji, he expressed gratitude.
In a statement by Robert G. Mugabe, in his capacity as outgoing Chairman 
of the PTA Authority at the third conference of the latter held at 
Bujumbura, Burundi, in 1984, he stated that, "the failure of the develop­
ment strategies followed until now by African states leaves them with
no choice other than to strengthen and intensify their regional economic 
45
co-operation". And more importantly the ECA saw the PTA as an instrument
for the reduction of dependency on South Africa. It stated that "the
PTA is an instrument which will enable the countries of the subregion
to establish a new system of economic relationships among themselves
which will eventually enable individual countries to reduce their economic
dependency while enabling them at the same time to strengthen their links
46
with other African countries ..."
(b) PTA: Structure and Organs
The headquarters of the PTA is located in Lusaka, Zambia. The 
structure of the PTA comprises the PTA Authority, Council of Ministers, 
Secretariat, Tribunal, the Commission, the committees and such other 
technical and specialized bodies as may be established or provided for 
by the Treaty (Article 5 of the Treaty).
The PTA Authority is made up of Heads of State and Governments 
of the member states as stipulated in Article 6 of the Treaty. It is 
the supreme organ of the PTA and is responsible for considering matters 
p f  general policy and control of the executive functions and the achieve­
ment of its aims. The Authority meets once a year.
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The Council of Ministers is composed of the Ministers of Trade, 
Development and Planning. It is responsible for keeping under constant 
review and for ensuring the proper functioning and development of the 
PTA in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. This organ makes 
recommendations to the Authority on matters of policy aimed at the 
efficient and harmonious functioning of the PTA according to Article 7 
of the Treaty. It also gives directions to all other subordinate 
institutions of the PTA.
The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General whose appointment
is for a term of four years, with a provision for renewal for a further
period of four years. This is in accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty.
He is constitutionally empowered to act "on his own initiative" on a
range of matters. He is also the principal executive officer and is
responsible to the PTA Authority. The Secretary-General draws a salary
in excess of $5o,000 and heads a staff of 35 (reduced from 55 for the
47
first year, 1983).
The Tribunal is its judicial organ whose function is to ensure 
the proper application or interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty 
and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it (Article 
40). The dispute has to be settled by direct agreement of the parties 
concerned. But in the event of failure to settle, the matter may be 
referred to the Tribunal by a party to such dispute and the decision 
of the Tribunal is final.
(c) PTA: Operation, Prospects and Problems
Although established in 1982, the operational phase of the PTA
y
was launched in 1984. It operates through a clearing and payment facility
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and its basic function is to promote the flow of goods and services.
Under the scheme the countries are able to use national currencies in 
the settlement of day-to-day payments and only use convertible currencies 
for settling net balances at the end of a transaction period of two 
calendar months. By so doing the facility was attempting to create 
additional international liquidity.
The unit of account used is the PTA unit of account (UAPTA) which 
is equal to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the IMF. The UAPTA, 
like the European Currency Unit, is a notional currency used for calcu­
lating transfer between PTA members. For the exchange rate, currency 
arrangements vary, but the currencies of most members are pegged to the
US dollar or the SDR. Sometimes it is based on a trade weighted basket 
48
system.
The clearing system operates in the manner described below:
(i) Exporter invoices goods in his local currency, UAPTA or importer's 
currency.
(ii) The importer pays his commercial bank in local currency for the 
imports.
(iii) The importer's bank approaches its central bank to purchase the 
exporting country's currency and instructs that the exporter's 
bank be credited accordingly.
(iv) The central bank in the importing country requests the central 
bank in the exporting country to credit the exporter's bank with 
its currency against credit through the Clearing House in UAPTA.
(v) Each central bank advises the Clearing House of each funding
49
operation.
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after two months (a transaction period) the Clearing House closes the 
books of the monetary authorities and arranges settlement in hard 
currency of net debtor balances in favour of holders of net creditor 
balances. The services of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York are 
used to process the actual settlements and, to this end, all member 
monetary authorities maintain an account with this Bank in US dollars.
Each monetary authority quotes a daily spot rate of exchange 
against SDR/UAPTA and undertakes to buy or sell its own currency at 
that quoted rate to other monetary authorities against credit through 
the Clearing House. In the event of a debtor failing to make proper 
provision for settlement on the due date, interest is charged by the 
Clearing House on such unpaid amount at a rate of one per cent above 
the ruling SDR rate for the first week and thereafter it is increased 
by one per cent for each subsequent week that settlement remains out­
standing .
On a cumulative basis, total payments channelled through the
multilateral clearing facility since it began operations stand at UAPTA
217,7 million.^ Trade through the Clearing House was on an annual
basis from UAPTA 37.2 million in December 1984, to UAPTA 48.9 million
in 1985, UAPTA 59,4 million in December 1986 and to UAPTA 87.9 million
in 1987."^ The increasing figures indicate that the states are not
trading very much between themselves - the old pattern of trading with
South Africa for the southern states in particular prevails, while most
of the eastern ones trade with the industrialized nations. Despite the
increase in the level of trade or use of the facility annually, the
Clearing House is under-utilized. Intra-regional trade accounted for
52
about 25 per cent of the total intra-regional trade in 1987.
s ' '
Fourteen countries have consistently used the facility, with
Table 7.1 Statement of Contributions to the Clearing House Budget as at 30 September 1987 (UAPTA)
Amount Amount Amount Interest due Late payment
Country due paid Outstanding and unpaid interest received
Burundi 3,866 3,866 - - —
Comoros 1,391 1,391 - - -
Djibouti 12,379 - 12,379 61,163 -
Ethiopia 6,718 6,718 - - -
Kenya 27,817 27,817 - - -
Lesotho 1,391 1,391 - - -
Malawi 7,997 7,997 - - -
Mauritius 2,392 2,392 - 7,969* -
Rwanda 10,696 10,696 - - -
Somalia 3,533 3,533 - - -
Swaziland 1,766 1,766 - - -
Tanzania 7,052 7,052 - - -
Uganda 22,713 22,713 - - -
Zambia 13,491 13,491 - - -
Zimbabwe 15,884 15,884 - - -
139,086 126,707 12,379 61,932 NIL
* Interest due and unpaid by Mauritius includes UAPTA 2,945 accrued on contributions paid in 1986. 
Source: PTA Clearing House - Executive Secretary's Report, November 1987, p. 4.
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Comoros and Djibouti yet to utilize it, while Somalia has participated 
only by paying contributions to the PTA institutions through the Clearing 
House. The contributions made so far by members are noted in Table 7.1. 
The table shows that Djibouti was owning UAPTA 61,163, while Mauritius 
was also owing UAPTA 7,969. They were the only states in this situation 
and were unable to make payments due to financial hardship which was a 
consequence of the recession. The fact that most of the members have 
been paying up indicates that they are eager and committed to the ideas 
of the PTA and they were helping it to function effectively.
Apart from the Clearing System, there is a step-by-step approach 
built into the Treaty for its gradual up-grading to a subregional common 
market with a time-frame of 10 years. In 1984 tariffs on a range of 
goods were reduced as a first step to boosting trade (see Table 7.2).
The list will be amended and expanded every three years until 1992 when 
the regional common market will be established.
Table 7.2 PTA Tariff Reductions
Category of goods % cut
Luxury goods 10
Food items and highly competing consumer goods 30
Non-durable consumer goods 35
Durable consumer goods 40
Agricultural raw materials 50
Intermediate goods 65
Capital goods and consumer goods of importance 
to economic development 70
Source; African Research Bulletin (Economic Series), Vol. 21, No. 6, 
31 July 1984, p. 7325.
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In 1987, the member states decided on a tentative timetable for the
complete elimination of tariff barriers by the year 2000. They would
cut tariffs by 10 per cent every two years up to 1996, by 20 per cent
54-
in 1988 and by 30 per cent in the year 2000. The timetable is subject 
to review in 1996 when the PTA will decide on how to maintain equitable 
distribution of costs and benefits. Fiscal compensatory arrangments 
were to be introduced to help governments which would lose revenue as 
a result of the tariff cuts. Although the PTA proposes to make such 
payments, it was not clear where the money will come from. Discussions 
are still taking place and no details have emerged so far. Djibouti 
and Comoros, the smallest states in the PTA, stressed that they will 
encounter difficulties accepting the timetable unless the PTA offered 
such facilities.
The activities of the PTA include the establishment of a PTA Trade 
and Development Bank in Burundi (1984); formation of the PTA Federation 
of Chambers of Commerce and Industry to co-ordinate major investment 
projects; installation of a trade information network (TINET) and the 
co-ordination of operations and services of airlines, coastal and inland 
shipping as the first state towards the establishment of a PTA airline, 
shipping line and inland water transport system. These show its potential 
but also the fact that these activities are similar to those of the 
Lusaka MULPOC and the SADCC. This explains why there is the need to 
co-ordinate the activities of the three entities to overcome overlap and 
duplication of work. The issue has not been officially discussed by the 
respective secretariats. Also there is no channel of direct contact 
between them.
However, suffice to state that the countries devote more time and
s'
energy to the activities and progress of SADCC. They see SADCC as a more
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viable co-operative arrangement which reflects the development needs 
and challenges in the region. SADCC is also their own creation compared 
to the PTA which was the ECA's brainchild and the Lusaka MULPOC which 
has been unable to implement attractive programmes.
Another source of problems for the PTA is pinpointed by Scott
^  Thomas (1987) when he stated that a number of its member states have
L/< l<>V7 r conflicting political and economic loyalties. Apart from the three
states of the defunct East African Community - Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania - 
it includes Ethiopia and Somalia which have a long history of mutual 
political strife, and two states (Lesotho and Swaziland) which are members 
of SACU. The PTA recognizes this unique situation by granting Lesotho 
and Swaziland ’’temporary exemptions” from applying some PTA provisions 
while the BLS states remain parties to SACU. “***
There has also been problems with the operation of the Clearing 
House for settling trading accounts. The rules and regulations in the 
protocol on clearing and payments have not been adhered to. At least 
two states - Djibouti and Mauritius - are in danger of suspension for 
non-payment of the PTA's initial membership fees. (See Table 7.2.) 
Moreover, the reduction of tariffs on a number of selected goods is not 
sufficient to boost trade within the area to anticipated levels.
Current exports of members and potential ones total only about $7,000 
million a year - 5 per cent of the continent's total - and imports 
about $8,000 million. And trade between member countries is a small 
proportion of these figures. Therefore, attention has to be focused 
on other aspects such as the competitiveness of the industries in the 
area, competition in agriculture, the communication networks or lack 
of it, to mention but a few. Development is multi-dimensional and trade 
is but one aspect. So an improvement in trade, say by the establishment
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of the PTA cannot be sustained unless there is subsequent progress 
made in other areas such as agriculture, human resources and industry.
7. CONCLUSION
The Lusaka MULPOC was built on a long history of subregional
activities. It was both a subregional office in the 1960s and an UNDAT
57in the early 1970s. The consequences of these links is in the fact 
that it inherited the work programme of the UNDAT, just like in the 
cases of the Niamey and Yaounde MULPOCs. It was the third conference
of the Ministerial Council of the UNDATs which is usually referred to
as the inaugural meeting of the Council of Ministers of the MULPOCs.
But this history has not made for a better operaion of the MULPOC.
Even though the intention for establishing it had to do with decentra­
lization to the subregion, authority and functions are still centrally 
defined. The Director of the MULPOC has to be in constant consultation 
with headquarters for most matters.
The programmes are drawn and implemented by staff of the substantive 
divisions, and there is no clear definition of what programmes to implement 
by either headquarters or the MULPOC. Also the programmes of the latter 
are not synchronized with those of the headquarters. While the former 
operates annual programmes (up to 1989 when they will be biennially), the 
headquarters runs medium-term and biennial programmes. The medium-term 
ones are drawn up for a period of six years.
Another problem is that the MULPOC has far too many programmes but
its implementation rate was not impressive due to the abandonment of 
-Some, delays and postponement. For example, in the human sector, the 
MULPOC had to abandon its plans in 1979 for the establishment of an
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Association of Eastern and Southern African Consultancy Organization 
due to insufficient funds.
Finally, the bulk of the programmes consisted of research, seminars, 
workshops and studies which in the long run will aid development. The 
problem with these types of programmes is that they do not provide answers 
to immediate development needs of the members. For example, the top 
priority of the Southern states is to reduce dependency on South Africa, 
they are worried about the rail links damaged in the region and the 
effects of droughts and famine and these aspects are not catered for with 
existing programmes. This is the reason why we stated that the states of 
Southern Africa were putting more energy and resources into the activities 
of SADCC and not those of the MULPOC. The former offers programmes which 
are more attractive in the sense that they are tailored to tackle immediate 
problems.
Member states complained about the weakness of the MULPOC especially
during the 1985-86 period, when it was unable to implement its programmes.
The secretariat acknowledge its weakness on grounds that it suffered
58
because of the prolonged illness of the Director. Other problems 
encountered included lack of financial resources, which for example led 
to the termination of the women’s programme in December 1987 when the 
UNDP withdrew the funds; inadequate manpower resources as there were only 
four professionals to manage the programmes for the 18 countries - so 
structurally, Lusaka faced the same problems as the rest of the MULPOCs.
Although the ECA officials referred to the Niamey MULPOC as the
59most active in terms of being at the forefront on policy matters,
(for example, the changing of the annual meetings of the policy organs 
Zo biennial ones was spearheaded by it, and secondly, this MULPOC was 
the first to question the purposes of the MULPOCs and in 1987 asked for
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a review of and redefinition of the objectives of the Niamey one), the 
Lusaka MULPOC could be said to be more active in terms of implementation 
of programmes. For example, in the transport and communications sector 
it was involved with the purchases of computers and the accessories, 
locomotives and shunting machines. But more importantly, the MULPOC 
recorded its greatest success with the establishment of the PTA. By so 
doing it has created additional liquidity as members are able to secure 
dollars for transactions. With the PTA the ECA/Lusaka MULPOC has been 
able to bring both the eastern and southern states under one co-operative 
venture. In terms of the present level of membership and the fact that 
most of them have paid their membership fees, the indication is that the 
countries are committed to the principles of the PTA and they find the 
institution of value in the field of trade in particular. This is not 
to deny the existence of problems of the PTA such as the fact that it 
has to work out its compensation schemes and the necessity of all the 
potential members joining.
On the whole, the MULPOC was encouraging and spearheading sub­
regional economic co-operation. Its main weakness was that of being 
unable to carry out more programmes due to structural factors such as 
the lack of authority and the heavy reliance on headquarters for the 
drawing up and implementation of programmes; the lack of funds and 
manpower resources, and the fact that the programmes mainly addressed 
long-term development needs and therefore less attractive to those of 
the PTA and SADCC. The presence of the three entities - the MULPOC, 
the PTA and SADCC - calls for co-ordination of their activities to 
avoid wastages, overlap and duplication of efforts.
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CHAPTER 8
ECA IN CENTRAL AFRICA: THE YAOUNDE AND GISENYI 
MULTINATIONAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRES (MULPOCs)
1. INTRODUCTION
The Central African subregion is unique in the sense that it has 
two MULPOCs. In Central Africa I, we have the Yaounde (Cameroon) MULPOC. 
This has seven member states (making Central Africa I one of the smaller 
MULPOCs), namely, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe. In Central Africa II 
we have the Gisenyi (Rwanda) MULPOC. This is the smallest, with only 
three member states, namely, Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire.
After a brief mention of the salient features of the Central 
African subregion, this chapter begins with the consideration of Central 
Africa I, that is, the Yaounde MULPOC. The second part is devoted to 
Central Africa II, that is, the Gisenyi MULPOC; and the peculiar problems 
affecting the states. There is then a conclusion.
The central argument is that having two MULPOCs in Central Africa 
is duplication of efforts and a waste of resources. There are no marked 
improvements in the organization of the MULPOCs nor are there more 
benefits resulting from the arrangement. The same problems encountered 
in other subregions are also present in this area if we consider the 
organization, structure and work programmes. Also the ECA has to a 
large extent been unable to provide for the special needs of the land­
locked states, for example.
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2. SALIENT FEATURES OF CENTRAL AFRICA
Taken together, Central Africa I and II have 10 member states.
Six, namely, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Equatorial 
Guinea, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe are listed as the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) in Africa. For Central Africa II, only Zaire is not 
listed as an LDC, so while the other two states, that is, Rwanda and 
Burundi are LDCs, their bargaining position with the relatively bouyant 
and economically stronger Zaire is weak. Do the three states have common 
interests? There are geographical and historical factors which suggest 
that such interests exist. Indeed they were the factors responsible 
for the establishment of two instead of one MULPOC.
The region is disjointed in nature when we look at its geographical 
area. Central Africa II is virtually cut off from the remainder of 
the subregion, while several areas of Zaire, the largest country in the 
are, are handicapped by economic isolation resulting from poor transport­
ation and communication. * Burundi and Rwanda are all landlocked
states. The Central African Republic and Chad also incur high transport­
ation costs due to their landlocked position.
The states of Central Africa II also share a common history and 
colonial links. Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire were former Belgian colonies. 
The countries have had a history of civil wars and bloodshed in the 
past. It was for security reasons that the three states expressed the 
desire to be together under a separate MULPOC. They hoped that this 
move would act as a stabilizing factor in their relations and thereby 
reduce the insecurity felt by each member.^
There are in existence three overlapping economic communitiesy
in the subregion: the Economic Community of Central African States
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(ECCAS), comprising Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Chad and Zaire; Union Douaniere et Economique de l ’Afrique 
Centrale (UDEAC), comprising Cameroon, Central African Republic, the 
Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad; and the Economic Community 
of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), comprising Burundi, Rwanda and 
Zaire. It should be mentioned that Burundi and Rwanda also belong to 
the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African States.
The situation warrants some mechanism for co-ordinating the activities 
of these bodies and for establishing a certain amount of division of 
labour among them. It also calls for the co-ordination of the activities 
of the two MULPOCs to increase the benefits to member states.
Another feature of the subregion is its tremendous hydro-electric 
potential. Most of this potential is concentrated in the Matadi-kinshasa 
Bay of the Zaire river where within a stretch of 350 km the river drops
2
300 metres through 32 falls, with a potential power capacity of 93,000 mw.
The Inga II project alone now produces a surplus of more than 1,600 mw
of electricity. According to the ECA, a priority activity in the strategy
of energy development within ECCAS is to make a systematic inventory
of the hydro-electric potential and to plan development on a collective
3
basis with grids and interconnections among the member states. But 
the Yaounde MULPOC has no energy programmes as part of its priority 
and work programme. Even in the case of Gisenyi, the energy content 
of its work programme is minimal. (See Gisenyi Work Programme for Energy.) 
Since the ECA staff were responsible for drafting the work programmes 
for the MULPOC and because they are aware of its energy potential, they 
have, however, failed to incorporate this vital piece of information 
^in the work programme.
- 327 -
3. THE YAOUNDE MULTINATIONAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE
(CENTRAL AFRICA I)
3a. Structures, Organs, Financial and Manpower Resources
The establishment of the MULPOCs in 1977 aimed at two functions:
(1) to accelerate the economic integration process and (2) to act as 
operational arms of the ECA. For the acceleration of the economic 
integration the proposed MULPOCs’ role consisted of: (a) providing 
assistance to inter-governmental organizations to enable them to solve 
the technical problems they are encountering; (b) identifying and con­
tributing to the implementation of multinational projects aimed at 
economic integration to the effect of establishing efficient subregional 
economic communities. The only kind of assistance which the Yaounde 
MULPOC provided was in the form of general studies as will be discussed 
later on. It has not been able to identify and contribute to the 
implementation of multinational projects. In the first instance, there 
were no such projects. Furthermore, the role of the MULPOC by implic­
ation was to act as an operational arm of the ECA. In practice, it 
was not clear what this meant. According to the UNDP/ECA evaluation 
mission in 1982, when they spoke to officials of the countries visited, 
that is, Cameroon, Central African Republic and the Congo, they stated 
that the operational role of the MULPOCs was not clearly defined. Also 
the MULPOCs did not transmit the thinking of governments to the ECA -
4
instead it was only the "voice" of the ECA. This finding suggests 
that the ECA's conception of the purpose of the MULPOCs was different 
from the expectations of member states. The organization and procedural 
methods of formulating the work programmes of the MULPOCs and the flow 
of information to member states confirm the pattern whereby the MULPOCs
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were only the "voice" of the ECA, whereas member states want them to 
include the "voice" of the member states. Since, in theory, the ECA 
has not defined precisely what it meant by stating that the MULPOCs 
were operational arms of the ECA, it was difficult to put the concept 
into practice. This explains why the MULPOCs seem to mean different 
things to the officials of the ECA in particular and to member states 
in general. No-one whom we spoke to at the ECA headquarters in February 
1987 was able to define and explain what being an operational arm of 
the ECA meant. And this in itself presents difficulties in the sense 
that one cannot chart the direction of the activities of the MULPOCs.
One does not really know the practical implications of the objectives 
of both MULPOCs. Although these present a problem for organization 
and administration, neither MULPOC has requested a review of the scope 
and objectives of the MULPOC. So far it was only in West Africa that 
such a request has been made. In 1987 the MULPOCs celebrated their 
tenth anniversary without any hint from the ECA headquarters that the 
role and objectives would be reviewed. The Ad hoc Committee set up 
to review the West African MULPOC in 1987 did recommend that its objectives 
should be more precise as to the real content and purpose and circumscribed 
within a time-frame. All the MULPOCs and the ECA have to give greater 
thought to this.
The Yaounde MULPOC has two main policy organs. At the ministerial 
level, there is the Council of Ministers and at the technical level, 
the Committee of Officials. As in the case of the Niamey MULPOC, this 
Council of Ministers is made up of ministers in charge of economic and 
social development planning. It acts on behalf of the ECA Conference 
of Ministers. Its meetings are on a yearly basis. The Committee of 
^Officials prepares the records to be submitted to the Council of 
Ministers. Its meetings are also on a yearly basis but this meeting
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precedes that of the Council of Ministers. Each year, the venue and 
chairman of these meetings change, so that each country has the 
opportunity to sensitize its national officials to the existence and 
the work of the MULPOC and to exchange views on certain aspects of 
the economic future of the area, the ECA maintains. But surely these 
states cannot sensitize their issues enough because the organs do not 
allow for easy implementation of the requests of the states. The 
delegates are always at these meetings to deliberate on semi-finished 
drafts of the work of the MULPOC prepared by the ECA and not on issues 
that might be of concern to particular states. The ECA approach is 
not based on a country-by-country analysis of needs but on a sectoral 
basis. Therefore, changing the venue of the meetings of the policy
organs will not necessarily sensitize issues nor yield positive results.
To come to terms with this discrepancy, member states felt the need 
for a common action by establishing an "Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee" for which there is a committee of officials operating on 
a sectoral basis. Given the limited resources of the MULPOC its role 
consists of identifying within the approved programme two or three 
priority programmes. The creation of this committee is due to the need 
to start implementation of the work programme by selecting a few priority 
areas. In addition, a follow-up committee had been created, but it 
is not clear what its role is. Also there is no indication of the 
timing of their meetings, although as from 1989 the two main policy 
organs will be meeting once every two years. (This decision was taken
as a result of a request by the West African MULPOC. It applies to
all the MULPOCs.)
In comparison with Gisenyi the Yaounde MULPOC has got more 
.facilities. The latter inherited the structures of the Yaounde United 
Nations Inter-disciplinary Advisory Team (UNDAT), a body which was set
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up along side the ECA subregional offices in 1973 to advise member 
states on matters relating to economic and social development. So it 
started its activities on the basis of the on-going programme of the 
UNDAT, without much delay. In the case of Gisenyi, the secretariat 
had delays due to settlement problems and the necessity to establish 
a cordial relationship with member states. The Yaounde MULPOC also 
gets political, financial and staffing support from the host country, 
the United Republic of Cameroon. In addition, it utilizes the facilities 
provided by the UDEAC secretariat. For instance, it organizes certain 
meetings in the UDEAC secretariat premises.
But it suffers the same fate as other MULPOCs when it comes to 
its financial resources. The estimates given by the ECA are shown 
on Tables 8.1 and 8.2. The UNDP has been the main source of funding 
for the Yaounde MULPOC as well. It pledged US$ 200,00 per annum for 
the 1978-81 period. But the ECA maintained that this amount was only 
sufficient to fund a core staff of three professionals, that is, the 
team leader and two experts.^ In 1979 the UNDP agreed to study the 
possibility of increasing its contributions from US$ 200,000 per annum
t:
for each MULPOC. The amount earmarked for Yaounde was US$ 350,000.
With reference to the estimates on Table 8.1 and Table 8.2, the proposed 
new level of funding reduced the resource gap from US$ 299,272 (Table 
8.1) to US$ 181,772 in Table 8.2. The MULPOC was to search for an 
alternate source of funds to cover the US$ 181,772. This is a predica­
ment which faced all the MULPOCs with the exception of the Tangier one 
which was financed from the regular budget of the ECA.
The ECA makes its proposals and sets priority programmes with 
no funds to implement them. Then it has to keep searching for the funds, 
meanwhile delaying implementation, with the programmes having a high
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Table 8.1 Estimated Resources Gap Assuming Current UNDP Funding
Levels (US$)
MULPOC
Centre
Resources Available 
(1977-1978 levels)
Resources Required 
1979-1980
Gap
Yaounde 580,500 881,772 299,272
Table 8.2 Estimated Resources Gap 
Earmarkings (US$)
Assuming Proposed New UNDP
MULPOC
Centre
Resources Available 
(new proposed UNDP levels)
Resources Required 
1979-1980
Gap
Yaounde 700,000 881,772 181,772
Source: ECA Multinational Programming and Operational Centres: A
Progress Report, Doc. ECA/MULPOC/LUSAKA/129, 24 October 1979, 
Addis Ababa, p. 12.
risk of not getting off the ground. For example, the UNDP has not 
provided funds for the fourth cycle 1987-91 and the ECA is still waiting. 
Otto B. Essien, Chief, Office of the Director, UNDP, revealed in a 
correspondence in February 1988 that the actual amount which the MULPOC 
received for the third cycle (1977-81) was US$ 545,014. This amount 
was far short of what the ECA expected and so it had to abandon some 
programmes as will be shown later. The contributions made by member 
states are minimal. Apart from financial pledges, most contributions 
were in kind in the form of provision of buildings, office eqiupment 
and local-level personnel. But more importantly, the contributions 
were on a voluntary basis and were made through the United Nations
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Trust Fund for African Development (UNTFAD). The monetary contributions 
for the 1986-87 period amounted to US$ 120,000 and 20 million (CFA).^
In addition, loans worth US$ 12,000 were made available to the MULPOC 
by the approval of the Executive Sectretary of the ECA in order to ensure
g
the financing of certain activities. But although the ECA mentioned 
this amount, it failed to indicate the activities for which the loan 
was given. This is a common problem with its presentation of reports - 
it usually presents them with incomplete information.
ECA officials want member states to increase their contributions
in the cases of all the MULPOCs but in reality such contributions have
9
been diminishing. Member states in general and in the case of the 
Yaounde MULPOC have not contributed significantly to the financing of 
the MULPOCs to date. They have given various reasons for not doing so. 
For some, it was surprising that the ECA was asking them to finance 
the MULPOCs, since at their inception the countries were given the 
impression that financial resources were available for them. It was 
not stated that they needed funds. In the present economic climate 
and given the plight of the LDCs, they do not see how some of the member 
states that are in need of resources themselves can afford to finance 
work programmes designed by the MULPOC while a lot of national projects
were not implemented due to the lack of resources. For such states
especially the LDCs national projects took first place to activities 
of international organizations such as the ECA. Even though member 
states had contributed office space, equipment and local personnel, 
evidence suggests that they would be more interested in financing 
projects rather than providing for the administrative support of the 
MULPOC. Hence they have requested the ECA to finance all the expenses 
^related to the functioning of the MULPOC.^
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Another reason why member states do not contribute to the 
financing of the MULPOC was because of the centralization by ECA 
headquarters of the financial management and the amounts involved.
Member states were not aware of the amount of resources made available 
to the MULPOCs and how they were utilized and so they do not feel 
motivated to contributed financially.^ This confirms one of the 
major problems during the trip to the ECA headquarters. Officials 
were forthcoming in pointing out some of the problems they faced in 
their day-to-day running of the secretariat and the MULPOCs, but no
one was able to disclose the actual amount made available to the ECA
as a whole or to the MULPOCs in particular. The result is that it is 
impossible to understand and appreciate the overall magnitude of the 
problems facing the ECA. Also they were unable to point out the amount
spent on the programmes at the headquarters and the subregions.
Finally, member states justify their attitude by the fact that
the ECA is always claiming that the MULPOCs are its operational arms
in the subregions. Therefore, they find it normal that the ECA regular
12
budget should finance the expenses related to their functioning.
ECA officials are very much aware of the constraints resulting
from lack of funds for the Central African MULPOCs in particular and
indeed for the MULPOC system as a whole. As one official puts it,
"the MULPOCs are a mirror of what is happening to the headquarters.
The same constraints on the secretariat applies to the MULPOCs. Lack
of funds exerts a financial constraint on the work programmes and
13
functioning of the MULPOCS".
However, it is not only finance that has been lacking in the 
Yaounde MULPOC, there is also a lack of manpower resources. The estimate 
put forward in the ECA's proposals through the General Assembly to ECOSOC
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in 1982 contains this point. It is as follows:
Yaounde
Existing Posts 
Proposed New Posts 
Total:
Staffing
D-l P-5 P-4 P-3
Total 
Prof.
Local
Level Total
Source: Report of the ECOSOC on Financing the MULPOCs of the ECA on
an Established Basis, General Assembly Doc. A/C.5/37/92,
UN, New York, 9 December 1982, p. 3.
Key:
D-l
P-5 and P-3
Local Level
is the head of the MULPOC (Director). He is the principal 
officer who is responsible for implementing programmes 
approved by the ECA MULPOC policy organ. He also consults 
government officials at the highest level and in the UN 
agencies and other IGOs. The Director could be an ex- 
minister, an academic or long-standing official of inter­
national instiutions.
is for senior officers. These posts are made up of economic 
affairs officers who undertake sectoral and topical studies; 
design multinational programmes and conduct research. They 
assist the head of the MULPOCs in the management of the 
centres. These are civil servants.
These are sometimes referred to as general service staff. 
They are recruited at the local level and are made up 
of administrative officers, typists, drivers, cleaners, 
night watchmen.
The proposal indicated that prior to 1982 the Yaounde MULPOC had no 
staff employed on a regular basis. During this period the MULPOC was 
administered and controlled by staff of the headquarters. The proposal 
was approved with some modification - the P-3 and local level staff 
were increased. In 1985 the manpower resources at the disposal of the 
MULPOC was made up of the following: one director, one economist, one
agronomist, one administrative officer, six secretaries, three drivers,
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one typist, one cleaner and one night watchman. So instead of the two
P-3 and one local level staff in the proposal, the Yaounde MULPOC had
12 persons. However, only four posts were catered for by the regular
budget of the ECA, that is, the posts of director, an economist, a
14
secretary and an agronomist. The remaining posts were funded through 
extra-budgetary funds.
The UNDP evaluation mission 1982 found that the staffing of all 
the MULPOCs was not only inadequate but insecure. The situation has 
remained unchanged up to June 1988. None of the directors of the MULPOCs, 
let alone the other MULPOC experts had an employment contract lasting 
more than one year, and the same was true of the general service or 
local level staff - except for a handful of secretaries and administra­
tive assistants who had been temporarily assigned to the MULPOC from 
ECA headquarters.^ This unsatisfactory situation stemmed from the 
fact that all the key posts were "project posts"; and the contracts 
of project staff were such that appointments could only be guaranteed 
for one year at a time, even if the prospects of renewal were virtually 
assured from year to year. These circumstances make it difficult to 
attract and retain the high calibre of core staff that the MULPOCs 
needed. The turnover of professional staff in Yaounde was relatively 
high.
3b. Yoaunde MULPOC: Work Programmes
During its first meeting on 2-3 March 1978, the Council of 
Ministers identified priority areas where it would carry out its 
activities and programmes; these were in the field of agriculture, 
^transport and communications, trade, industry, human resources, energy 
and environment. In agriculture, the MULPOC aimed at the production
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and marketing of cereals; rural development; livestock and production 
of meat; and, intra-subregional specialization in the field of food­
stuffs.
(a) Industry
In the case of industry, the aims included the processing of salt 
and potash resources; the establishment of a multinational cement 
industry based on raw materials available in the Congo and Gabon; devel­
opment of aluminium industries based on bauxite available in the Cameroon
and the hydro-electric potential in the subregion; co-ordination and
16
harmonization of the production of petroleum refineries.
(b) Energy
In the case of energy, they wanted the establishment of a sub­
regional committee on energy and the utilization of solar energy.^
The programme was abandoned because headquarters staff had no time to 
consider it.
The objectives of the priority areas chosen illustrated the ways 
in which the MULPOC used grand words which lacked precise scope and 
content and also a timeframe. For example, the ECA aimed at the creation 
of indigenous consultancy agencies in the human resources sector. There 
is no information on the number of agencies to be set up; their loca­
tions and when it plans to do so. Reading through them one gets the 
impression that tangible projects to aid development in the subregion 
had been devised and that the MULPOC was ready to implement them. When 
one examines the actual programmes carried out, it is clear that the 
reality was rather different - the bulk of the programmes were studies. 
^Secondly, there was no evidence to suggest that the MULPOC had carried 
out programmes prior to 1981 even though the selection was decided 
upon as far back as 1978.
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(c) Trade
In the field of trade, member states approved the study on competi­
tiveness of industrial and agro-industrial products likely to be 
traded among the countries belonging to the Yaounde-based MULPOC back 
in 1978. But up to this date the study has not yet been completed.
This was followed by approval for a study on non-recorded border trade 
in 1982. The study was scheduled for completion in 1985, according to 
the ECA. But due to lack of support by the trade division of ECA 
headquarters and also owing to financial constraint, this has not been 
completed so far.^
(d) Transport and communications
For this sector one of the aims was to establish a multinational 
coastal shipping line. For road transport, a pre-feasibility study of 
the BATA-EBEBIYIN road was approved in 1982. The project document was 
submitted to the UNDP for possible funding. No funds had been secured 
by June 1988. There was also a pre-feasibility study of the NOLA- 
BOMASSA-ODESSA road. Here too the project document was submitted to 
the UNDP for possible funding. Again this was followed by another 
feasibility study in 1983 for the EBOLOWA-YAOUNDE-BERTOUA-GAROUA BOULAI 
roads. But owing to lack of funds the physical inspection of these 
roads was postponed to 1985. The ECA was still waiting for the UNDP 
to provide the funds. With regard to telecommunications and for the 
improvement of information-gathering, the establishment of the Central 
African Documentation and Information System (CADIS) was approved in 
1983. The equipment for the centre was ordered but was re-routed to 
Addis Ababa in 1987 to allow for training of staff for it and the 
jworking out of agreement with the government of Zaire, where CADIS will 
be located.
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(e) Agriculture
In the agriculture sector, there were nine programmes approved 
between 1981-83. Of these, only two were implemented fully; four were 
abandoned; two were submitted to the UNDP for funding and one was never 
considered. The detail of these programmes was as follows:
(1) Publication of CADIS directory. This was approved in 1981.
The first issue was published in 1983. But it has not been up-dated
19
due to lack of funds. This means that only one issue has been published 
so far. (It is used for on-going agricultural research projects and was 
initially prepared under an FAO, inter-regional project.);
(2) Publication of a subregional agricultural parasitism map 
(approved 1982). No follow-up action was taken for this programme and 
the study was eventually taken out of the MULPOC work programme in 1984;
(3) Study on agricultural pricing policies and marketing of 
agricultural products (approved 1983). The project document was sub­
mitted to the UNDP for possible funding. No response has been received 
as at June 1988;
(4) Publication of a booklet on simple methods of animal feeding 
(approved 1983). The booklet was published in 1985;
(5) Study on meat marketing (approved 1982). No follow-up action 
was taken and eventually the study was taken out of -the MULPOC work 
programme in 1984;
(6) Feasibility study on the implementation of a food security 
programme (approved in February 1983). The project document was sub-
emitted to the UNDP for funding but no response received;
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(7) Creation of a unit for the definition of formulae for the 
production of pesticides and analysis of their residues (approved 1982) . 
The programme was considered but no follow-up action was taken. It
was also abandoned in 1984; and,
(8) Preparation of national phytosanitary legislation in com­
pliance with relevant OAU convention (approved in 1982). The programme 
was never considered.
(f) Human resources
The ECA wanted to create indigeneous consultancy agencies and 
also the conversion of technical schools and facilities at national 
universities to subregional ones. None of the approved programmes was 
ever carried out due mainly to lack of funds. For instance, in the 
case of the study on the establishment of a subregional higher business 
school, approved in 1982, the programme was first of all in competition 
with an existing proposal, that is, the one on the establishment of a 
subregional management institute being handled by the substantive 
division of the ECA - an evidence of a clash of programme of the ECA
headquarters and the MULPOC. But the study was not being implemented
due to lack of funds. The second programme for this sector was the
study on the creation of indigeneous consultancy agencies, approved in
1978. The study had never been considered. Even if it were to be 
implemented, no detail of the number of agencies to be created was 
made, neither do we know the areas which needed consultancy agencies.
Apart from a clash in programmes of the ECA headquarters and the 
MULPOC, the latter was actually depending too much on the headquarters 
to carry out its programmes. This was the case with the energy sector 
"where the main programme was the establishment of a subregional committee
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on energy, approved in 1982. The meeting of experts for this purpose
was never convened due to lack of follow-up on the part of the substantive
^   ^ 20 division concerned.
(g) The women’s programme
The activities implemented within the women’s programme was similar 
to that of other MULPOCs. They included the study on the integration 
of women’s component in development projects; feasibility study on the 
establishment of a women’s documentation centre; training course in plan­
ning; seminar on the organization and management of co-operatives in 
agriculture, fishing and handicrafts (Zaire). All these activities were 
conducted in 1980. No programmes were carried out after that because
the policy organs failed to meet in 1983 and so there was no guidance
21
for more programmes. Moreover the programme for 1985-86 was not imple­
mented because there was no women’s co-ordinator. Finally, the women’s 
programme was terminated in 1987 following the withdrawal of funds by 
the UNDP.
The rate of implementation for the MULPOC is as follows:
Sector % Rate of Implementation
1. Trade 25
2. Transport 10
3. Agriculture 30
4. Human resources 30
5. Environment 30
6. Energy 0
7. CADIS 50
Average (including women’s component) 23.5%
Source: Performance Report of the MULPOCs 1977-1984,
ECO Division, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1984, p. 33.
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Compared with all the other MULPOCs, Yaounde had the lowest rate of 
22
implementation. It had to postpone or abandon a sizeable number of 
its programmes due to a combination of factors such as inadequate funds, 
limited manpower resources, dependence on headquarters for implementation, 
absence of a women’s co-ordinator to mention but a few. Its objectives 
were rather vague as well. For example, in the programme for the inte­
gration of women in the process of development, there was no mention of 
the aspects of development, and the number of women from each country 
which will be involved. When the UNDP/ECA evaluation missions visited 
the member states, they reported that the latter expressed dissatisfaction 
at the low rate of implemenation and complained that at each meeting they
examined the same subjects and that the same studies were being initiated
23
but never completed.
Furthermore, most of studies implemented dealt with general aspects
in each sector and the member states wanted the MULPOC to go beyond the
studies by implementing concrete programmes which had relevance to 
24
development. The missions also found that the UNDP Resident Represent-
(*Ur*C
atives in the respective countries were highly regarded by national 
officials at any level than the MULPOC ones. The reason was that the 
governments were able to identify with UNDP projects which were tangible 
and of importance to them while the ECA was merely carrying out studies 
and submitting reports. But although the member states expect so much 
from the MULPOC, the latter was not equipped with the necessary organs 
for implementing real projects. Apart from vague objectives and scope 
of activities, Yoaunde had no organ for co-ordination, evaluation, 
monitoring and implementation of projects. Although these could be 
established within the present mandate, nevertheless, the MULPOC lacks 
the financial and manpower resources to enable it to do so. Therefore, 
in its present form, it cannot deliver the goods. This makes its role
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in development passive if not negligible.
4. THE GISENYI MULTINATIONAL PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE 
(CENTRAL AFRICA II)
Although we have outlined the salient features of Central Africa 
as a whole under sub-heading two, there are points to be made concerning 
Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda. As indicated earlier on, the Gisenyi MULPOC
has only these three member states.
Zaire is under the authoritarian rule of President Mobutu Sese Seko, 
who has been in power since 1963. The capital of Zaire is Kinshasa.
Its industrial complex is in Shaba. In 1983 economic reforms and liber­
alization programmes were set in motion under the supervision of the IMF 
and the World Bank. Zaire had also had its periods of political crisis 
in the past, notably the crisis of 1960-65, popular insurrections, 
mercenary revolts and the Shaba wars. It has been described as a miliary 
state basically governed by "Mobutu law which provides for a largely
undisciplined armed force who are often terrorists at the service of the
25
existing order, arbitrary detentions, torture ..." President Mobutu
was alleged to be "one of the richest men in the world. His fortune is
26
estimated at $5 billion". In a documentary on London Weekend Television,
the commentators argued that it was difficult to distinguish between the
treasury, the government and the private property of President Mobutu
Sese Seko. According to them the treasury was the Presdient's personal
purse. They traced how he remitted US$ 2 million to the guardian of one
27
of his sons studying in Europe. The child was under 18.
In contrast, Burundi has been classed among the poorest countries 
in the world. It has an area of 27,834 sq. km. and a population of less
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than 5 million. Burundi is situated more than 1,500 kilometres from
the Indian Ocean and its foreign trade is conducted through the ports
28
of Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) and Mombasa (Kenya). 90 per cent of
Burundi’s imports come through the Tanzanian port, over 1,000 kilometres 
29
away. Coffee accounts for 90 per cent of the country’s earnings of 
foreign exchange. Burundi has had a troubled and bloody history in the 
past 26 years since it became independent in July 1962. The history 
is based on the complex ethnic relationship which existed between its 
Hutu majority (84 per cent of the population) being ruled by the Tutsi
minority - this group make up 15 per cent of the population.
The dominance of the minority Thtsi over the majority Hutu group 
remains the central political and social reality in the control of 
Burundi's political institutions and the military. Apart from the armed 
forces, the security monitor dissent and signs of Hutu resistance. Power 
struggle between the two groups resulted in the so-called 1972 genocide. 
About 450 Hutu troops were massacred in early May at the request of the
army high command and this has resulted in an all-Tutsi army.
Rivalry within the Tutsi elite was also frequent. For instance, 
it led to a bloodless coup on 3 September 1987 - President Jean-Baptiste 
Bagaza was removed while attending a Francophone Conference in Quebec, 
Canada. Bagaza sought refuge in Uganda. The new leadership is a Military 
Committee for National Redemption led by Major Pierre Buyoga who is a 
Tutsi Hima from former President Bagaza's region.
The political instability in Burundi affected its relations with 
its neighbours - Rwanda and Zaire. Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi 
is vulnerable to Zairean attacks and the latter has been known to carry 
out military maneouvres along the Burundian border.
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In March 1986, the government approved its Burundianization 
programme for two reasons: (a) it was part of a wider campaign against
foreign influences; and (b) to make the Economic Stabilization and 
Structural Adjustment Programme more easily accepted among Burundians.
An aspect which directly affected Zaireans and other nationals was when 
Lt. Col. Melchiade Manderu, Director-General of Immigration, announced 
new criteria in September to apply to residency permit renewals. This 
included applicants contribution to the society and whether they were 
investing in sectors where Burundians lacked knowledge or means. 
Foreigners were expelled and the Zairean Community was particularly 
hard hit as more than 2,000 were forced to leave the Rumonge region in 
southern Burundi.^
Just as serious is the decline of relations with Rwanda. In 1986,
the Rwanda ambassador was virtually thrown out of his official residence
in Bujumbura, following accusations that the Rwanda embassy was carrying
31
out surveillance of the presidential palace. There is now only a
skeleton staff and the location of the embassy is said to have been
forcibly changed. Relations with Rwanda continued to be strained since
the eviction of its ambassador. Brussels sources also disclosed that
there was an unpublicized border clash between the two countries in 1987
32
which was resolved by a secret meeting between the two presidents.
It is under this atmosphere of political instability affecting the three 
countries that the Gisenyi MULPOC has had to function. If the states 
are not on good terms with each other, it affects their deliberation 
at the policy organ meetings of the MULPOC.
The Rwandese Republic, like Burundi, is distinct among the inde­
pendent states of black Africa for both the smallness of its territory 
"and the density of its population. Covering an area of 26,338 sq. km.
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(10,169 sq. miles), Rwanda had an estimated population of 5,757,000
33
at mid-1983, with a density of 218.6 inhabitants per sq. km.
The population is composed of Hutu (about 84 per cent), Tutsi 
(about 15 per cent) and Twa (one per cent).
The capital of Rwanda is Kigali and the official languages are 
French and Kin Yar Wanda, a Bantu language.
Like Burundi, Rwanda has two main physical handicaps to economic 
development: the extreme population density and the distance from the
sea. The population problem is aggravated by a high rate of growth, 
estimated at an average annual increase of 3.7 per cent, which is 
placing an increasing strain on food resources.^
Historically, the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi were enemies and 
traditional national feeling remains high in both countries. Serious 
ethnic strife between the Hutu and Tutsi broke out in December 1963 and 
in the early 1970s. In 1974 a tripartite conference was held in Burundi, 
attended by the heads of state of Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. It resulted 
in a broad agreement to take concerted action to improve border security 
in each state and to take steps to facilitate co-operation across national 
boundaries. In September 1976 they established the Economic Community 
of the Great Lakes Countries.
Relations with Zaire have been cordial until 16 May 1985 when the 
Libyan leader Col. Gaddafy visited Rwanda for three days. He attended 
Friday night prayers at the Kigali Mosque, built with Libyan funds, where 
he lashed out against Christianity as the ’’religion of colonialism”.
He called Islam the "religion of God" and the religion meant for Africans. 
In speaking of muslim brothers in Zaire, he stated that they live under 
the unjust law of Mobutu, a Zionist agent, and.that "he who kills Mobutu
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will go to paradise". He called upon muslims to topple Mobutu in a 
holy war.
Apart from sharing the same history and a geographical fact of
being landlocked states, the three countries are the only members of
35
the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). The 
CEPGL was established a year before the establishment of the Gisenyi 
MULPOC. Its objectives included the creation of a security partnership, 
harmonization of various aspects of life in the area and the promotion 
of trade. Since the technical ministerial organs of the CEPGL were 
established before the creation of the MULPOC policy organs, an agree­
ment was reached during the consultations held with the representatives 
of the three countries during the fourth and fifth meetings of the ECA 
Conference of Ministers in 1977 and 1979, respectively. They agreed 
that the CEPGL and the MULPOC should co-operate closely with a view to 
achieving economic co-operation and integration. In conformity with 
this agreement, the inaugural meeting of the MULPOC Council of Ministers 
in October 1977 directed that the MULPOC should provide logistic support 
to the CEPGL. This guideline was endorsed by the first extraordinary 
meeting of the MULPOC Council of Ministers held in August 1980 and by 
the Conference of the Heads of State and Governments of the CEPGL 
countries held in December 1980. This explains the ease with which 
some of the Gisenyi programmes were transferred to the CEPGL secretariat 
as will be shown later.
It should be noted that the CEPGL countries are in turn members 
of a larger economic grouping, namely, the Economic Community of Central
O £
African States (ECCAS). This community was initiated in October 1983. 
The headquarters which is in Libreville, Gabon, was opened in December 
1985. The objectives were to promote and reinforce co-operation and a
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sustained and balanced development in economic and social activity 
between member states.
It is significant for us to state that the three entities, that 
is, the CEPGL, the Gisenyi MULPOC and ECCAS are operated with similar 
objectives and sectors. The three states of Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire 
have to make subscriptions to the three organizations, thereby reducing 
their abilities to make considerable contributions, given the nature of 
the economies of these countries. Both Burundi and Rwanda cannot afford 
to make financial contributions to all three.
4a. Structures, Organs, Financial and Manpower Resources
The Gisenyi MULPOC has the same terms of reference and objectives 
as that of Yaounde. Therefore, the same problems arising from vague 
terminology, wider scope of activities with no time-frame affect it.
It also has similar structures and policy organs as the Yaounde 
MULPOC. The only exception being that, unlike the former, it does not 
have an Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee. The meetings of its 
policy organs have been held regularly, except for 1983 when the Council 
of Ministers did not meet. The MULPOC was still dealing with its organ­
izational matters at the time.
The Gisenyi MULPOC also received UNDP contributions amounting to
US$ 200,000 per annum for the 1977-79 period. The amount earmarked for
1980 onwards was US$ 250,000 per annum. The additional US$ 50,000 was
37
to provide for an increase in consultancy services. The estimated 
resources gap assuming current UNDP funding levels were as follows:
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Table 8.3 Estimated Resources Gap Assuming UNDP Funding
(us$)
(US$)
Levels
MULPOC
Centre
Resources Available 
(1977-1978 levels)
Resources Required 
1979-1980
Gap
Gisenyi 320,000 1,734,282 1,413,782
Table 8.4 Estimated Resource Gap 
Earmarking (US$)
Assuming Proposed New UNDP
MULPOC
Centre
Resources Available 
(new proposed UNDP levels)
Resources Required 
1979-1980
Gap
Gisenyi 500,000 1,734,282 1,234,282
Source: ECA Multinational Programming and Operational Centres: A
Progress Report, Doc. ECA/MULPOC/Lusaka/129, 24 October 1978, 
pp. 43-44.
Notes: Column 2 does not include funding contributions from non-UNDP
sources which in 1977-78 amounted to US$ 62,500.
If these funds continue to be available at the same level, the resources 
gap will be marginally reduced by US$ 62,5000 to US$ 1,171,782. But the 
actual amount received for the period (1977-78) was US$ 403,719.
No contribution has been made for the fourth cycle 1987-91) . The MULPOC 
has an even bigger financial problem than either Yaounde or Niamey, 
because its resource gap topped the one million mark. The chances of 
it getting funds to cover the gap were slim according to officials of 
the ECO dividion of the ECA in February 1987. Apart from the costs of 
its work programmes, the reason for the huge gap is because it is the 
only MULPOC not carved out of a pre-existing subregional structure of 
the ECA. It therefore had to spend more on organizing its administrative 
and policy organs.
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Not only did the MULPOC lack financial resources for carrying 
out its programmes, it also lacked manpower resources. When the ECA 
made a proposal for staffing to ECOSOC in 1982, it stated the following
Gisenyi Staffing
D-l P-5 P-4
Existing posts 
Proposed new posts 
Total
P-3
1
1
Total
Prof.
1
2
Local
Level Total
1
3
Source: Report of the ECOSOC on financing of the MULPOCs of the ECA
on an established basis, General Assembly, Doc. A/C.5/37/92, 
9 December 1982, p. 3.
Key:
D-l
P-5 and P-3
Local Level
is the Head of the MULPOC (Director). He is a political 
appointee. The post is for principal officers who are 
responsible for implementing programmes approved by the 
ECA MULPOC policy organs. He also has to consult govern­
ment officials at the ministerial level and in the UN 
agencies and other IGOs. The post could be occupied by 
an ex-minister, academic or long-standing official of 
international institutions.
is for senior officers. These posts are usually for 
economic affairs officers who undertake sectoral and 
topical studies; design multinational projects and con­
duct research. They assist heads of the MULPOCs in the 
management of the centres. These are civil servants.
This is made up of staff recruited at the local level or 
where the centres are situated. They are the general 
service staff, such as administrative assistants, typists, 
secretaries, drivers, cleaners and messengers.
From the schedule above, one can observe that prior to 1982 when the 
proposal was made, the MULPOC only had one member of staff in the P-3 
category. This was an administrative assistant as confirmed by the ECO 
division. There were no local level staff either. The administrative
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officer acted as a liaison officer for the MULPOC since it was the
substantive division staff who were in charge of running it from Addis
Ababa. When the need arose, the officer made the. necessary arrangements
for the policy organ meetings. The MULPOC suffered from acute staff
shortages prior to 1982. Even with the ECA's proposal of four members
of staff, that is, a director, an administrative officer and one local
staff, the staffing level was still grossly inadequate. Given the
number of studies to be carried out, the four members of staff would
find the tasks too demanding. Another observation relates to the calibre
of people employed. The director's post was a political appointment
and could be occupied by anyone the Commission appointed. Then there
is an administrative officer or two. These persons are not versed in
socio-economic matters. They are not suited to research into the complex
factors affecting development in Central Africa nor, indeed, any other
part of Africa. The fact that the MULPOCs were provided with only
skeleton staff suggests that the ECA does not want them to play leading
roles in development. If this was not the intention, then why is it that
the experts are all at Addis Ababa, rather than at the MULPOCs? This
means that important matters were left in the hands of an officer who
was in category P-3 in 1982 for example. The UNDP/ECA evaluation mission
to Gisenyi in 1982 reported that the Gisenyi MULPOC encountered some
problems due to its staff. In 1977 it appointed an administrative
officer who was not aware of UN administrative procedures. This was
because before this appointment at Gisenyi he only fulfilled low level
38
duties. This made the functioning of the MULPOC a difficult one.
In December 1979 he was transferred to another station and experts were
appointed. Even so, the report argued that they lacked intellectual
39
and technical qualifications necessary to fulfil their duties.
There has been a slight improvement in its staffing since 1987.
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There are now five professionals, namely, the director, trade and 
finance economist, transport and communications engineer, energy 
specialist and an agriculture economist.^
4 b . Gisenyi MULPOC: Work Programmes
At the inaugural meeting of its Council of Ministers, the member 
states approved programmes in five sectors, namely, trade, energy, 
transport, human resources and tourism. Between 1980-84, four sectors 
were added - industry, agriculture, communications and the integration 
of women in the development process.
(a) Trade
In trade, three programmes were approved., The first was a study 
on the possibility of establishing a monetary clearing house arrangement 
in Central Africa. This was approved in October 1977. The study com­
pleted was completed in 1978 and the main finding was that there was 
already a Clearing House System in Central Africa. Burundi and Rwanda 
were expected to join the Clearing House, jointly established by the 
Bank of Central Africa Republic, Congo, Chad, Gabon and the Central 
Bank of Zaire. The second programme was a study on subregional inte­
gration (approved in 1977). This study was initially entitled ’Trade 
promotion among member states’. It became more specific in terms of 
its coverage when it was included in the UNDP financed project on 
'multisectoral assistance to CEPGL' as a sub-project thereof. It 
included various aspects such as the statute of community enterprises, 
establishment of a trade documentation centre and the harmonization of 
investment codes. The project was still under execution. It was an 
attempt by the UNDP to reshape and focus a MULPOC programme. The
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programmes are usually too general in nature. The study on trade 
promotion was carried out in 1981-82 by a consultant. (The ECA 
occasionally employs consultants to carry out some of the programmes 
when it has no experts of its own. The jobs were done on a contract 
basis.) The third programme was a report on administrative procedures 
as obstacles to trade promotion (approved in 1982). A progress report 
was submitted to the policy organs in March 1984 and the study is still 
pending. Negotiations for the elimination of identified obstacles were 
scheduled to start in June 1985. But the programme has not been 
completed due to lack of funds.
(b) Industry
Five programmes were approved for industry. The study on pro­
duction of plywoods was approved in 1980. The programme was included 
in the work programme of the MULPOC at the request of the CEPGL 
secretariat and has since been incorporated into the project entitled 
'Establishment of a complex of forest-based industries for CEPGL 
countries', funded by the UNDP and was under execution with the assis­
tance of the ECA/FAO Forest Industries Advisory Group. The study has 
reached the pre-feasibility stage.
Next was the study on the creation of a fish canning factory 
(approved in August 1980). This was also included at the request of 
the CEPGL secretariat and was now part of the UNDP financed project 
on 'Multi-sectoral Assistance to CEPGL' under the 'Development of 
fisheries sub-project'. (The multisectoral assistance to CEPGL was 
a major exercise in which the Gisenyi MULPOC has been engaged in since 
1982. As the leading agency the MULPOC has to co-ordinate the activities 
pf the associated agencies FAO, UNIDO, UNCTAD, WTO, ITO involved in the 
implementation of various projects. The UNDP-funded projects are
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implemented under such arrangements.) The exercise faced difficulties 
due to co-ordination problems which were now being overcome as a 
result of discussions held in October 1983 at the tripartite (that is, 
ECA other executing agencies and CEPGL secretariat) meeting held with 
the UNDP in Geneva. At the request of the CEPGL secretariat, they 
decided to postpone components of the project especially relating to 
the CEPGL until a comprehensive evaluation of the CEPGL structure, 
objectives and achievements had taken place. This exercise is still 
pending. Still on the creation of a fish canning factory, a consultant 
carried out the preliminary study. But in 1955 its implementation was 
postponed at the request of the CEPGL secretariat to allow room for 
the impending evaluation exercise.
There was also the study on the creation of cement plant and of 
small-scale sugar plants (approved in February 1981). But the programme 
on cement plants was taken out of the MULPOC work programme at the 
policy organs meeting in 1984. It was then entrusted to the CEPGL 
which was operating across the same sector. The policy organs also 
suspended the establishment of small-scale sugar plants until such a 
time that there were funds for carrying out the pre-feasibility study. 
This MULPOC faced the same problems relating to inadquate financial 
resources. More often than not, its programmes are deferred, suspended 
or transferred to the CEPGL secretariat. The fact that it lacked 
financial resources was one thing but the most significant consequences 
of this were the uncertainties relating to implementation surrounding 
the sources of funds, especially as member states made minimal con­
tributions on a voluntary basis. In practice, they can only contribute 
if funds were available. So we have a situation where officials draw 
^up programmes and then they have to wait for very long periods before 
funds can be found. In the case of Gisenyi, they have tried to come
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to terms with the problems by transferring some of its programmes to 
the CEPGL secretariat, as the studies on production of plywoods and 
the creation of a fish canning factory indicated. But in the long 
run the programmes will be in jeopardy unless money is forthcoming or 
the ECA curtails their numbers.
Another programme under industry was the study of protocol on 
harmonization of industrial policies of CEPGL member states which was 
approved in February 1981. The MULPOC prepared a paper on this and 
submitted it to the policy organs in 1984, but no further action has 
been taken. Finally, the study on the establishment of a subregional 
research centre on building materials was approved in 1981. The UNDP 
funding for this programme ended in 1983. Burundi had declared her 
willingness to host the centre which will serve both the Gisenyi and 
Yaounde MULPOCs. (This is the second example so far where a programme 
has been devised to serve both Central Africa I and II member states.
The first one was with the establishment of a Clearing House by member 
states of Central Africa I, that is, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Congo, Chad, Gabon and Zaire.) Both Burundi and Rwanda (in Central 
Africa II) are expected to join shortly. (These two programmes would 
have prevented duplication of efforts for the two MULPOCs.) However, 
the study was suspended since 1983 due to lack of alternate source of 
funding.
(c) Energy
In the sector for energy, the MULPOC had two programmes. The 
first one was a study on the development of methane gas. This was 
approved in 1977. This programme was taken out of the MULPOC work 
programme mainly because of lack of funds in 1984. It was now being 
implemented by the CEPGL secretariat which was about to create a
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demonstration centre. The second programme was a study on the develop­
ment of peat resources, approved in October 1977. A consultant carried 
out a pre-feasibility study in 1981. Since 1983 this programme became 
part of the ’Multisectoral assistance project to CEPGL'. The UNDP 
provided funds for it.
(d) Agriculture
The MULPOC performed poorly in the agriculture sector. It had 
only two programmes: (1) Study on production, multiplication and
dissemination of selected rice, beans and soya bean seeds (approved 
in 1981). The first phase of the programme which was the preliminary 
study was completed. The second phase involving a pre-feasibility 
study on food security programme for the CEPGL countries was approved 
in February 1981. A preliminary study has been carried out. The 
second and third phases have been suspended here too until funds were 
available. It had barely started off on each study but none has been 
completed up till June 1988.
(e) Human resources
The worst performance of the Gisenyi MULPOC was in this sector, 
where none of the three programmes was implemented. These were 
(1) the establishment of an indigeneous consultancy centre (approved 
in 1977); (2) the compilation of a directory of existing training 
facilities (approved in 1977); and (3) the creation of a centre for 
the production of educational materials, also approved in 1977 but 
abandoned in 1980.^
(f) Transport and communications
For transport, there were two programmes also. The first was a
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study on the co-ordination of the activities of national airlines and 
identification of viable air linkages between CEPGL countries and 
other subregions, approved in 1977. Originally, the study related only 
to the establishment of a subregional air freight company, but its 
scope was enlarged to include other aspects of air transport at the 
request of member states. The latter were invited to submit their 
comments on the preliminary study in 1984. The comments were considered 
by an ad hoc meeting of civil aviation officials before being submitted 
to the policy organs of the MULPOC. Subsequent reports have failed 
to state either the outcome of the study or the comments made. The 
second programme was a study on navigation on Lake Tanganyika and Lake 
Kivu, approved in October 1977. This programme became part of a broader 
one entitled, 'Study on policy for integration of CEPGL countries' 
transport systems with a view to alleviating the problems arising from 
the landlocked nature of these countries', executed under the 'Multi­
sectoral assistance to CEPGL project'. Its report is still pending.
In the sector of communications, the programme involved the 
establishment of a subregional documentation and information system 
for CEPGL countries. It was approved in March 1984. The intention 
was to create a subregional centre to link up with the Central Co­
ordinating Centre, that is, the Pan-African Documentation and Information 
System (PADIS). The one for Central Africa is referred to as CADIS.
At the time of the approval of the programme, its location had not been 
determined. The argument was whether CADIS would serve only Gisenyi 
member states or whether it would include the Yaounde MULPOC ones.
Planned field missions took place and this explains why the equipment 
bought for Yaounde MULPOC was re-routed to Addis Ababa. A meeting of 
Plenipotentiaries of state members of the Giesenyi and Yaounde MULPOCs 
on the creation of CADIS was held in Addis Ababa, 10-11 April 1987.
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Representatives of seven states attended. They decided unanimously 
to accept the offer of Zaire to house CADIS. The government of Zaire 
accepted to pay the costs of the first phase of the project, that is, 
for investment and start-up costs,, including the provision of office 
space, a computer room with appropriate infrastructure, a meeting/ 
training room, office furniture and equipment, professional personnel, 
that is, a director, information scientist/data base manager and chief 
documentalist, and as part of the support staff a computer operator,
j 42a secretary and a guard.
(g) Tourism
There was only one programme in this sector. This had to do with 
the establishment of a subregional training centre for toursim, approved 
in October 1977. The feasibility study was completed with the financial 
assistance of the World Tourism Organization (WTO) as part of the 
'Multisectoral assistance to CEPGL project'.
(h) CADIS
It was also decided that all the state members of the two MULPOCs 
will use CADIS and thereby constitute the subregional Technical Committee. 
Zaire will chair the committee for two years and in that capacity 
represent CADIS. In December 1987 the secretariat undertook a mission 
to Zaire to work out the details for the establishment of CADIS with 
its government. Joint training of personnel was expected to commence 
during the first quarter of 1988.
CADIS when fully operational will be the first programme which 
looks any way near a tangible programme because it involves the instal­
lation of computers and costs can be calculated for instance. It will 
be very useful for Central Africa because of the lack of information
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on development issues of the area, a situation worsened by the land­
locked nature of the states. The programme will make it possible for 
already processed data and other materials to be made available to 
member states. It involves the use of equipment and technical staff 
which will make the calculation of costs and benefits a possibility, 
sometime lacking with the studies.
(i) The women's programme
The Gisenyi MULPOC was most active with reference to its programme
on the integration of women in the development process. In Burundi,
its government has realized that a grave mistake had been made in the
past in neglecting women because they were the ones who did most of
the farming work. In the UNDP-sponsored project, a special component
was financed by UNICEF entirely devoted to the training of women as
farmers. The best part of the project was that it generated its own
income. The World Bank was so impressed that a major loan had been
agreed for a much larger programme based on this Gitega (Burundi)
43scheme. The programme involved the training of women as farmers.
This programme made a break from the monotony of studies, research, 
seminars and workshops on women which have dominated the programmes 
of other MULPOCs. The neglect of women in development was a major
problem. And with the help of UNDP and UNICEF, the MULPOC was able
to design and implement a more realistic and practical programme.
The Gitega scheme was the only one of its kind. The ECA did not 
implement a similar scheme in the other MULPOCs. The Burundi authority 
welcomed the scheme because it tied in at the time with its campaign 
to encourage women to participate in development as a whole, and also 
to acknowledge the role they had played in agriculture in the past.
It involved the use of simple skills and techniques in farming. The
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training of women as farmers is a direct contribution to development.
The attractiveness of the approach lies in the fact that women were not 
only portrayed as mothers whose places were in their homes, but also 
as active participants in development. Although a small step forward, 
this was, nevertheless, an important one because what women need most 
is such practical training to enable them to enter the workforce. More 
skills in the various sectors will mean access to jobs, housing and 
better working conditions. The jobs will also make the women economically 
independent too. Apart from the Gitega Scheme, the MULPOC also conducted 
a number of studies, namely:
(1) Study on needs assessment, approved and completed in 1981;
(2) Feasibility study on the establishment of a women’s documentation 
centre, approved in 1980 and completed in 1983;
(3) Feasibility study on the needs of the Women’s co-operative union 
in the marketing of handicrafts, approved in 1980 and completed 
in 1984;
(4) The study on the 'Ruhengeri Nutrition Centre', approved in 1980 
and completed in 1984; and
(5) The study on women groups in the production and marketing of 
handicrafts, approved in 1980 and also completed in 1984.
The dates of approval and subsequent ones for the programmes indicate 
that the MULPOC took 3-4 years to implement its studies on women in 
development. The withdrawal of UNDP funds led to the termination of 
the women’s programme, including the Gitega Scheme, in Central Africa 
in 1987. The withdrawal affected both programmes implemented and those 
under planning.
The implementation rate of the entire work programme of Gisenyi
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was as follows:
Sector % Rate of Implementation
1. Trade 66
2. Industry 48
3. Energy 25
4. Agriculture 40
5. Transport 50
6. Human resources 0
7. Tourism 100
8. CADIS 0
Average (including women's component) 54.5
Source: Performance Report of the MULPOCs 1977-1984,
ECO Division, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1984, p. 32.
The figures for some of the sectors are misleading. First, the ECA
has not explained how it derived these figures in its report. Secondly, 
if we look at the sector on tourism, the implementation rate is 100 per 
cent. This does not reflect the fact that the MULPOC only had one pro­
gramme which was a study on the establishment of a subregional training 
centre for tourism, nor the fact that the programme had been transferred 
with financial assistance from the WTO to the 'Multisectoral assistance 
to CEPGL project'. The figures are misleading for CADIS at zero per 
cent because the equipment has been bought. The CADIS headquarters 
will be based in Kinshasa. Zaire is to provide personnel, office and 
other costs as a result of an agreement in 1987. In fact a lot more
has been achieved for CADIS than the zero percentage will allow one to
think. The only explanation for the zero recorded was that when the 
report was prepared, it was possible that none of the actions mentioned 
here had taken place.
While examining the work programme a number of observations have
- 361 -
been made, one of which was the dependence on consultants to carry 
out parts of programmes. For instance, in the case of the energy 
programme, that is, the development of peat resources, a consultant 
carried out a pre-feasibility study in 1982. The same applied to 
industry, with the preliminary study on the creation of a fish canning 
factory in 1981.
Secondly, in instances where programmes had not been implemented 
due mainly to lack of funds, the Gisenyi MULPOC has had to transfer 
some to the CEPGL secretariat in 1984. This applied to the industrial 
programme on the production of plywoods; the creation of cement plants 
and of small-scale sugar plants.
There are also examples where items have been included in the 
work programme by the CEPGL secretariat. Because the two entities 
operated within the same sectors and they serve the same member states, 
it created a flexible atmosphere whereby programmes have been requested 
and transferred from one to the other and vice versa. Moreover, there 
is a formal agreement between the Gisenyi MULPOC and the CEPGL secret­
ariat, which was endorsed by both in 1980 for closer co-operation.
Then there were attempts by the UNDP to re-focus the MULPOC 
programmes where the former was providing the funds. This was the case 
with the study on subregional integration. The initial study was entitled 
'Trade promotion among member states'. After due consultation with the 
UNDP, it included various aspects such as the statute of community 
enterprise, establishment of trade documentation centre and harmoniz­
ation of investment codes.
Finally, by comparison, the Gisenyi MULPOC implemented more 
programmes than that of Yaounde; this was reflected in the relatively
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higher implementation rate for the former which was 54.5 per cent.
The Yaounde MULPOC had 23.5 per cent. Gisenyi was more effective in 
the area especially, as it was dealing with only three states with 
common history and a determination to work together. The states 
indicated their willingness to work together when they requested the 
ECA to establish the MULPOC. They are interested in co-operation as 
a means of bringing stability to their respective territories. Both 
Burundi and Rwanda have similar compositions in their populations. 
Therefore, political instability in one could spill over to the other.
5. THE PECULIAR PROBLEMS IN THE SUBREGION AND ECA'S RESPONSE
Six out of ten member states are LDCs but going through the 
programmes there were no indications that their problems were given 
special attention. All the states were treated as the same as far as 
the programmes were concerned.
For Central Africa II, that is, Gisenyi, the major problem related 
to the fact that the three states were landlocked. The ECA has not 
come up with a solution and so all the states were operating through 
bilateral arrangements with Tanzania and Kenya. The MULPOC also exper­
ienced the problems of lack of communications with ECA headquarters, 
CEPGL secretariat and the UNDP representatation. This was mainly due 
to the fact that the secretariat was located in Rwanda which was geo­
graphically isolated. This was the second MULPOC located in such an 
area. The other was the Tangier MULPOC.
To overcome the problem, the ECA installed communications 
equipment in the form of a telex line in 1988. This has improved the 
situation for all concerned as a permanent contact has been established
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with the ECA headquarters and other agencies in the area. The problem 
of co-ordination of activities has been achieved with an agreement 
between the ECA and CEPGL secretariat in 1982. But there is no formal 
relationship between the MULPOC, UDEAC and ECCAS.
6. CONCLUSION
There are two categories of problems encountered by the two 
MULPOCs. The first category relates to structural deficiencies, namely, 
lack of funds, manpower resources, ill-defined objectives of the MULPOCs 
and implementation of work programmes; with the exception of the Gitega 
Scheme for women farmers and the proposed CADIS, the programmes were of a 
general nature and most of them studies. Moreover, the programmes did not 
reflect the objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action endorsed in 1980, 
because most of them were adopted in the period 1977-80 under the frame­
work of the demand for a New International Economic Order. These 
structural handicaps were responsible for the ineffectiveness of the 
MULPOCs, although Gisenyi implemented more programmes than Yaounde.
The second category related to the external environment. These 
sets of problems served to undermine the effectiveness of the MULPOCs.
In Central Africa I, Equatorial Guinea was still recovering from the 
effects of a dictatorship and a battered economy. The current political 
situation in Chad was making it difficult for the MULPOC to function.
For example, the Director has been unable to visit Chad. Four members 
of Yaounde are in the UDEAC, that is, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo and 
Central Africa Republic. The other three, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and 
Sao Tome are not UDEAC members. The functioning of the MULPOC was 
hampered by a certain lack of political cohesion among its seven member
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states, especially the three which were outside UDEAC. In addition,
Sao Tome and Principe, which was an island, riad no easy links with 
the continent. On the other hand, political problems in Chad and 
Equatorial Guinea added to physical communication problems to reduce 
the effectiveness of the MULPOC in general.
Although in Gisenyi there was a formal relationship between the 
MULPOC and CEPGL secretariat, there was no co-operation between UDEAC 
and the Yaounde MULPOC. No formal links existed between the MULPOC 
with ECCAS either.
External factors also affected the Gisenyi MULPOC. Relations 
between Burundi and Zaire were not cordial. Moreover, the political 
instability in Burundi, Zaire and to a lesser extent Rwanda affected 
the overall functioning of the MULPOC.
Of all the MULPOCs, the Gisenyi-based MULPOC was the only one 
not carved out of pre-existing subregional offices or UNDATs. Thus, 
it had inherited no continuity of activities at the time of its 
creation; this accounted for its difficulties to establish links with 
member states in its earlier years.
As in the case of the West and North Africa MULPOCs, Yaounde and 
Gisenyi suffer from the lack of effective decentralization of activities 
from the ECA headquarters. The MULPOCs have virtually no autonomy 
with respect to technical, administrative and financial decisions.
And finally, the fact that there are two MULPOCs in Central Africa 
has not made any significant impact on development. The two faced 
similar problems and in the final analysis such constraints were 
^multiplied by two. Perhaps the only point to be made is the fact that 
Gisenyi was more effective than Yaounde because the former dealt with
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only three states which had historical, cultural and geographical 
links. The constraints facing the states were similar but the rates 
of implementation of programmes was higher for Gisenyi at 54 per 
cent compared with 23.5 per cent for Yaounde. Apart from the common 
historical, cultural and geographical links between Burundi, Rwanda 
and Zaire, the three were members of the Economic Community of the 
Great Lakes countries. This made it possible for them to switch pro­
grammes between the latter and the MULPOC. Also smallness made it 
easier to identify the interests of the states.
The co-operation with other specialized agencies in the case of 
Gisenyi MULPOC was another factor for its effectiveness. For instance, 
the UNICEF and World Bank financed the Gitega Scheme. The WTO financed 
the feasibility study on tourism, while the UNDP provided financial 
backing for sectors such as agriculture, industry, trade and the 
women’s programme. Such institutions were more sympathetic to the 
fact that Rwanda and Burundi are LDCs.
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CHAPTER 9
ECA IN NORTH AFRICA: THE TANGIER MULTINATIONAL 
PROGRAMMING AND OPERATIONAL CENTRE (MULPOC)
1. INTRODUCTION
The MULPOC for North Africa based in Tangier, Morocco, replaced 
the ECA subregional office which was set up in 1963. Its operational 
venue covers the following countries: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco,
the Sudan and Tunisia. Despite its long history of being a subregional 
structure of the ECA, this MULPOC is the least developed of all the 
MULPOCs, in terms of its policy organs (it does not have a fully-fledged 
policy organ at the ministerial level), and the fact that it has always 
been funded from the regular budget of the ECA. It is the only MULPOC 
which has been funded from this source since its inception. All the 
others have had to look to the UNDP for funding. Even though all the 
other MULPOCs have had at least one major evaluation by the joint ECA/ 
UNDP mission, the Tangier MULPOC has never been part of the exercise.
The wider implication of its isolation and non-participation in the 
evaluation excerises is that in the deliberations on the various aspects 
of the MULPOCs at the ECA secretariat, the activities and problems of 
the MULPOC have been omitted.
This MULPOC is also a small one with six countries (the smallest 
is Gisenyi with three states). In the case of Gisenyi, smallness was 
an advantage because it was more effective than that of Yaounde. But 
like Yaounde with only seven states, the Tangier MULPOC is not effective 
.-for reasons treated later in the chapter.
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The Tangier MULPOC has had virtually no impact in North Africa 
because it has not been able to operate effectively and efficiently 
due to its internal constraints which have manifested themselves in 
the form of substandard policy organs, unrealistic programmes and the 
lack of financial and manpower resources for the implementation of 
programmes. And that is not all, the MULPOC faced major external 
obstacles to its operations in North Africa, the most important ones 
being the existence of the Arab League to which almost all the North 
African states belong a n d  the political conflicts between the states.
The North African states prefer to carry out their activities in the 
Arab League rather than in the MULPOC. Every aspect of their relation­
ship is covered by the Arab League. In addition, the MULPOC has avoided 
consideration of the political conflicts in North Africa in its deliber­
ations but this strategy is unrealistic especially when we realize that 
the political factors have been partly responsible for the inactivity 
of the MULPOC.^
Another obstacle to the operation of the MULPOC has to do with 
the location of the office. The government of Morocoo has built an 
office complex referred to as the International Pavilion for International 
Organizations as a way of attracting the latter to Tangier, but the 
gesture may have come too late. The Tangier MULPOC is situated in the 
International Pavilion but the ECA is, so far, the only international 
organization in the complex. The others which are the Centre Africain 
de Formation et de Recherche Administratives pour le Developpement 
(CAFRAD), the Association of African Trade Promotion Organization (AATPO) 
and the Centre d'Etudes Industrielles du Maghreb (CEIM) are all regional 
organizations operating in Tangier. Tangier is isolated: the city has
.-lost its status as an international city to places like Rabat and 
Cassablanca. Most of the other international organizations such as the
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UNDP, UNICEF and UNESCO, and embassies are situated in these cities.
There are no direct flights from sub-Saharan Africa to Tangier. So 
delegates have to spend at least two days on their journey to meetings 
in Tangier. Apart from the costs of travelling, it is inconvenient.
Also there is the problem of communication between the MULPOC and other 
organizations in North Africa and also with the ECA headquarters.
Before considering the MULPOC in detail, we shall outline some 
of the distinct features of the North African subregion.
2. SALIENT FEATURES OF NORTH AFRICA
North Africa is a distinct region of its own. This is borne out 
by the fact that in International Relations when we talk of the Middle 
East, North Africa is excluded. Also when we refer to Africa, the same 
applies especially as the Sahara Desert has created a natural demarcation 
between North Africa and the rest of Africa. Unless otherwise stated, 
we use the term sub-Saharan Africa for the rest of Africa, excluding 
the North.
North Africa has 30 per cent of Africa's area, 25 per cent of its
2
population and 47 per cent of its GNP.
Here as in sub-Saharan Africa, average income is low though income 
differentials are wide within and between countries. Reliance on 
primary production (agriculture and mining) is also heavy, not only 
as constituents of GNP but also as the major source of foreign exchange. 
Again, the economics of North Africa resemble those of other subregions 
in being fairly open and exhibiting a strong orientation of foreign trade 
towards the industrial countries.
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Though having much in common with other African subregions, North 
Africa has its own distinct characteristics. Islam, Arabic and centuries 
of submission by most states to Carthaginian, Roman, Umayyed, Moravidi, 
Mohadi and Ottoman rule have created greater social and cultural homo­
geneity than in sub-Saharan Africa. These countries have their centres 
of population along the Mediterranean shores, to the west along the 
Atlantic and to the east along the Red Sea. From Morocco to Egypt, there 
is a similar Mediterranean civilization based on cultural, geographic, 
climatic, agricultural and historical affinities.
Economically, North African economies are more diversified and 
export-oriented than other African countries, but less integrated 
commercially. Unlike in other subregions, integration efforts in North 
Africa were mostly bilateral and involved production, infrastructure 
and labour, but no trade and monetary arrangements on the scale practised 
in the rest of the continent.
Socially, North Africa is relatively urbanized and integrated.
However, despite these similarities, there are also important
differences. That part of North Africa which lies west of Egypt and
north of the Sahara is called al-Maghrib in Arabic or the occidental,
that is, where the sun sets, as opposed to al-Mashriq or the levant,
3
that is, where the sun rises. Views differ as to where the Mashreq
ends and the Maghreb begins, with some writers excluding Libya from the
latter and using that term to refer exclusively to Tunisia, Algeria,
4 =
Morocco, Mauritania and the territory of the Western Sahara. The 
exclusion of Libya is due to its character as a transitional country.
It is not of the Mashreq, but it is also the least Maghrebic of the 
.North African states.
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There are striking physical and cultural differences between the 
people of the Maghreb and those of the Mashreq, but they are markedly 
weaker in Libya. The undercurrent of Berber subculture gets stronger 
as one goes west. There are also climatic differences between Libya 
and the rest of North Africa. The region from Morocco to Tunisia, 
because it projects northwards from the continent, benefits from the 
moisture-laden Westerlies coming across the Atlantic, whereas Libya is 
on their southern fringe and gets very little rain. Morocco, Algeria 
and Tunisia have important areas of rain-fed cultivation and have 
population/cultivable land ratios that are favourable by Arab world 
standards. The ratios are 700 inhabitants per square mile to arable 
land in Morocco and Algeria and 300 in Tunisia, compared with about 
2,000 in Egypt and 400 in Syria.^
Despite the differences, the ECA does not make a distinction 
between the Maghreb and the Mashreq. The Commission treats all the 
countries in North Africa as the same. But an official pointed out 
that Libya sees itself as part of the Mashreq, although some writers 
state otherwise. Even though the ECA has lumped together Egypt and 
the North African states, it has also ignored the historical links 
existing between Egypt, Central and Eastern Africa. Egypt is physically 
and organically tied to the latter. The Sahara Desert constitutes a 
physical barrier between other North African states and sub-Saharan 
Africa, but there is no such barrier existing between Egypt, the Sudan 
and countries around Lake Victoria, Lake Nyasa and its tributaries.
The Nile is a bridge between the northern and southern parts of the great
Nile system. It has fused the cultures, civilizations and races of
Egypt, the Nile, the Sudan and Ethiopia, for instance. At present the
.nine Nile Basin countries, that is, the beneficiaries of the Nile - 
Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan* Tanzania, Uganda and
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Zaire - have a close co-operation arrangement for the maximum utiliz­
ation of the Nile. Egypt also hinted its preference for links with 
Central and Eastern Africa when the Ambassador of Egypt to Ethiopia 
stated during the Silver Jubilee Anniversary of the ECA in 1983 at 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that "For those whom God and the Great Nile have 
brought together, let no man bring asunder".^ So just to say that 
because Egypt is situated north of the Sahara is not enough to put all 
the North African states together. The historical and cultural links 
with Central Africa through the Nile system are both important and real. 
This partially explains why until recently Egypt has had less particip­
ation in the MULPOC than the other states. As it tries to re-establish 
cordial relationship with Libya, she has also given the ECA the green 
light to include her in future studies especially on migrant labour.
As the MULPOCs were established to reflect the peculiar needs of 
each subregion, the ECA seemed to be operating without due consideration 
of the Afro-Arab nature, nor the distinctions between the states in 
North Africa. It is therefore difficult for the states to identify with 
the ECA.
Most potent of the differences in the economic characteristics of 
the countries are reflected in the profile of each country. Some of 
the differences are reflected in figures on Table 9.1. The figures 
correspond with the World Bank’s classification of these countries.
Libya is classified as a high-income country, with a GNP per capita of 
$7,170; industry accounts for 57 per cent of its GDP with services at 
39 per cent, but agriculture is o n l y  4 per cent. Algeria and Tunisia 
are upper-middle income with GNP per capita of $2,550 and $1,190, 
respectively. Industry accounts for 48 per cent of GDP for Algeria and 
34 per cent for Tunisia. The percentage of agriculture is relatively
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Table 9.1 Basic Economic Indicators for North Africa (1985)
Per Capita GDP Structure
Popn GNP GNP A I M S
(Mn) ($mn) ($)
(%)
Sudan 21.9 6,930 300 26 18 9 57
Morocco 21.9 11,850 447 18 32 17 50
Egypt 48.5 30,550 610 20 31 14 49
Tunisia 7.1 7,240 1,190 17 34 14 49
Algeria 21.9 58,180 2,550 8 48 11 42
Libya 3.8 25,240 7,170 4 57 5 39
N Africa 125.1 133,990 1,872 12 43 12 45
SS Africa 396.1 153,730 388 34 27 10 39
Source: World Bank, World Development Report (1987)
SS is Sub-Saharan Africa
A is Agricutlure
I is Industry
M is Manufacturing
S is Services
higher for Tunisia at 17, compared with 8 for Algeria. Egypt and Morocco 
are lower middle income countries and the corresponding figures of their 
basic indicator is in Table 9.1. Sudan, on the other hand, is the only 
low income country in the region. It is also an LDC. Compared with the 
rest of Africa, North Africa has only one LDC - West Africa has 8, with 
9 in Southern and Eastern Africa. Central Africa has 6. Also with the 
exception-of Sudan, the economies of North African countries are relatively 
stronger than those of sub-Saharan countries. (For comparisons see 
Table 1.2.)
With reference to the profile of each country, Algeria is one of
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the countries classified as "upper middle income". (The other one is 
Tunisia.) They have per capita GNP of $2,100 and $1,400, respectively,
g
estimated for 1981. The Algerian economy is more industrialized and 
diversified than any other economy in North Africa, although it rests 
on a limited base of resources consisting mainly of carbohydrates (oil 
and gas). The revenue from oil at present is 40 per cent. Industrial­
ization has rendered Algeria more self-sufficient in manufactures than
most countries, hence her low foreign trade-GNP ratio of only 41 per 
9
cent. Agriculture accounts for only 6 per cent of GNP due to gross 
inefficiency; reforms have not revitalized the sector. As a result the 
country is dependent on the import of food.
In the case of Egypt, its natural resources are becoming rapidly 
and manifestly inadequate for supporting a large and fast growing 
population. Fortunately, oil depletion and soil exhaustion are balanced 
by two inexhaustible sources income, that is, the Suez Canal and tourism. 
Egypt is a large exporter of labour to Europe and has thereby been able 
to turn surplus manpower from a liability into an asset, though not 
without cost. As a lasting solution, Egypt had embarked earlier than 
most African countries on an ambitious industrialization programme which 
secured for her during the period 1973-84 growth rates in the industrial 
sector (10.3 per cent) and the GNP (8.5 per cent) which were more than 
double those of the average low middle income country (4.2 per cent in 
both cases).^ But in the process Egypt became the leading debtor in 
the region. In May 1987, it reached an agreement with the IMF which 
signalled a change in IMF policy. The programme gave Egypt very 
favourable rescheduling terms for its estimated US$ 44 billion debt.^
A free market for foreign exchange was initiated which led to the 
^depreciation of the Egyptian pound in relation to the dollar.
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Libya has an area of 1,775,000 km and is considered as being
the fourth largest country in Africa. It is bordered north by the
Mediterranean Sea, east by Egypt and Sudan, south and south-west by
Chad and Niger, west by Algeria and finally north-west by Tunisia. Its
population is estimated at 2,939,200 inhabitants, 57 per cent of whom
live in the main urban centres like Tripoli (31.4 per cent), Benghazi
12
(14.5 per cent) and Zawia (11 per cent).
Libya is unique in combining 2.9 per cent of the subregion’s 
population with 19 per cent of its GNP. This gave it a per capita GNP
13
of $7,170 in 1985 and made it the only country classified as high income.
It is totally dependent on oil which accounts for about 60 per cent of
14
the GNP and 99 per cent of the exports. Services, which are closely 
linked to the oil sector, contribute 39 per cent of the GNP, industry 
5 per cent and agriculture 4 per cent.^
Libya is led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who toppled King Idriss 
on 1 September 1969, in a bloodless coup. Once in power he created a 
’state of the masses' (Jamahiriya). His philosophy is called the ’Third 
Universal Theory' - the land becomes the property of all since everyone 
can work it to meet personal needs. Economic activity is no longer 
orientated towards the increase in capital for the ruling class but to 
the meeting of everyone's needs. Production is shared out between 
producers. The 'Third Universal Theory' is meant to be an alternative 
to communism which Gaddafi saw as Godless and the capitalist system which 
he described as exploitative. The governmental structure consists of 
nationwide town meetings called congresses, which are invested with the 
authority to elect people's committees to run the government administration 
and every other state institution.
Libya and Algeria share similar revoltuionary goals and they support
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movements of national liberation. Thus, while there is a superficial 
unity of language and culture among these states, they are in fact 
diverse in political inclinations. They have parochial interests and 
rivalries. For instance, Algeria is in conflict with Morocco over the 
Western Sahara, while relations deteriorated between Libya and Egypt 
over the Camp David Accord (1979).
The Moroccan economy has a fairly wide and balanced base. The 
country has considerable land, mineral, animal and marine (fish) 
resources. It is the world’s leading source of sardines which consti- 
tues about 80 per cent of the catch. It exports about 150,000 tons 
annually.
GNP is divided evenly between production of goods (50 per cent) 
and services (50 per cent); within the former, the share of agriculture, 
extractive industry and manufacturing are nearly equal at 18 per cent,
15 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively. (See Table 9.2.)
Alone in the region, Morocco expanded its exports at a faster rate 
(3.6 per cent) than imports (2.1 per cent) during the period 1973-84."^ 
Nevertheless, the country had balance of trade deficits throughout the 
period 1980-86 with the import/export ratio never exceeding 63 per cent. 
Economic policy has had to concentrate on the issue of foreign debt, 
relations with the EEC which is the main market for Morocco’s exports, 
and with the need to reduce the fiscal deficit. The current adjustment 
programme which is supported by the IMF lays particular emphasis on the 
fiscal deficit, credit control and various structural measures including 
the public sector. The programme has been implemented despite the 
drought, bad crop and unfavourable phosphate prices which put pressure 
On the current account.
Table 9.2 Foreign Trade (1985)
Exports Imports As % of GDP Exports (%) Imports (%)
($mn) E M prim mfd food prim mfd
Sudan 374 771 5 11 96 4 11 24 65
Morocco 2,156 3,885 18 33 60 40 17 41 42
Egypt 4,150 11,200 14 37 90 10 25 14 61
Tunisia 1,738 2,757 24 38 58 42 15 21 64
Algeria 13,034 9,061 22 16 98 2 19 8 73
Libya 10,841 6,614 43 26 98 2 13 13 77
N Africa 32,293 24,288 24 26 92 8 17 17 65
SS Africa 31,861 28,004 21 18 94 6 16 16 64
Source: op. cit.
Key: SS is Sub-Saharan Africa
E is Export
M is Import
mfd is Manufacture 
prim is Primary Sector
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Sudan is the best endowed but least developed of the six countries.
It has 26 per cent and 67 per cent, respectively, of the cultivated and
the cultivable but unused land and no more than 18 per cent of its
population. (See Table 9.1 for estimates of the population.) It is
2
the largest country in Africa with a total area of 2.5 km . It has 
about 200 million hectares of arable land but the area actually cultivated 
amounts to only 18 million hectares. ^  Sudan is a low income country 
with its per capita GNP estimated at $300 in 1985. It turned into an 
exporter of labour to the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. An 
influx of recycled petro-dollars helped the country to achieve a high 
(6.1 per cent) and inflation-free (3.4 per cent) growth during the 1970s. 
In the process, it accumulated a $12 billion debt which it could not 
service. Rescheduling under the auspices of the IMF entailed the imple­
mentation of three programmes of economic reforms and adjustment under 
which the Sudanese pound was devalued 13 times, the GDP fell in real
terms from £S 6.1 billion in 1981-82 to £S 5.5 billion in 1985-86, whereaas
20
the balance of trade deficit rose from £S 533 million to £S 918 million.
The country also experienced more difficulties after the IMF cut its
credit facility for failure to service its IMF debt, on which it had
built considerable arrears. However, in 1987, the government arrived
at an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank on a programme to cut
inflation, reduce public expenditure and reform the public sector. A
first step was taken which was the devaluation of the Sudanese pound
21
on October 1987 by 44 per cent, relative to the US dollar. It is the 
only country in North Africa classified as least developed by the General 
Assembly of the UN.
Tunisia has fertile lands, minerals (including oil), animal wealth 
-and tourist attractions such as bazaars, beaches, historical sites and 
a Mediterranean climate. The Tunisian economy is more open than any
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other in North Africa. (For its export and import figures, see Table 
9.2.) It relies heavily on invisibles, particularly earnings from 
migrant labour and tourism. These factors render the economy vulnerable 
to external forces. Tunisia is looking inwards for solutions to its 
economic problems resulting from factors such as the fall in prices of 
phosphates and the enlargement of the EEC to include Spain and Portugal.
Tunisia was until 1987 governed by one man since its independence -
President Bourguiba who was ousted on 7 November 1987 by General Zine
al-Abidine Ben ali after a team of medical specialists declared the
former President incapable of doing his job. But General Ben Ali
declared that no major changes were expected in both the domestic and
22
foreign policy spheres. The declaration left Tunisia as the most open 
of all the countries.
It is not only in the economic sphere that differences exist between 
the countries of North Africa. If we look at the political sphere, we 
find that there are differences in the ideologies, systems of government, 
and the projection of national personalities. For example, Morocco is 
the most traditional of the world’s surviving monarchies. The ruling 
Alaonite family have been in power since the mid-seventeenth century and 
they have deeply ingrained rituals of dress and behaviour characterizing 
the royal court. However, it is not on the differences that the ECA was 
relying in its dealings with these countries. The Commission sought to 
exploit the similarities in the economic and social aspects of life in 
the subregion. First, the ECA counted on the fact that the countries 
have similar degrees of success in meeting the basic needs of their 
people. The Overseas Development Council's Physical Quality of Life 
Index (PQLI) is a composite index which measures infant mortality, life 
expectancy and basic literacy on a scale of 0 to 100. The PQLI scores
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for Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are 47, 49 and 62, respectively.
In 1979, a survey of 150 countries ranked Tunisia 50th, Algeria 51st 
and Morocco 60th in terms of the PQLI score (see Table 9.3). Apart 
from similarities, the ECA also relied on the common history and the 
fact that Islam is a unifying factor in the subregion. In Algeria,
Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, Islam is the state religion, while 
95 per cent of the population in the Sudan are Muslims. Also the 
countries are Arab in culture. But unity is an illusion when we consider 
the relations between the states. In reality North Africa has never 
functioned as a single political or economic entity. Each state is pro­
foundly suspicious of its immediate neighbours. The external problem 
of the Maghreb countries, for instance, have largely been with each other. 
There is a deep-seated mistrust between them which has its roots in 
ethnic and dynastic rivalries long ante-dating the coming of the Turks 
and the French. Tunisia has long feared Algeria and today feels threatened 
by Libya. In 1980 Libya supported a guerrilla raid on the Tunisian 
mining town of Gafsa. Also Libya expelled some 30,000 Tunisian workers 
in 1985. Given such incidents, and many other examples could be cited, 
political instability and conflict between the countries, it was un­
realistic for the ECA to count so much on unity in North Africa.
The position of the ECA in North Africa is further jeopardized
because the Maghrebs have a closer relationship with Europe than with
sub-Saharan Africa. So while they are concerned about what goes on in
sub-Saharan Africa or in intra-African politics, their concern is more
likely to find verbal than physical expression. The North African
countries are more inclined to the Arab League than the 0AU. When the
US attacked Libya in the Gulf of Sirte, Gaddafi did not appeal to either
24
-Africa or the 0AU but to the Arab League. Thus, in the wider context 
of fostering regional economic co-operation, the role of the ECA in North
E^able 9.3 Selected Data
COUNTRY MOROCCO ALGERIA TUNISIA LIBYA
Population (1982 estimate - millions) 22.5 20.2 6.7 3.4
Percent rural (1980)1 59 56 48 48
Percent urban 41 44 52 52
Arable land exploited (*000 ha) - 1980* 7,497 7,719 4,970 2,000
Population/arable land 2.9/ha 2.6/ha 1.3/ha 1.7/ha
Irrigated land ('000 ha) 340 750 185 na
Pasture, forest & scrub land per 
rural person - 1980* 3.4 ha 1.4 ha 1.6 ha 5 ha
Percent of workforce in agriculture 
(1981 estimate) 52 223 34 19
Percent of workforce in industry 21 28^ 33 28
Percent of workforce in services 27 50 33 53
Percent unemployment (1982 estimate) 20+ 20-25 20-25 na
GNP/capita (1981)2 $869 $2,129 $1,417 $8,560
GDP 1982 (Economic Trends Reports 
estimates) $15 billion $40 billion $6.4 billion $13 billion
GNP/capita growth rate (1981-82) 1.7 4.0 1.5* -55
Physical Quality of Life Index2 47 49 62 55
Birth rate per 1,0002 45 46 35 47
Death rate per 1,0002 14 14 11 13
Life expectancy at birth2 55 56 58 55
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births2 107 118 100 100
Literacy2 28 35 62 50
Per capita public education - 19792 $49 $131 $67 $358
Per capita military expenditures - 19792 $44 $33 $9 $171
Total exports for 19812- ($ millions) 2,160 14,056 2,209 16,391
Total imports cif 19812- ($ millions) 4,487 11,505 3,923 15,414
Debt service ratio (1982 estimate) 36% 18-25% 12% na
./cont.
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frable 9.3 (cont.)
* Based on dinar, not dollar, values.
1. From the World Bank's World Development Report for 1982 and conversations with World Bank officals.
2. From US Foreign Policy and the Third World, Agenda for 1983, The Overseas Development Council, 
Washington, DC (New York: Praeger, 1983).
3. US Agricultural Attache Rabat, Report AG-2001 (3 May 1982), Agricultural Situation.
4. Revised to reflect decrease in agricultural percentage of workforce in 1981.
Note: 1980 is the last "normal" year for Morocco for which data are available.
Source: Richard B. Parker (ed.), North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns, Praeger,
New York, 1984, p. 17.
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Africa is highly debatable. As the ECA cannot get the states to agree
on issues relating to development, the Commission's claim of being a
25
catalytic agent in development is far-fetched.
3. TANGIER MULPOC: STRUCTURES, ORGANS, FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER 
RESOURCES
At the onset the terms of reference of the MULPOC were as follows:
(a) to identify areas of technical assistance for the countries of the
subregion;
(b) to establish contacts with countries of the subregion;
(c) to obtain documents and information required by the ECA;
(d) to carry out studies as needed in the subregion;
26
(e) to brief experts and review their reports.
When we consider these terms of reference in the context of the 
general theme of the MULPOCs, we notice that an important facet referring 
to economic co-operation had been initially omitted. The primary role 
of the North African MULPOC was to be a forum for the exchange of ideas 
and an agent for data-gathering and the publication of documents such 
as the annual Economic and Social Condition in North Africa. Because 
it had no part to play in economic co-operation, the identification, 
formulation and implementation of programmes was omitted from the terms 
of reference. It also followed that no provision was made for the MULPOC 
to monitor concrete programmes. The omission of such fundamental aspects 
meant that the ECA's role in the subregion was inevitably of a general 
nature. Officials of the ECA are aware of such constraining factors on 
the role of the Commssion and feel that there is a need to change the 
terms of reference by making them reflect the specific characteristics
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of North Africa. ECA officials agree that they cannot ignore Afro-Arab 
co-operation, for instance. In the last two decades, numerous funds 
designed to extend financial aid to the LDCs, including the Arab countries, 
have been established. For example:, the Saudi Fund for Arab Economic 
Development and the Arab Fund for Afro-Arab Co-operation. Also, 25 per 
cent of the population of Africa belong to the Arab countries and most
27
of the Population of the 20 Arab states is within the African continent. 
Therefore, the ECA stated that it has been an "obvious role and respon­
sibility in the promotion of Afro-Arab co-operation in economic and
28
social development". Although it recognized the need to play a role
in this direction, it has not been able to determine the form and strategy
for it. In 1981 the Commission identified two areas of activities. It
can either act as intermediary in programme implementation of existing
agencies for financing development programmes or it can be a depository
of development data and information on socio-economic matters for Afro-
Arab co-operation. In fact, the ECA has shelved the whole idea because
it has neither the staff nor the financial resources to take up additional 
29
activities. Also a role in Afro-Arab co-operation suggests a link with 
other Afro-Arab institutions but the MULPOC has no formal agreement on 
co-operation with institutions such as the Arab League.
Apart from the fact that the terms of reference acts as an internal 
constraint on the MULPOC, there are other types of constraints. The 
structure of the MULPOC is itself a constraint. We stated earlier on 
that the MULPOC was undeveloped. This is mainly because of two reasons.
First, it is the only MULPOC without a fully-fledged policy otgan. While 
all others have a Council of Ministers as a supreme body for making 
decisions, from its inception the Tangier MULPOC had a Council of Pleni­
potentiaries. The inaugural meeting of experts held in 1978 recommended 
that this should be the highest policy organ. , The Council of Plenipotentiaries
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is made up of representatives chosen by each country and they are 
usually professionals and specialists who study and make recommendations 
on reports submitted by the ECA to their meetings. It also includes 
envoys given full powers to take decisions by their respective govern­
ments. The Regional Adviser of the MULPOC pointed out that initially 
the ECA wanted the participation of the states at it meetings. "They 
wanted a system to bring the states together and at the time, it was
30the Council of Plenipotentiaries which offered the best possibility."
The main problem here is that usually the ministers for development 
planning are more versed in matters relating to socio-economic develop­
ment and they are not attending the meetings in the case of North Africa.
The meetings of the Council of Plenipotentiaries were usually held 
yearly, but the MULPOC has adopted the decision made initially by the 
Niamey MULPOC in 1987 that the policy organs meeting will be held every 
two years, with effect from 1989.
In addition to the Council of Plenipotentiaries, the MULPOC has 
a Committee of experts made up of technicians and specialists on aspects 
of development. This organ prepares the drafts of documents to be 
forwarded to the Council of Plenipotentiaries and it meets before the 
latter. In practice, at their meetings the experts go through the drafts 
presented to them by the ECA, checking for logic and terminologies and 
then they make recommendations as to the form the draft should take.
The ECA will then do the write-up and make representations to the Council 
of Plenipotentiaries. Sometimes, the Committee of Experts will consider 
requests by individual states and include them in the draft. But so far 
the ECA has been unable to meet such requests due to lack of funds, and 
also because it does not deal on country-by-country basis. In addition 
to these two policy organs there is a sub-committee on the women's 
programme.
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The second reason why this MULPOC is undeveloped has to do with
its source of funding. It is the only MULPOC that is funded directly
by the ECA. The ECA funds the MULPOC on a monthly basis. The monthly
31
running costs being around US$ 10,000-US$ 11,000 approximately. The 
money is purely for administrative costs such as telephone bills, 
salaries, supply of stationery and electricity. The ECA also pays for 
its meetings and workshops, but it does not pay for the main programmes 
of the MULPOC. In fact, it relies solely on the UNDP for funds to carry 
out its programmes. This dependence on the UNDP has severe consequences. 
For example, at present the MULPOC has not been able to carry out any 
programmes because it made representation to the UNDP requesting for more 
funds to cover the period 1987-91. At the moment the ECA is still waiting 
to see if the UNDP will provide funds. The resulting uncertainty is 
profound, particularly as the member states themselves have not made 
direct financial contributions to the MULPOC. No one seems to know 
whether the MULPOC will carry out any programmes for the period in ques­
tion if the UNDP fails to provide the funds. Lack of finance was thus 
one of the major constraints on the MULPOC.
The other major constraint was its manpower resources. When the 
ECA had to report to ECOSOC in 1982 on matters relating to the financing 
of the MULPOCs on an established basis, it made the following estimates 
for posts in Tangier:
Tangier
Staffing
Total Local 
D-l P-5 P-4 P-3 Profs Level Total
Existing posts 
Proposed new posts 
Total
Source: Report of the ECOSOC on Financing of. the MULPOCs of the ECA
on an Established Basis, General Assembly Doc. A/C.5/37/02.9, 
December 1982, p. 3.
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Key:
D-l is for the Head of the MULPOC (Director). He is a
political appointee, and he is responsible for the 
implementation of programmes approved by the ECA 
policy organs. He also has to consult government 
officials and other inter-governmental organizations. 
This post is for ex-ministers, academics and long­
standing officers of international institutions.
P-3 to P-5 is for senior officers. It is made up of economic
affairs officers who undertake sectoral and topical 
studies; design multinational projects and conduct 
research; assist the director in the management of 
the centre. These are usually the international civil 
servants.
Local Level is made up of staff recruited at the local level,
usually referred to as the General Service staff.
They include the administrative assistants, secretaries, 
typists, drivers, messengers and cleaners.
The estimate by the ECA shows that before 1983 the MULPOC had a 
skeleton staff only. There were two professionals and four local level 
staff. Currently, there is a slight increase in the number of staff 
but the increase is mostly at the junior level. The present staffing 
position of the MULPOC is as follows:
1 Director 
1 Regional Adviser 
1 Finance Officer 
1 Senior Administrative Assistant 
1 Secretary
1 Telex/Telephone Operator 
1 Driver
1 Messenger
2 Day/Night Watchmen 
1 Cleaner
The total number of staff is therefore 11 of which three are profes- 
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sionals. The MULPOC lost two staffing positions in the last two 
^years, these were (a) the post of the Librarian/Secretary whose appoint­
ment was terminated in May 1987 at the end of his contract. The MULPOC
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had no funds to renew the contract and as a result the present staff 
are left to man the library in addition to their respective duties; 
and (b) that of the co-ordinator of the women’s programme. As we shall 
see, this MULPOC also has wide work programmes. But its present man­
power cannot cope. The result is that the ECA has used consultants 
to carry out most of its studies in North Africa. For example, in 
the agricultural sector, they carried out the study on co-operation and 
trade in food and agricultural production among Egypt, Sudan, Morocco 
and Tunisia (1983); and another concerning the expansion and strengthen­
ing of cereals and livestock production between Egypt and the Sudan 
(1983).
With reference to recruitment of staff, the MULPOC was responsible 
for recruiting local level staff, while the headquarters handled that 
of the professionals. We found that all the local level staff had been 
working there for a very long time but most of them still have temporary 
appointments, reviewed on a yearly basis. Two of them had worked for 
over 20 years but only had their appointments confirmed in the last two 
years, for example. The staff were well versed in the procedures of the 
UN and were aware of the handicaps of the ECA. However, their interests 
were not properly seen to by headquarters. When staff have problems, 
they have to write to the headquarters and it took a period of up to 
six months to get the replies. As with the other MULPOCs, the ECA does 
not send staff to the MULPOC to attend to the needs of its workers.
As in other MULPOCs, the role of the director is very limited.
He has no autonomy on any matter relating to the MULPOC. All matters 
are referred to headquarters. The idea of using political appointees 
for the posts of directors has its shortcomings. If the director has 
no interest in what is happening in Africa, then his job is just to
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be there and carry on with administrative procedures. Bringing in 
directors from outside the UN system means that they have to spend 
time trying to understand UN procedures. This creates tension between 
the directors and other staff. For instance, the present director of 
the MULPOC is an ex-minister of development planning of Libya. He is 
new to UN procedures. Also he is fluent in Arabic but does not under­
stand French. Most of the documents are in French, English and to a 
lesser extent in Arabic. The result is that staff spend time translating 
letters and documents from English and French to Arabic. The director 
took over two years ago when the former director retired in accordance 
with UN regulations, he has not yet achieved a cordial relationship with 
the rest of the staff, and he is having to learn about UN procedures, 
something which has caused uneasiness with staff at times.
Unlike the other MULPOCs, however, we found that the Tangier MULPOC 
has had a stable staff turnover. The previous directors have had on 
average 8-12 years of service. The result is that it has not experienced 
instability of leadership brought about by the frequent changing of 
directors which the Niamey and Yaounde MULPOCs have experienced.
4. TANGIER MULPOC: WORK PROGRAMMES
Throughout the 1980s the MULPOC had been trying to implement a 
work programme approved at its inaugural meeting of the Committee of 
experts in 1978, but most of the programmes were studies, seminars and 
a few workshops. The Committee of Experts selected five sectors, namely, 
trade, industry, transport and communications, agriculture and human 
resources. The meeting further recommended that the ECA secretariat 
should prepare terms of reference and proposals on specific programmes
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in each of the five sectors for submission to the policy organs to
enable the latter to formulate action-oriented projects for the approval
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of the Council of Plenipotentiaries. This was the first indication 
that the member states wanted action-oriented or concrete programmes.
We found very little of this throughout the ECA's programmes for North 
Africa. The one area where the ECA attempted to implement a concrete 
project is in the Transport and Communications Sector but its efforts 
have been plagued by major obstacles such as lack of finance and dupli­
cation of effort. Before going into details of this, we shall look at 
each sector in turn, bearing in mind the ECA’s set of objectives and 
whether such were achieved.
The development objective of the work programmes was aimed at
"contributing to the solution of problems through strengthening the
activities of the MULPOC in the five sectors, but top priority was given
to two sectors - agriculture and human resources, with specific reference
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to the participation of women in the development process".
(a) Agriculture
The immediate objectives of the programme were to increase food
and agricultural production and to strengthen and expand co-operation
in trade in food and agricultural products among the countries of the
subregion. According to the ECA, "one of the main problems hampering
the development of agriculture and food production in North Africa is
the insufficiency of existing subregional mechanisms to initiate, expand
35
and strengthen co-operation at the subregional level". The programme 
was considered to be essential for attaining the goals of the Regional 
Food Plan for Africa (AFPLAN). This is a programme which the ECA adopted 
in 1978. In conformity with the Freetown Declaration for making the
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region self-sufficient in food within the 1980s, AFPLAN provided 
governments with guidelines for re-orientating their agricultural 
development policy and increasing food production and thus the region's 
self-sufficiency ratio. The Plan was prepared because of the poor 
performance of the agriculture sector. The average growth rate of total 
agricultural output was 1.4 per cent per annum during the period 1970-77, 
while that of food production was 1.5 per cent or less, far below the 
growth rate in population.
With reference to the implementation of AFPLAN, the ECA aimed
at strengthening the institutions in agriculture and food production and
in the use of the mass media for boosting food production. How did it
propose to carry this out? Through the recommendations made by the
policy organs we found that the ECA's strategy was to carry out studies.
The recommendations for the first study on co-operation and trade in food
and agricultural production among Egypt, Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia
prepared in September 1983 was endorsed by the Council of Plenipotentiaries
meeting held in 1984. A second study concerning the expansion and
strengthening of cereals and livestock production between Egypt and the
Sudan was also completed in 1983. A third and final study on co-operation
and trade in food and agricultural production among Algeria, the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco and Tunisia had to be postponed to early 1985
at the request of member states. This was completed by 1986 and the
report distributed to the FAO and the member states. All the studies
were undertaken with the support and co-operation of the FAO. According
to the Regional Adviser of the MULPOC, the FAO provided about US$ 20,000
37
which enabled the ECA to carry out the studies. What is striking is 
that for all the studies, the ECA used the services of consultants despite 
^the fact that it has qualified staff at the secretariat who could have 
done the job, thereby reducing the costs of the studies. The other
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important finding is that the heavy emphasis on studies means that in 
terms of actual output and impact on agriculture, it is not possible 
to point to concrete evidence nor does it enable us to access such. 
Moreover, it is difficult to see how these studies can provide solutions 
to the sector, even though the ECA was of the opinion that the "ways and 
means indicated in the programme for overcoming the problems were con­
sidered adequate, despite the fact that they were defined at a general 
level".38
(b) Industry
For industry the ECA followed a programme which was in line with 
the objectives of the Industrial Development Decade Programme for Africa 
(IDDA). In 1980 the Lagos Economic Summit of the OAU adopted the years 
1980-90 as the Industrial Development Decade for Africa. Industrial 
development was seen as a driving force for economic growth and overall 
development. For this the ECA prepared and presented a document entitled 
Initial Integrated Industrial Promotion Programme for the North African 
Subregion. The main objectives of the proposal were to promote policy 
measures and institutional mechanisms that would facilitate the efforts 
of government organs to plan, promote and implement integrated industrial 
programmes at both the national and subregional levels. A detailed 
examination of the document revealed that the proposal contained a set 
of feasibility and prefeasibility studies on aspects such as engineering, 
leather, textile and agro-based industries. The ECA hoped that the member 
states would approve these studies in the Council of Plenipotentiaries.
The member states indicated that they wanted an identification of 
multinational projects in chemicals, basic metals, engineering and agro­
based industries. But the ECA was only able to make provisions for a
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study to be carried out on the development of forest-based industries 
in 1981. It has been unable to carry this out because of the lack of 
funds. In addition, the ECA organized workshops such as the African 
regional workshop of experts on the role of private business and para- 
statals.
Again in terms of output and impact of its programme, the ECA 
was unable to achieve much in the industrial sector. There is definitely 
a discrepancy between the forceful and sometimes grandiose terminology 
adopted by the ECA and the actual output and impact of its programmes.
The Secretariat referred to the lack of follow-up activities at
the national level as the "principal obstacle to the implementation of
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its programme" for the industrial sector. But we found that the
principal obstacle was the ECA itself for proposing unrealistic programmes
with very vague objectives and strategies. Secondly, the programmes are
not only ambitious but the ECA lacks the manpower and financial resources
for implementation. The Commission admitted later on that "during the
period 1984-86 many problems were encountered in the implementation of
the IDDA programme, the main one being the financial constraints especially
for staff travel. The programme also suffered from a high rate of
vacancies, as a result of which some activities related to the programme 
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were postponed". As in the case of industry and indeed other sectors, 
the ECA has been unable to carry out any new programmes since 1986 due 
to the lack of funds.
(c) Human resources
In the field of human resources, the ECA has two main objectives, 
^namely, (i) the establishment of genuine co-operation and co-ordination 
among national institutions, and (ii) the integration of women into the
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process of development. For the attainment of the first objective, 
the ECA set out the proposal for the establishment of a North African 
Graduate Institute of Management. It also drew up the constitution of 
the entity and set out to convince.member states that the institution 
was necessary and that they should all join it. Member states do not 
feel the need for this institution. Egypt refused to sign the constitu­
tion on the grounds that similar ones already exist. The constitution 
stipulates that once four states have signed, the institution would 
start to operate. But as at June 1988 only three states have indicated 
their interest. By their action the member states have avoided the 
duplication of efforts.
In the case of the second objective the ECA aimed at improving 
the condition of women and the programme opted for was the establishment 
and strengthening of national and subregional machineries for particip­
ation of women in development. As part of its strategy the ECA through 
the ATRCW in Addis Ababa organized three studies —  Women and Co-operatives: 
Egypt, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Sudan, published in 1980; Study 
on the Condition of Women in Morocco, 1981; and the study on Women and 
the Mass Media in Africa: Case Study of Egypt, 1981. It also organized 
two workshops on participation of women in development through co­
operatives, Khartoum, Sudan, 1980, and that on rural women leaders, also 
in Sudan 1981. Finally the Commission had a seminar for professional 
training in traditional and non-traditional crafts held in Tunis, May 
1984.
The UNDP budget for the women’s programme was US$ 231,953 for the
duration of 16 months. And the Voluntary Funds of the UN for the Women’s
Decade approved the grant of US$ 20,000 for the training of female 
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managers in 1985. These in effect were the funds used by the MULPOC 
for the programme.
The operational activities for the women’s programme were very 
much delayed by difficulties in identifying and recruiting experts and 
consultants from within the subregion. This was particularly the case 
of the women’s co-ordinator because it was required that the expert 
should be selected among the candidates nominated by the countries 
themselves. So although the programme was approved in 1980, it only 
became operational in September 1983 when the co-ordinator assumed her 
duties. According to the MULPOC the major obstacles to the production 
of outputs in this sector were: (1) inadequacy of logistic support;
(2) difficulties of communication within the subregion; and (3) in-
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sufficiency of information on women's condition at the national level.
In addition to the fact that the co-ordinator assumed duty in 1983 we 
found out during the fieldwork that she was unable to carry out her 
duties effectively because she spent so much time travelling and not 
enough time doing the job. No programmes were actually implemented 
successfully during her tenure of office. Her appointment was terminated 
in 1986 and since then no women's programme has been implemented by the 
MULPOC up to June 1988. The appointment was terminated due to lack of 
funds and the fact that her contract had expired. However there is an 
attempt to review the programme with the aims of reviving it. Egypt 
has offered to send in another co-ordinator on condition that the ECA 
will pay her rent. But as the regional adviser pointed out during a 
discussion there are no such provisions in the UN system. As a result 
of this no further action has been taken. The ECA has also submitted 
its proposal for this subsector to the UNDP for more funds. At present 
the UNDP has not yet given any favourable reply. But it is difficult 
to see how the programmes implemented so far can lead to the integration 
of women in development either directly or indirectly.
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(d) Population and water resource/environment
In the 1980s the MULPOC added two more sectors to its work pro­
grammes, namely, population and water resources/environment. The former 
was as a result of the member states’ concern over the problems of 
migrant labour within North Africa and to Europe. Countries such as 
Egypt and Tunisia are having to look for ways of absorbing their nationals 
who have lost their jobs in Europe in particular as a result of redund­
ancy policies and the recession. But the ECA has abandoned its plan for 
a study on migration for lack of funds. For the water resources and 
environment sector, discussions are still going on about the possibility 
of establishing a subregional committee on water and environment. The 
Committee in expected to advise North African countries in managing and 
developing their water resources and in giving due consideration to the 
related environmental issues. The ECA made the proposal for the Committee 
in 1984. No decisions have been made concerning this Committee as at 
April 1988.
(e) Transport and communications
As had been indicated earlier on, the ECA is attempting to implement 
a concrete programme in the transport and communications sector. It 
agreed on the establishment of the North African Documentation and 
Information System (NADIS) in March 1983. NADIS is to be the subregional 
arm of the Pan-African Documentation and Information System (PADIS) which 
is based at the ECA headquarters. PADIS was created for the exchange 
of information and data on development in Africa. (This aspect of the 
ECA’s programme is covered extensively in Chapter 2.) The ECA has 
purchased the computer and necessary gadgets for NADIS but the decision 
"was taken that NADIS should be established and located within the Arab
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League Documentation System (ALDOC) for a transitional period of three 
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years. This decision was taken for three main reasons. The first
one had to do with finance. Even though the UNDP has provided some
funds for NADIS, member states have to supplement the costs of running
it. Secondly, the ECA at present has no trained manpower for NADIS and
so they depend on the Arab League. (The Arab League is providing
training facilities for ECA staff at present.) Thirdly, ALDOC has been
serving member states of the MULPOC and the ECA is hoping to draw from
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its experience and existing knowledge. After the transitional period
of three years, NADIS will be re-located at the MULPOC office in Tangier.
However, the ECA is encountering other problems in its efforts to set
up NADIS. Apart from the lack of finance and trained manpower, it has
been unable to solve the problem of duplication and wastage of resources
liable to result from the creation of NADIS. The Egyptian delegation
referred to other systems existing such as ALDOC and that of UNESCO and
were of the opinion that the establishment of NADIS will create further
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duplication and financial repercussions for member states. Egypt
further maintained that she would not associate with any financial
implications arising from efforts to establish NADIS especially as she
is facing economic problems and also due to the fact that NADIS is to
be housed in the Arab League ^ Egypt not a membeijf# Even though
Egypt expressed concern about duplication of efforts, the ECA maintained
that a decision to establish NADIS had already been taken by the Council
of Plenipotentiaries and the Commission was mainly concerned with the
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implementation of that decision. This is the second time we have 
found evidence of duplication of efforts, the first occurring in the 
human resources sector. But in both cases, the ECA did not see dupli­
cation as a problem as it pressed on with the implementation of the 
decision regardless of the implications.
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In the case of transport, the MULPOC was able to complete studies 
on regional port projects of North Africa; the study on the planning 
and development of ports, and the study on tariff harmonization in 
North African ports. All studies were financed by the EEC and formed 
part of programmes implemented for the United Nations Transport and 
Communications Decade in Africa (1978-1988).
(f) Trade
The activities of the ECA in the trade sector are dealt with 
extensively under the next sub-heading of this chapter which relates 
to the peculiar problems in North Africa. The main proposal is the 
establishment of a Preferential Trade Area (PTA). This is an attempt 
by the ECA to set up yet another institution in Africa and we doubt 
whether it has understood the real implications, especially as the 
member states appear not to be ready for a PTA.
The Commission estimated the implementation rate of its work 
programme for this MULPOC as follows:
Sector % Rate of Implementation
1. Trade • 50
2. Industry 0
3. Water resources and environment 50
4. Population 30
5. Agriculture 100
6 . NADIS 50
7. Human resources 50
Average (excluding women’s programme component) 47
Source: Performance Report of the MULPOCs 1977-1984,
ECO Divsion, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1984, p. 33.
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The figures show that the Tangier MULPOC had the second lowest rate 
of implementation. The lowest was for Yaounde at 23.5 per cent (Niamey's
rate was 66 per cent, Lusaka 63 per cent and Gisenyi 54.5 per cent,
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respectively.) The figures confirm the non co-operation between the 
countries and other problems the ECA is facing in North Africa.
5. THE PECULIAR PROBLEMS IN THE SUBREGION AND THE ECA'S RESPONSE
The political climate in North Africa is not very favourable for
economic co-operation. The ECA has diagnosed the main problem areas
but has put its priority on the trade sector. One of the problems here
has to do with the difficulties in servicing external debts, plus the
financial squeeze in the subregion. According to the ECA, external
debt is emerging as the most critical development constraint. Allowing
for incomplete information, debt reporting lags and definitional variations
in tentative statistics, North African external debt has grown from
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US$ 17.5 billion in 1987 to around US$ 100 billion in 1988. The
Commission is not only concerned with the sheer size of the debt but
the escalation of the debt in relation to ability to manage it. Debt
service ratios of 38.5 per cent and 28.9 per cent for 1986 and 1987,
respectively are formidable. It pointed out that only Algeria was able
to meet in full both its substantial debt services obligations estimated
at about 62 per cent of exports and workers’ remittances in 1986 and
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simultaneously cater for critical import demands.
The next facet of economic problems relate to the oil market 
situation. North Africa also has importers of oil and the rise in 
the price of this commodity has different effects: importers had to
contend with an increased import bill while in 1986 many of them bene­
fited very substantially from lower prices. ,,0il exporters on the other
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hand, benefit through increased revenues.
Up-to-date the countries still look to the developed world for 
their trade. Trade among the Maghreb countries amounts to only 2 per 
cent of their total foreign trade. The figure has remained around 
this since the late 1970s. A number of factors are responsible for the 
low level of subregional trade. While potentially tradeable commodities 
can be produced, the economies were not diversified to create comple­
mentary markets in final goods. They also lack the structure to exploit 
opportunities. Primary commodities are exported to Europe to be 
processed into final goods and then imported to the subregion. The one 
exception is oil where through special arrangements exporters supply 
their neighbours. Even where potentially tradeable goods are produced, 
they are likely to be sold outside the subregion on account of the lack 
of infrastructures and commercial barriers.
In effect, the developed market economies continue to dominate 
the external trade of the area. This group absorbs and supplies most 
of the exports and imports. There is a further consequence of this 
domination. The enlargement of the EEC to the Northern Mediterranean 
countries such as Spain and Portugal, and the emergence of the new 
industrialized countries (NICs) in Asia and Latin America limit the 
export prospects of the countries with respect to agricultural and 
industrial products. North Africa faces competition from the EEC and 
NICs because of the low maritime costs and the advancement of agricultural 
production. Both Tunisia and Algeria, for example, produce identical 
products such as phosphates with Spain and Portugal. Hence, one 
possible solution is the re-orientation of trade flows within an intra- 
subregional framework and between the subregion and sub-Saharan Africa.
But how can this be achieved when North Africa has never functioned
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as one economic unit? The ECA argues that both socially and ecologi­
cally North Africa is better suited for economic integration than most 
other subregions. It points to the fact that the population is fairly 
homogeneous, and that the subregion is essentially a geographical unit 
surrounded by the sea and desert with no natural barrier dividing it. 
Furthermore, infrastructure links between most countries in the sub- 
region are in general better than any other subregion. And although 
the countries are mainly primary commodity producers, economic variations 
among them are marked. None of the countries is self-sufficient even 
in basic needs. The objective indicators correspond to the ECA's 
findings but the evidence suggests that subjectively they are not 
ready for the solution proposed by the ECA. The Commission is seeking 
to promote trade in the area and had put forward its plan for the 
establishment of a Preferential Trade Area (PTA). The drafts on the 
possibility and arrangements for the establishment of the PTA was 
approved by the Council of Plenipotentiaries in 1985. After extensive 
discussions the member states agreed in principle that the PTA should 
be established, by Resolution No. 2 of March 1987. They agreed to 
institute negotiations for a treaty for the PTA and a payment and 
clearing arrangement. They also by this resolution established an 
Inter-governmental Team of Experts (INT) to define steps to be taken 
to set up the PTA. The INT consists of Directors of Planning, Ministers 
of Commerce, Ministers of Co-operation and National Economy, the Deputy 
Executive Secretary of the ECA, the Director of International Trade 
and Finance (ECA) and the Chief, Economic Co-operation Office of the 
ECA.
The Executive Secretary of the ECA has continue in his efforts 
X-o promote the idea of a PTA. While attending the meeting of the Council 
of Plenipotentiaries in 1988 he described the PTA as uan innovation in
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so far as it would bring together all the six countries of North 
Africa which were determined to create an autonomous and self- 
sustaining economy for the prosperity of the member countries". ^
In all the ECA has given three main reasons for the PTA, namely,
(1) to increase trade; (2) to develop their own productivity so as 
to equip them with resources to confront the present world crisis; 
and (3) to enable the subregion to tackle development problems more 
effectively. This is by providing an effective agency for co­
operation with the aim of achieving systematic utilization of available
resources in the creation of complexes within the framework of the 
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PTA.
The ECA is poised to exploit the potential of North Africa. For 
example, a combined North African market would cater for nearly 58
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million people rising to around 100 million by the end of the century.
This would give impetus to large-scale industrial projects such as
Algeria’s planned car factory, as well as a major market for agricultural
exporters such as Morocco and Tunisia (both threatened by the EEC). As
Libya’s union with Morocco indicated, closer ties could redeploy labour
from regions of high unemployment to countries where migrant labour
still had a role to play. Around 30,000 Moroccans were working in Libya 
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in 1985.
The Commission has set a tentative timetable for the PTA as 
follows:
(1) 19-24 March 1988 - Preparation and discussion of the draft of 
the PTA treaty;
(2) 24-28 October 1988 - Examination of sectoral studies to identify 
areas of co-operation and to assemble the necessary elements for 
preparing the treaty and the protocols;
- 406 -
(3) 15-30 June 1989 - Preparation and discussion of draft protocols;
(4) 25-29 September 1989 - Finalization of treaty and protocols with 
the participation of legal counsellors from member states;
(5) 19-21 December 1989 - Extraordinary meeting of trade, finance and 
planning ministers to examine the drafts of treaties and protocols 
before their submission to the Plenipotentiaries;
(6) March 1990 - Meeting of Plenipotentiaries to adopt the treaty 
and protocols. During this meeting they will discuss the treaty, 
the protocols and the report of the INT group and they will decide 
the venus and the date of a summit of Heads of State and Govern­
ment at which the treaty will be signed.
On paper the ECA's proposals look promising. The area has potential
and there is a need to restructure trade and other sectors of their
economy. But the road to the PTA is paved with fundamental difficulties
such as the lack of an institutional framework for economic co-operation
between the states. A recent mission by the ECA to the countries of
North Africa made it quite clear that the absence of institutions to
involve the countries in actual deliberations and negotiations leading
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to the PTA was a major obstacle towards its objective. Therefore, 
the ECA is in the process of creating yet another institution when the 
governemnts are not yet ready for it nor do they have the facilities 
for processing the arrangements towards a PTA.
Moreover, the creation of a PTA in itself is not sufficient to 
tap market opportunities within the area. This would largely depend 
upon the availability of goods to be traded and on the co-ordination 
of production and investment policies. Food is one item which constitutes 
"A large percentage of the import bills of many of the North African 
countries. Clearly, this situation cannot be rectified by trade
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liberalization. Part of the solution lies in investment in this field. 
The Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID) 
was created in 1976 for this purpose. But its function is to encourage 
food production throughout the Arab world (including North Africa), but 
not to promote trade in food within the area. Also food exporting 
countries in North Africa do not offer export credit facilities. This 
is why Sudan cannot buy enough of Egyptian rice; instead it imports 
Italian rice. Solving the problem requires creating some form of import 
financing agency to offer export credits on a multilateral basis in the 
area.
There are other obstacles to the PTA, namely, the fact that their 
economies are competitive and not complementary to each other; high trade 
barriers; the fact that most of the countries have the inability to 
acquire sophisticated goods from each other since none of them produces 
these goods; and the lack of payment facilities. Also we have to con­
sider the establishment of the PTA against the history of integration 
and co-operation in the area. North Africa has a poor history in this 
respect. The Pan-Arab integration arrangements of 1953, the Arab 
Common Market 1964 and Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee 1964 
failed to function for political and other reasons. This brings us to 
the disruptive effects of political conflicts and rivalries among the 
countries. These conflicts take the form of shifts in axis and alliances. 
Thus, the rift between Sudan and Libya in the early 1980s led to the 
enhancement of Sudanese-Egyptian ties until the popular uprising of 1985 
in Sudan prompted a shift from Egypt to Libya. Likewise, the recon­
ciliation of Libya and Morocco which culminated in a unity pact indued 
Tunisia and Algeria to come closer to each other. What these show is 
„that the political climate of constant conflict between the states 
present a major obstacle to any plans for integration and co-operation
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and the PTA. And yet the ECA is playing down the significance of 
politics in the subregion. Progress towards the PTA depends to a 
greater extent on the political conditions of the subregion as had been 
the case in previous steps towards co-operation and integation. As a 
Tunisian delegate summed it up, "The North African countries, feeling 
the weight of the political problems that have divided them for so long, 
unfortunately marked time in terms of establishing efficient multi­
lateral bodies as nuclei for promoting co-operation. After initiating 
economic integration measures they have remained timid" . ^
6. CONCLUSION
The MULPOC in Tangier has not benefited from its long history and 
experience as a subregional office in the 1960s. It has basically 
remained as an outreach of the headquarters and was directly financed 
through the regular budget of the ECA. Apart from being an outpost of 
the headquarters it has remained largely ineffective in the subregion 
for various reasons attributed to its structure, functions and programmes. 
The MULPOC lacked the finance, the manpower and other resources to enable 
it to play a meaningful role in the area. It is out of touch with 
reality, unwieldy and incompetent to tackle development problems in the 
area, because it concentrated on surveys, studies an seminars without 
iplementing concrete programmes. It has largely ignored the Afro-Arab 
feature of the area and also the political climate there.
One of the highlights of the achievements of this MULPOC is in the 
transport and communications sector, with plans to establish NADIS. It 
has purchased the computer and the necessary gadgets. Also a decision 
has been taken for NADIS to be located within the Arab League Documentation
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System (ALDOC) for a transitional period of three years. ALDOC is 
involved with the training of staff for NADIS. When fully operational, 
NADIS will become an additional source of data on socio-economic 
factors in the area - ALDOC and UNESCO are already providing this 
service.
Another achievement of the MULPOC is in organizing the policy
organ meetings and as one of the officials pointed out, "the single
achievement of the MULPOC is that while no two or three North African
countries were on speaking terms, the MULPOC was able to get most of
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them together through its meetings and conferences". But this achieve­
ment is marred by the fact that in going through the reports of the 
policy organs, states such as Egypt, Libya, Morocco to mention but three, 
continually made reservations to resolutions and decisions taken. In 
reality, the states were unable to agree. The picture which emerged is 
one that indicates that the very political factors which the ECA had 
pulled out of its agenda were affecting the relations of the states.
Even the Executive Secretary of the ECA admitted that the MULPOC was 
encountering difficulties, when he expressed his regret that while all 
the other four ECA/MULPOCs established for West, Central, Eastern and 
Southern Africa have been well established, the Commission has since 
1978 "been trying to get the North African MULPOC to become operational,
but has not been successful due to the geo-political circumstances of 
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North Africa". Other subregions have economic co-operative ventures, 
but none exists in North Africa. So for consistency, the ECA maintains 
that one, that is, the PTA has to be established.
The PTA is wholly an ECA's idea for fostering economic co-operation 
in the area but the ECA is taking for granted and ignoring the political 
■relations of the state which we think will be a decisive factor for the
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actual processing of the PTA. Apart from politics, there are other 
obstacles to the PTA such as the competitiveness of the products of 
the countries, lack of institutions for co-operation, and the fact that 
North Africa has never functioned as an economic unit. It may sound 
very colourful and impressive to note that the ECA has established many 
institutions in Africa as a whole, but it is depressing to find that 
the majority of its institutions are not really operating. The makings 
of the PTA in North Africa follows the usual pattern and approach of the 
ECA in such matters and it is an approach which has failed in the past. 
The arrangements and tentative timetable of the PTA show that the ECA 
has not heeded the warning by its ad hoc committee set up in 1984 to 
review its institutions, that no more of these entities should be 
created unless there was a genuine need for them. To quote from the 
report, "The Ad hoc Committee recommends that no new institutions should 
be established until after a comprehensive study, which should take 
account of the opinions of existing institutions in the same field as 
to whether the objectives of the proposed institutions can be satisfact­
orily achieved by existing multinational and national institutions and 
they should be established only after a decisions has been reached that 
existing ones are unsuitable and then only after obtaining declarations
of intent from prospective member states of their determination to give
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such institutions their political, financial and other support".
With reference to the structure of the MULPOC, we found that it 
had no formal link with the Arab League and its specialized agencies 
and therefore it has not been able to avoid duplication and wastage in 
its programmes. For example, the establishment of NADIS is going ahead 
despite the fact that the Arab League and UNESCO are providing similar 
services already. Moreover, the MULPOC situated in Tangier is isolated 
from other international organizations in Morocco and this presents
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problems in the form of inadequate communication links and high costs 
of travel for delegates attending meetings and other activities.
We conclude that a combination of internal and external factors 
have led to the ineffectiveness of the MULPOC. The impact of the ECA 
is not felt in North Africa as most states look to the Arab League for 
socio-economic matters. In comparison with other MULPOCs, we found 
that the Tangier MULPOC was undeveloped and the most inactive of them 
all. Also, it implemented unrealistic programmes in the sense that its 
objectives and the programmes did not incorporate the lack of communic­
ation between the states at the ministerial level. The Commission 
underestimates the effect of political conflicts in the area. Rather 
than carry out studies, there is the need to concentrate on ideas and 
strategies to bring all parties to co-operate before turning to actual 
programmes. This is because the external factors combined with structural 
constraints to make this MULPOC to operate below expectations.
The overall conclusion is that the MULPOCs on the whole are operat­
ing sub-optimally. In the case of North Africa, it is even weaker 
because the ECA operates through ambassadors and senior officials, that 
is, the Council of Plenipotentiaries and not the real ministers respons­
ible for economic development and planning.
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION
The issues of what the ECA has done or what it should have done 
have dominated its existence. We are not much closer to finding the 
right answers in the 1980s. One does not expect it to perform its
functions to 100 per cent perfection, but at the same time the state
members want services which are of relevance to their economic conditions 
such as the uneven distribution of population and natural resources, 
inflationary effects, mass poverty and unemployment. These economic, 
geographical and social factors form the basis of their demands and 
expectations, which have been discussed in the various chapters. For 
example, the states want projects which gave value for money (see 
Chapter 2). They want the Commission to devise a development option 
and strategy which is truly African in scope and content. However, 
they have not come up with what that might be (see Chapter 3). On the
institution-building role treated in Chapter 4, the states do not want
the Commission to establish any more IGOs unless it is absolutely 
necessary. Chapters 5-9 deal with the ECA’s efforts to decentralize, 
but at the end of the period under study the headquarters was still in 
complete control of authority, programmes, finance and manpower resources. 
The states want effective decentralization.
The ECA has been involved in the promotional services, advisory 
and training of African experts in the field of demography and statistics. 
It also publishes annual reports and surveys on economic conditions.
In the long-run such activities and services do contribute to development, 
but it is difficult to quantify their effects or impact. Even though 
it continues to defend its programmes, the states are making more demands
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than ever before. The main reason is that the Commission is providing 
UN-type services which were not targetted to particular areas or states.
Nor were they designed to solve specific problems of an area. Moreover, 
its studies to a large extent treat general issues (see work programmes 
in Chapters 6-9) while at the same time ignoring immediate economic 
problems such as the balance of payments deficits, huge external debts 
and high servicing ratios. It also lacked comprehensive programmes to 
cater for natural disasters such as droughts, famine and flooding.
The reason for the defense of its programmes, on the one hand, and 
the attack by the states, on the other, stems from the interpretation 
given by both sides to the terms of reference. The latter are open to 
all sorts of interpretations. They give the impression that there are 
many things which the Commission is mandated to do. What are these 
things? The mandate stipulates that the ECA should carry out investi­
gations and studies of economic and technological problems and development; 
it should undertake the collection, evaluation and dissemination of such 
information to its member states; it should initiate and participate in 
the measures for economic reconstruction and development; and also perform 
advisory and training functions.^" It is not actually stated that the 
Commission should implement projects because of the absence of provisions 
for organs to formulate, implement, evaluate and monitor them. But it 
is implied that it can perform these functions. The problem then stems 
from the UN creating such bodies with loopholes in their mandates.
Secondly, socio-economic development is multi-dimensional; there are 
several sectors in an economy, such as trade, agriculture, human resources 
and the environment. So to say that the Commission is to aid socio­
economic development, without specifying the sectors or the aspects to 
"''be considered, results in a lack of focus and precision in its programmes. 
This problem is common to all the Regional Economic Commissions. Surely
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they cannot be involved in all aspects of socio-economic development.
The ECA has had to work out its functions since its inception.
It came up with six categories. Firstly, it sees itself as a forum 
for negotiations and decisions. But its ability to perform this func­
tion depends on what is to be discussed. There are several avenues 
available to the states. On the continental level, the OAU is the 
platform for endorsing political and economic decisions. The ECA now 
acts as the technical arm by providing data and expertise. Examples 
of this arrangement were in the events leading up to the endorsement 
of the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 and the UN-PAAERD in 1986 (see 
Chapter 3). On the international scene we have other instituions, for 
example, the IMF, GATT, UNCTAD and the World Bank. However, the ECA 
is the most effective forum for dealing with socio-economic matters, 
the Commission is thus one of several fora for negotiations and decisions.
Its second role deals with traditional secretariat activities, 
that is, research, data collection, analysis and dissemination, organ­
ization of conferences, expert meetings and workshops. Member states 
are very much aware of them. But although it is an important source
of data, the states want it to move on to the implementation of projects
3
which give value for money and reflect their development priorities.
The states want projects such as roads, hospitals, schools, dams and 
clean water. But with its constraints it has been difficult for the 
Commission to switch to or implement programmes. Its programmes are 
based on a sector-by-sector approach and it had chosen to concentrate 
on 11 of them. All its administration and resources are geared up to 
the provision of secretariat activities in the chosen areas. The states 
have been in favour of change since the 1970s but the ECA has not yet 
adjusted.
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Its third role is institution-building, with the aim of encourag­
ing economic co-operation. It started off by promoting continental 
co-operation in the 1960s but factors such as the issue of sovereignty, 
boundary problems, smallness of markets and uneven distribution of 
population and natural resources made it change to the support of sub­
regional co-operation. Another set of reasons for the change in emphasis 
had to do with the weakness of the ECA itself; lack of proper working 
relations and understanding between the secretariat and that of the OAU 
meant that not much was achieved. Moreover, the ECA was so deeply 
committed to the quest for economic integration and so involved in 
working out its economic rationale and possible institutional structures 
that it became somewhat intolerant of nationally-based regional initia­
tives, such as the EAC during the mid-1960s and the SADCC in the 1980s, 
which cross-cut the subregions defined by the ECA and deviate from the 
standard sequence of the preferential trade/common market theoretical 
model. Furthermore, its economic and technical emphases and leadership, 
meant that it had not given adquate attention to the need to involve 
states more fully in designing and participating in their own subregional 
groupings rather than accepting largely ECA-designed treaties and 
institutional structures which did not really provide for integral 
on-going national investment. These resulted in many members seeing 
the regional institutions and programmes as those of the ECA and not 
theirs.
The Commission describes its fourth role as the promoter of
economic and technical co-operation. However, it is difficult for one
4
to make a distinction between this and the third function. The 
ultimate goal for the two roles is the same, that is, the creation 
of an African Common Market by the year 2000. The means for achieving 
the goal has not really been worked out in detail at present.
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Fifthly, it describes itself as a regional ’think-tank’. It 
sees itself as the spring board for development ideas. To some extent 
it can claim limited success in the sense that it provided the basic 
documents which were used as the foundation of the Lagos Plan of Action 
and the programme for the United Nations Programme of Action for African 
Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD). African governments 
and the ECA's critics often point to the fact that in the 1950s the 
ECLA (now ECLAC) devised the dependency theory as a way of explaining 
the economic conditions of the Latin American states. It also offered 
them a strategy for development which empahsized delinking from the 
international economic system. These critics saw the dependency theory 
as a distinct and coherent ideology and wanted the ECA to emulate the 
ECLA. It is not an easy thing for an institution to develop a philosophy 
and strategy. Aside from the ECLA no other Regional Economic Commission 
has succeeded in doing so. We can only state that the ECA had made an 
intellectual contribution to the African development debate by offering 
guiding principles such as collective self-reliance and self sustaining 
growth. They offer a different path to development.
The sixth role had to do with operational activities. It defined 
these as the capabilities for project-oriented activities. The document 
does not really describe in detail what this m e a n s . T h e r e  is limited 
evidence of an attempt to implement projects in the field of transport 
and communications - PADIS (see Chapter 2). The programme involves the 
purchasing and installation of computers and other related equipment 
at the secretariat and the subregions. The programme was estimated to 
cost US$ 160 million. The main problems facing it include, lack of 
finance and the skilled manpower to man the units, plus the legal conditions 
x for operation in the subregions* F V  pit, ^  U^s.1
wv/V'JL v/^ V'
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What is perhaps striking is the fact that the Commission has 
been trying to perform all these roles at the same time. The obvious 
problem is that in the process of doing so it has not been able to 
perform any of them properly. Secondly, it does not possess the 
necessary capabilities to sustain all the roles. This brings us to 
the issue of constraints on the Commission.
The states in the subregions complained about the inefficiency 
of the secretariat in sending documents for meetings. They complained 
about the lack of information on its activities. It had little or no 
influence in West Africa, for instance. What are the reasons for this 
operational weakness? Some of the inhibitions are in its structures 
and organization. Its organizational changes were illustrated in 
Table 2.1, which showed that it has revised its structure to its 
present form of 11 divisions, 32' sections and 12 units, making's grand 
total of 55 apartments so to speak. It has an elaborated and modern 
bureaucracy with complex procedures. This makes the task of managing 
a large secretariat a difficult one.
There is the problem of finance. In the first instance, the 
financial crisis of the UN system has affected it in the sense that 
New York has instructed that the Commission should freeze its recruit­
ment and the rumour is that there are plans to make some employees 
redundant. Secondly, in real terms, its regular budget has increased 
by only 1.7 per cent annually. Thirdly, the contributions from the 
states and other international organizations have also been falling 
if we look at the figures of the UNCTAD Conferences in Table 2.3.
The states have not been paying as much as they have pledged in all 
instances. For example, in April 1981 members pledged a total of 
US$ 1,763,513 but the actual amount paid was US$ 497,711, leaving an 
outstanding balance of US$ 1,265,802.
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The pattern of expenditure also reveals some problems - a large 
part went on administrative costs (see Chapter 2). Spending on man­
power accounted for the largest share of its budget for two reasons:
(1) it had to allocate resources for the support staff for the various 
divisions, sections and units; (2) the bulk of its work consists of 
research. So the Commission has to pay the salaries in addition to 
the costs of hiring consultants, travel and the supply of equipment 
and stationery. These types of expenditure were at the expense of 
financing its activities and programmes.
Other difficulties arise from managing a large secretariat.
Because of the lack of an organizational ideology the divisions competed 
with each other. Their programmes were independently formulated and 
executed. And so we have a situation where the transport, communications 
and tourism division was running a programme for the UN Transport and 
Communications Decade inAfrica (UNCTACDA 1978-1988); the ECA/UNIDO 
industry division was concentrating on the United Nations Industrial 
Development Decade for Africa (IDDA 1980-1990); while the ECA/FAO 
agriculture division was running one for the Regional Food Plan for 
Africa (AFPLAN). These are all very grand programmes in terms of scope 
and objectives. Neither their strategies nor their dates are co-ordinated. 
In the case of the IDDA the aim is for Africa to achieve a target of 
2 per cent of world industrial production, while AFPLAN aims at self- 
sufficiency in food production by the end of the century. There was 
no mention of the relationship between AFPLAN and IDDA, nor a clear 
indication of the aspects of the former which may sustain the latter.
Since the programmes are not part of an integrated and comprehensive 
plan the impression has been created by the officals that each is equally 
^as important as the other and they all have different priorities, 
strategies and objectives.
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Apart from the size of the secretariat, the Commission also has 
a set of policy organs. At the continental level it has the Conference 
of Minister^. and its technical arm - the Technical Preparatory Committee 
of the Whole (TEPCOW). There is a counterpart of these at the subregional 
level, namely, the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Officials, * 
respectively. In addition, there are eight subsidiary organs for specific 
sectors - industry, trade, social affairs and human resources to mention 
but a few. Then there are three specialized subsidiary bodies - the 
joint conference of African planners, statisticians and demographers; 
the inter-governmental committee of experts for science and technology 
development; and the joint inter-govermental regional committee on human 
settlements and environment. The volume of work connected with the 
servicing of these meetings is enormous. Officials have to prepare the 
necessary documents for each and in some cases they have to be in 
attendance. The typing and processing of the papers and the writing 
of reports including translations are also very demanding.
The quality and composition of the staff is an important factor 
for the smooth and effective running of an organization. A balance 
between professionals and non-professionals will make staffing an asset 
while a lack of balance results in problems thereby making it a liability. 
In the case of- the Commission its total number of staff, that is, the 
professionals and non-professionals rose to 1000 by 1987, but the pro­
fessionals are 300. It has more non-professionals and this is unhealthy, 
because it needs more of the former to carry out the research. The small 
number of senior staff creates a managerial gap. In the past the 
Commission has tried to solve this problem by using consultants. This 
has given its personnel structure a patchwork effect as they temporarily 
"^increase the number, but once they have submitted their reports they 
disaapear from view, leaving the permanent staff to continue and conduct
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any follow-up work that may be required.
It had the problem of high staff turnover which was a consequence 
of the short-term nature of many of the posts. This created insecurity 
and disruption for personnel. It also made the posts unattractive to 
would-be applicants. Some of the professional staff have worked for a 
long period of time but they are not undergoing any form of training in 
the field of development studies, for instance. Training courses are 
arranged for the secretaries and for those hoping to brush up in the 
official languages - English and French in particular. Moreover, the 
officials do not write occasional papers so that some of their ideas 
can be challenged in debate. The only person who appears to be publishing 
extensively is the present Executive Secretary. A staff member spoke to 
me about administrative procedures not permitting them to publish papers. 
When I insisted on the details he was worried that I might tell the 
Executive Secretary because the latter was my country man. Despite my 
reassurances he refused to say anything. Others approached were not 
even willing to consider the issue.
The Commission tackled the issue of geographical distribution. It 
has attained 75 per cent Africanization of its staff. The member states 
are not willing to release their competent officials to work at the ECA. 
Although the Commission fixed desirable ranges for the posts in 1981, 
there is an element of over-representation. Many of its potential 
candidates come from 10 of the 50 states - Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire. It has tried to cope 
with the situation by employing Europeans, Americans and also consultants. 
So on the whole factors such as a patchworkcpersonnel structure, declining 
regular posts, high staff turnover, modest grade levels, slow recruitment 
and uneven geographical distribution have undermined its manpower resources 
and therefore its capability.
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The work programmes of the ECA are constantly criticized by the
£
states. For the subregional programmes they have asked for re­
definition to give precision. For example, the Gisenyi MULPOC has a 
programme with the initial title of ’Trade Promotion Among Member States’ 
which was approved in 1977 for the trade sector. It became more specific 
in terms of its coverage when it was included in the UNDP financed 
project as a sub-project on ’Multi-Sectoral Assistance to the CEPGL’.
It included aspects such as the statute of community enterprises, 
the establishment of a trade documentation centre and the harmonization 
of investment codes. Secondly, the Commission tries to go for grand 
programmes that it could not really implement. For example, in the 
transport and communication sector it aims at developing all the modes 
of transport as a means of expanding inter- and intra-regional links. 
Within the road transport sector it planned 236 studies for the period 
1984-87, but only 62 were completed. For rail transport it made plans 
for 84 but only 14 were completed. Out of 70 for ports, nine were 
completed. The low rate of implementation was quite common in all 
sectors. Also there were far too many sections in each of its 13 major 
programmes. Transport and communications alone had 10 sections, that 
is, seven for transport - roads, rail, maritime, ports, air, inland 
water and sulti-modal transports; and three for telecommunications - 
broadcasting, postal services and telecommunications. What is perhaps 
striking is the fact that it has not expressed any intentions of 
curtailing their numbers, which is a logical move given the lack of 
funds and the low rate of implementation.
Apart from their sheer numbers, the nature of the programmes was 
also criticized. They consisted of conferences, meetings, workshops 
and seminars; the dominant aspect being research. Most of the reports
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from these activities end up on shelves at the secretariat and the 
respective ministries depending on the topic. It is anybody's guess 
what happens once they get there. One cannot help thinking that such 
exercises may have been in vain. The Commission itself has no means 
of following up on the reports. It just assumes that the states will 
make good use of them. But how can this be when it was the ECA which 
decided in the first instance that the research will be of benefit to 
them? The programmes are also too general in nature. For example, 
the programmes for the integration of women in the process of develop­
ment. One does not know what this really means and the officials are 
unable to explain it. However, the Commission insisted that it was 
going to implement the programme through training, advisory services, 
seminars ans studies. We know that development is multi-dimensional 
yet there is no indication of the aspect(s) on which it intends to 
concentrate. The programme aimed at two targets: (a) the improvement
of the conditions of women; (b) to assist member states in the formu­
lation of policies and programmes designed to develop the capabilities 
of women as vital human resources for development. However laudible 
these objectives they have to be put in proper perspective. The 
Commission has failed to develop such context for its programmes and 
this is arguably one of its main problems.
The timing of programmes is essential as well. The findings 
concerning subregional programmes is such that it does not actually 
put them in a time framework. Most were actually approved in the 1977-78 
period, but they were actually implemented in the 1982-85 period. One 
reason for this was that the Commission had the practice of drawing up 
the programmes and getting them approved by the states before scouting 
--around for funds to implement them. Since its sources of extra-budgetary 
funding are never certain it has to wait for long periods, until such a
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time that funds are available. This also explains why some programmes 
get abandoned. For example, the ECA abandoned its programme for women 
in North Africa in 1986 due to lack of funds. It also terminated the 
same programme in all the other subregions, that is, the Central,
Eastern and Southern, and West Africa.
The Commission tended to concentrate on a single theme for its 
programmes, that is, the idea of using regional economic co-operation 
as a vehicle for development. Its major strategy has.been to establish 
institutions. The ECA has gone further than most other Regional Economic 
Commissions in terms of the numbers in existence. All of them have 
established development institutes as a direct consequence of their 
advisory services and technical training. The Latin American Institute 
for Economic Development and Planning was- established at Santiago, Chile, 
in 1962; the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning at 
Dakar, Senegal was established the following year. However, the ECA 
is the one with more institutions. The ESCAP has established about 
five of such - the Asian and Pacific Centtefor Transfer of Technology 
(APCTT), formerly known as- the Regional Centre for Technology Transfer; 
the Regional Co-ordination Centre for Research and Development of Coarse 
Grains, Pulses, Roots and Tuber Crops in the Humid Tropis of Asia and 
the Pacific (CGPRT), are among them. Both the ECLAC and the ECE have 
less than five each. The ECA has 32 at the moment and is going ahead 
with its plan to establish a PTA in North Africa in 1990.
Most of the institutions are not functioning effectively due to 
lack of members and non-payment of subcriptions. For example, the 
Regional Centre for Training in Aerial Surveys (RECTAS) has had only 
four members since it was established in 1972 - Benin, Ghana, Nigeria 
and Senegal, yet there are 16 countries in West Africa. The problem
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stems from the ECA hoisting such institutions on the states. The 
latter have to look for foreign exchange to pay their subscriptions 
and they will only do so if they feel that the institutions are of 
benefit to them. The other problem is that there are far too many of 
them in existence. This is in addition to the fact that there are 
national equivalents to the ECA scheme especially in the field of 
manpower training, minearl and natural resources. Moreover, other 
organizations such as the UNESCO, UNIDO and ILO offer similar services 
to the states on a free of charge basis. Then there is the problem of 
duplication of efforts, for example, the ECA established similar institu­
tions in Central and Southern Africa - the Port Management Association 
of West and Central Africa (PMAWCA) and the Port Management Association 
of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA). Couldn’t the interest of all 
the states be served in a single institution? Both are facing problems 
of non-payment of subscriptions and lack of members. Besides African 
states have asked for the co-ordination and rationalization of the 
activities of all the ECA-sponsored institutions as a way of tackling 
some of their problems. But the Commission has not yet considered 
their suggestions. Even though they have asked it not to establish any 
more institutions unless it was necessary, it was still of the opinion 
that Africa needed more.
The Commission had made two major attempts to decentralize. Its 
motives were to satisfy the states which criticized it for being too 
distant from their problems. It was also taking part in an exercise 
of restructuring of the UN system. Finally, it was looking for a way 
to get the states interested in its programmes and activities. But not 
all the Regional Economic Commissions went in for decentralization by 
^establishing subregional offices. For example, neither the ECE nor the 
ECWA have subregional offices. The ECLAC has six offices - in Mexico,
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Bogota (Colombia), Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Montevideo (Uraguay) and 
Washington, but the ESCAP has only one, namely, the ESCAP Pacific 
Operations Centre (EPOC) at Port Vila, Vanuatu.
The ECA has six offices known as the Multinational Programme and 
Operational Centres (MULPOCs). It went a step further in its second 
attempt by allowing them to have policy organs (there was an absence 
of these in its subregional offices of the 1960s). It also devised 
programmes for each MULPOC. These were the two main advances made.
Apart from them the MULPOCs are facing similar problems to those of 
the subregional offices, such as inadequate funding, the use of skeleton 
staff to man them, and ineffective programmes. Besides each office 
functioned without contact with the other. Nor were programmes co­
ordinated .
Chapters 5-9 dealt with the history of decentralization and each 
of the MULPOCs in detail. The main point made in Chapter 5 was the 
extent of the ECA’s failure in achieving its objectives as far as 
decentralization was concerned. As indicated earlier on the member states 
are not consulted before programmes are implemented and so they are not 
directly involved with the process of decision making. The participation 
of the states is therefore a passive one.
One of the reasons why the MULPOCs were established to replace the 
subregional offices was so that the former will have more autonomy and 
authority to operate. But headquarters was in control of all aspects 
of the MULPOCs, that is, financial and personnel, administrative matters 
and work programmes. In this sense the MULPOCs were not really different 
from the subregional offices. The only main difference between the two 
^is that the former had policy organs, that is, the Council of Ministers 
and the technical arm which is the Committee of Officials.
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Another reason for establishing the MULPOCs had to do with allowing 
the staff to be in the field so that the peculiar problems of each area 
can be identified and solutions sought. The finding of this research 
is that the ECA has not really achieved much by way of tackling the pro­
blems especially in North, West and Central Africa. In the case of West 
Africa, the major problems facing the states include drought, famine, 
desertification and the proliferation of inter-governmental institutions. 
The studies conducted by the ECA failed to address these problems. The 
member states expressed their dissatisfaction with ECA activities. In 
fact, the Niamey MULPOC was the first to question the relevance of the 
ECA. During the policy organ meetings in February 1986, the member 
states decided that on account of economic development throughout Africa 
in general and West Africa in particular, the mandate and role of the 
MULPOC be reviewed and its scope of activity redefined in order to 
address the individual and collective needs of the states.^ Apart from 
the programmes, the member states also complained about the organization 
of the meetings of the policy organs. Officials complained that the 
ECA does not send them the agendas for meetings and the drafts of 
programmes on time. So ministers arrive for meetings unprepared and
g
they also have shorter periods to go through a mass of documents.
They were also unhappy about the annual meetings of the policy organs. 
Such meetings left little time for implementation and evaluation of 
programmes. In 1987 the member states decided that from 1989 the policy 
organs will meet every two years. A decision which has been adopted 
by all the MULPOCs. So in terms of changes in policies, the Niamey 
MULPOC has been a forerunner. (More detail on the Niamey MULPOC is in 
Chapter 6.)
Chapter 7 dealt with the Lusaka MULPOC. This MULPOC was built 
on a long history of subregional activities. It was both a subregional
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office in the 1960s and an UNDAT in the early 1970s. It meant that, 
as in the cases of Niamey and Yaounde MULPOCs, Lusaka had inherited the 
work programmes of previous organs. The programmes implemented were 
less attractive when compared with those of the SADCC and PTA because 
the former laid more emphasis on long-term development through its 
studies, research, seminars and workshops. The countries were concerned 
about immediate issues such as dependence on South Africa; reconstruction 
and rehabilitation of their railway lines; and drought. In some instances 
the Lusaka MULPOC was implementing the wrong set of programmes. For 
example, the area has hydro-electric potential but there were no pro­
grammes designed to exploit this.
In comparative terms, the Lusaka MULPOC recorded success by imple­
menting valuable programmes such as purchasing of computers and software, 
locomotives and shunting machines. It also established a PTA for the 
member states.
Chapter 8 examined the activities of the ECA in Central Africa.
The Commission established two MULPOCs in the area, that is, the Yaounde 
and Gisenyi. Both faced structural and external problems. In the case 
of Yaounde, Equatorial Guinea was still recovering from the effects of 
a dictatorship and a battered economy. The political situation in Chad 
was also making it difficult for the MULPOC to function. The Director 
of the MULPOC has not been able to visit Chad as a result of that. With 
reference to the Gisenyi MULPOC, relations between Burundi and Zaire 
were not cordial. Moreover, the political instability in Burundi, Rwanda 
and Zaire makes for unstable relations in the MULPOC. Despite these 
problems, the Gisenyi MULPOC had a higher rate of implementation of work 
programmes. The rate was 54 per cent compared with 23.5 per cent for
s'
Yaounde. The reasons for the relative effectiveness of the former
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include the fact that there are only three states which are prepared 
to work together and also specialized agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF,
WTO and the IBRD were more sympathetic to Burundi and Rwanda which are 
LDCs and willing to provide funds for the programmes. The Gisenyi 
MULPOC recorded limited success with its women’s programme. Its Gitega 
scheme in Burundi for the training of women as farmers in basic skills 
and techniques was a real contribution to development. But the scheme 
was termimated in 1987 when the UNDP withdrew funds following the 
setting up of its women’s programme. The second reason had to do with 
the fact that an evaluation exercise of ECA programmes by the UNDP 
revealed that the Commission was using funds contributed by the latter 
for administrative costs instead of implementation of programmes (see 
Chapter 5).
The MULPOC in Tangier has not benefitted from its long history 
and experience as a subregional office in the 1960s. It is undeveloped 
in the sense that it has no fully-fledged policy organ. The MULPOC 
operates through a Council of Plenipotentiaries which is composed of 
ambassadors, envoys and senior officials. All other MULPOCs have 
Councils of Ministers, made up of ministers of economic development 
and planning of each member state.
External factors such as the Western Sahara dispute and the effects 
of the Camp David Accord (1979) have disrupted the operations of this 
MULPOC. There is no formal communication between the states at the 
ministerial level. Therefore, the ECA’s plan to establish a PTA in 
North Africa faces obstacles such as no communication links and the 
absence of institutional structures for co-operative ventures.
^ The overall conclusion is that all the MULPOCs are operating sub­
op timally, but the ECA was most ineffective in North Africa. All the
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MULPOCs faced internal constraints such as lack of funds and manpower 
resources. There is no clear division of labour between what head­
quarters and the MULPOCs should do. To an extent the ECA failed to 
achieve its objectives for establishing the MULPOCs because the head­
quarters was in control of all matters relating to finance, personnel, 
work programmes and administration. The MULPOCs have no authority nor 
autonomy. In this respect they were not really different from the 
subregional offices (see Chapter 5).
With the examples and illustrations given above and in the previous 
chapters the findings of the research are as follows:
(1) that the lack of financial and manpower resources was a serious 
threat to the functioning of the Commission;
(2) the inadequacies in its organization, structures, policies and 
strategies were responsible for its ineffective and lack of parti­
cipation of the states in its activities;
(3) it did not have organs for the co-ordination, execution and 
monitoring of real projects;
(4) the programmes took no account of the development priorities of 
the states; and
(5) the constraints at the headquarters were present at the subregional 
level. The constraints affected the capability of the Commission 
to the extent that it was of marginal concern to the states. 
Therefore, it was neither a vital agent nor a motivator in develop­
ment .
The failure of the Commission is attributed to two main factors: 
first, we blame it as far as it made certain choices; and secondly, its
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failure in the main stems from the fact that it is an arm of the UN 
system.. Each line of argument is considered in turn. All the Regional 
Economic Commissions receive instructions and guidelines from the 
Secretary-General for their programmes, but they can choose areas and 
emphasis. In the case of the ECA the leadership and management chose 
to concentrate on 13 major areas. Even with its limited resources it 
is still continuing with all of them. The ECE, for example, has 11 
major programmes but they chose to concentrate on different themes which 
reflected the economic situations of the members for each decade. For 
the 1947-57 decade it dealt with setting up of its operational and 
subsidiary organs. For 1977-87 the theme was economic co-operation 
within the subregional groupings in Europe. Moreover, it did not opt 
for the establishment of subregional offices.
The question of choices also affects and determines the size of 
administration. While the ECLAC opted for a small secretariat in the 
1950s, the trend in the 1970s and 1980s is for larger ones. For example, 
the ECA has 11 divisions, 32 sections and 12 units. The ECLAC operates 
through eight divisions and eight units, while the ECE has nine divisions, 
six units and 16 subsidiary organs.
But in as much as choices have to be made, we cannot overlook 
their status as arms of the UN system. The greater part of their handi- 
cp^s originate from it. They were all established to promote concerted 
action for the economic and social development with a view to raising 
the level of economic activity, but in practical terms it has been 
difficult to implement the idea. It is not at all clear from their 
documents what that really means. Moreover, they are all research- 
oriented institutions. They all have the same basic programme structure, 
similar patterns of budgetary growth and budge size, except for the ECWA 
which is the youngest and smallest (see Table 2.2). Their purposes are
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are not very clear-cut. A UN Office of Public Information pamphlet - 
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Doc. 
OPI/235-66-22616 - stated that a Commission "can be used as extensively 
as its member countries desire". When speaking to delegates attending 
the 45th Ordinary Session of the OAU in February 1987, they all seemed 
to have different views about the ECA. Some did not know what it was 
meant for. A member of the Liberian Delegation who refused to tell me 
his name admitted that he had never heard of the ECA before arriving 
at Addis Ababa. He even thought that the Africa Hall was the conference 
complex of the OAU, whereas it belongs to the Commission. The Regional 
Economic Commissions provide services which other UN Specialized Agencies 
were dealing with. The bureaus of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs and others such as the UNDP, UNIDO and UNCTAD are all organized 
along sectoral lines.
The complexity of African economic crisis is such that a sector- 
by-sector approach does not reflect the peculiar needs for development 
in each subregion; for instance, in West Africa one of the major problems 
facing the states is the multiplicity of IGOs. It is a problem not 
present in other regions and the way the ECA programmes are structured 
at present does not take into account the ways and means of controlling 
and co-ordinating the activities of the IGOs.
The development priorities of each, region have to be taken into 
account if realistic programmes are to be formulated and implemented.
The ECA has emerged with certain procedures that are ineffective. For 
instance, it does not have prior consultation with member states in 
each region before drawing up its programmes. The officials do so and 
also prepare the agenda and other documents in a semi-finished state 
and then the states carry out discussions. In effect, the states
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discuss ECA programmes for each subregion and not programmes that the 
states have chosen. It therefore formulates and implements programmes 
on the basis that they are good for the areas and not necessarily what 
the states wanted.
One does not expect the Commission to solve every development 
problem. However, the states expect it to play a positive role by 
devising projects which are easy to assess in terms of costs and benefits. 
Problems given top priority by the states include the scarcity of 
foreign exchange, lack of technology and technical know-how, insufficient 
supply of capital and inability to provide basic amenities. Most of 
the studies conducted by the ECA ignore these.
The member states prefer projects such as the building of roads, 
dams, hospitals and schools. Such projects are tangible with benefits to 
communities which can be assessed. It is also easy for states to identify 
with such projects. But the ECA has yet to respond to such demands.
The ECA is therefore an unlikely forum for the initiation of 
measures to combat underdevelopment in Africa. As an arm of the UN it 
cannot be easily sensitive to African problems. For these and other 
reasons, the conclusion is that the ECA cannot play a meaningful role 
in development.
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NOTES
1. Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure of the ECA, Doc. E/CN.14/ 
111/Rev.8/Corr.1, ECA, Addis Ababa, pp. 1-2. These were amended
by resolution 947D.1(XXXVI) of 5 July 1968, and resolution 1979/68 
of 4 August 1978; including the amendments and additions adopted 
by the ECOSOC and the Commission up to 24 July 1981.
2 . ECA and Africa’s Development 1983-2008: A Preliminary Perspective 
Study, Addis Ababa, April 1983, p. 100.
3. Annual Review of Programmes and Projects by the Executive Secretary 
with Programme Managers, PPCO, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1985, p. 1.
4. Op. cit., p. 100.
5. Ibid.
6. Excerpt of an address by P.S. Mmusi, Vice-President of Botswana,
at the Silver Jubilee Anniversary of the ECA, 27 April 1983. See
also, Economic Commission for Africa 1958-1983, ECA, Addis Ababa,
April 1985, p. 97. Also details of criticisms are in Chapter 2 
in the subheading for 'Work Programmes'.
7. Report of the Ad hoc Committee set to review the mandate of the
MULPOC for West Africa and to redefine its scope of activity, Doc.
ECA/MULPOC/NIA/87/X/25/Rev.1, ECA, Addis Ababa, February 1987,
p. 20.
8. Report of the Second Meeting of the Committee of Officials of the
MULPOC for West Africa, Doc. E/CN.14/TECO/INFO/18, 15 March 1979, 
ECA, Addis Ababa, p. 13.
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APPENDIX 1
External Debt: Sub-Saharan Africa, 1970-1985, US$ billion
1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Long-term debt 5,752.9 14,929.9 43,910.2 49,189.7 55,393.3 61,461.6 62,046.1 67,979.2
Use of IMF credit 106.4 648.1 1,966.8 3,428.5 3,997.3 5,088.6 5,258.7 6,008.3
Short-term debt n.a. n.a. 9,480.0 10,498.7 8,628.3 10,343.9 10,914.4 11,603.3
Total external debt - - 55,357.0 63,116.9 68,018.9 76,894.1 78,219.2 85,590.8
External debt as a 
% of GNP - - 29.8 35.7 39.7 46.2 49.1 55.1
n.a. = figures not available
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables: External Debt of Development Countries 1986-87 (Washington, DC, World Bank,
1987).
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Growth of GNP Per Person 1960-1990
Country Groups
GNP per person 
(1980 current $)
1960-70
Annual
1970-80
growth of GNP 
Low case 
1980-90
High case 
1980-90
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Low-income oil importers 260 1.7 -0.4 -1.0 0.1
Middle-income oil importers 520 1.7 0.4 0.0 0.3
Oil exporters 730 0.4 2.6 2.0 2.3
All developing countries 850 3.5 2.7 2.2 3.3
Low income 250 1.8 1.6 1.5 2.6
Middle income 1,580 3.9 2.8 2.2 3.4
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1981 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 
Table 1.1.
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APPENDIX 3
Status of Pledged Contributions as of 31 December 1982
General Fund Pledges Specific Fund Pledges
IjUUHLL y / ILlbLiLULIUUb
1978-79 1980-81 1982-83 Collections Unpaid3 1978-79 1980-81 1982-83 Collections Unpaid3
1. Algeria _ 500,000 . _ 500,000
2. Benin 40,000 - - 40,000 - - 5,000 - 5,000
3. Botswana - 10,000 12,000 15,124 6,876 - - 13,000 13,000 -
4. Burundi 20,000 - 10,000 20,000 10,000 - - 10,000 - 10,000
5. Central African 
Republic 12,000 12,000 . _
6. Cape Verde - 2,000 - 2,000 - - - - - -
7. Chad 20,000 - - - 20,000 - - - - -
8. Congo - - - - - - - 53,333 53,333 -
9. Ethiopia 73,280 - - 73,280 - - - 14,602 14,602 -
10. Egypt - 71,428 - 71,428 - - - - - -
11. Gabon - 70,000 40,000 - 110,000 - - - - -
12. Gambia 5,000 - - 5,000 - - - - - -
13. Ghana 50,000 - 64,877 114,877 - - - - - -
14. Guinea - 61,043 30,000 61,043 30,000 - - - - -
15. Guinea-Bissau - - - - 926 - - - - -
16. Kenya 59,259 60,000 70,000 56,515 132,744 - - - - -
17. Lesotho - 7,000 7,000 7,000 7,000 - - 1,000 - 1,000
18. Liberia 15,000 20,000 20,000 15,000 40,000 - - - - -
19. Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 100,000 200,000 300,000 200,000 200,000
20. Mali - 25,000 25,000 4,346 45,654 - - - - -
21. Mauritania 9,621 18,879 - 28,500 - - - - - -
22. Mauritius 10,000 20,000 - 30,000 - - - - - -
23. Morocco - 500,000 - 200,000 300,000 - - 500,000 - 500,000
24. Niger - 10,000 - '10,000 - - - - - -
. ../c o n t .
4
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\APPENDIX 3 (cont.)
Country/Institutions
General Fund Pledges Specific Fund Pledges
1978-79 1980-81 1982-83 Collections Unpaid3 1978-79 1980-81 1982-83 Collections Unpaid3
25. Nigeria _ 1,085,095 509,801 200,000 1,594,000 200,000
26. Rwanda 15,000 15,000 4,500 34,500 - - - 10,500 10,000 -
27. Senegal 150,000 50,000 - 151,390 48,610 - - - - -
28. Sierra Leone 40,000 20,000 30,000 39,089 40,911 - - - - -
29. Somalia - - - - - - - 30,000 30,000 -
30. Sudan 50,000 - - - 50,000 - - - - -
31. Swaziland - 1,776 - 1,776 - - - - - -
32. Togo - 20,000 - 20,000 - - - 10,000 10,000 -
33. Tunisia - 25,000 - 25,000 - - - - - -
34. Uganda 11,902 - - 11,902 - - - - - -
35. United Republic 
of Cameroon 40,000 40,000 80,000 40,000 40,000
36. United Republic 
of Tanzania _ _ . 500,000 250,000 50,000 500,000 300,000
37. Upper Volta - - - - - - - 1,775 1,775 -
38. Zaire 156,976 87,663 125,000 87,222 282,417 - - 125,000 - 125,000
39. Zambia - - - - - - - 40,000 - 40,000
40. Zimbabwe - - 20,000 20,000 - - - - - -
41. African Develop­
ment Bank - - - - - - 250,000 - 250,000 -
Total 878,038 1,334,789 459,303 1,524,992 1 ,147,138 2,085,097 1,009,801 1,304,210 3,218,106 1,181,000
Contribution in kind: 1.. Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) - $818,206 building and equipment for the Regional Remote Sensing Centre.
2. Zambia - $465,880 office rent and maintenance of the Eastern and Southern AFrican MULPOC (Lusaka).
See Appendix 4 for breakdown of unpaid balance by biennium.
Source: UNTFAD: Progress report on pledges and payments by member states and institutions, project implementation and expenditures
for the period 1981-82, E/ECA/CM.9/17, 15 March 1983, pp. 3-4.
|
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APPENDIX 4
Pledged Contributions Unpaid as of 31 December 1982 (in US$)
Countries
General fund Specific fund
1978-79 1980-81 1982-83 1980-81 1982-83 Total
1. Benin _ . 5,000 5,000
2. Botswana - - 6,876 - - 6,876
3. Burundi - - 10,000 - 10,000 20,000
4. Central African Republic 12,000 - - - - 12,000
5. Chad 20,000 - - - - 20,000
6. Gabon - 70,000 40,000 - - 110,000
7. Guinea - - 30,000 - - 30,000
8. Guinea-Bissau - - 926 - - 926
9. Kenya 2,744 60,000 70,000 - - 132,744
10. Lesotho - - 7,000 - 1,000 8,000
11. Liberia - 20,000 20,000 - - 40,000
12. Mali - 20,654 25,000 - - 45,654
13. Morocco - 300,000 - - 500,000 800,000
14. Nigeria - - - - 200,000 200,000
15. Senegal - 48,610 - - - 48,610
16. Sierra Leone 911 20,000 30,000 - - 50,911
17. Sudan 50,000 - - - - 50,000
18. United Republic of 
Tanzania 250,000 50,000 300,000
19. Zaire 69,754 87,663 125,000 - 125,000 407,417
20. Zambia - - - - 40,000 40,000
Total 155,409 626,927 364,802 250,000 931,000 2,328,138
4
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APPENDIX 5
Summary of Unpaid Pledged Contritubions
Biennium General fund Specific fund Total
1978-79 155,409 - 155,409
1980-81 625,927 250,000 876,927
1982-83 364,802 931,000 1,295,802
Total 1,147,138 1,181,000 2,328,138
Source: Op. cit., p. 5.
APPENDIX 6
Salary Scales for Professional and Higher Categories 
Showing Annual Gross and the Net Equivalent after Application of Staff Assessment
(US$, effective 1 January 1981)
Level
Steps
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII
Under-Secretary-General
USG Gross . . 96,765.00
Net D .. 55,076.65
Net S 50,011.58
Assistant Secretary-General
ASG Gross . . 85,864.00
Net D 50,524.52
Net S 46,042.46
Director
D-2 Gross . . 67,009.00 68,931.00 70,908.00 72,927.00
Net D . . 42,172.19 43,051.95 43,941.60 44,850.15
Net S 38,626.70 39,407.34 40,200.11 41,009.73
Principal Officer
D-l Gross . . 55,919.00 57,732.00 59,531.00 61,342.00 63,193.00 64,998.00 66.755.00
Net D 36,939.12 37,809.36 38,672.88 39,537.03 40,397.75 41,237.07 42,054.08
Net S 33,997.58 34,768.10 35,532.68 36,297.57 37,058.33 37,800.18 38,522.31
Senior Officer
P-5 Gross .. 48.661.00 50,086.00 51,495.00 52,856.00 54,218.00 55,605.00 57,005.00 58,405.00 59,818.00 61,231.00
Net D . . 33,318.33 34,041.00 34,745.50 35,426.00 36,107.00 36,788.40 37,460.40 38,132.40 38,810.64 39,485.42
N etS  .. 30,776.32 31,420.27 32,047.28 32,652.92 33,259.01 33,864.13 34,459.13 35,054.13 35,654.65 36,251.95
First Officer
P-4 Gross . . 38,167.00 39,398.00 40,630.00 41,862.00 43,101.00 44,367.00 45,627.00 46,887.00 48,211.00 49,547.00 50.884.00 52,173.00
Net D 27,611.52 28,300.88 28,990.80 29,680.72 30,371.53 31,042.51 31,710.31 32,378.11 33,079.83 33,771.50 34,440.00 35,084.50
Net S 25,671.67 26,288.40 26,905.63 27,522.87 28,140.88 28,740.96 29,338.20 29,935.44 30,563.02 31,180.42 31,775.38 32,348.99
Second Officer
P-3 Gross .. 30,518.00 31,589.00 32,648.00 33,713.00 34,814.00 35,939.00 37,055.00 38,157.00 39,202.00 40,237.00 41,282.00 42.315.00 43,375.00
Net D . . 23,103.98 23,757.29 24,403.28 25,031.54 25,670.12 26,322.62 26,969.90 27,605.92 28,191.12 28.770.72 29,355.92 29,934.40 30,516.75
Net S 21,600.46 22,192.72 22,778.35 23,345.90 23,921.73 24,510.10 25,093.77 25,666.66 26,190.21 26,708.74 27,232.29 27,749.82 28,270.75
Associate Officer
P-2 Gross .. 24,233.00 25,097.00 25,967.00 26,832.00 27,706.00 28,589.00 29,492.00 30,387.00 31,285.00 32,184.00 33,078.00
Net D 19,194.79 19,739.11 20,287.21 20,832.16 21,382.78 21,927.29 22,478.12 23,024.07 23,571.85 24,120.24 24,663.24
N etS  .. 18,026.91 18,527.17 19,030.90 19,531.73 20,037.78 20,533.72 21,033.08 21,528.02 22,024.61 22,521.76 23,013.80
Assistant Officer
P-l Gross . . 18,200.00 18,964.00 19,740.00 20,516.00 21,318.00 22,120.00 22,935.00 23,724 00 24,513.00 25,285.00
Net D 15,166.00 15,693.16 16,228.60 16,748.56 17,277.88 17,807.20 18.345.10 18,865.84 19,371.19 19,857.55
Net S 14,304.00 14,792.96 15,289.60 15,770.25 16,258.67 16,747.08 17,243.42 17,723.92 18,189.03 18,636.02
D = Rate applicable to staff members with a dependent spouse or child.
S = Rate applicable to staff members with no dependent spouse or child.
Source: Staff Regulations of the United Nations and Staff Rules 200.1 to 212.7
Applicable to Technical Assistance Project Personnel, Doc. ST/SGB/ 
Staff Rules/2/Rev.6., UN, New York, 1984, p. 87.
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